431 BC


                                 by Thucydides


                         translated by Richard Crawley





                         The First Book.


                           CHAPTER I.





       The State of Greece from the earliest Times to the


              Commencement of the Peloponnesian War





  THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the


Peloponnesians and the Athenians, beginning at the moment that it


broke out, and believing that it would be a great war and more


worthy of relation than any that had preceded it. This belief was


not without its grounds. The preparations of both the combatants


were in every department in the last state of perfection; and he could


see the rest of the Hellenic race taking sides in the quarrel; those


who delayed doing so at once having it in contemplation. Indeed this


was the greatest movement yet known in history, not only of the


Hellenes, but of a large part of the barbarian world- I had almost


said of mankind. For though the events of remote antiquity, and even


those that more immediately preceded the war, could not from lapse


of time be clearly ascertained, yet the evidences which an inquiry


carried as far back as was practicable leads me to trust, all point to


the conclusion that there was nothing on a great scale, either in


war or in other matters.


  For instance, it is evident that the country now called Hellas had


in ancient times no settled population; on the contrary, migrations


were of frequent occurrence, the several tribes readily abandoning


their homes under the pressure of superior numbers. Without


commerce, without freedom of communication either by land or sea,


cultivating no more of their territory than the exigencies of life


required, destitute of capital, never planting their land (for they


could not tell when an invader might not come and take it all away,


and when he did come they had no walls to stop him), thinking that the


necessities of daily sustenance could be supplied at one place as well


as another, they cared little for shifting their habitation, and


consequently neither built large cities nor attained to any other form


of greatness. The richest soils were always most subject to this


change of masters; such as the district now called Thessaly,


Boeotia, most of the Peloponnese, Arcadia excepted, and the most


fertile parts of the rest of Hellas. The goodness of the land favoured


the aggrandizement of particular individuals, and thus created faction


which proved a fertile source of ruin. It also invited invasion.


Accordingly Attica, from the poverty of its soil enjoying from a


very remote period freedom from faction, never changed its


inhabitants. And here is no inconsiderable exemplification of my


assertion that the migrations were the cause of there being no


correspondent growth in other parts. The most powerful victims of


war or faction from the rest of Hellas took refuge with the


Athenians as a safe retreat; and at an early period, becoming


naturalized, swelled the already large population of the city to


such a height that Attica became at last too small to hold them, and


they had to send out colonies to Ionia.


  There is also another circumstance that contributes not a little


to my conviction of the weakness of ancient times. Before the Trojan


war there is no indication of any common action in Hellas, nor


indeed of the universal prevalence of the name; on the contrary,


before the time of Hellen, son of Deucalion, no such appellation


existed, but the country went by the names of the different tribes, in


particular of the Pelasgian. It was not till Hellen and his sons


grew strong in Phthiotis, and were invited as allies into the other


cities, that one by one they gradually acquired from the connection


the name of Hellenes; though a long time elapsed before that name


could fasten itself upon all. The best proof of this is furnished by


Homer. Born long after the Trojan War, he nowhere calls all of them by


that name, nor indeed any of them except the followers of Achilles


from Phthiotis, who were the original Hellenes: in his poems they


are called Danaans, Argives, and Achaeans. He does not even use the


term barbarian, probably because the Hellenes had not yet been


marked off from the rest of the world by one distinctive


appellation. It appears therefore that the several Hellenic


communities, comprising not only those who first acquired the name,


city by city, as they came to understand each other, but also those


who assumed it afterwards as the name of the whole people, were before


the Trojan war prevented by their want of strength and the absence


of mutual intercourse from displaying any collective action.


  Indeed, they could not unite for this expedition till they had


gained increased familiarity with the sea. And the first person


known to us by tradition as having established a navy is Minos. He


made himself master of what is now called the Hellenic sea, and


ruled over the Cyclades, into most of which he sent the first


colonies, expelling the Carians and appointing his own sons governors;


and thus did his best to put down piracy in those waters, a


necessary step to secure the revenues for his own use.


  For in early times the Hellenes and the barbarians of the coast


and islands, as communication by sea became more common, were


tempted to turn pirates, under the conduct of their most powerful men;


the motives being to serve their own cupidity and to support the


needy. They would fall upon a town unprotected by walls, and


consisting of a mere collection of villages, and would plunder it;


indeed, this came to be the main source of their livelihood, no


disgrace being yet attached to such an achievement, but even some


glory. An illustration of this is furnished by the honour with which


some of the inhabitants of the continent still regard a successful


marauder, and by the question we find the old poets everywhere


representing the people as asking of voyagers- "Are they pirates?"-


as if those who are asked the question would have no idea of


disclaiming the imputation, or their interrogators of reproaching them


for it. The same rapine prevailed also by land.


  And even at the present day many of Hellas still follow the old


fashion, the Ozolian Locrians for instance, the Aetolians, the


Acarnanians, and that region of the continent; and the custom of


carrying arms is still kept up among these continentals, from the


old piratical habits. The whole of Hellas used once to carry arms,


their habitations being unprotected and their communication with


each other unsafe; indeed, to wear arms was as much a part of everyday


life with them as with the barbarians. And the fact that the people in


these parts of Hellas are still living in the old way points to a time


when the same mode of life was once equally common to all. The


Athenians were the first to lay aside their weapons, and to adopt an


easier and more luxurious mode of life; indeed, it is only lately that


their rich old men left off the luxury of wearing undergarments of


linen, and fastening a knot of their hair with a tie of golden


grasshoppers, a fashion which spread to their Ionian kindred and


long prevailed among the old men there. On the contrary, a modest


style of dressing, more in conformity with modern ideas, was first


adopted by the Lacedaemonians, the rich doing their best to assimilate


their way of life to that of the common people. They also set the


example of contending naked, publicly stripping and anointing


themselves with oil in their gymnastic exercises. Formerly, even in


the Olympic contests, the athletes who contended wore belts across


their middles; and it is but a few years since that the practice


ceased. To this day among some of the barbarians, especially in


Asia, when prizes for boxing and wrestling are offered, belts are worn


by the combatants. And there are many other points in which a likeness


might be shown between the life of the Hellenic world of old and the


barbarian of to-day.


  With respect to their towns, later on, at an era of increased


facilities of navigation and a greater supply of capital, we find


the shores becoming the site of walled towns, and the isthmuses


being occupied for the purposes of commerce and defence against a


neighbour. But the old towns, on account of the great prevalence of


piracy, were built away from the sea, whether on the islands or the


continent, and still remain in their old sites. For the pirates used


to plunder one another, and indeed all coast populations, whether


seafaring or not.


  The islanders, too, were great pirates. These islanders were Carians


and Phoenicians, by whom most of the islands were colonized, as was


proved by the following fact. During the purification of Delos by


Athens in this war all the graves in the island were taken up, and


it was found that above half their inmates were Carians: they were


identified by the fashion of the arms buried with them, and by the


method of interment, which was the same as the Carians still follow.


But as soon as Minos had formed his navy, communication by sea


became easier, as he colonized most of the islands, and thus


expelled the malefactors. The coast population now began to apply


themselves more closely to the acquisition of wealth, and their life


became more settled; some even began to build themselves walls on


the strength of their newly acquired riches. For the love of gain


would reconcile the weaker to the dominion of the stronger, and the


possession of capital enabled the more powerful to reduce the


smaller towns to subjection. And it was at a somewhat later stage of


this development that they went on the expedition against Troy.


  What enabled Agamemnon to raise the armament was more, in my


opinion, his superiority in strength, than the oaths of Tyndareus,


which bound the suitors to follow him. Indeed, the account given by


those Peloponnesians who have been the recipients of the most credible


tradition is this. First of all Pelops, arriving among a needy


population from Asia with vast wealth, acquired such power that,


stranger though he was, the country was called after him; and this


power fortune saw fit materially to increase in the hands of his


descendants. Eurystheus had been killed in Attica by the Heraclids.


Atreus was his mother's brother; and to the hands of his relation, who


had left his father on account of the death of Chrysippus, Eurystheus,


when he set out on his expedition, had committed Mycenae and the


government. As time went on and Eurystheus did not return, Atreus


complied with the wishes of the Mycenaeans, who were influenced by


fear of the Heraclids- besides, his power seemed considerable, and he


had not neglected to court the favour of the populace- and assumed


the sceptre of Mycenae and the rest of the dominions of Eurystheus.


And so the power of the descendants of Pelops came to be greater


than that of the descendants of Perseus. To all this Agamemnon


succeeded. He had also a navy far stronger than his contemporaries, so


that, in my opinion, fear was quite as strong an element as love in


the formation of the confederate expedition. The strength of his


navy is shown by the fact that his own was the largest contingent, and


that of the Arcadians was furnished by him; this at least is what


Homer says, if his testimony is deemed sufficient. Besides, in his


account of the transmission of the sceptre, he calls him





     Of many an isle, and of all Argos king.





Now Agamemnon's was a continental power; and he could not have been


master of any except the adjacent islands (and these would not be


many), but through the possession of a fleet.


  And from this expedition we may infer the character of earlier


enterprises. Now Mycenae may have been a small place, and many of


the towns of that age may appear comparatively insignificant, but no


exact observer would therefore feel justified in rejecting the


estimate given by the poets and by tradition of the magnitude of the


armament. For I suppose if Lacedaemon were to become desolate, and the


temples and the foundations of the public buildings were left, that as


time went on there would be a strong disposition with posterity to


refuse to accept her fame as a true exponent of her power. And yet


they occupy two-fifths of Peloponnese and lead the whole, not to speak


of their numerous allies without. Still, as the city is neither


built in a compact form nor adorned with magnificent temples and


public edifices, but composed of villages after the old fashion of


Hellas, there would be an impression of inadequacy. Whereas, if Athens


were to suffer the same misfortune, I suppose that any inference


from the appearance presented to the eye would make her power to


have been twice as great as it is. We have therefore no right to be


sceptical, nor to content ourselves with an inspection of a town to


the exclusion of a consideration of its power; but we may safely


conclude that the armament in question surpassed all before it, as


it fell short of modern efforts; if we can here also accept the


testimony of Homer's poems, in which, without allowing for the


exaggeration which a poet would feel himself licensed to employ, we


can see that it was far from equalling ours. He has represented it


as consisting of twelve hundred vessels; the Boeotian complement of


each ship being a hundred and twenty men, that of the ships of


Philoctetes fifty. By this, I conceive, he meant to convey the maximum


and the minimum complement: at any rate, he does not specify the


amount of any others in his catalogue of the ships. That they were all


rowers as well as warriors we see from his account of the ships of


Philoctetes, in which all the men at the oar are bowmen. Now it is


improbable that many supernumeraries sailed, if we except the kings


and high officers; especially as they had to cross the open sea with


munitions of war, in ships, moreover, that had no decks, but were


equipped in the old piratical fashion. So that if we strike the


average of the largest and smallest ships, the number of those who


sailed will appear inconsiderable, representing, as they did, the


whole force of Hellas. And this was due not so much to scarcity of men


as of money. Difficulty of subsistence made the invaders reduce the


numbers of the army to a point at which it might live on the country


during the prosecution of the war. Even after the victory they


obtained on their arrival- and a victory there must have been, or the


fortifications of the naval camp could never have been built- there


is no indication of their whole force having been employed; on the


contrary, they seem to have turned to cultivation of the Chersonese


and to piracy from want of supplies. This was what really enabled


the Trojans to keep the field for ten years against them; the


dispersion of the enemy making them always a match for the


detachment left behind. If they had brought plenty of supplies with


them, and had persevered in the war without scattering for piracy


and agriculture, they would have easily defeated the Trojans in the


field, since they could hold their own against them with the


division on service. In short, if they had stuck to the siege, the


capture of Troy would have cost them less time and less trouble. But


as want of money proved the weakness of earlier expeditions, so from


the same cause even the one in question, more famous than its


predecessors, may be pronounced on the evidence of what it effected to


have been inferior to its renown and to the current opinion about it


formed under the tuition of the poets.


  Even after the Trojan War, Hellas was still engaged in removing


and settling, and thus could not attain to the quiet which must


precede growth. The late return of the Hellenes from Ilium caused many


revolutions, and factions ensued almost everywhere; and it was the


citizens thus driven into exile who founded the cities. Sixty years


after the capture of Ilium, the modern Boeotians were driven out of


Arne by the Thessalians, and settled in the present Boeotia, the


former Cadmeis; though there was a division of them there before, some


of whom joined the expedition to Ilium. Twenty years later, the


Dorians and the Heraclids became masters of Peloponnese; so that


much had to be done and many years had to elapse before Hellas could


attain to a durable tranquillity undisturbed by removals, and could


begin to send out colonies, as Athens did to Ionia and most of the


islands, and the Peloponnesians to most of Italy and Sicily and some


places in the rest of Hellas. All these places were founded


subsequently to the war with Troy.


  But as the power of Hellas grew, and the acquisition of wealth


became more an object, the revenues of the states increasing,


tyrannies were by their means established almost everywhere- the old


form of government being hereditary monarchy with definite


prerogatives- and Hellas began to fit out fleets and apply herself


more closely to the sea. It is said that the Corinthians were the


first to approach the modern style of naval architecture, and that


Corinth was the first place in Hellas where galleys were built; and


we have Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipwright, making four ships for


the Samians. Dating from the end of this war, it is nearly three


hundred years ago that Ameinocles went to Samos. Again, the earliest


sea-fight in history was between the Corinthians and Corcyraeans; this


was about two hundred and sixty years ago, dating from the same time.


Planted on an isthmus, Corinth had from time out of mind been a


commercial emporium; as formerly almost all communication between the


Hellenes within and without Peloponnese was carried on overland, and


the Corinthian territory was the highway through which it travelled.


She had consequently great money resources, as is shown by the epithet


"wealthy" bestowed by the old poets on the place, and this enabled


her, when traffic by sea became more common, to procure her navy and


put down piracy; and as she could offer a mart for both branches of


the trade, she acquired for herself all the power which a large


revenue affords. Subsequently the Ionians attained to great naval


strength in the reign of Cyrus, the first king of the Persians, and of


his son Cambyses, and while they were at war with the former commanded


for a while the Ionian sea. Polycrates also, the tyrant of Samos,


had a powerful navy in the reign of Cambyses, with which he reduced


many of the islands, and among them Rhenea, which he consecrated to


the Delian Apollo. About this time also the Phocaeans, while they were


founding Marseilles, defeated the Carthaginians in a sea-fight.


These were the most powerful navies. And even these, although so


many generations had elapsed since the Trojan war, seem to have been


principally composed of the old fifty-oars and long-boats, and to have


counted few galleys among their ranks. Indeed it was only shortly


the Persian war, and the death of Darius the successor of Cambyses,


that the Sicilian tyrants and the Corcyraeans acquired any large


number of galleys. For after these there were no navies of any account


in Hellas till the expedition of Xerxes; Aegina, Athens, and others


may have possessed a few vessels, but they were principally


fifty-oars. It was quite at the end of this period that the war with


Aegina and the prospect of the barbarian invasion enabled Themistocles


to persuade the Athenians to build the fleet with which they fought at


Salamis; and even these vessels had not complete decks.


  The navies, then, of the Hellenes during the period we have


traversed were what I have described. All their insignificance did not


prevent their being an element of the greatest power to those who


cultivated them, alike in revenue and in dominion. They were the means


by which the islands were reached and reduced, those of the smallest


area falling the easiest prey. Wars by land there were none, none at


least by which power was acquired; we have the usual border


contests, but of distant expeditions with conquest for object we


hear nothing among the Hellenes. There was no union of subject


cities round a great state, no spontaneous combination of equals for


confederate expeditions; what fighting there was consisted merely of


local warfare between rival neighbours. The nearest approach to a


coalition took place in the old war between Chalcis and Eretria;


this was a quarrel in which the rest of the Hellenic name did to


some extent take sides.


  Various, too, were the obstacles which the national growth


encountered in various localities. The power of the Ionians was


advancing with rapid strides, when it came into collision with Persia,


under King Cyrus, who, after having dethroned Croesus and overrun


everything between the Halys and the sea, stopped not till he had


reduced the cities of the coast; the islands being only left to be


subdued by Darius and the Phoenician navy.


  Again, wherever there were tyrants, their habit of providing


simply for themselves, of looking solely to their personal comfort and


family aggrandizement, made safety the great aim of their policy,


and prevented anything great proceeding from them; though they would


each have their affairs with their immediate neighbours. All this is


only true of the mother country, for in Sicily they attained to very


great power. Thus for a long time everywhere in Hellas do we find


causes which make the states alike incapable of combination for


great and national ends, or of any vigorous action of their own.


  But at last a time came when the tyrants of Athens and the far older


tyrannies of the rest of Hellas were, with the exception of those in


Sicily, once and for all put down by Lacedaemon; for this city, though


after the settlement of the Dorians, its present inhabitants, it


suffered from factions for an unparalleled length of time, still at


a very early period obtained good laws, and enjoyed a freedom from


tyrants which was unbroken; it has possessed the same form of


government for more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of


the late war, and has thus been in a position to arrange the affairs


of the other states. Not many years after the deposition of the


tyrants, the battle of Marathon was fought between the Medes and the


Athenians. Ten years afterwards, the barbarian returned with the


armada for the subjugation of Hellas. In the face of this great


danger, the command of the confederate Hellenes was assumed by the


Lacedaemonians in virtue of their superior power; and the Athenians,


having made up their minds to abandon their city, broke up their


homes, threw themselves into their ships, and became a naval people.


This coalition, after repulsing the barbarian, soon afterwards split


into two sections, which included the Hellenes who had revolted from


the King, as well as those who had aided him in the war. At the end of


the one stood Athens, at the head of the other Lacedaemon, one the


first naval, the other the first military power in Hellas. For a short


time the league held together, till the Lacedaemonians and Athenians


quarrelled and made war upon each other with their allies, a duel into


which all the Hellenes sooner or later were drawn, though some might


at first remain neutral. So that the whole period from the Median


war to this, with some peaceful intervals, was spent by each power


in war, either with its rival, or with its own revolted allies, and


consequently afforded them constant practice in military matters,


and that experience which is learnt in the school of danger.


  The policy of Lacedaemon was not to exact tribute from her allies,


but merely to secure their subservience to her interests by


establishing oligarchies among them; Athens, on the contrary, had by


degrees deprived hers of their ships, and imposed instead


contributions in money on all except Chios and Lesbos. Both found


their resources for this war separately to exceed the sum of their


strength when the alliance flourished intact.


  Having now given the result of my inquiries into early times, I


grant that there will be a difficulty in believing every particular


detail. The way that most men deal with traditions, even traditions of


their own country, is to receive them all alike as they are delivered,


without applying any critical test whatever. The general Athenian


public fancy that Hipparchus was tyrant when he fell by the hands of


Harmodius and Aristogiton, not knowing that Hippias, the eldest of the


sons of Pisistratus, was really supreme, and that Hipparchus and


Thessalus were his brothers; and that Harmodius and Aristogiton


suspecting, on the very day, nay at the very moment fixed on for the


deed, that information had been conveyed to Hippias by their


accomplices, concluded that he had been warned, and did not attack


him, yet, not liking to be apprehended and risk their lives for


nothing, fell upon Hipparchus near the temple of the daughters of


Leos, and slew him as he was arranging the Panathenaic procession.


  There are many other unfounded ideas current among the rest of the


Hellenes, even on matters of contemporary history, which have not been


obscured by time. For instance, there is the notion that the


Lacedaemonian kings have two votes each, the fact being that they have


only one; and that there is a company of Pitane, there being simply no


such thing. So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of


truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand. On the


whole, however, the conclusions I have drawn from the proofs quoted


may, I believe, safely be relied on. Assuredly they will not be


disturbed either by the lays of a poet displaying the exaggeration


of his craft, or by the compositions of the chroniclers that are


attractive at truth's expense; the subjects they treat of being out of


the reach of evidence, and time having robbed most of them of


historical value by enthroning them in the region of legend. Turning


from these, we can rest satisfied with having proceeded upon the


clearest data, and having arrived at conclusions as exact as can be


expected in matters of such antiquity. To come to this war: despite


the known disposition of the actors in a struggle to overrate its


importance, and when it is over to return to their admiration of


earlier events, yet an examination of the facts will show that it


was much greater than the wars which preceded it.


  With reference to the speeches in this history, some were


delivered before the war began, others while it was going on; some I


heard myself, others I got from various quarters; it was in all


cases difficult to carry them word for word in one's memory, so my


habit has been to make the speakers say what was in my opinion


demanded of them by the various occasions, of course adhering as


closely as possible to the general sense of what they really said. And


with reference to the narrative of events, far from permitting


myself to derive it from the first source that came to hand, I did not


even trust my own impressions, but it rests partly on what I saw


myself, partly on what others saw for me, the accuracy of the report


being always tried by the most severe and detailed tests possible.


My conclusions have cost me some labour from the want of coincidence


between accounts of the same occurrences by different eye-witnesses,


arising sometimes from imperfect memory, sometimes from undue


partiality for one side or the other. The absence of romance in my


history will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be


judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of


the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the


course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it, I


shall be content. In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay


which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for


all time.


  The Median War, the greatest achievement of past times, yet found


a speedy decision in two actions by sea and two by land. The


Peloponnesian War was prolonged to an immense length, and, long as


it was, it was short without parallel for the misfortunes that it


brought upon Hellas. Never had so many cities been taken and laid


desolate, here by the barbarians, here by the parties contending


(the old inhabitants being sometimes removed to make room for others);


never was there so much banishing and blood-shedding, now on the field


of battle, now in the strife of faction. Old stories of occurrences


handed down by tradition, but scantily confirmed by experience,


suddenly ceased to be incredible; there were earthquakes of


unparalleled extent and violence; eclipses of the sun occurred with


a frequency unrecorded in previous history; there were great


droughts in sundry places and consequent famines, and that most


calamitous and awfully fatal visitation, the plague. All this came


upon them with the late war, which was begun by the Athenians and


Peloponnesians by the dissolution of the thirty years' truce made


after the conquest of Euboea. To the question why they broke the


treaty, I answer by placing first an account of their grounds of


complaint and points of difference, that no one may ever have to ask


the immediate cause which plunged the Hellenes into a war of such


magnitude. The real cause I consider to be the one which was


formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens,


and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war


inevitable. Still it is well to give the grounds alleged by either


side which led to the dissolution of the treaty and the breaking out


of the war.


                           CHAPTER II.





          Causes of the War - The Affair of Epidamnus -


                     The Affair of Potidaea





  THE city of Epidamnus stands on the right of the entrance of the


Ionic Gulf. Its vicinity is inhabited by the Taulantians, an


Illyrian people. The place is a colony from Corcyra, founded by


Phalius, son of Eratocleides, of the family of the Heraclids, who


had according to ancient usage been summoned for the purpose from


Corinth, the mother country. The colonists were joined by some


Corinthians, and others of the Dorian race. Now, as time went on,


the city of Epidamnus became great and populous; but falling a prey to


factions arising, it is said, from a war with her neighbours the


barbarians, she became much enfeebled, and lost a considerable


amount of her power. The last act before the war was the expulsion


of the nobles by the people. The exiled party joined the barbarians,


and proceeded to plunder those in the city by sea and land; and the


Epidamnians, finding themselves hard pressed, sent ambassadors to


Corcyra beseeching their mother country not to allow them to perish,


but to make up matters between them and the exiles, and to rid them of


the war with the barbarians. The ambassadors seated themselves in


the temple of Hera as suppliants, and made the above requests to the


Corcyraeans. But the Corcyraeans refused to accept their supplication,


and they were dismissed without having effected anything.


  When the Epidamnians found that no help could be expected from


Corcyra, they were in a strait what to do next. So they sent to Delphi


and inquired of the God whether they should deliver their city to


the Corinthians and endeavour to obtain some assistance from their


founders. The answer he gave them was to deliver the city and place


themselves under Corinthian protection. So the Epidamnians went to


Corinth and delivered over the colony in obedience to the commands


of the oracle. They showed that their founder came from Corinth, and


revealed the answer of the god; and they begged them not to allow them


to perish, but to assist them. This the Corinthians consented to do.


Believing the colony to belong as much to themselves as to the


Corcyraeans, they felt it to be a kind of duty to undertake their


protection. Besides, they hated the Corcyraeans for their contempt


of the mother country. Instead of meeting with the usual honours


accorded to the parent city by every other colony at public


assemblies, such as precedence at sacrifices, Corinth found herself


treated with contempt by a power which in point of wealth could


stand comparison with any even of the richest communities in Hellas,


which possessed great military strength, and which sometimes could not


repress a pride in the high naval position of an, island whose


nautical renown dated from the days of its old inhabitants, the


Phaeacians. This was one reason of the care that they lavished on


their fleet, which became very efficient; indeed they began the war


with a force of a hundred and twenty galleys.


  All these grievances made Corinth eager to send the promised aid


to Epidamnus. Advertisement was made for volunteer settlers, and a


force of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Corinthians was dispatched.


They marched by land to Apollonia, a Corinthian colony, the route by


sea being avoided from fear of Corcyraean interruption. When the


Corcyraeans heard of the arrival of the settlers and troops in


Epidamnus, and the surrender of the colony to Corinth, they took fire.


Instantly putting to sea with five-and-twenty ships, which were


quickly followed by others, they insolently commanded the


Epidamnians to receive back the banished nobles- (it must be premised


that the Epidamnian exiles had come to Corcyra and, pointing to the


sepulchres of their ancestors, had appealed to their kindred to


restore them)- and to dismiss the Corinthian garrison and settlers.


But to all this the Epidamnians turned a deaf ear. Upon this the


Corcyraeans commenced operations against them with a fleet of forty


sail. They took with them the exiles, with a view to their


restoration, and also secured the services of the Illyrians. Sitting


down before the city, they issued a proclamation to the effect that


any of the natives that chose, and the foreigners, might depart


unharmed, with the alternative of being treated as enemies. On their


refusal the Corcyraeans proceeded to besiege the city, which stands on


an isthmus; and the Corinthians, receiving intelligence of the


investment of Epidamnus, got together an armament and proclaimed a


colony to Epidamnus, perfect political equality being guaranteed to


all who chose to go. Any who were not prepared to sail at once


might, by paying down the sum of fifty Corinthian drachmae, have a


share in the colony without leaving Corinth. Great numbers took


advantage of this proclamation, some being ready to start directly,


others paying the requisite forfeit. In case of their passage being


disputed by the Corcyraeans, several cities were asked to lend them


a convoy. Megara prepared to accompany them with eight ships, Pale


in Cephallonia with four; Epidaurus furnished five, Hermione one,


Troezen two, Leucas ten, and Ambracia eight. The Thebans and


Phliasians were asked for money, the Eleans for hulls as well; while


Corinth herself furnished thirty ships and three thousand heavy


infantry.


  When the Corcyraeans heard of their preparations they came to


Corinth with envoys from Lacedaemon and Sicyon, whom they persuaded to


accompany them, and bade her recall the garrison and settlers, as


she had nothing to do with Epidamnus. If, however, she had any


claims to make, they were willing to submit the matter to the


arbitration of such of the cities in Peloponnese as should be chosen


by mutual agreement, and that the colony should remain with the city


to whom the arbitrators might assign it. They were also willing to


refer the matter to the oracle at Delphi. If, in defiance of their


protestations, war was appealed to, they should be themselves


compelled by this violence to seek friends in quarters where they


had no desire to seek them, and to make even old ties give way to


the necessity of assistance. The answer they got from Corinth was


that, if they would withdraw their fleet and the barbarians from


Epidamnus, negotiation might be possible; but, while the town was


still being besieged, going before arbitrators was out of the


question. The Corcyraeans retorted that if Corinth would withdraw


her troops from Epidamnus they would withdraw theirs, or they were


ready to let both parties remain in statu quo, an armistice being


concluded till judgment could be given.


  Turning a deaf ear to all these proposals, when their ships were


manned and their allies had come in, the Corinthians sent a herald


before them to declare war and, getting under way with seventy-five


ships and two thousand heavy infantry, sailed for Epidamnus to give


battle to the Corcyraeans. The fleet was under the command of


Aristeus, son of Pellichas, Callicrates, son of Callias, and


Timanor, son of Timanthes; the troops under that of Archetimus, son of


Eurytimus, and Isarchidas, son of Isarchus. When they had reached


Actium in the territory of Anactorium, at the mouth of the mouth of


the Gulf of Ambracia, where the temple of Apollo stands, the


Corcyraeans sent on a herald in a light boat to warn them not to


sail against them. Meanwhile they proceeded to man their ships, all of


which had been equipped for action, the old vessels being


undergirded to make them seaworthy. On the return of the herald


without any peaceful answer from the Corinthians, their ships being


now manned, they put out to sea to meet the enemy with a fleet of


eighty sail (forty were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus), formed


line, and went into action, and gained a decisive victory, and


destroyed fifteen of the Corinthian vessels. The same day had seen


Epidamnus compelled by its besiegers to capitulate; the conditions


being that the foreigners should be sold, and the Corinthians kept


as prisoners of war, till their fate should be otherwise decided.


  After the engagement the Corcyraeans set up a trophy on Leukimme,


a headland of Corcyra, and slew all their captives except the


Corinthians, whom they kept as prisoners of war. Defeated at sea,


the Corinthians and their allies repaired home, and left the


Corcyraeans masters of all the sea about those parts. Sailing to


Leucas, a Corinthian colony, they ravaged their territory, and burnt


Cyllene, the harbour of the Eleans, because they had furnished ships


and money to Corinth. For almost the whole of the period that followed


the battle they remained masters of the sea, and the allies of Corinth


were harassed by Corcyraean cruisers. At last Corinth, roused by the


sufferings of her allies, sent out ships and troops in the fall of the


summer, who formed an encampment at Actium and about Chimerium, in


Thesprotis, for the protection of Leucas and the rest of the


friendly cities. The Corcyraeans on their part formed a similar


station on Leukimme. Neither party made any movement, but they


remained confronting each other till the end of the summer, and winter


was at hand before either of them returned home.


  Corinth, exasperated by the war with the Corcyraeans, spent the


whole of the year after the engagement and that succeeding it in


building ships, and in straining every nerve to form an efficient


fleet; rowers being drawn from Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas by


the inducement of large bounties. The Corcyraeans, alarmed at the news


of their preparations, being without a single ally in Hellas (for they


had not enrolled themselves either in the Athenian or in the


Lacedaemonian confederacy), decided to repair to Athens in order to


enter into alliance and to endeavour to procure support from her.


Corinth also, hearing of their intentions, sent an embassy to Athens


to prevent the Corcyraean navy being joined by the Athenian, and her


prospect of ordering the war according to her wishes being thus


impeded. An assembly was convoked, and the rival advocates appeared:


the Corcyraeans spoke as follows:


  "Athenians! when a people that have not rendered any important


service or support to their neighbours in times past, for which they


might claim to be repaid, appear before them as we now appear before


you to solicit their assistance, they may fairly be required to


satisfy certain preliminary conditions. They should show, first,


that it is expedient or at least safe to grant their request; next,


that they will retain a lasting sense of the kindness. But if they


cannot clearly establish any of these points, they must not be annoyed


if they meet with a rebuff. Now the Corcyraeans believe that with


their petition for assistance they can also give you a satisfactory


answer on these points, and they have therefore dispatched us


hither. It has so happened that our policy as regards you with respect


to this request, turns out to be inconsistent, and as regards our


interests, to be at the present crisis inexpedient. We say


inconsistent, because a power which has never in the whole of her past


history been willing to ally herself with any of her neighbours, is


now found asking them to ally themselves with her. And we say


inexpedient, because in our present war with Corinth it has left us in


a position of entire isolation, and what once seemed the wise


precaution of refusing to involve ourselves in alliances with other


powers, lest we should also involve ourselves in risks of their


choosing, has now proved to be folly and weakness. It is true that


in the late naval engagement we drove back the Corinthians from our


shores single-handed. But they have now got together a still larger


armament from Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas; and we, seeing our


utter inability to cope with them without foreign aid, and the


magnitude of the danger which subjection to them implies, find it


necessary to ask help from you and from every other power. And we hope


to be excused if we forswear our old principle of complete political


isolation, a principle which was not adopted with any sinister


intention, but was rather the consequence of an error in judgment.


  "Now there are many reasons why in the event of your compliance


you will congratulate yourselves on this request having been made to


you. First, because your assistance will be rendered to a power which,


herself inoffensive, is a victim to the injustice of others. Secondly,


because all that we most value is at stake in the present contest, and


your welcome of us under these circumstances will be a proof of


goodwill which will ever keep alive the gratitude you will lay up in


our hearts. Thirdly, yourselves excepted, we are the greatest naval


power in Hellas. Moreover, can you conceive a stroke of good fortune


more rare in itself, or more disheartening to your enemies, than


that the power whose adhesion you would have valued above much


material and moral strength should present herself self-invited,


should deliver herself into your hands without danger and without


expense, and should lastly put you in the way of gaining a high


character in the eyes of the world, the gratitude of those whom you


shall assist, and a great accession of strength for yourselves? You


may search all history without finding many instances of a people


gaining all these advantages at once, or many instances of a power


that comes in quest of assistance being in a position to give to the


people whose alliance she solicits as much safety and honour as she


will receive. But it will be urged that it is only in the case of a


war that we shall be found useful. To this we answer that if any of


you imagine that that war is far off, he is grievously mistaken, and


is blind to the fact that Lacedaemon regards you with jealousy and


desires war, and that Corinth is powerful there- the same, remember,


that is your enemy, and is even now trying to subdue us as a


preliminary to attacking you. And this she does to prevent our


becoming united by a common enmity, and her having us both on her


hands, and also to ensure getting the start of you in one of two ways,


either by crippling our power or by making its strength her own. Now


it is our policy to be beforehand with her- that is, for Corcyra to


make an offer of alliance and for you to accept it; in fact, we


ought to form plans against her instead of waiting to defeat the plans


she forms against us.


  "If she asserts that for you to receive a colony of hers into


alliance is not right, let her know that every colony that is well


treated honours its parent state, but becomes estranged from it by


injustice. For colonists are not sent forth on the understanding


that they are to be the slaves of those that remain behind, but that


they are to be their equals. And that Corinth was injuring us is


clear. Invited to refer the dispute about Epidamnus to arbitration,


they chose to prosecute their complaints war rather than by a fair


trial. And let their conduct towards us who are their kindred be a


warning to you not to be misled by their deceit, nor to yield to their


direct requests; concessions to adversaries only end in self-reproach,


and the more strictly they are avoided the greater will be the


chance of security.


  "If it be urged that your reception of us will be a breach of the


treaty existing between you and Lacedaemon, the answer is that we


are a neutral state, and that one of the express provisions of that


treaty is that it shall be competent for any Hellenic state that is


neutral to join whichever side it pleases. And it is intolerable for


Corinth to be allowed to obtain men for her navy not only from her


allies, but also from the rest of Hellas, no small number being


furnished by your own subjects; while we are to be excluded both


from the alliance left open to us by treaty, and from any assistance


that we might get from other quarters, and you are to be accused of


political immorality if you comply with our request. On the other


hand, we shall have much greater cause to complain of you, if you do


not comply with it; if we, who are in peril and are no enemies of


yours, meet with a repulse at your hands, while Corinth, who is the


aggressor and your enemy, not only meets with no hindrance from you,


but is even allowed to draw material for war from your dependencies.


This ought not to be, but you should either forbid her enlisting men


in your dominions, or you should lend us too what help you may think


advisable.


  "But your real policy is to afford us avowed countenance and


support. The advantages of this course, as we premised in the


beginning of our speech, are many. We mention one that is perhaps


the chief. Could there be a clearer guarantee of our good faith than


is offered by the fact that the power which is at enmity with you is


also at enmity with us, and that that power is fully able to punish


defection? And there is a wide difference between declining the


alliance of an inland and of a maritime power. For your first


endeavour should be to prevent, if possible, the existence of any


naval power except your own; failing this, to secure the friendship of


the strongest that does exist. And if any of you believe that what


we urge is expedient, but fear to act upon this belief, lest it should


lead to a breach of the treaty, you must remember that on the one


hand, whatever your fears, your strength will be formidable to your


antagonists; on the other, whatever the confidence you derive from


refusing to receive us, your weakness will have no terrors for a


strong enemy. You must also remember that your decision is for


Athens no less than Corcyra, and that you are not making the best


provision for her interests, if at a time when you are anxiously


scanning the horizon that you may be in readiness for the breaking out


of the war which is all but upon you, you hesitate to attach to your


side a place whose adhesion or estrangement is alike pregnant with the


most vital consequences. For it lies conveniently for the coast-


navigation in the direction of Italy and Sicily, being able to


bar the passage of naval reinforcements from thence to Peloponnese,


and from Peloponnese thither; and it is in other respects a most


desirable station. To sum up as shortly as possible, embracing both


general and particular considerations, let this show you the folly


of sacrificing us. Remember that there are but three considerable


naval powers in Hellas- Athens, Corcyra, and Corinth- and that if you


allow two of these three to become one, and Corinth to secure us for


herself, you will have to hold the sea against the united fleets of


Corcyra and Peloponnese. But if you receive us, you will have our


ships to reinforce you in the struggle."


  Such were the words of the Corcyraeans. After they had finished, the


Corinthians spoke as follows:


  "These Corcyraeans in the speech we have just heard do not confine


themselves to the question of their reception into your alliance. They


also talk of our being guilty of injustice, and their being the


victims of an unjustifiable war. It becomes necessary for us to


touch upon both these points before we proceed to the rest of what


we have to say, that you may have a more correct idea of the grounds


of our claim, and have good cause to reject their petition.


According to them, their old policy of refusing all offers of alliance


was a policy of moderation. It was in fact adopted for bad ends, not


for good; indeed their conduct is such as to make them by no means


desirous of having allies present to witness it, or of having the


shame of asking their concurrence. Besides, their geographical


situation makes them independent of others, and consequently the


decision in cases where they injure any lies not with judges appointed


by mutual agreement, but with themselves, because, while they seldom


make voyages to their neighbours, they are constantly being visited by


foreign vessels which are compelled to put in to Corcyra. In short,


the object that they propose to themselves, in their specious policy


of complete isolation, is not to avoid sharing in the crimes of


others, but to secure monopoly of crime to themselves- the licence of


outrage wherever they can compel, of fraud wherever they can elude,


and the enjoyment of their gains without shame. And yet if they were


the honest men they pretend to be, the less hold that others had


upon them, the stronger would be the light in which they might have


put their honesty by giving and taking what was just.


  "But such has not been their conduct either towards others or


towards us. The attitude of our colony towards us has always been


one of estrangement and is now one of hostility; for, say they: 'We


were not sent out to be ill-treated.' We rejoin that we did not


found the colony to be insulted by them, but to be their head and to


be regarded with a proper respect. At any rate our other colonies


honour us, and we are much beloved by our colonists; and clearly, if


the majority are satisfied with us, these can have no good reason


for a dissatisfaction in which they stand alone, and we are not acting


improperly in making war against them, nor are we making war against


them without having received signal provocation. Besides, if we were


in the wrong, it would be honourable in them to give way to our


wishes, and disgraceful for us to trample on their moderation; but


in the pride and licence of wealth they have sinned again and again


against us, and never more deeply than when Epidamnus, our dependency,


which they took no steps to claim in its distress upon our coming to


relieve it, was by them seized, and is now held by force of arms.


  "As to their allegation that they wished the question to be first


submitted to arbitration, it is obvious that a challenge coming from


the party who is safe in a commanding position cannot gain the


credit due only to him who, before appealing to arms, in deeds as well


as words, places himself on a level with his adversary. In their case,


it was not before they laid siege to the place, but after they at


length understood that we should not tamely suffer it, that they


thought of the specious word arbitration. And not satisfied with their


own misconduct there, they appear here now requiring you to join


with them not in alliance but in crime, and to receive them in spite


of their being at enmity with us. But it was when they stood firmest


that they should have made overtures to you, and not at a time when we


have been wronged and they are in peril; nor yet at a time when you


will be admitting to a share in your protection those who never


admitted you to a share in their power, and will be incurring an equal


amount of blame from us with those in whose offences you had no


hand. No, they should have shared their power with you before they


asked you to share your fortunes with them.


  "So then the reality of the grievances we come to complain of, and


the violence and rapacity of our opponents, have both been proved. But


that you cannot equitably receive them, this you have still to


learn. It may be true that one of the provisions of the treaty is that


it shall be competent for any state, whose name was not down on the


list, to join whichever side it pleases. But this agreement is not


meant for those whose object in joining is the injury of other powers,


but for those whose need of support does not arise from the fact of


defection, and whose adhesion will not bring to the power that is


mad enough to receive them war instead of peace; which will be the


case with you, if you refuse to listen to us. For you cannot become


their auxiliary and remain our friend; if you join in their attack,


you must share the punishment which the defenders inflict on them. And


yet you have the best possible right to be neutral, or, failing


this, you should on the contrary join us against them. Corinth is at


least in treaty with you; with Corcyra you were never even in truce.


But do not lay down the principle that defection is to be


patronized. Did we on the defection of the Samians record our vote


against you, when the rest of the Peloponnesian powers were equally


divided on the question whether they should assist them? No, we told


them to their face that every power has a right to punish its own


allies. Why, if you make it your policy to receive and assist all


offenders, you will find that just as many of your dependencies will


come over to us, and the principle that you establish will press


less heavily on us than on yourselves.


  "This then is what Hellenic law entitles us to demand as a right.


But we have also advice to offer and claims on your gratitude,


which, since there is no danger of our injuring you, as we are not


enemies, and since our friendship does not amount to very frequent


intercourse, we say ought to be liquidated at the present juncture.


When you were in want of ships of war for the war against the


Aeginetans, before the Persian invasion, Corinth supplied you with


twenty vessels. That good turn, and the line we took on the Samian


question, when we were the cause of the Peloponnesians refusing to


assist them, enabled you to conquer Aegina and to punish Samos. And we


acted thus at crises when, if ever, men are wont in their efforts


against their enemies to forget everything for the sake of victory,


regarding him who assists them then as a friend, even if thus far he


has been a foe, and him who opposes them then as a foe, even if he has


thus far been a friend; indeed they allow their real interests to


suffer from their absorbing preoccupation in the struggle.


  "Weigh well these considerations, and let your youth learn what they


are from their elders, and let them determine to do unto us as we have


done unto you. And let them not acknowledge the justice of what we


say, but dispute its wisdom in the contingency of war. Not only is the


straightest path generally speaking the wisest; but the coming of


the war, which the Corcyraeans have used as a bugbear to persuade


you to do wrong, is still uncertain, and it is not worth while to be


carried away by it into gaining the instant and declared enmity of


Corinth. It were, rather, wise to try and counteract the


unfavourable impression which your conduct to Megara has created.


For kindness opportunely shown has a greater power of removing old


grievances than the facts of the case may warrant. And do not be


seduced by the prospect of a great naval alliance. Abstinence from all


injustice to other first-rate powers is a greater tower of strength


than anything that can be gained by the sacrifice of permanent


tranquillity for an apparent temporary advantage. It is now our turn


to benefit by the principle that we laid down at Lacedaemon, that


every power has a right to punish her own allies. We now claim to


receive the same from you, and protest against your rewarding us for


benefiting you by our vote by injuring us by yours. On the contrary,


return us like for like, remembering that this is that very crisis in


which he who lends aid is most a friend, and he who opposes is most a


foe. And for these Corcyraeans- neither receive them into alliance in


our despite, nor be their abettors in crime. So do, and you will act


as we have a right to expect of you, and at the same time best consult


your own interests."


  Such were the words of the Corinthians.


  When the Athenians had heard both out, two assemblies were held.


In the first there was a manifest disposition to listen to the


representations of Corinth; in the second, public feeling had


changed and an alliance with Corcyra was decided on, with certain


reservations. It was to be a defensive, not an offensive alliance.


It did not involve a breach of the treaty with Peloponnese: Athens


could not be required to join Corcyra in any attack upon Corinth.


But each of the contracting parties had a right to the other's


assistance against invasion, whether of his own territory or that of


an ally. For it began now to be felt that the coming of the


Peloponnesian war was only a question of time, and no one was


willing to see a naval power of such magnitude as Corcyra sacrificed


to Corinth; though if they could let them weaken each other by


mutual conflict, it would be no bad preparation for the struggle which


Athens might one day have to wage with Corinth and the other naval


powers. At the same time the island seemed to lie conveniently on


the coasting passage to Italy and Sicily. With these views, Athens


received Corcyra into alliance and, on the departure of the


Corinthians not long afterwards, sent ten ships to their assistance.


They were commanded by Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, Diotimus,


the son of Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epicles. Their


instructions were to avoid collision with the Corinthian fleet


except under certain circumstances. If it sailed to Corcyra and


threatened a landing on her coast, or in any of her possessions,


they were to do their utmost to prevent it. These instructions were


prompted by an anxiety to avoid a breach of the treaty.


  Meanwhile the Corinthians completed their preparations, and sailed


for Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships. Of these Elis furnished


ten, Megara twelve, Leucas ten, Ambracia twenty-seven, Anactorium one,


and Corinth herself ninety. Each of these contingents had its own


admiral, the Corinthian being under the command of Xenoclides, son of


Euthycles, with four colleagues. Sailing from Leucas, they made land


at the part of the continent opposite Corcyra. They anchored in the


harbour of Chimerium, in the territory of Thesprotis, above which,


at some distance from the sea, lies the city of Ephyre, in the Elean


district. By this city the Acherusian lake pours its waters into the


sea. It gets its name from the river Acheron, which flows through


Thesprotis and falls into the lake. There also the river Thyamis


flows, forming the boundary between Thesprotis and Kestrine; and


between these rivers rises the point of Chimerium. In this part of the


continent the Corinthians now came to anchor, and formed an


encampment. When the Corcyraeans saw them coming, they manned a


hundred and ten ships, commanded by Meikiades, Aisimides, and


Eurybatus, and stationed themselves at one of the Sybota isles; the


ten Athenian ships being present. On Point Leukimme they posted


their land forces, and a thousand heavy infantry who had come from


Zacynthus to their assistance. Nor were the Corinthians on the


mainland without their allies. The barbarians flocked in large numbers


to their assistance, the inhabitants of this part of the continent


being old allies of theirs.


  When the Corinthian preparations were completed, they took three


days' provisions and put out from Chimerium by night, ready for


action. Sailing with the dawn, they sighted the Corcyraean fleet out


at sea and coming towards them. When they perceived each other, both


sides formed in order of battle. On the Corcyraean right wing lay


the Athenian ships, the rest of the line being occupied by their own


vessels formed in three squadrons, each of which was commanded by


one of the three admirals. Such was the Corcyraean formation. The


Corinthian was as follows: on the right wing lay the Megarian and


Ambraciot ships, in the centre the rest of the allies in order. But


the left was composed of the best sailers in the Corinthian navy, to


encounter the Athenians and the right wing of the Corcyraeans. As soon


as the signals were raised on either side, they joined battle. Both


sides had a large number of heavy infantry on their decks, and a large


number of archers and darters, the old imperfect armament still


prevailing. The sea-fight was an obstinate one, though not


remarkable for its science; indeed it was more like a battle by


land. Whenever they charged each other, the multitude and crush of the


vessels made it by no means easy to get loose; besides, their hopes of


victory lay principally in the heavy infantry on the decks, who


stood and fought in order, the ships remaining stationary. The


manoeuvre of breaking the line was not tried; in short, strength and


pluck had more share in the fight than science. Everywhere tumult


reigned, the battle being one scene of confusion; meanwhile the


Athenian ships, by coming up to the Corcyraeans whenever they were


pressed, served to alarm the enemy, though their commanders could


not join in the battle from fear of their instructions. The right wing


of the Corinthians suffered most. The Corcyraeans routed it, and


chased them in disorder to the continent with twenty ships, sailed


up to their camp, and burnt the tents which they found empty, and


plundered the stuff. So in this quarter the Corinthians and their


allies were defeated, and the Corcyraeans were victorious. But where


the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they gained a decided


success; the scanty forces of the Corcyraeans being further weakened


by the want of the twenty ships absent on the pursuit. Seeing the


Corcyraeans hard pressed, the Athenians began at length to assist them


more unequivocally. At first, it is true, they refrained from charging


any ships; but when the rout was becoming patent, and the


Corinthians were pressing on, the time at last came when every one set


to, and all distinction was laid aside, and it came to this point,


that the Corinthians and Athenians raised their hands against each


other.


  After the rout, the Corinthians, instead of employing themselves


in lashing fast and hauling after them the hulls of the vessels


which they had disabled, turned their attention to the men, whom


they butchered as they sailed through, not caring so much to make


prisoners. Some even of their own friends were slain by them, by


mistake, in their ignorance of the defeat of the right wing For the


number of the ships on both sides, and the distance to which they


covered the sea, made it difficult, after they had once joined, to


distinguish between the conquering and the conquered; this battle


proving far greater than any before it, any at least between Hellenes,


for the number of vessels engaged. After the Corinthians had chased


the Corcyraeans to the land, they turned to the wrecks and their dead,


most of whom they succeeded in getting hold of and conveying to


Sybota, the rendezvous of the land forces furnished by their barbarian


allies. Sybota, it must be known, is a desert harbour of Thesprotis.


This task over, they mustered anew, and sailed against the


Corcyraeans, who on their part advanced to meet them with all their


ships that were fit for service and remaining to them, accompanied


by the Athenian vessels, fearing that they might attempt a landing


in their territory. It was by this time getting late, and the paean


had been sung for the attack, when the Corinthians suddenly began to


back water. They had observed twenty Athenian ships sailing up,


which had been sent out afterwards to reinforce the ten vessels by the


Athenians, who feared, as it turned out justly, the defeat of the


Corcyraeans and the inability of their handful of ships to protect


them. These ships were thus seen by the Corinthians first. They


suspected that they were from Athens, and that those which they saw


were not all, but that there were more behind; they accordingly


began to retire. The Corcyraeans meanwhile had not sighted them, as


they were advancing from a point which they could not so well see, and


were wondering why the Corinthians were backing water, when some


caught sight of them, and cried out that there were ships in sight


ahead. Upon this they also retired; for it was now getting dark, and


the retreat of the Corinthians had suspended hostilities. Thus they


parted from each other, and the battle ceased with night. The


Corcyraeans were in their camp at Leukimme, when these twenty ships


from Athens, under the command of Glaucon, the son of Leagrus, and


Andocides, son of Leogoras, bore on through the corpses and the


wrecks, and sailed up to the camp, not long after they were sighted.


It was now night, and the Corcyraeans feared that they might be


hostile vessels; but they soon knew them, and the ships came to


anchor.


  The next day the thirty Athenian vessels put out to sea, accompanied


by all the Corcyraean ships that were seaworthy, and sailed to the


harbour at Sybota, where the Corinthians lay, to see if they would


engage. The Corinthians put out from the land and formed a line in the


open sea, but beyond this made no further movement, having no


intention of assuming the offensive. For they saw reinforcements


arrived fresh from Athens, and themselves confronted by numerous


difficulties, such as the necessity of guarding the prisoners whom


they had on board and the want of all means of refitting their ships


in a desert place. What they were thinking more about was how their


voyage home was to be effected; they feared that the Athenians might


consider that the treaty was dissolved by the collision which had


occurred, and forbid their departure.


  Accordingly they resolved to put some men on board a boat, and


send them without a herald's wand to the Athenians, as an


experiment. Having done so, they spoke as follows: "You do wrong,


Athenians, to begin war and break the treaty. Engaged in chastising


our enemies, we find you placing yourselves in our path in arms


against us. Now if your intentions are to prevent us sailing to


Corcyra, or anywhere else that we may wish, and if you are for


breaking the treaty, first take us that are here and treat us as


enemies." Such was what they said, and all the Corcyraean armament


that were within hearing immediately called out to take them and


kill them. But the Athenians answered as follows: "Neither are we


beginning war, Peloponnesians, nor are we breaking the treaty; but


these Corcyraeans are our allies, and we are come to help them. So


if you want to sail anywhere else, we place no obstacle in your way;


but if you are going to sail against Corcyra, or any of her


possessions, we shall do our best to stop you."


  Receiving this answer from the Athenians, the Corinthians


commenced preparations for their voyage home, and set up a trophy in


Sybota, on the continent; while the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and


dead that had been carried out to them by the current, and by a wind


which rose in the night and scattered them in all directions, and


set up their trophy in Sybota, on the island, as victors. The


reasons each side had for claiming the victory were these. The


Corinthians had been victorious in the sea-fight until night; and


having thus been enabled to carry off most wrecks and dead, they


were in possession of no fewer than a thousand prisoners of war, and


had sunk close upon seventy vessels. The Corcyraeans had destroyed


about thirty ships, and after the arrival of the Athenians had taken


up the wrecks and dead on their side; they had besides seen the


Corinthians retire before them, backing water on sight of the Athenian


vessels, and upon the arrival of the Athenians refuse to sail out


against them from Sybota. Thus both sides claimed the victory.


  The Corinthians on the voyage home took Anactorium, which stands


at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf. The place was taken by


treachery, being common ground to the Corcyraeans and Corinthians.


After establishing Corinthian settlers there, they retired home. Eight


hundred of the Corcyraeans were slaves; these they sold; two hundred


and fifty they retained in captivity, and treated with great


attention, in the hope that they might bring over their country to


Corinth on their return; most of them being, as it happened, men of


very high position in Corcyra. In this way Corcyra maintained her


political existence in the war with Corinth, and the Athenian


vessels left the island. This was the first cause of the war that


Corinth had against the Athenians, viz., that they had fought


against them with the Corcyraeans in time of treaty.


  Almost immediately after this, fresh differences arose between the


Athenians and Peloponnesians, and contributed their share to the


war. Corinth was forming schemes for retaliation, and Athens suspected


her hostility. The Potidaeans, who inhabit the isthmus of Pallene,


being a Corinthian colony, but tributary allies of Athens, were


ordered to raze the wall looking towards Pallene, to give hostages, to


dismiss the Corinthian magistrates, and in future not to receive the


persons sent from Corinth annually to succeed them. It was feared that


they might be persuaded by Perdiccas and the Corinthians to revolt,


and might draw the rest of the allies in the direction of Thrace to


revolt with them. These precautions against the Potidaeans were


taken by the Athenians immediately after the battle at Corcyra. Not


only was Corinth at length openly hostile, but Perdiccas, son of


Alexander, king of the Macedonians, had from an old friend and ally


been made an enemy. He had been made an enemy by the Athenians


entering into alliance with his brother Philip and Derdas, who were in


league against him. In his alarm he had sent to Lacedaemon to try


and involve the Athenians in a war with the Peloponnesians, and was


endeavouring to win over Corinth in order to bring about the revolt of


Potidaea. He also made overtures to the Chalcidians in the direction


of Thrace, and to the Bottiaeans, to persuade them to join in the


revolt; for he thought that if these places on the border could be


made his allies, it would be easier to carry on the war with their


co-operation. Alive to all this, and wishing to anticipate the


revolt of the cities, the Athenians acted as follows. They were just


then sending off thirty ships and a thousand heavy infantry for his


country under the command of Archestratus, son of Lycomedes, with four


colleagues. They instructed the captains to take hostages of the


Potidaeans, to raze the wall, and to be on their guard against the


revolt of the neighbouring cities.


  Meanwhile the Potidaeans sent envoys to Athens on the chance of


persuading them to take no new steps in their matters; they also


went to Lacedaemon with the Corinthians to secure support in case of


need. Failing after prolonged negotiation to obtain anything


satisfactory from the Athenians; being unable, for all they could say,


to prevent the vessels that were destined for Macedonia from also


sailing against them; and receiving from the Lacedaemonian


government a promise to invade Attica, if the Athenians should


attack Potidaea, the Potidaeans, thus favoured by the moment, at


last entered into league with the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and


revolted. And Perdiccas induced the Chalcidians to abandon and


demolish their towns on the seaboard and, settling inland at Olynthus,


to make that one city a strong place: meanwhile to those who


followed his advice he gave a part of his territory in Mygdonia


round Lake Bolbe as a place of abode while the war against the


Athenians should last. They accordingly demolished their towns,


removed inland and prepared for war. The thirty ships of the


Athenians, arriving before the Thracian places, found Potidaea and the


rest in revolt. Their commanders, considering it to be quite


impossible with their present force to carry on war with Perdiccas and


with the confederate towns as well turned to Macedonia, their original


destination, and, having established themselves there, carried on


war in co-operation with Philip, and the brothers of Derdas, who had


invaded the country from the interior.


  Meanwhile the Corinthians, with Potidaea in revolt and the


Athenian ships on the coast of Macedonia, alarmed for the safety of


the place and thinking its danger theirs, sent volunteers from


Corinth, and mercenaries from the rest of Peloponnese, to the number


of sixteen hundred heavy infantry in all, and four hundred light


troops. Aristeus, son of Adimantus, who was always a steady friend


to the Potidaeans, took command of the expedition, and it was


principally for love of him that most of the men from Corinth


volunteered. They arrived in Thrace forty days after the revolt of


Potidaea.


  The Athenians also immediately received the news of the revolt of


the cities. On being informed that Aristeus and his reinforcements


were on their way, they sent two thousand heavy infantry of their


own citizens and forty ships against the places in revolt, under the


command of Callias, son of Calliades, and four colleagues. They


arrived in Macedonia first, and found the force of a thousand men that


had been first sent out, just become masters of Therme and besieging


Pydna. Accordingly they also joined in the investment, and besieged


Pydna for a while. Subsequently they came to terms and concluded a


forced alliance with Perdiccas, hastened by the calls of Potidaea


and by the arrival of Aristeus at that place. They withdrew from


Macedonia, going to Beroea and thence to Strepsa, and, after a


futile attempt on the latter place, they pursued by land their march


to Potidaea with three thousand heavy infantry of their own


citizens, besides a number of their allies, and six hundred Macedonian


horsemen, the followers of Philip and Pausanias. With these sailed


seventy ships along the coast. Advancing by short marches, on the


third day they arrived at Gigonus, where they encamped.


  Meanwhile the Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus were


encamped on the side looking towards Olynthus on the isthmus, in


expectation of the Athenians, and had established their market outside


the city. The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the


infantry; while the command of the cavalry was given to Perdiccas, who


had at once left the alliance of the Athenians and gone back to that


of the Potidaeans, having deputed Iolaus as his general: The plan of


Aristeus was to keep his own force on the isthmus, and await the


attack of the Athenians; leaving the Chalcidians and the allies


outside the isthmus, and the two hundred cavalry from Perdiccas in


Olynthus to act upon the Athenian rear, on the occasion of their


advancing against him; and thus to place the enemy between two


fires. While Callias the Athenian general and his colleagues


dispatched the Macedonian horse and a few of the allies to Olynthus,


to prevent any movement being made from that quarter, the Athenians


themselves broke up their camp and marched against Potidaea. After


they had arrived at the isthmus, and saw the enemy preparing for


battle, they formed against him, and soon afterwards engaged. The wing


of Aristeus, with the Corinthians and other picked troops round him,


routed the wing opposed to it, and followed for a considerable


distance in pursuit. But the rest of the army of the Potidaeans and of


the Peloponnesians was defeated by the Athenians, and took refuge


within the fortifications. Returning from the pursuit, Aristeus


perceived the defeat of the rest of the army. Being at a loss which of


the two risks to choose, whether to go to Olynthus or to Potidaea,


he at last determined to draw his men into as small a space as


possible, and force his way with a run into Potidaea. Not without


difficulty, through a storm of missiles, he passed along by the


breakwater through the sea, and brought off most of his men safe,


though a few were lost. Meanwhile the auxiliaries of the Potidaeans


from Olynthus, which is about seven miles off and in sight of


Potidaea, when the battle began and the signals were raised,


advanced a little way to render assistance; and the Macedonian horse


formed against them to prevent it. But on victory speedily declaring


for the Athenians and the signals being taken down, they retired


back within the wall; and the Macedonians returned to the Athenians.


Thus there were no cavalry present on either side. After the battle


the Athenians set up a trophy, and gave back their dead to the


Potidaeans under truce. The Potidaeans and their allies had close upon


three hundred killed; the Athenians a hundred and fifty of their own


citizens, and Callias their general.


  The wall on the side of the isthmus had now works at once raised


against it, and manned by the Athenians. That on the side of Pallene


had no works raised against it. They did not think themselves strong


enough at once to keep a garrison in the isthmus and to cross over


to Pallene and raise works there; they were afraid that the Potidaeans


and their allies might take advantage of their division to attack


them. Meanwhile the Athenians at home learning that there were no


works at Pallene, some time afterwards sent off sixteen hundred


heavy infantry of their own citizens under the command of Phormio, son


of Asopius. Arrived at Pallene, he fixed his headquarters at


Aphytis, and led his army against Potidaea by short marches,


ravaging the country as he advanced. No one venturing to meet him in


the field, he raised works against the wall on the side of Pallene. So


at length Potidaea was strongly invested on either side, and from


the sea by the ships co-operating in the blockade. Aristeus, seeing


its investment complete, and having no hope of its salvation, except


in the event of some movement from the Peloponnese, or of some other


improbable contingency, advised all except five hundred to watch for a


wind and sail out of the place, in order that their provisions might


last the longer. He was willing to be himself one of those who


remained. Unable to persuade them, and desirous of acting on the


next alternative, and of having things outside in the best posture


possible, he eluded the guardships of the Athenians and sailed out.


Remaining among the Chalcidians, he continued to carry on the war;


in particular he laid an ambuscade near the city of the Sermylians,


and cut off many of them; he also communicated with Peloponnese, and


tried to contrive some method by which help might be brought.


Meanwhile, after the completion of the investment of Potidaea, Phormio


next employed his sixteen hundred men in ravaging Chalcidice and


Bottica: some of the towns also were taken by him.


                          CHAPTER III.





            Congress of the Peloponnesian Confederacy


                          at Lacedaemon





  THE Athenians and Peloponnesians had these antecedent grounds of


complaint against each other: the complaint of Corinth was that her


colony of Potidaea, and Corinthian and Peloponnesian citizens within


it, were being besieged; that of Athens against the Peloponnesians


that they had incited a town of hers, a member of her alliance and a


contributor to her revenue, to revolt, and had come and were openly


fighting against her on the side of the Potidaeans. For all this,


war had not yet broken out: there was still truce for a while; for


this was a private enterprise on the part of Corinth.


  But the siege of Potidaea put an end to her inaction; she had men


inside it: besides, she feared for the place. Immediately summoning


the allies to Lacedaemon, she came and loudly accused Athens of breach


of the treaty and aggression on the rights of Peloponnese. With her,


the Aeginetans, formally unrepresented from fear of Athens, in


secret proved not the least urgent of the advocates for war, asserting


that they had not the independence guaranteed to them by the treaty.


After extending the summons to any of their allies and others who


might have complaints to make of Athenian aggression, the


Lacedaemonians held their ordinary assembly, and invited them to


speak. There were many who came forward and made their several


accusations; among them the Megarians, in a long list of grievances,


called special attention to the fact of their exclusion from the ports


of the Athenian empire and the market of Athens, in defiance of the


treaty. Last of all the Corinthians came forward, and having let those


who preceded them inflame the Lacedaemonians, now followed with a


speech to this effect:


  "Lacedaemonians! the confidence which you feel in your


constitution and social order, inclines you to receive any reflections


of ours on other powers with a certain scepticism. Hence springs


your moderation, but hence also the rather limited knowledge which you


betray in dealing with foreign politics. Time after time was our voice


raised to warn you of the blows about to be dealt us by Athens, and


time after time, instead of taking the trouble to ascertain the


worth of our communications, you contented yourselves with


suspecting the speakers of being inspired by private interest. And so,


instead of calling these allies together before the blow fell, you


have delayed to do so till we are smarting under it; allies among whom


we have not the worst title to speak, as having the greatest


complaints to make, complaints of Athenian outrage and Lacedaemonian


neglect. Now if these assaults on the rights of Hellas had been made


in the dark, you might be unacquainted with the facts, and it would be


our duty to enlighten you. As it is, long speeches are not needed


where you see servitude accomplished for some of us, meditated for


others- in particular for our allies- and prolonged preparations in


the aggressor against the hour of war. Or what, pray, is the meaning


of their reception of Corcyra by fraud, and their holding it against


us by force? what of the siege of Potidaea?- places one of which lies


most conveniently for any action against the Thracian towns; while the


other would have contributed a very large navy to the Peloponnesians?


  "For all this you are responsible. You it was who first allowed them


to fortify their city after the Median war, and afterwards to erect


the long walls- you who, then and now, are always depriving of


freedom not only those whom they have enslaved, but also those who


have as yet been your allies. For the true author of the subjugation


of a people is not so much the immediate agent, as the power which


permits it having the means to prevent it; particularly if that


power aspires to the glory of being the liberator of Hellas. We are at


last assembled. It has not been easy to assemble, nor even now are our


objects defined. We ought not to be still inquiring into the fact of


our wrongs, but into the means of our defence. For the aggressors with


matured plans to oppose to our indecision have cast threats aside


and betaken themselves to action. And we know what are the paths by


which Athenian aggression travels, and how insidious is its


progress. A degree of confidence she may feel from the idea that


your bluntness of perception prevents your noticing her; but it is


nothing to the impulse which her advance will receive from the


knowledge that you see, but do not care to interfere. You,


Lacedaemonians, of all the Hellenes are alone inactive, and defend


yourselves not by doing anything but by looking as if you would do


something; you alone wait till the power of an enemy is becoming twice


its original size, instead of crushing it in its infancy. And yet


the world used to say that you were to be depended upon; but in your


case, we fear, it said more than the truth. The Mede, we ourselves


know, had time to come from the ends of the earth to Peloponnese,


without any force of yours worthy of the name advancing to meet him.


But this was a distant enemy. Well, Athens at all events is a near


neighbour, and yet Athens you utterly disregard; against Athens you


prefer to act on the defensive instead of on the offensive, and to


make it an affair of chances by deferring the struggle till she has


grown far stronger than at first. And yet you know that on the whole


the rock on which the barbarian was wrecked was himself, and that if


our present enemy Athens has not again and again annihilated us, we


owe it more to her blunders than to your protection; Indeed,


expectations from you have before now been the ruin of some, whose


faith induced them to omit preparation.


  "We hope that none of you will consider these words of


remonstrance to be rather words of hostility; men remonstrate with


friends who are in error, accusations they reserve for enemies who


have wronged them. Besides, we consider that we have as good a right


as any one to point out a neighbour's faults, particularly when we


contemplate the great contrast between the two national characters;


a contrast of which, as far as we can see, you have little perception,


having never yet considered what sort of antagonists you will


encounter in the Athenians, how widely, how absolutely different


from yourselves. The Athenians are addicted to innovation, and their


designs are characterized by swiftness alike in conception and


execution; you have a genius for keeping what you have got,


accompanied by a total want of invention, and when forced to act you


never go far enough. Again, they are adventurous beyond their power,


and daring beyond their judgment, and in danger they are sanguine;


your wont is to attempt less than is justified by your power, to


mistrust even what is sanctioned by your judgment, and to fancy that


from danger there is no release. Further, there is promptitude on


their side against procrastination on yours; they are never at home,


you are never from it: for they hope by their absence to extend


their acquisitions, you fear by your advance to endanger what you have


left behind. They are swift to follow up a success, and slow to recoil


from a reverse. Their bodies they spend ungrudgingly in their


country's cause; their intellect they jealously husband to be employed


in her service. A scheme unexecuted is with them a positive loss, a


successful enterprise a comparative failure. The deficiency created by


the miscarriage of an undertaking is soon filled up by fresh hopes;


for they alone are enabled to call a thing hoped for a thing got, by


the speed with which they act upon their resolutions. Thus they toil


on in trouble and danger all the days of their life, with little


opportunity for enjoying, being ever engaged in getting: their only


idea of a holiday is to do what the occasion demands, and to them


laborious occupation is less of a misfortune than the peace of a quiet


life. To describe their character in a word, one might truly say


that they were born into the world to take no rest themselves and to


give none to others.


  "Such is Athens, your antagonist. And yet, Lacedaemonians, you still


delay, and fail to see that peace stays longest with those, who are


not more careful to use their power justly than to show their


determination not to submit to injustice. On the contrary, your


ideal of fair dealing is based on the principle that, if you do not


injure others, you need not risk your own fortunes in preventing


others from injuring you. Now you could scarcely have succeeded in


such a policy even with a neighbour like yourselves; but in the


present instance, as we have just shown, your habits are old-fashioned


as compared with theirs. It is the law as in art, so in politics, that


improvements ever prevail; and though fixed usages may be best for


undisturbed communities, constant necessities of action must be


accompanied by the constant improvement of methods. Thus it happens


that the vast experience of Athens has carried her further than you on


the path of innovation.


  "Here, at least, let your procrastination end. For the present,


assist your allies and Potidaea in particular, as you promised, by a


speedy invasion of Attica, and do not sacrifice friends and kindred to


their bitterest enemies, and drive the rest of us in despair to some


other alliance. Such a step would not be condemned either by the


Gods who received our oaths, or by the men who witnessed them. The


breach of a treaty cannot be laid to the people whom desertion compels


to seek new relations, but to the power that fails to assist its


confederate. But if you will only act, we will stand by you; it


would be unnatural for us to change, and never should we meet with


such a congenial ally. For these reasons choose the right course,


and endeavour not to let Peloponnese under your supremacy degenerate


from the prestige that it enjoyed under that of your ancestors."


  Such were the words of the Corinthians. There happened to be


Athenian envoys present at Lacedaemon on other business. On hearing


the speeches they thought themselves called upon to come before the


Lacedaemonians. Their intention was not to offer a defence on any of


the charges which the cities brought against them, but to show on a


comprehensive view that it was not a matter to be hastily decided


on, but one that demanded further consideration. There was also a wish


to call attention to the great power of Athens, and to refresh the


memory of the old and enlighten the ignorance of the young, from a


notion that their words might have the effect of inducing them to


prefer tranquillity to war. So they came to the Lacedaemonians and


said that they too, if there was no objection, wished to speak to


their assembly. They replied by inviting them to come forward. The


Athenians advanced, and spoke as follows:


  "The object of our mission here was not to argue with your allies,


but to attend to the matters on which our state dispatched us.


However, the vehemence of the outcry that we hear against us has


prevailed on us to come forward. It is not to combat the accusations


of the cities (indeed you are not the judges before whom either we


or they can plead), but to prevent your taking the wrong course on


matters of great importance by yielding too readily to the persuasions


of your allies. We also wish to show on a review of the whole


indictment that we have a fair title to our possessions, and that


our country has claims to consideration. We need not refer to remote


antiquity: there we could appeal to the voice of tradition, but not to


the experience of our audience. But to the Median War and contemporary


history we must refer, although we are rather tired of continually


bringing this subject forward. In our action during that war we ran


great risk to obtain certain advantages: you had your share in the


solid results, do not try to rob us of all share in the good that


the glory may do us. However, the story shall be told not so much to


deprecate hostility as to testify against it, and to show, if you


are so ill advised as to enter into a struggle with Athens, what


sort of an antagonist she is likely to prove. We assert that at


Marathon we were at the front, and faced the barbarian


single-handed. That when he came the second time, unable to cope


with him by land we went on board our ships with all our people, and


joined in the action at Salamis. This prevented his taking the


Peloponnesian states in detail, and ravaging them with his fleet; when


the multitude of his vessels would have made any combination for


self-defence impossible. The best proof of this was furnished by the


invader himself. Defeated at sea, he considered his power to be no


longer what it had been, and retired as speedily as possible with


the greater part of his army.


  "Such, then, was the result of the matter, and it was clearly proved


that it was on the fleet of Hellas that her cause depended. Well, to


this result we contributed three very useful elements, viz., the


largest number of ships, the ablest commander, and the most


unhesitating patriotism. Our contingent of ships was little less


than two-thirds of the whole four hundred; the commander was


Themistocles, through whom chiefly it was that the battle took place


in the straits, the acknowledged salvation of our cause. Indeed,


this was the reason of your receiving him with honours such as had


never been accorded to any foreign visitor. While for daring


patriotism we had no competitors. Receiving no reinforcements from


behind, seeing everything in front of us already subjugated, we had


the spirit, after abandoning our city, after sacrificing our


property (instead of deserting the remainder of the league or


depriving them of our services by dispersing), to throw ourselves into


our ships and meet the danger, without a thought of resenting your


neglect to assist us. We assert, therefore, that we conferred on you


quite as much as we received. For you had a stake to fight for; the


cities which you had left were still filled with your homes, and you


had the prospect of enjoying them again; and your coming was


prompted quite as much by fear for yourselves as for us; at all


events, you never appeared till we had nothing left to lose. But we


left behind us a city that was a city no longer, and staked our


lives for a city that had an existence only in desperate hope, and


so bore our full share in your deliverance and in ours. But if we


had copied others, and allowed fears for our territory to make us give


in our adhesion to the Mede before you came, or if we had suffered our


ruin to break our spirit and prevent us embarking in our ships, your


naval inferiority would have made a sea-fight unnecessary, and his


objects would have been peaceably attained.


  "Surely, Lacedaemonians, neither by the patriotism that we displayed


at that crisis, nor by the wisdom of our counsels, do we merit our


extreme unpopularity with the Hellenes, not at least unpopularity


for our empire. That empire we acquired by no violent means, but


because you were unwilling to prosecute to its conclusion the war


against the barbarian, and because the allies attached themselves to


us and spontaneously asked us to assume the command. And the nature of


the case first compelled us to advance our empire to its present


height; fear being our principal motive, though honour and interest


afterwards came in. And at last, when almost all hated us, when some


had already revolted and had been subdued, when you had ceased to be


the friends that you once were, and had become objects of suspicion


and dislike, it appeared no longer safe to give up our empire;


especially as all who left us would fall to you. And no one can


quarrel with a people for making, in matters of tremendous risk, the


best provision that it can for its interest.


  "You, at all events, Lacedaemonians, have used your supremacy to


settle the states in Peloponnese as is agreeable to you. And if at the


period of which we were speaking you had persevered to the end of


the matter, and had incurred hatred in your command, we are sure


that you would have made yourselves just as galling to the allies, and


would have been forced to choose between a strong government and


danger to yourselves. It follows that it was not a very wonderful


action, or contrary to the common practice of mankind, if we did


accept an empire that was offered to us, and refused to give it up


under the pressure of three of the strongest motives, fear, honour,


and interest. And it was not we who set the example, for it has always


been law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger. Besides,


we believed ourselves to be worthy of our position, and so you thought


us till now, when calculations of interest have made you take up the


cry of justice- a consideration which no one ever yet brought forward


to hinder his ambition when he had a chance of gaining anything by


might. And praise is due to all who, if not so superior to human


nature as to refuse dominion, yet respect justice more than their


position compels them to do.


  "We imagine that our moderation would be best demonstrated by the


conduct of others who should be placed in our position; but even our


equity has very unreasonably subjected us to condemnation instead of


approval. Our abatement of our rights in the contract trials with


our allies, and our causing them to be decided by impartial laws at


Athens, have gained us the character of being litigious. And none care


to inquire why this reproach is not brought against other imperial


powers, who treat their subjects with less moderation than we do;


the secret being that where force can be used, law is not needed.


But our subjects are so habituated to associate with us as equals that


any defeat whatever that clashes with their notions of justice,


whether it proceeds from a legal judgment or from the power which


our empire gives us, makes them forget to be grateful for being


allowed to retain most of their possessions, and more vexed at a


part being taken, than if we had from the first cast law aside and


openly gratified our covetousness. If we had done so, not even would


they have disputed that the weaker must give way to the stronger.


Men's indignation, it seems, is more excited by legal wrong than by


violent wrong; the first looks like being cheated by an equal, the


second like being compelled by a superior. At all events they


contrived to put up with much worse treatment than this from the Mede,


yet they think our rule severe, and this is to be expected, for the


present always weighs heavy on the conquered. This at least is


certain. If you were to succeed in overthrowing us and in taking our


place, you would speedily lose the popularity with which fear of us


has invested you, if your policy of to-day is at all to tally with the


sample that you gave of it during the brief period of your command


against the Mede. Not only is your life at home regulated by rules and


institutions incompatible with those of others, but your citizens


abroad act neither on these rules nor on those which are recognized by


the rest of Hellas.


  "Take time then in forming your resolution, as the matter is of


great importance; and do not be persuaded by the opinions and


complaints of others to bring trouble on yourselves, but consider


the vast influence of accident in war, before you are engaged in it.


As it continues, it generally becomes an affair of chances, chances


from which neither of us is exempt, and whose event we must risk in


the dark. It is a common mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong


end, to act first, and wait for disaster to discuss the matter. But we


are not yet by any means so misguided, nor, so far as we can see,


are you; accordingly, while it is still open to us both to choose


aright, we bid you not to dissolve the treaty, or to break your oaths,


but to have our differences settled by arbitration according to our


agreement. Or else we take the gods who heard the oaths to witness,


and if you begin hostilities, whatever line of action you choose, we


will try not to be behindhand in repelling you."


  Such were the words of the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had


heard the complaints of the allies against the Athenians, and the


observations of the latter, they made all withdraw, and consulted by


themselves on the question before them. The opinions of the majority


all led to the same conclusion; the Athenians were open aggressors,


and war must be declared at once. But Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian


king, came forward, who had the reputation of being at once a wise and


a moderate man, and made the following speech:


  "I have not lived so long, Lacedaemonians, without having had the


experience of many wars, and I see those among you of the same age


as myself, who will not fall into the common misfortune of longing for


war from inexperience or from a belief in its advantage and its


safety. This, the war on which you are now debating, would be one of


the greatest magnitude, on a sober consideration of the matter. In a


struggle with Peloponnesians and neighbours our strength is of the


same character, and it is possible to move swiftly on the different


points. But a struggle with a people who live in a distant land, who


have also an extraordinary familiarity with the sea, and who are in


the highest state of preparation in every other department; with


wealth private and public, with ships, and horses, and heavy infantry,


and a population such as no one other Hellenic place can equal, and


lastly a number of tributary allies- what can justify us in rashly


beginning such a struggle? wherein is our trust that we should rush on


it unprepared? Is it in our ships? There we are inferior; while if


we are to practise and become a match for them, time must intervene.


Is it in our money? There we have a far greater deficiency. We neither


have it in our treasury, nor are we ready to contribute it from our


private funds. Confidence might possibly be felt in our superiority in


heavy infantry and population, which will enable us to invade and


devastate their lands. But the Athenians have plenty of other land


in their empire, and can import what they want by sea. Again, if we


are to attempt an insurrection of their allies, these will have to


be supported with a fleet, most of them being islanders. What then


is to be our war? For unless we can either beat them at sea, or


deprive them of the revenues which feed their navy, we shall meet with


little but disaster. Meanwhile our honour will be pledged to keeping


on, particularly if it be the opinion that we began the quarrel. For


let us never be elated by the fatal hope of the war being quickly


ended by the devastation of their lands. I fear rather that we may


leave it as a legacy to our children; so improbable is it that the


Athenian spirit will be the slave of their land, or Athenian


experience be cowed by war.


  "Not that I would bid you be so unfeeling as to suffer them to


injure your allies, and to refrain from unmasking their intrigues; but


I do bid you not to take up arms at once, but to send and


remonstrate with them in a tone not too suggestive of war, nor again


too suggestive of submission, and to employ the interval in perfecting


our own preparations. The means will be, first, the acquisition of


allies, Hellenic or barbarian it matters not, so long as they are an


accession to our strength naval or pecuniary- I say Hellenic or


barbarian, because the odium of such an accession to all who like us


are the objects of the designs of the Athenians is taken away by the


law of self-preservation- and secondly the development of our home


resources. If they listen to our embassy, so much the better; but if


not, after the lapse of two or three years our position will have


become materially strengthened, and we can then attack them if we


think proper. Perhaps by that time the sight of our preparations,


backed by language equally significant, will have disposed them to


submission, while their land is still untouched, and while their


counsels may be directed to the retention of advantages as yet


undestroyed. For the only light in which you can view their land is


that of a hostage in your hands, a hostage the more valuable the


better it is cultivated. This you ought to spare as long as


possible, and not make them desperate, and so increase the


difficulty of dealing with them. For if while still unprepared,


hurried away by the complaints of our allies, we are induced to lay it


waste, have a care that we do not bring deep disgrace and deep


perplexity upon Peloponnese. Complaints, whether of communities or


individuals, it is possible to adjust; but war undertaken by a


coalition for sectional interests, whose progress there is no means of


foreseeing, does not easily admit of creditable settlement.


  "And none need think it cowardice for a number of confederates to


pause before they attack a single city. The Athenians have allies as


numerous as our own, and allies that pay tribute, and war is a


matter not so much of arms as of money, which makes arms of use. And


this is more than ever true in a struggle between a continental and


a maritime power. First, then, let us provide money, and not allow


ourselves to be carried away by the talk of our allies before we


have done so: as we shall have the largest share of responsibility for


the consequences be they good or bad, we have also a right to a


tranquil inquiry respecting them.


  "And the slowness and procrastination, the parts of our character


that are most assailed by their criticism, need not make you blush. If


we undertake the war without preparation, we should by hastening its


commencement only delay its conclusion: further, a free and a famous


city has through all time been ours. The quality which they condemn is


really nothing but a wise moderation; thanks to its possession, we


alone do not become insolent in success and give way less than


others in misfortune; we are not carried away by the pleasure of


hearing ourselves cheered on to risks which our judgment condemns;


nor, if annoyed, are we any the more convinced by attempts to


exasperate us by accusation. We are both warlike and wise, and it is


our sense of order that makes us so. We are warlike, because


self-control contains honour as a chief constituent, and honour


bravery. And we are wise, because we are educated with too little


learning to despise the laws, and with too severe a self-control to


disobey them, and are brought up not to be too knowing in useless


matters- such as the knowledge which can give a specious criticism of


an enemy's plans in theory, but fails to assail them with equal


success in practice- but are taught to consider that the schemes of


our enemies are not dissimilar to our own, and that the freaks of


chance are not determinable by calculation. In practice we always base


our preparations against an enemy on the assumption that his plans are


good; indeed, it is right to rest our hopes not on a belief in his


blunders, but on the soundness of our provisions. Nor ought we to


believe that there is much difference between man and man, but to


think that the superiority lies with him who is reared in the severest


school. These practices, then, which our ancestors have delivered to


us, and by whose maintenance we have always profited, must not be


given up. And we must not be hurried into deciding in a day's brief


space a question which concerns many lives and fortunes and many


cities, and in which honour is deeply involved- but we must decide


calmly. This our strength peculiarly enables us to do. As for the


Athenians, send to them on the matter of Potidaea, send on the


matter of the alleged wrongs of the allies, particularly as they are


prepared with legal satisfaction; and to proceed against one who


offers arbitration as against a wrongdoer, law forbids. Meanwhile do


not omit preparation for war. This decision will be the best for


yourselves, the most terrible to your opponents."


  Such were the words of Archidamus. Last came forward Sthenelaidas,


one of the ephors for that year, and spoke to the Lacedaemonians as


follows:


  "The long speech of the Athenians I do not pretend to understand.


They said a good deal in praise of themselves, but nowhere denied that


they are injuring our allies and Peloponnese. And yet if they


behaved well against the Mede then, but ill towards us now, they


deserve double punishment for having ceased to be good and for


having become bad. We meanwhile are the same then and now, and shall


not, if we are wise, disregard the wrongs of our allies, or put off


till to-morrow the duty of assisting those who must suffer to-day.


Others have much money and ships and horses, but we have good allies


whom we must not give up to the Athenians, nor by lawsuits and words


decide the matter, as it is anything but in word that we are harmed,


but render instant and powerful help. And let us not be told that it


is fitting for us to deliberate under injustice; long deliberation


is rather fitting for those who have injustice in contemplation.


Vote therefore, Lacedaemonians, for war, as the honour of Sparta


demands, and neither allow the further aggrandizement of Athens, nor


betray our allies to ruin, but with the gods let us advance against


the aggressors."


  With these words he, as ephor, himself put the question to the


assembly of the Lacedaemonians. He said that he could not determine


which was the loudest acclamation (their mode of decision is by


acclamation not by voting); the fact being that he wished to make them


declare their opinion openly and thus to increase their ardour for


war. Accordingly he said: "All Lacedaemonians who are of opinion


that the treaty has been broken, and that Athens is guilty, leave your


seats and go there," pointing out a certain place; "all who are of the


opposite opinion, there." They accordingly stood up and divided; and


those who held that the treaty had been broken were in a decided


majority. Summoning the allies, they told them that their opinion


was that Athens had been guilty of injustice, but that they wished


to convoke all the allies and put it to the vote; in order that they


might make war, if they decided to do so, on a common resolution.


Having thus gained their point, the delegates returned home at once;


the Athenian envoys a little later, when they had dispatched the


objects of their mission. This decision of the assembly, judging


that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year of


the thirty years' truce, which was entered into after the affair of


Euboea.


  The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that


the war must be declared, not so much because they were persuaded by


the arguments of the allies, as because they feared the growth of


the power of the Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to


them.


                           CHAPTER IV.





          From the end of the Persian to the beginning


             of the Peloponnesian War - The Progress


                    from Supremacy to Empire





  THE way in which Athens came to be placed in the circumstances


under which her power grew was this. After the Medes had returned


from Europe, defeated by sea and land by the Hellenes, and after


those of them who had fled with their ships to Mycale had been


destroyed, Leotychides, king of the Lacedaemonians, the commander of


the Hellenes at Mycale, departed home with the allies from


Peloponnese. But the Athenians and the allies from Ionia and


Hellespont, who had now revolted from the King, remained and laid


siege to Sestos, which was still held by the Medes. After wintering


before it, they became masters of the place on its evacuation by the


barbarians; and after this they sailed away from Hellespont to their


respective cities. Meanwhile the Athenian people, after the departure


of the barbarian from their country, at once proceeded to carry over


their children and wives, and such property as they had left, from


the places where they had deposited them, and prepared to rebuild


their city and their walls. For only isolated portions of the


circumference had been left standing, and most of the houses were in


ruins; though a few remained, in which the Persian grandees had taken


up their quarters.


  Perceiving what they were going to do, the Lacedaemonians sent an


embassy to Athens. They would have themselves preferred to see neither


her nor any other city in possession of a wall; though here they acted


principally at the instigation of their allies, who were alarmed at


the strength of her newly acquired navy and the valour which she had


displayed in the war with the Medes. They begged her not only to


abstain from building walls for herself, but also to join them in


throwing down the walls that still held together of the


ultra-Peloponnesian cities. The real meaning of their advice, the


suspicion that it contained against the Athenians, was not proclaimed;


it was urged that so the barbarian, in the event of a third


invasion, would not have any strong place, such as he now had in


Thebes, for his base of operations; and that Peloponnese would suffice


for all as a base both for retreat and offence. After the


Lacedaemonians had thus spoken, they were, on the advice of


Themistocles, immediately dismissed by the Athenians, with the


answer that ambassadors should be sent to Sparta to discuss the


question. Themistocles told the Athenians to send him off with all


speed to Lacedaemon, but not to dispatch his colleagues as soon as


they had selected them, but to wait until they had raised their wall


to the height from which defence was possible. Meanwhile the whole


population in the city was to labour at the wall, the Athenians, their


wives, and their children, sparing no edifice, private or public,


which might be of any use to the work, but throwing all down. After


giving these instructions, and adding that he would be responsible for


all other matters there, he departed. Arrived at Lacedaemon he did not


seek an audience with the authorities, but tried to gain time and made


excuses. When any of the government asked him why he did not appear in


the assembly, he would say that he was waiting for his colleagues, who


had been detained in Athens by some engagement; however, that he


expected their speedy arrival, and wondered that they were not yet


there. At first the Lacedaemonians trusted the words of


Themistocles, through their friendship for him; but when others


arrived, all distinctly declaring that the work was going on and


already attaining some elevation, they did not know how to


disbelieve it. Aware of this, he told them that rumours are deceptive,


and should not be trusted; they should send some reputable persons


from Sparta to inspect, whose report might be trusted. They dispatched


them accordingly. Concerning these Themistocles secretly sent word


to the Athenians to detain them as far as possible without putting


them under open constraint, and not to let them go until they had


themselves returned. For his colleagues had now joined him,


Abronichus, son of Lysicles, and Aristides, son of Lysimachus, with


the news that the wall was sufficiently advanced; and he feared that


when the Lacedaemonians heard the facts, they might refuse to let them


go. So the Athenians detained the envoys according to his message, and


Themistocles had an audience with the Lacedaemonians, and at last


openly told them that Athens was now fortified sufficiently to protect


its inhabitants; that any embassy which the Lacedaemonians or their


allies might wish to send to them should in future proceed on the


assumption that the people to whom they were going was able to


distinguish both its own and the general interests. That when the


Athenians thought fit to abandon their city and to embark in their


ships, they ventured on that perilous step without consulting them;


and that on the other hand, wherever they had deliberated with the


Lacedaemonians, they had proved themselves to be in judgment second to


none. That they now thought it fit that their city should have a wall,


and that this would be more for the advantage of both the citizens


of Athens and the Hellenic confederacy; for without equal military


strength it was impossible to contribute equal or fair counsel to


the common interest. It followed, he observed, either that all the


members of the confederacy should be without walls, or that the


present step should be considered a right one.


  The Lacedaemonians did not betray any open signs of anger against


the Athenians at what they heard. The embassy, it seems, was


prompted not by a desire to obstruct, but to guide the counsels of


their government: besides, Spartan feeling was at that time very


friendly towards Athens on account of the patriotism which she had


displayed in the struggle with the Mede. Still the defeat of their


wishes could not but cause them secret annoyance. The envoys of each


state departed home without complaint.


  In this way the Athenians walled their city in a little while. To


this day the building shows signs of the haste of its execution; the


foundations are laid of stones of all kinds, and in some places not


wrought or fitted, but placed just in the order in which they were


brought by the different hands; and many columns, too, from tombs, and


sculptured stones were put in with the rest. For the bounds of the


city were extended at every point of the circumference; and so they


laid hands on everything without exception in their haste.


Themistocles also persuaded them to finish the walls of Piraeus, which


had been begun before, in his year of office as archon; being


influenced alike by the fineness of a locality that has three


natural harbours, and by the great start which the Athenians would


gain in the acquisition of power by becoming a naval people. For he


first ventured to tell them to stick to the sea and forthwith began to


lay the foundations of the empire. It was by his advice, too, that


they built the walls of that thickness which can still be discerned


round Piraeus, the stones being brought up by two wagons meeting


each other. Between the walls thus formed there was neither rubble nor


mortar, but great stones hewn square and fitted together, cramped to


each other on the outside with iron and lead. About half the height


that he intended was finished. His idea was by their size and


thickness to keep off the attacks of an enemy; he thought that they


might be adequately defended by a small garrison of invalids, and


the rest be freed for service in the fleet. For the fleet claimed most


of his attention. He saw, as I think, that the approach by sea was


easier for the king's army than that by land: he also thought


Piraeus more valuable than the upper city; indeed, he was always


advising the Athenians, if a day should come when they were hard


pressed by land, to go down into Piraeus, and defy the world with


their fleet. Thus, therefore, the Athenians completed their wall,


and commenced their other buildings immediately after the retreat of


the Mede.


  Meanwhile Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, was sent out from


Lacedaemon as commander-in-chief of the Hellenes, with twenty ships


from Peloponnese. With him sailed the Athenians with thirty ships, and


a number of the other allies. They made an expedition against Cyprus


and subdued most of the island, and afterwards against Byzantium,


which was in the hands of the Medes, and compelled it to surrender.


This event took place while the Spartans were still supreme. But the


violence of Pausanias had already begun to be disagreeable to the


Hellenes, particularly to the Ionians and the newly liberated


populations. These resorted to the Athenians and requested them as


their kinsmen to become their leaders, and to stop any attempt at


violence on the part of Pausanias. The Athenians accepted their


overtures, and determined to put down any attempt of the kind and to


settle everything else as their interests might seem to demand. In the


meantime the Lacedaemonians recalled Pausanias for an investigation of


the reports which had reached them. Manifold and grave accusations had


been brought against him by Hellenes arriving in Sparta; and, to all


appearance, there had been in him more of the mimicry of a despot than


of the attitude of a general. As it happened, his recall came just


at the time when the hatred which he had inspired had induced the


allies to desert him, the soldiers from Peloponnese excepted, and to


range themselves by the side of the Athenians. On his arrival at


Lacedaemon, he was censured for his private acts of oppression, but


was acquitted on the heaviest counts and pronounced not guilty; it


must be known that the charge of Medism formed one of the principal,


and to all appearance one of the best founded, articles against him.


The Lacedaemonians did not, however, restore him to his command, but


sent out Dorkis and certain others with a small force; who found the


allies no longer inclined to concede to them the supremacy. Perceiving


this they departed, and the Lacedaemonians did not send out any to


succeed them. They feared for those who went out a deterioration


similar to that observable in Pausanias; besides, they desired to be


rid of the Median War, and were satisfied of the competency of the


Athenians for the position, and of their friendship at the time


towards themselves.


  The Athenians, having thus succeeded to the supremacy by the


voluntary act of the allies through their hatred of Pausanias, fixed


which cities were to contribute money against the barbarian, which


ships; their professed object being to retaliate for their


sufferings by ravaging the King's country. Now was the time that the


office of "Treasurers for Hellas" was first instituted by the


Athenians. These officers received the tribute, as the money


contributed was called. The tribute was first fixed at four hundred


and sixty talents. The common treasury was at Delos, and the


congresses were held in the temple. Their supremacy commenced with


independent allies who acted on the resolutions of a common


congress. It was marked by the following undertakings in war and in


administration during the interval between the Median and the


present war, against the barbarian, against their own rebel allies,


and against the Peloponnesian powers which would come in contact


with them on various occasions. My excuse for relating these events,


and for venturing on this digression, is that this passage of


history has been omitted by all my predecessors, who have confined


themselves either to Hellenic history before the Median War, or the


Median War itself. Hellanicus, it is true, did touch on these events


in his Athenian history; but he is somewhat concise and not accurate


in his dates. Besides, the history of these events contains an


explanation of the growth of the Athenian empire.


  First the Athenians besieged and captured Eion on the Strymon from


the Medes, and made slaves of the inhabitants, being under the command


of Cimon, son of Miltiades. Next they enslaved Scyros, the island in


the Aegean, containing a Dolopian population, and colonized it


themselves. This was followed by a war against Carystus, in which


the rest of Euboea remained neutral, and which was ended by


surrender on conditions. After this Naxos left the confederacy, and


a war ensued, and she had to return after a siege; this was the


first instance of the engagement being broken by the subjugation of an


allied city, a precedent which was followed by that of the rest in the


order which circumstances prescribed. Of all the causes of


defection, that connected with arrears of tribute and vessels, and


with failure of service, was the chief; for the Athenians were very


severe and exacting, and made themselves offensive by applying the


screw of necessity to men who were not used to and in fact not


disposed for any continuous labour. In some other respects the


Athenians were not the old popular rulers they had been at first;


and if they had more than their fair share of service, it was


correspondingly easy for them to reduce any that tried to leave the


confederacy. For this the allies had themselves to blame; the wish


to get off service making most of them arrange to pay their share of


the expense in money instead of in ships, and so to avoid having to


leave their homes. Thus while Athens was increasing her navy with


the funds which they contributed, a revolt always found them without


resources or experience for war.


  Next we come to the actions by land and by sea at the river


Eurymedon, between the Athenians with their allies, and the Medes,


when the Athenians won both battles on the same day under the


conduct of Cimon, son of Miltiades, and captured and destroyed the


whole Phoenician fleet, consisting of two hundred vessels. Some time


afterwards occurred the defection of the Thasians, caused by


disagreements about the marts on the opposite coast of Thrace, and


about the mine in their possession. Sailing with a fleet to Thasos,


the Athenians defeated them at sea and effected a landing on the


island. About the same time they sent ten thousand settlers of their


own citizens and the allies to settle the place then called Ennea


Hodoi or Nine Ways, now Amphipolis. They succeeded in gaining


possession of Ennea Hodoi from the Edonians, but on advancing into the


interior of Thrace were cut off in Drabescus, a town of the


Edonians, by the assembled Thracians, who regarded the settlement of


the place Ennea Hodoi as an act of hostility. Meanwhile the Thasians


being defeated in the field and suffering siege, appealed to


Lacedaemon, and desired her to assist them by an invasion of Attica.


Without informing Athens, she promised and intended to do so, but


was prevented by the occurrence of the earthquake, accompanied by


the secession of the Helots and the Thuriats and Aethaeans of the


Perioeci to Ithome. Most of the Helots were the descendants of the old


Messenians that were enslaved in the famous war; and so all of them


came to be called Messenians. So the Lacedaemonians being engaged in a


war with the rebels in Ithome, the Thasians in the third year of the


siege obtained terms from the Athenians by razing their walls,


delivering up their ships, and arranging to pay the moneys demanded at


once, and tribute in future; giving up their possessions on the


continent together with the mine.


  The Lacedaemonians, meanwhile, finding the war against the rebels in


Ithome likely to last, invoked the aid of their allies, and especially


of the Athenians, who came in some force under the command of Cimon.


The reason for this pressing summons lay in their reputed skill in


siege operations; a long siege had taught the Lacedaemonians their own


deficiency in this art, else they would have taken the place by


assault. The first open quarrel between the Lacedaemonians and


Athenians arose out of this expedition. The Lacedaemonians, when


assault failed to take the place, apprehensive of the enterprising and


revolutionary character of the Athenians, and further looking upon


them as of alien extraction, began to fear that, if they remained,


they might be tempted by the besieged in Ithome to attempt some


political changes. They accordingly dismissed them alone of the


allies, without declaring their suspicions, but merely saying that


they had now no need of them. But the Athenians, aware that their


dismissal did not proceed from the more honourable reason of the


two, but from suspicions which had been conceived, went away deeply


offended, and conscious of having done nothing to merit such treatment


from the Lacedaemonians; and the instant that they returned home


they broke off the alliance which had been made against the Mede,


and allied themselves with Sparta's enemy Argos; each of the


contracting parties taking the same oaths and making the same alliance


with the Thessalians.


  Meanwhile the rebels in Ithome, unable to prolong further a ten


years' resistance, surrendered to Lacedaemon; the conditions being


that they should depart from Peloponnese under safe conduct, and


should never set foot in it again: any one who might hereafter be


found there was to be the slave of his captor. It must be known that


the Lacedaemonians had an old oracle from Delphi, to the effect that


they should let go the suppliant of Zeus at Ithome. So they went forth


with their children and their wives, and being received by Athens from


the hatred that she now felt for the Lacedaemonians, were located at


Naupactus, which she had lately taken from the Ozolian Locrians. The


Athenians received another addition to their confederacy in the


Megarians; who left the Lacedaemonian alliance, annoyed by a war about


boundaries forced on them by Corinth. The Athenians occupied Megara


and Pegae, and built the Megarians their long walls from the city to


Nisaea, in which they placed an Athenian garrison. This was the


principal cause of the Corinthians conceiving such a deadly hatred


against Athens.


  Meanwhile Inaros, son of Psammetichus, a Libyan king of the


Libyans on the Egyptian border, having his headquarters at Marea,


the town above Pharos, caused a revolt of almost the whole of Egypt


from King Artaxerxes and, placing himself at its head, invited the


Athenians to his assistance. Abandoning a Cyprian expedition upon


which they happened to be engaged with two hundred ships of their


own and their allies, they arrived in Egypt and sailed from the sea


into the Nile, and making themselves masters of the river and


two-thirds of Memphis, addressed themselves to the attack of the


remaining third, which is called White Castle. Within it were Persians


and Medes who had taken refuge there, and Egyptians who had not joined


the rebellion.


  Meanwhile the Athenians, making a descent from their fleet upon


Haliae, were engaged by a force of Corinthians and Epidaurians; and


the Corinthians were victorious. Afterwards the Athenians engaged


the Peloponnesian fleet off Cecruphalia; and the Athenians were


victorious. Subsequently war broke out between Aegina and Athens,


and there was a great battle at sea off Aegina between the Athenians


and Aeginetans, each being aided by their allies; in which victory


remained with the Athenians, who took seventy of the enemy's ships,


and landed in the country and commenced a siege under the command of


Leocrates, son of Stroebus. Upon this the Peloponnesians, desirous


of aiding the Aeginetans, threw into Aegina a force of three hundred


heavy infantry, who had before been serving with the Corinthians and


Epidaurians. Meanwhile the Corinthians and their allies occupied the


heights of Geraneia, and marched down into the Megarid, in the


belief that, with a large force absent in Aegina and Egypt, Athens


would be unable to help the Megarians without raising the siege of


Aegina. But the Athenians, instead of moving the army of Aegina,


raised a force of the old and young men that had been left in the


city, and marched into the Megarid under the command of Myronides.


After a drawn battle with the Corinthians, the rival hosts parted,


each with the impression that they had gained the victory. The


Athenians, however, if anything, had rather the advantage, and on


the departure of the Corinthians set up a trophy. Urged by the


taunts of the elders in their city, the Corinthians made their


preparations, and about twelve days afterwards came and set up their


trophy as victors. Sallying out from Megara, the Athenians cut off the


party that was employed in erecting the trophy, and engaged and


defeated the rest. In the retreat of the vanquished army, a


considerable division, pressed by the pursuers and mistaking the road,


dashed into a field on some private property, with a deep trench all


round it, and no way out. Being acquainted with the place, the


Athenians hemmed their front with heavy infantry and, placing the


light troops round in a circle, stoned all who had gone in. Corinth


here suffered a severe blow. The bulk of her army continued its


retreat home.


  About this time the Athenians began to build the long walls to the


sea, that towards Phalerum and that towards Piraeus. Meanwhile the


Phocians made an expedition against Doris, the old home of the


Lacedaemonians, containing the towns of Boeum, Kitinium, and


Erineum. They had taken one of these towns, when the Lacedaemonians


under Nicomedes, son of Cleombrotus, commanding for King


Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, who was still a minor, came to the


aid of the Dorians with fifteen hundred heavy infantry of their own,


and ten thousand of their allies. After compelling the Phocians to


restore the town on conditions, they began their retreat. The route by


sea, across the Crissaean Gulf, exposed them to the risk of being


stopped by the Athenian fleet; that across Geraneia seemed scarcely


safe, the Athenians holding Megara and Pegae. For the pass was a


difficult one, and was always guarded by the Athenians; and, in the


present instance, the Lacedaemonians had information that they meant


to dispute their passage. So they resolved to remain in Boeotia, and


to consider which would be the safest line of march. They had also


another reason for this resolve. Secret encouragement had been given


them by a party in Athens, who hoped to put an end to the reign of


democracy and the building of the Long Walls. Meanwhile the


Athenians marched against them with their whole levy and a thousand


Argives and the respective contingents of the rest of their allies.


Altogether they were fourteen thousand strong. The march was


prompted by the notion that the Lacedaemonians were at a loss how to


effect their passage, and also by suspicions of an attempt to


overthrow the democracy. Some cavalry also joined the Athenians from


their Thessalian allies; but these went over to the Lacedaemonians


during the battle.


  The battle was fought at Tanagra in Boeotia. After heavy loss on


both sides, victory declared for the Lacedaemonians and their


allies. After entering the Megarid and cutting down the fruit trees,


the Lacedaemonians returned home across Geraneia and the isthmus.


Sixty-two days after the battle the Athenians marched into Boeotia


under the command of Myronides, defeated the Boeotians in battle at


Oenophyta, and became masters of Boeotia and Phocis. They dismantled


the walls of the Tanagraeans, took a hundred of the richest men of the


Opuntian Locrians as hostages, and finished their own long walls. This


was followed by the surrender of the Aeginetans to Athens on


conditions; they pulled down their walls, gave up their ships, and


agreed to pay tribute in future. The Athenians sailed round


Peloponnese under Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus, burnt the arsenal of


Lacedaemon, took Chalcis, a town of the Corinthians, and in a


descent upon Sicyon defeated the Sicyonians in battle.


  Meanwhile the Athenians in Egypt and their allies were still


there, and encountered all the vicissitudes of war. First the


Athenians were masters of Egypt, and the King sent Megabazus a Persian


to Lacedaemon with money to bribe the Peloponnesians to invade


Attica and so draw off the Athenians from Egypt. Finding that the


matter made no progress, and that the money was only being wasted,


he recalled Megabazus with the remainder of the money, and sent


Megabuzus, son of Zopyrus, a Persian, with a large army to Egypt.


Arriving by land he defeated the Egyptians and their allies in a


battle, and drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and at length shut them


up in the island of Prosopitis, where he besieged them for a year


and six months. At last, draining the canal of its waters, which he


diverted into another channel, he left their ships high and dry and


joined most of the island to the mainland, and then marched over on


foot and captured it. Thus the enterprise of the Hellenes came to ruin


after six years of war. Of all that large host a few travelling


through Libya reached Cyrene in safety, but most of them perished. And


thus Egypt returned to its subjection to the King, except Amyrtaeus,


the king in the marshes, whom they were unable to capture from the


extent of the marsh; the marshmen being also the most warlike of the


Egyptians. Inaros, the Libyan king, the sole author of the Egyptian


revolt, was betrayed, taken, and crucified. Meanwhile a relieving


squadron of fifty vessels had sailed from Athens and the rest of the


confederacy for Egypt. They put in to shore at the Mendesian mouth


of the Nile, in total ignorance of what had occurred. Attacked on


the land side by the troops, and from the sea by the Phoenician


navy, most of the ships were destroyed; the few remaining being


saved by retreat. Such was the end of the great expedition of the


Athenians and their allies to Egypt.


  Meanwhile Orestes, son of Echecratidas, the Thessalian king, being


an exile from Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. Taking


with them the Boeotians and Phocians their allies, the Athenians


marched to Pharsalus in Thessaly. They became masters of the


country, though only in the immediate vicinity of the camp; beyond


which they could not go for fear of the Thessalian cavalry. But they


failed to take the city or to attain any of the other objects of their


expedition, and returned home with Orestes without having effected


anything. Not long after this a thousand of the Athenians embarked


in the vessels that were at Pegae (Pegae, it must be remembered, was


now theirs), and sailed along the coast to Sicyon under the command of


Pericles, son of Xanthippus. Landing in Sicyon and defeating the


Sicyonians who engaged them, they immediately took with them the


Achaeans and, sailing across, marched against and laid siege to


Oeniadae in Acarnania. Failing however to take it, they returned home.


  Three years afterwards a truce was made between the Peloponnesians


and Athenians for five years. Released from Hellenic war, the


Athenians made an expedition to Cyprus with two hundred vessels of


their own and their allies, under the command of Cimon. Sixty of these


were detached to Egypt at the instance of Amyrtaeus, the king in the


marshes; the rest laid siege to Kitium, from which, however, they were


compelled to retire by the death of Cimon and by scarcity of


provisions. Sailing off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought with the


Phoenicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians by land and sea, and, being


victorious on both elements departed home, and with them the


returned squadron from Egypt. After this the Lacedaemonians marched


out on a sacred war, and, becoming masters of the temple at Delphi, it


in the hands of the Delphians. Immediately after their retreat, the


Athenians marched out, became masters of the temple, and placed it


in the hands of the Phocians.


  Some time after this, Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and some other places


in Boeotia being in the hands of the Boeotian exiles, the Athenians


marched against the above-mentioned hostile places with a thousand


Athenian heavy infantry and the allied contingents, under the


command of Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus. They took Chaeronea, and made


slaves of the inhabitants, and, leaving a garrison, commenced their


return. On their road they were attacked at Coronea by the Boeotian


exiles from Orchomenus, with some Locrians and Euboean exiles, and


others who were of the same way of thinking, were defeated in


battle, and some killed, others taken captive. The Athenians evacuated


all Boeotia by a treaty providing for the recovery of the men; and the


exiled Boeotians returned, and with all the rest regained their


independence.


  This was soon afterwards followed by the revolt of Euboea from


Athens. Pericles had already crossed over with an army of Athenians to


the island, when news was brought to him that Megara had revolted,


that the Peloponnesians were on the point of invading Attica, and that


the Athenian garrison had been cut off by the Megarians, with the


exception of a few who had taken refuge in Nisaea. The Megarians had


introduced the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians into the


town before they revolted. Meanwhile Pericles brought his army back in


all haste from Euboea. After this the Peloponnesians marched into


Attica as far as Eleusis and Thrius, ravaging the country under the


conduct of King Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, and without


advancing further returned home. The Athenians then crossed over again


to Euboea under the command of Pericles, and subdued the whole of


the island: all but Histiaea was settled by convention; the Histiaeans


they expelled from their homes, and occupied their territory


themselves.


  Not long after their return from Euboea, they made a truce with


the Lacedaemonians and their allies for thirty years, giving up the


posts which they occupied in Peloponnese- Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and


Achaia. In the sixth year of the truce, war broke out between the


Samians and Milesians about Priene. Worsted in the war, the


Milesians came to Athens with loud complaints against the Samians.


In this they were joined by certain private persons from Samos itself,


who wished to revolutionize the government. Accordingly the


Athenians sailed to Samos with forty ships and set up a democracy;


took hostages from the Samians, fifty boys and as many men, lodged


them in Lemnos, and after leaving a garrison in the island returned


home. But some of the Samians had not remained in the island, but


had fled to the continent. Making an agreement with the most


powerful of those in the city, and an alliance with Pissuthnes, son of


Hystaspes, the then satrap of Sardis, they got together a force of


seven hundred mercenaries, and under cover of night crossed over to


Samos. Their first step was to rise on the commons, most of whom


they secured; their next to steal their hostages from Lemnos; after


which they revolted, gave up the Athenian garrison left with them


and its commanders to Pissuthnes, and instantly prepared for an


expedition against Miletus. The Byzantines also revolted with them.


  As soon as the Athenians heard the news, they sailed with sixty


ships against Samos. Sixteen of these went to Caria to look out for


the Phoenician fleet, and to Chios and Lesbos carrying round orders


for reinforcements, and so never engaged; but forty-four ships under


the command of Pericles with nine colleagues gave battle, off the


island of Tragia, to seventy Samian vessels, of which twenty were


transports, as they were sailing from Miletus. Victory remained with


the Athenians. Reinforced afterwards by forty ships from Athens, and


twenty-five Chian and Lesbian vessels, the Athenians landed, and


having the superiority by land invested the city with three walls;


it was also invested from the sea. Meanwhile Pericles took sixty ships


from the blockading squadron, and departed in haste for Caunus and


Caria, intelligence having been brought in of the approach of the


Phoenician fleet to the aid of the Samians; indeed Stesagoras and


others had left the island with five ships to bring them. But in the


meantime the Samians made a sudden sally, and fell on the camp,


which they found unfortified. Destroying the look-out vessels, and


engaging and defeating such as were being launched to meet them,


they remained masters of their own seas for fourteen days, and carried


in and carried out what they pleased. But on the arrival of


Pericles, they were once more shut up. Fresh reinforcements afterwards


arrived- forty ships from Athens with Thucydides, Hagnon, and


Phormio; twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles, and thirty vessels


from Chios and Lesbos. After a brief attempt at fighting, the Samians,


unable to hold out, were reduced after a nine months' siege and


surrendered on conditions; they razed their walls, gave hostages,


delivered up their ships, and arranged to pay the expenses of the


war by instalments. The Byzantines also agreed to be subject as


before.


                           CHAPTER V.





          Second Congress at Lacedaemon - Preparations


           for War and Diplomatic Skirmishes - Cylon -


                    Pausanias - Themistocles





  AFTER this, though not many years later, we at length come to what


has been already related, the affairs of Corcyra and Potidaea, and the


events that served as a pretext for the present war. All these actions


of the Hellenes against each other and the barbarian occurred in the


fifty years' interval between the retreat of Xerxes and the


beginning of the present war. During this interval the Athenians


succeeded in placing their empire on a firmer basis, and advanced


their own home power to a very great height. The Lacedaemonians,


though fully aware of it, opposed it only for a little while, but


remained inactive during most of the period, being of old slow to go


to war except under the pressure of necessity, and in the present


instance being hampered by wars at home; until the growth of the


Athenian power could be no longer ignored, and their own confederacy


became the object of its encroachments. They then felt that they could


endure it no longer, but that the time had come for them to throw


themselves heart and soul upon the hostile power, and break it, if


they could, by commencing the present war. And though the


Lacedaemonians had made up their own minds on the fact of the breach


of the treaty and the guilt of the Athenians, yet they sent to


Delphi and inquired of the God whether it would be well with them if


they went to war; and, as it is reported, received from him the answer


that if they put their whole strength into the war, victory would be


theirs, and the promise that he himself would be with them, whether


invoked or uninvoked. Still they wished to summon their allies


again, and to take their vote on the propriety of making war. After


the ambassadors from the confederates had arrived and a congress had


been convened, they all spoke their minds, most of them denouncing the


Athenians and demanding that the war should begin. In particular the


Corinthians. They had before on their own account canvassed the cities


in detail to induce them to vote for the war, in the fear that it


might come too late to save Potidaea; they were present also on this


occasion, and came forward the last, and made the following speech:


  "Fellow allies, we can no longer accuse the Lacedaemonians of having


failed in their duty: they have not only voted for war themselves, but


have assembled us here for that purpose. We say their duty, for


supremacy has its duties. Besides equitably administering private


interests, leaders are required to show a special care for the


common welfare in return for the special honours accorded to them by


all in other ways. For ourselves, all who have already had dealings


with the Athenians require no warning to be on their guard against


them. The states more inland and out of the highway of communication


should understand that, if they omit to support the coast powers,


the result will be to injure the transit of their produce for


exportation and the reception in exchange of their imports from the


sea; and they must not be careless judges of what is now said, as if


it had nothing to do with them, but must expect that the sacrifice


of the powers on the coast will one day be followed by the extension


of the danger to the interior, and must recognize that their own


interests are deeply involved in this discussion. For these reasons


they should not hesitate to exchange peace for war. If wise men remain


quiet, while they are not injured, brave men abandon peace for war


when they are injured, returning to an understanding on a favourable


opportunity: in fact, they are neither intoxicated by their success in


war, nor disposed to take an injury for the sake of the delightful


tranquillity of peace. Indeed, to falter for the sake of such delights


is, if you remain inactive, the quickest way of losing the sweets of


repose to which you cling; while to conceive extravagant pretensions


from success in war is to forget how hollow is the confidence by which


you are elated. For if many ill-conceived plans have succeeded through


the still greater fatuity of an opponent, many more, apparently well


laid, have on the contrary ended in disgrace. The confidence with


which we form our schemes is never completely justified in their


execution; speculation is carried on in safety, but, when it comes


to action, fear causes failure.


  "To apply these rules to ourselves, if we are now kindling war it is


under the pressure of injury, with adequate grounds of complaint;


and after we have chastised the Athenians we will in season desist. We


have many reasons to expect success- first, superiority in numbers


and in military experience, and secondly our general and unvarying


obedience in the execution of orders. The naval strength which they


possess shall be raised by us from our respective antecedent


resources, and from the moneys at Olympia and Delphi. A loan from


these enables us to seduce their foreign sailors by the offer of


higher pay. For the power of Athens is more mercenary than national;


while ours will not be exposed to the same risk, as its strength


lies more in men than in money. A single defeat at sea is in all


likelihood their ruin: should they hold out, in that case there will


be the more time for us to exercise ourselves in naval matters; and as


soon as we have arrived at an equality in science, we need scarcely


ask whether we shall be their superiors in courage. For the advantages


that we have by nature they cannot acquire by education; while their


superiority in science must be removed by our practice. The money


required for these objects shall be provided by our contributions:


nothing indeed could be more monstrous than the suggestion that, while


their allies never tire of contributing for their own servitude, we


should refuse to spend for vengeance and self-preservation the


treasure which by such refusal we shall forfeit to Athenian rapacity


and see employed for our own ruin.





  "We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of


their allies, the surest method of depriving them of their revenues,


which are the source of their strength, and establishment of fortified


positions in their country, and various operations which cannot be


foreseen at present. For war of all things proceeds least upon


definite rules, but draws principally upon itself for contrivances


to meet an emergency; and in such cases the party who faces the


struggle and keeps his temper best meets with most security, and he


who loses his temper about it with correspondent disaster. Let us also


reflect that if it was merely a number of disputes of territory


between rival neighbours, it might be borne; but here we have an enemy


in Athens that is a match for our whole coalition, and more than a


match for any of its members; so that unless as a body and as


individual nationalities and individual cities we make an unanimous


stand against her, she will easily conquer us divided and in detail.


That conquest, terrible as it may sound, would, it must be known, have


no other end than slavery pure and simple; a word which Peloponnese


cannot even hear whispered without disgrace, or without disgrace see


so many states abused by one. Meanwhile the opinion would be either


that we were justly so used, or that we put up with it from cowardice,


and were proving degenerate sons in not even securing for ourselves


the freedom which our fathers gave to Hellas; and in allowing the


establishment in Hellas of a tyrant state, though in individual states


we think it our duty to put down sole rulers. And we do not know how


this conduct can be held free from three of the gravest failings, want


of sense, of courage, or of vigilance. For we do not suppose that


you have taken refuge in that contempt of an enemy which has proved so


fatal in so many instances- a feeling which from the numbers that it


has ruined has come to be called not contemptuous but contemptible.


  "There is, however, no advantage in reflections on the past


further than may be of service to the present. For the future we


must provide by maintaining what the present gives us and redoubling


our efforts; it is hereditary to us to win virtue as the fruit of


labour, and you must not change the habit, even though you should have


a slight advantage in wealth and resources; for it is not right that


what was won in want should be lost in plenty; no, we must boldly


advance to the war for many reasons; the god has commanded it and


promised to be with us, and the rest of Hellas will all join in the


struggle, part from fear, part from interest. You will be the first to


break a treaty which the god, in advising us to go to war, judges to


be violated already, but rather to support a treaty that has been


outraged: indeed, treaties are broken not by resistance but by


aggression.


  "Your position, therefore, from whatever quarter you may view it,


will amply justify you in going to war; and this step we recommend


in the interests of all, bearing in mind that identity of interest


you have taken refuge in that contempt of an enemy which has proved so


fatal in so many instances- a feeling which from the numbers that it


has ruined has come to be called not contemptuous but contemptible.


  "There is, however, no advantage in reflections on the past


further than may be of service to the present. For the future we


must provide by maintaining what the present gives us and redoubling


our efforts; it is hereditary to us to win virtue as the fruit of


labour, and you must not change the habit, even though you should have


a slight advantage in wealth and resources; for it is not right that


what was won in want should be lost in plenty; no, we must boldly


advance to the war for many reasons; the god has commanded it and


promised to be with us, and the rest of Hellas will all join in the


struggle, part from fear, part from interest. You will be the first to


break a treaty which the god, in advising us to go to war, judges to


be violated already, but rather to support a treaty that has been


outraged: indeed, treaties are broken not by resistance but by


aggression.


  "Your position, therefore, from whatever quarter you may view it,


will amply justify you in going to war; and this step we recommend


in the interests of all, bearing in mind that identity of interest


you have taken refuge in that contempt of an enemy which has proved so


fatal in so many instances- a feeling which from the numbers that it


has ruined has come to be called not contemptuous but contemptible.


  "There is, however, no advantage in reflections on the past


further than may be of service to the present. For the future we


must provide by maintaining what the present gives us and redoubling


our efforts; it is hereditary to us to win virtue as the fruit of


labour, and you must not change the habit, even though you should have


a slight advantage in wealth and resources; for it is not right that


what was won in want should be lost in plenty; no, we must boldly


advance to the war for many reasons; the god has commanded it and


promised to be with us, and the rest of Hellas will all join in the


struggle, part from fear, part from interest. You will be the first to


break a treaty which the god, in advising us to go to war, judges to


be violated already, but rather to support a treaty that has been


outraged: indeed, treaties are broken not by resistance but by


aggression.


  "Your position, therefore, from whatever quarter you may view it,


will amply justify you in going to war; and this step we recommend


in the interests of all, bearing in mind that identity of interest


is the surest of bonds, whether between states or individuals. Delay


not, therefore, to assist Potidaea, a Dorian city besieged by Ionians,


which is quite a reversal of the order of things; nor to assert the


freedom of the rest. It is impossible for us to wait any longer when


waiting can only mean immediate disaster for some of us, and, if it


comes to be known that we have conferred but do not venture to protect


ourselves, like disaster in the near future for the rest. Delay not,


fellow allies, but, convinced of the necessity of the crisis and the


wisdom of this counsel, vote for the war, undeterred by its


immediate terrors, but looking beyond to the lasting peace by which it


will be succeeded. Out of war peace gains fresh stability, but to


refuse to abandon repose for war is not so sure a method of avoiding


danger. We must believe that the tyrant city that has been established


in Hellas has been established against all alike, with a programme


of universal empire, part fulfilled, part in contemplation; let us


then attack and reduce it, and win future security for ourselves and


freedom for the Hellenes who are now enslaved."


  Such were the words of the Corinthians. The Lacedaemonians, having


now heard all, give their opinion, took the vote of all the allied


states present in order, great and small alike; and the majority voted


for war. This decided, it was still impossible for them to commence at


once, from their want of preparation; but it was resolved that the


means requisite were to be procured by the different states, and


that there was to be no delay. And indeed, in spite of the time


occupied with the necessary arrangements, less than a year elapsed


before Attica was invaded, and the war openly begun.


  This interval was spent in sending embassies to Athens charged


with complaints, in order to obtain as good a pretext for war as


possible, in the event of her paying no attention to them. The first


Lacedaemonian embassy was to order the Athenians to drive out the


curse of the goddess; the history of which is as follows. In former


generations there was an Athenian of the name of Cylon, a victor at


the Olympic games, of good birth and powerful position, who had


married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, at that time tyrant of


Megara. Now this Cylon was inquiring at Delphi; when he was told by


the god to seize the Acropolis of Athens on the grand festival of


Zeus. Accordingly, procuring a force from Theagenes and persuading his


friends to join him, when the Olympic festival in Peloponnese came, he


seized the Acropolis, with the intention of making himself tyrant,


thinking that this was the grand festival of Zeus, and also an


occasion appropriate for a victor at the Olympic games. Whether the


grand festival that was meant was in Attica or elsewhere was a


question which he never thought of, and which the oracle did not offer


to solve. For the Athenians also have a festival which is called the


grand festival of Zeus Meilichios or Gracious, viz., the Diasia. It is


celebrated outside the city, and the whole people sacrifice not real


victims but a number of bloodless offerings peculiar to the country.


However, fancying he had chosen the right time, he made the attempt.


As soon as the Athenians perceived it, they flocked in, one and all,


from the country, and sat down, and laid siege to the citadel. But


as time went on, weary of the labour of blockade, most of them


departed; the responsibility of keeping guard being left to the nine


archons, with plenary powers to arrange everything according to


their good judgment. It must be known that at that time most political


functions were discharged by the nine archons. Meanwhile Cylon and his


besieged companions were distressed for want of food and water.


Accordingly Cylon and his brother made their escape; but the rest


being hard pressed, and some even dying of famine, seated themselves


as suppliants at the altar in the Acropolis. The Athenians who were


charged with the duty of keeping guard, when they saw them at the


point of death in the temple, raised them up on the understanding that


no harm should be done to them, led them out, and slew them. Some


who as they passed by took refuge at the altars of the awful goddesses


were dispatched on the spot. From this deed the men who killed them


were called accursed and guilty against the goddess, they and their


descendants. Accordingly these cursed ones were driven out by the


Athenians, driven out again by Cleomenes of Lacedaemon and an Athenian


faction; the living were driven out, and the bones of the dead were


taken up; thus they were cast out. For all that, they came back


afterwards, and their descendants are still in the city.


  This, then was the curse that the Lacedaemonians ordered them to


drive out. They were actuated primarily, as they pretended, by a


care for the honour of the gods; but they also know that Pericles, son


of Xanthippus, was connected with the curse on his mother's side,


and they thought that his banishment would materially advance their


designs on Athens. Not that they really hoped to succeed in


procuring this; they rather thought to create a prejudice against


him in the eyes of his countrymen from the feeling that the war


would be partly caused by his misfortune. For being the most


powerful man of his time, and the leading Athenian statesman, he


opposed the Lacedaemonians in everything, and would have no


concessions, but ever urged the Athenians on to war.


  The Athenians retorted by ordering the Lacedaemonians to drive out


the curse of Taenarus. The Lacedaemonians had once raised up some


Helot suppliants from the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, led them


away and slain them; for which they believe the great earthquake at


Sparta to have been a retribution. The Athenians also ordered them


to drive out the curse of the goddess of the Brazen House; the history


of which is as follows. After Pausanias the Lacedaemonian had been


recalled by the Spartans from his command in the Hellespont (this is


his first recall), and had been tried by them and acquitted, not being


again sent out in a public capacity, he took a galley of Hermione on


his own responsibility, without the authority of the Lacedaemonians,


and arrived as a private person in the Hellespont. He came


ostensibly for the Hellenic war, really to carry on his intrigues with


the King, which he had begun before his recall, being ambitious of


reigning over Hellas. The circumstance which first enabled him to


lay the King under an obligation, and to make a beginning of the whole


design, was this. Some connections and kinsmen of the King had been


taken in Byzantium, on its capture from the Medes, when he was first


there, after the return from Cyprus. These captives he sent off to the


King without the knowledge of the rest of the allies, the account


being that they had escaped from him. He managed this with the help of


Gongylus, an Eretrian, whom he had placed in charge of Byzantium and


the prisoners. He also gave Gongylus a letter for the King, the


contents of which were as follows, as was afterwards discovered:


"Pausanias, the general of Sparta, anxious to do you a favour, sends


you these his prisoners of war. I propose also, with your approval, to


marry your daughter, and to make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject


to you. I may say that I think I am able to do this, with your


co-operation. Accordingly if any of this please you, send a safe man


to the sea through whom we may in future conduct our correspondence."


  This was all that was revealed in the writing, and Xerxes was


pleased with the letter. He sent off Artabazus, son of Pharnaces, to


the sea with orders to supersede Megabates, the previous governor in


the satrapy of Daskylion, and to send over as quickly as possible to


Pausanias at Byzantium a letter which he entrusted to him; to show him


the royal signet, and to execute any commission which he might receive


from Pausanias on the King's matters with all care and fidelity.


Artabazus on his arrival carried the King's orders into effect, and


sent over the letter, which contained the following answer: "Thus


saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. For the men whom you have saved for me


across sea from Byzantium, an obligation is laid up for you in our


house, recorded for ever; and with your proposals I am well pleased.


Let neither night nor day stop you from diligently performing any of


your promises to me; neither for cost of gold nor of silver let them


be hindered, nor yet for number of troops, wherever it may be that


their presence is needed; but with Artabazus, an honourable man whom I


send you, boldly advance my objects and yours, as may be most for


the honour and interest of us both."


  Before held in high honour by the Hellenes as the hero of Plataea,


Pausanias, after the receipt of this letter, became prouder than ever,


and could no longer live in the usual style, but went out of Byzantium


in a Median dress, was attended on his march through Thrace by a


bodyguard of Medes and Egyptians, kept a Persian table, and was


quite unable to contain his intentions, but betrayed by his conduct in


trifles what his ambition looked one day to enact on a grander


scale. He also made himself difficult of access, and displayed so


violent a temper to every one without exception that no one could come


near him. Indeed, this was the principal reason why the confederacy


went over to the Athenians.


  The above-mentioned conduct, coming to the ears of the


Lacedaemonians, occasioned his first recall. And after his second


voyage out in the ship of Hermione, without their orders, he gave


proofs of similar behaviour. Besieged and expelled from Byzantium by


the Athenians, he did not return to Sparta; but news came that he


had settled at Colonae in the Troad, and was intriguing with the


barbarians, and that his stay there was for no good purpose; and the


ephors, now no longer hesitating, sent him a herald and a scytale with


orders to accompany the herald or be declared a public enemy.


Anxious above everything to avoid suspicion, and confident that he


could quash the charge by means of money, he returned a second time to


Sparta. At first thrown into prison by the ephors (whose powers enable


them to do this to the King), soon compromised the matter and came out


again, and offered himself for trial to any who wished to institute an


inquiry concerning him.


  Now the Spartans had no tangible proof against him- neither his


enemies nor the nation- of that indubitable kind required for the


punishment of a member of the royal family, and at that moment in high


office; he being regent for his first cousin King Pleistarchus,


Leonidas's son, who was still a minor. But by his contempt of the laws


and imitation of the barbarians, he gave grounds for much suspicion of


his being discontented with things established; all the occasions on


which he had in any way departed from the regular customs were


passed in review, and it was remembered that he had taken upon himself


to have inscribed on the tripod at Delphi, which was dedicated by


the Hellenes as the first-fruits of the spoil of the Medes, the


following couplet:





    The Mede defeated, great Pausanias raised


    This monument, that Phoebus might be praised.





  At the time the Lacedaemonians had at once erased the couplet, and


inscribed the names of the cities that had aided in the overthrow of


the barbarian and dedicated the offering. Yet it was considered that


Pausanias had here been guilty of a grave offence, which,


interpreted by the light of the attitude which he had since assumed,


gained a new significance, and seemed to be quite in keeping with


his present schemes. Besides, they were informed that he was even


intriguing with the Helots; and such indeed was the fact, for he


promised them freedom and citizenship if they would join him in


insurrection and would help him to carry out his plans to the end.


Even now, mistrusting the evidence even of the Helots themselves,


the ephors would not consent to take any decided step against him;


in accordance with their regular custom towards themselves, namely, to


be slow in taking any irrevocable resolve in the matter of a Spartan


citizen without indisputable proof. At last, it is said, the person


who was going to carry to Artabazus the last letter for the King, a


man of Argilus, once the favourite and most trusty servant of


Pausanias, turned informer. Alarmed by the reflection that none of the


previous messengers had ever returned, having counterfeited the


seal, in order that, if he found himself mistaken in his surmises,


or if Pausanias should ask to make some correction, he might not be


discovered, he undid the letter, and found the postscript that he


had suspected, viz., an order to put him to death.


  On being shown the letter, the ephors now felt more certain.


Still, they wished to hear Pausanias commit himself with their own


ears. Accordingly the man went by appointment to Taenarus as a


suppliant, and there built himself a hut divided into two by a


partition; within which he concealed some of the ephors and let them


hear the whole matter plainly. For Pausanias came to him and asked him


the reason of his suppliant position; and the man reproached him


with the order that he had written concerning him, and one by one


declared all the rest of the circumstances, how he who had never yet


brought him into any danger, while employed as agent between him and


the King, was yet just like the mass of his servants to be rewarded


with death. Admitting all this, and telling him not to be angry


about the matter, Pausanias gave him the pledge of raising him up from


the temple, and begged him to set off as quickly as possible, and


not to hinder the business in hand.


  The ephors listened carefully, and then departed, taking no action


for the moment, but, having at last attained to certainty, were


preparing to arrest him in the city. It is reported that, as he was


about to be arrested in the street, he saw from the face of one of the


ephors what he was coming for; another, too, made him a secret signal,


and betrayed it to him from kindness. Setting off with a run for the


temple of the goddess of the Brazen House, the enclosure of which


was near at hand, he succeeded in taking sanctuary before they took


him, and entering into a small chamber, which formed part of the


temple, to avoid being exposed to the weather, lay still there. The


ephors, for the moment distanced in the pursuit, afterwards took off


the roof of the chamber, and having made sure that he was inside, shut


him in, barricaded the doors, and staying before the place, reduced


him by starvation. When they found that he was on the point of


expiring, just as he was, in the chamber, they brought him out of


the temple, while the breath was still in him, and as soon as he was


brought out he died. They were going to throw him into the Kaiadas,


where they cast criminals, but finally decided to inter him


somewhere near. But the god at Delphi afterwards ordered the


Lacedaemonians to remove the tomb to the place of his death- where he


now lies in the consecrated ground, as an inscription on a monument


declares- and, as what had been done was a curse to them, to give


back two bodies instead of one to the goddess of the Brazen House.


So they had two brazen statues made, and dedicated them as a


substitute for Pausanias. the Athenians retorted by telling the


Lacedaemonians to drive out what the god himself had pronounced to


be a curse.


  To return to the Medism of Pausanias. Matter was found in the course


of the inquiry to implicate Themistocles; and the Lacedaemonians


accordingly sent envoys to the Athenians and required them to punish


him as they had punished Pausanias. The Athenians consented to do


so. But he had, as it happened, been ostracized, and, with a residence


at Argos, was in the habit of visiting other parts of Peloponnese.


So they sent with the Lacedaemonians, who were ready to join in the


pursuit, persons with instructions to take him wherever they found


him. But Themistocles got scent of their intentions, and fled from


Peloponnese to Corcyra, which was under obligations towards him. But


the Corcyraeans alleged that they could not venture to shelter him


at the cost of offending Athens and Lacedaemon, and they conveyed


him over to the continent opposite. Pursued by the officers who hung


on the report of his movements, at a loss where to turn, he was


compelled to stop at the house of Admetus, the Molossian king,


though they were not on friendly terms. Admetus happened not to be


indoors, but his wife, to whom he made himself a suppliant, instructed


him to take their child in his arms and sit down by the hearth. Soon


afterwards Admetus came in, and Themistocles told him who he was,


and begged him not to revenge on Themistocles in exile any


opposition which his requests might have experienced from Themistocles


at Athens. Indeed, he was now far too low for his revenge; retaliation


was only honourable between equals. Besides, his opposition to the


king had only affected the success of a request, not the safety of his


person; if the king were to give him up to the pursuers that he


mentioned, and the fate which they intended for him, he would just


be consigning him to certain death.


  The King listened to him and raised him up with his son, as he was


sitting with him in his arms after the most effectual method of


supplication, and on the arrival of the Lacedaemonians not long


afterwards, refused to give him up for anything they could say, but


sent him off by land to the other sea to Pydna in Alexander's


dominions, as he wished to go to the Persian king. There he met with a


merchantman on the point of starting for Ionia. Going on board, he was


carried by a storm to the Athenian squadron which was blockading


Naxos. In his alarm- he was luckily unknown to the people in the


vessel- he told the master who he was and what he was flying for, and


said that, if he refused to save him, he would declare that he was


taking him for a bribe. Meanwhile their safety consisted in letting no


one leave the ship until a favourable time for sailing should arise.


If he complied with his wishes, he promised him a proper recompense.


The master acted as he desired, and, after lying to for a day and a


night out of reach of the squadron, at length arrived at Ephesus.


  After having rewarded him with a present of money, as soon as he


received some from his friends at Athens and from his secret hoards at


Argos, Themistocles started inland with one of the coast Persians, and


sent a letter to King Artaxerxes, Xerxes's son, who had just come to


the throne. Its contents were as follows: "I, Themistocles, am come to


you, who did your house more harm than any of the Hellenes, when I was


compelled to defend myself against your father's invasion- harm,


however, far surpassed by the good that I did him during his


retreat, which brought no danger for me but much for him. For the


past, you are a good turn in my debt"- here he mentioned the warning


sent to Xerxes from Salamis to retreat, as well as his finding the


bridges unbroken, which, as he falsely pretended, was due to him-


"for the present, able to do you great service, I am here, pursued


by the Hellenes for my friendship for you. However, I desire a


year's grace, when I shall be able to declare in person the objects of


my coming."


  It is said that the King approved his intention, and told him to


do as he said. He employed the interval in making what progress he


could in the study of the Persian tongue, and of the customs of the


country. Arrived at court at the end of the year, he attained to


very high consideration there, such as no Hellene has ever possessed


before or since; partly from his splendid antecedents, partly from the


hopes which he held out of effecting for him the subjugation of


Hellas, but principally by the proof which experience daily gave of


his capacity. For Themistocles was a man who exhibited the most


indubitable signs of genius; indeed, in this particular he has a claim


on our admiration quite extraordinary and unparalleled. By his own


native capacity, alike unformed and unsupplemented by study, he was at


once the best judge in those sudden crises which admit of little or of


no deliberation, and the best prophet of the future, even to its


most distant possibilities. An able theoretical expositor of all


that came within the sphere of his practice, he was not without the


power of passing an adequate judgment in matters in which he had no


experience. He could also excellently divine the good and evil which


lay hid in the unseen future. In fine, whether we consider the


extent of his natural powers, or the slightness of his application,


this extraordinary man must be allowed to have surpassed all others in


the faculty of intuitively meeting an emergency. Disease was the


real cause of his death; though there is a story of his having ended


his life by poison, on finding himself unable to fulfil his promises


to the king. However this may be, there is a monument to him in the


marketplace of Asiatic Magnesia. He was governor of the district,


the King having given him Magnesia, which brought in fifty talents a


year, for bread, Lampsacus, which was considered to be the richest


wine country, for wine, and Myos for other provisions. His bones, it


is said, were conveyed home by his relatives in accordance with his


wishes, and interred in Attic ground. This was done without the


knowledge of the Athenians; as it is against the law to bury in Attica


an outlaw for treason. So ends the history of Pausanias and


Themistocles, the Lacedaemonian and the Athenian, the most famous


men of their time in Hellas.


  To return to the Lacedaemonians. The history of their first embassy,


the injunctions which it conveyed, and the rejoinder which it


provoked, concerning the expulsion of the accursed persons, have


been related already. It was followed by a second, which ordered


Athens to raise the siege of Potidaea, and to respect the independence


of Aegina. Above all, it gave her most distinctly to understand that


war might be prevented by the revocation of the Megara decree,


excluding the Megarians from the use of Athenian harbours and of the


market of Athens. But Athens was not inclined either to revoke the


decree, or to entertain their other proposals; she accused the


Megarians of pushing their cultivation into the consecrated ground and


the unenclosed land on the border, and of harbouring her runaway


slaves. At last an embassy arrived with the Lacedaemonian ultimatum.


The ambassadors were Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander. Not a word


was said on any of the old subjects; there was simply this:


"Lacedaemon wishes the peace to continue, and there is no reason why


it should not, if you would leave the Hellenes independent." Upon this


the Athenians held an assembly, and laid the matter before their


consideration. It was resolved to deliberate once for all on all their


demands, and to give them an answer. There were many speakers who came


forward and gave their support to one side or the other, urging the


necessity of war, or the revocation of the decree and the folly of


allowing it to stand in the way of peace. Among them came forward


Pericles, son of Xanthippus, the first man of his time at Athens,


ablest alike in counsel and in action, and gave the following advice:


  "There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold to through


everything, and that is the principle of no concession to the


Peloponnesians. I know that the spirit which inspires men while they


are being persuaded to make war is not always retained in action; that


as circumstances change, resolutions change. Yet I see that now as


before the same, almost literally the same, counsel is demanded of me;


and I put it to those of you who are allowing yourselves to be


persuaded, to support the national resolves even in the case of


reverses, or to forfeit all credit for their wisdom in the event of


success. For sometimes the course of things is as arbitrary as the


plans of man; indeed this is why we usually blame chance for


whatever does not happen as we expected. Now it was clear before


that Lacedaemon entertained designs against us; it is still more clear


now. The treaty provides that we shall mutually submit our differences


to legal settlement, and that we shall meanwhile each keep what we


have. Yet the Lacedaemonians never yet made us any such offer, never


yet would accept from us any such offer; on the contrary, they wish


complaints to be settled by war instead of by negotiation; and in


the end we find them here dropping the tone of expostulation and


adopting that of command. They order us to raise the siege of


Potidaea, to let Aegina be independent, to revoke the Megara decree;


and they conclude with an ultimatum warning us to leave the Hellenes


independent. I hope that you will none of you think that we shall be


going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megara decree,


which appears in front of their complaints, and the revocation of


which is to save us from war, or let any feeling of self-reproach


linger in your minds, as if you went to war for slight cause. Why,


this trifle contains the whole seal and trial of your resolution. If


you give way, you will instantly have to meet some greater demand,


as having been frightened into obedience in the first instance;


while a firm refusal will make them clearly understand that they


must treat you more as equals. Make your decision therefore at once,


either to submit before you are harmed, or if we are to go to war,


as I for one think we ought, to do so without caring whether the


ostensible cause be great or small, resolved against making


concessions or consenting to a precarious tenure of our possessions.


For all claims from an equal, urged upon a neighbour as commands


before any attempt at legal settlement, be they great or be they


small, have only one meaning, and that is slavery.


  "As to the war and the resources of either party, a detailed


comparison will not show you the inferiority of Athens. Personally


engaged in the cultivation of their land, without funds either private


or public, the Peloponnesians are also without experience in long wars


across sea, from the strict limit which poverty imposes on their


attacks upon each other. Powers of this description are quite


incapable of often manning a fleet or often sending out an army:


they cannot afford the absence from their homes, the expenditure


from their own funds; and besides, they have not command of the sea.


Capital, it must be remembered, maintains a war more than forced


contributions. Farmers are a class of men that are always more ready


to serve in person than in purse. Confident that the former will


survive the dangers, they are by no means so sure that the latter will


not be prematurely exhausted, especially if the war last longer than


they expect, which it very likely will. In a single battle the


Peloponnesians and their allies may be able to defy all Hellas, but


they are incapacitated from carrying on a war against a power


different in character from their own, by the want of the single


council-chamber requisite to prompt and vigorous action, and the


substitution of a diet composed of various races, in which every state


possesses an equal vote, and each presses its own ends, a condition of


things which generally results in no action at all. The great wish


of some is to avenge themselves on some particular enemy, the great


wish of others to save their own pocket. Slow in assembling, they


devote a very small fraction of the time to the consideration of any


public object, most of it to the prosecution of their own objects.


Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come of his neglect, that


it is the business of somebody else to look after this or that for


him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by all separately,


the common cause imperceptibly decays.


  "But the principal point is the hindrance that they will


experience from want of money. The slowness with which it comes in


will cause delay; but the opportunities of war wait for no man. Again,


we need not be alarmed either at the possibility of their raising


fortifications in Attica, or at their navy. It would be difficult


for any system of fortifications to establish a rival city, even in


time of peace, much more, surely, in an enemy's country, with Athens


just as much fortified against it as it against Athens; while a mere


post might be able to do some harm to the country by incursions and by


the facilities which it would afford for desertion, but can never


prevent our sailing into their country and raising fortifications


there, and making reprisals with our powerful fleet. For our naval


skill is of more use to us for service on land, than their military


skill for service at sea. Familiarity with the sea they will not


find an easy acquisition. If you who have been practising at it ever


since the Median invasion have not yet brought it to perfection, is


there any chance of anything considerable being effected by an


agricultural, unseafaring population, who will besides be prevented


from practising by the constant presence of strong squadrons of


observation from Athens? With a small squadron they might hazard an


engagement, encouraging their ignorance by numbers; but the


restraint of a strong force will prevent their moving, and through


want of practice they will grow more clumsy, and consequently more


timid. It must be kept in mind that seamanship, just like anything


else, is a matter of art, and will not admit of being taken up


occasionally as an occupation for times of leisure; on the contrary,


it is so exacting as to leave leisure for nothing else.


  "Even if they were to touch the moneys at Olympia or Delphi, and try


to seduce our foreign sailors by the temptation of higher pay, that


would only be a serious danger if we could not still be a match for


them by embarking our own citizens and the aliens resident among us.


But in fact by this means we are always a match for them; and, best of


all, we have a larger and higher class of native coxswains and sailors


among our own citizens than all the rest of Hellas. And to say nothing


of the danger of such a step, none of our foreign sailors would


consent to become an outlaw from his country, and to take service with


them and their hopes, for the sake of a few days' high pay.


  "This, I think, is a tolerably fair account of the position of the


Peloponnesians; that of Athens is free from the defects that I have


criticized in them, and has other advantages of its own, which they


can show nothing to equal. If they march against our country we will


sail against theirs, and it will then be found that the desolation


of the whole of Attica is not the same as that of even a fraction of


Peloponnese; for they will not be able to supply the deficiency except


by a battle, while we have plenty of land both on the islands and


the continent. The rule of the sea is indeed a great matter.


Consider for a moment. Suppose that we were islanders; can you


conceive a more impregnable position? Well, this in future should,


as far as possible, be our conception of our position. Dismissing


all thought of our land and houses, we must vigilantly guard the sea


and the city. No irritation that we may feel for the former must


provoke us to a battle with the numerical superiority of the


Peloponnesians. A victory would only be succeeded by another battle


against the same superiority: a reverse involves the loss of our


allies, the source of our strength, who will not remain quiet a day


after we become unable to march against them. We must cry not over the


loss of houses and land but of men's lives; since houses and land do


not gain men, but men them. And if I had thought that I could persuade


you, I would have bid you go out and lay them waste with your own


hands, and show the Peloponnesians that this at any rate will not make


you submit.


  "I have many other reasons to hope for a favourable issue, if you


can consent not to combine schemes of fresh conquest with the


conduct of the war, and will abstain from wilfully involving


yourselves in other dangers; indeed, I am more afraid of our own


blunders than of the enemy's devices. But these matters shall be


explained in another speech, as events require; for the present


dismiss these men with the answer that we will allow Megara the use of


our market and harbours, when the Lacedaemonians suspend their alien


acts in favour of us and our allies, there being nothing in the treaty


to prevent either one or the other: that we will leave the cities


independent, if independent we found them when we made the treaty, and


when the Lacedaemonians grant to their cities an independence not


involving subservience to Lacedaemonian interests, but such as each


severally may desire: that we are willing to give the legal


satisfaction which our agreements specify, and that we shall not


commence hostilities, but shall resist those who do commence them.


This is an answer agreeable at once to the rights and the dignity of


Athens. It must be thoroughly understood that war is a necessity;


but that the more readily we accept it, the less will be the ardour of


our opponents, and that out of the greatest dangers communities and


individuals acquire the greatest glory. Did not our fathers resist the


Medes not only with resources far different from ours, but even when


those resources had been abandoned; and more by wisdom than by


fortune, more by daring than by strength, did not they beat off the


barbarian and advance their affairs to their present height? We must


not fall behind them, but must resist our enemies in any way and in


every way, and attempt to hand down our power to our posterity


unimpaired."


  Such were the words of Pericles. The Athenians, persuaded of the


wisdom of his advice, voted as he desired, and answered the


Lacedaemonians as he recommended, both on the separate points and in


the general; they would do nothing on dictation, but were ready to


have the complaints settled in a fair and impartial manner by the


legal method, which the terms of the truce prescribed. So the envoys


departed home and did not return again.


  These were the charges and differences existing between the rival


powers before the war, arising immediately from the affair at


Epidamnus and Corcyra. Still intercourse continued in spite of them,


and mutual communication. It was carried on without heralds, but not


without suspicion, as events were occurring which were equivalent to a


breach of the treaty and matter for war.