The Second Book.


                           CHAPTER VI.





              Beginning of the Peloponnesian War -


               First Invasion of Attica - Funeral


                       Oration of Pericles





  THE war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and the allies on


either side now really begins. For now all intercourse except


through the medium of heralds ceased, and hostilities were commenced


and prosecuted without intermission. The history follows the


chronological order of events by summers and winters.


  The thirty years' truce which was entered into after the conquest of


Euboea lasted fourteen years. In the fifteenth, in the forty-eighth


year of the priestess-ship of Chrysis at Argos, in the ephorate of


Aenesias at Sparta, in the last month but two of the archonship of


Pythodorus at Athens, and six months after the battle of Potidaea,


just at the beginning of spring, a Theban force a little over three


hundred strong, under the command of their Boeotarchs, Pythangelus,


son of Phyleides, and Diemporus, son of Onetorides, about the first


watch of the night, made an armed entry into Plataea, a town of


Boeotia in alliance with Athens. The gates were opened to them by a


Plataean called Naucleides, who, with his party, had invited them


in, meaning to put to death the citizens of the opposite party,


bring over the city to Thebes, and thus obtain power for themselves.


This was arranged through Eurymachus, son of Leontiades, a person of


great influence at Thebes. For Plataea had always been at variance


with Thebes; and the latter, foreseeing that war was at hand, wished


to surprise her old enemy in time of peace, before hostilities had


actually broken out. Indeed this was how they got in so easily without


being observed, as no guard had been posted. After the soldiers had


grounded arms in the market-place, those who had invited them in


wished them to set to work at once and go to their enemies' houses.


This, however, the Thebans refused to do, but determined to make a


conciliatory proclamation, and if possible to come to a friendly


understanding with the citizens. Their herald accordingly invited


any who wished to resume their old place in the confederacy of their


countrymen to ground arms with them, for they thought that in this way


the city would readily join them.


  On becoming aware of the presence of the Thebans within their gates,


and of the sudden occupation of the town, the Plataeans concluded in


their alarm that more had entered than was really the case, the


night preventing their seeing them. They accordingly came to terms


and, accepting the proposal, made no movement; especially as the


Thebans offered none of them any violence. But somehow or other,


during the negotiations, they discovered the scanty numbers of the


Thebans, and decided that they could easily attack and overpower them;


the mass of the Plataeans being averse to revolting from Athens. At


all events they resolved to attempt it. Digging through the party


walls of the houses, they thus managed to join each other without


being seen going through the streets, in which they placed wagons


without the beasts in them, to serve as a barricade, and arranged


everything else as seemed convenient for the occasion. When everything


had been done that circumstances permitted, they watched their


opportunity and went out of their houses against the enemy. It was


still night, though daybreak was at hand: in daylight it was thought


that their attack would be met by men full of courage and on equal


terms with their assailants, while in darkness it would fall upon


panic-stricken troops, who would also be at a disadvantage from


their enemy's knowledge of the locality. So they made their assault at


once, and came to close quarters as quickly as they could.


  The Thebans, finding themselves outwitted, immediately closed up


to repel all attacks made upon them. Twice or thrice they beat back


their assailants. But the men shouted and charged them, the women


and slaves screamed and yelled from the houses and pelted them with


stones and tiles; besides, it had been raining hard all night; and


so at last their courage gave way, and they turned and fled through


the town. Most of the fugitives were quite ignorant of the right


ways out, and this, with the mud, and the darkness caused by the


moon being in her last quarter, and the fact that their pursuers


knew their way about and could easily stop their escape, proved


fatal to many. The only gate open was the one by which they had


entered, and this was shut by one of the Plataeans driving the spike


of a javelin into the bar instead of the bolt; so that even here there


was no longer any means of exit. They were now chased all over the


town. Some got on the wall and threw themselves over, in most cases


with a fatal result. One party managed to find a deserted gate, and


obtaining an axe from a woman, cut through the bar; but as they were


soon observed only a few succeeded in getting out. Others were cut off


in detail in different parts of the city. The most numerous and


compact body rushed into a large building next to the city wall: the


doors on the side of the street happened to be open, and the Thebans


fancied that they were the gates of the town, and that there was a


passage right through to the outside. The Plataeans, seeing their


enemies in a trap, now consulted whether they should set fire to the


building and burn them just as they were, or whether there was


anything else that they could do with them; until at length these


and the rest of the Theban survivors found wandering about the town


agreed to an unconditional surrender of themselves and their arms to


the Plataeans.


  While such was the fate of the party in Plataea, the rest of the


Thebans who were to have joined them with all their forces before


daybreak, in case of anything miscarrying with the body that had


entered, received the news of the affair on the road, and pressed


forward to their succour. Now Plataea is nearly eight miles from


Thebes, and their march delayed by the rain that had fallen in the


night, for the river Asopus had risen and was not easy of passage; and


so, having to march in the rain, and being hindered in crossing the


river, they arrived too late, and found the whole party either slain


or captive. When they learned what had happened, they at once formed a


design against the Plataeans outside the city. As the attack had


been made in time of peace, and was perfectly unexpected, there were


of course men and stock in the fields; and the Thebans wished if


possible to have some prisoners to exchange against their countrymen


in the town, should any chance to have been taken alive. Such was


their plan. But the Plataeans suspected their intention almost


before it was formed, and becoming alarmed for their fellow citizens


outside the town, sent a herald to the Thebans, reproaching them for


their unscrupulous attempt to seize their city in time of peace, and


warning them against any outrage on those outside. Should the


warning be disregarded, they threatened to put to death the men they


had in their hands, but added that, on the Thebans retiring from their


territory, they would surrender the prisoners to their friends. This


is the Theban account of the matter, and they say that they had an


oath given them. The Plataeans, on the other hand, do not admit any


promise of an immediate surrender, but make it contingent upon


subsequent negotiation: the oath they deny altogether. Be this as it


may, upon the Thebans retiring from their territory without committing


any injury, the Plataeans hastily got in whatever they had in the


country and immediately put the men to death. The prisoners were a


hundred and eighty in number; Eurymachus, the person with whom the


traitors had negotiated, being one.


  This done, the Plataeans sent a messenger to Athens, gave back the


dead to the Thebans under a truce, and arranged things in the city


as seemed best to meet the present emergency. The Athenians meanwhile,


having had word of the affair sent them immediately after its


occurrence, had instantly seized all the Boeotians in Attica, and sent


a herald to the Plataeans to forbid their proceeding to extremities


with their Theban prisoners without instructions from Athens. The news


of the men's death had of course not arrived; the first messenger


having left Plataea just when the Thebans entered it, the second


just after their defeat and capture; so there was no later news.


Thus the Athenians sent orders in ignorance of the facts; and the


herald on his arrival found the men slain. After this the Athenians


marched to Plataea and brought in provisions, and left a garrison in


the place, also taking away the women and children and such of the men


as were least efficient.


  After the affair at Plataea, the treaty had been broken by an


overt act, and Athens at once prepared for war, as did also Lacedaemon


and her allies. They resolved to send embassies to the King and to


such other of the barbarian powers as either party could look to for


assistance, and tried to ally themselves with the independent states


at home. Lacedaemon, in addition to the existing marine, gave orders


to the states that had declared for her in Italy and Sicily to build


vessels up to a grand total of five hundred, the quota of each city


being determined by its size, and also to provide a specified sum of


money. Till these were ready they were to remain neutral and to


admit single Athenian ships into their harbours. Athens on her part


reviewed her existing confederacy, and sent embassies to the places


more immediately round Peloponnese- Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania,


and Zacynthus- perceiving that if these could be relied on she could


carry the war all round Peloponnese.


  And if both sides nourished the boldest hopes and put forth their


utmost strength for the war, this was only natural. Zeal is always


at its height at the commencement of an undertaking; and on this


particular occasion Peloponnese and Athens were both full of young men


whose inexperience made them eager to take up arms, while the rest


of Hellas stood straining with excitement at the conflict of its


leading cities. Everywhere predictions were being recited and


oracles being chanted by such persons as collect them, and this not


only in the contending cities. Further, some while before this,


there was an earthquake at Delos, for the first time in the memory


of the Hellenes. This was said and thought to be ominous of the events


impending; indeed, nothing of the kind that happened was allowed to


pass without remark. The good wishes of men made greatly for the


Lacedaemonians, especially as they proclaimed themselves the


liberators of Hellas. No private or public effort that could help them


in speech or action was omitted; each thinking that the cause suffered


wherever he could not himself see to it. So general was the


indignation felt against Athens, whether by those who wished to escape


from her empire, or were apprehensive of being absorbed by it. Such


were the preparations and such the feelings with which the contest


opened.


  The allies of the two belligerents were the following. These were


the allies of Lacedaemon: all the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus


except the Argives and Achaeans, who were neutral; Pellene being the


only Achaean city that first joined in the war, though her example was


afterwards followed by the rest. Outside Peloponnese the Megarians,


Locrians, Boeotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and


Anactorians. Of these, ships were furnished by the Corinthians,


Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians;


and cavalry by the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians. The other states


sent infantry. This was the Lacedaemonian confederacy. That of


Athens comprised the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians in


Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyraeans, Zacynthians,


and some tributary cities in the following countries, viz., Caria upon


the sea with her Dorian neighbours, Ionia, the Hellespont, the


Thracian towns, the islands lying between Peloponnese and Crete


towards the east, and all the Cyclades except Melos and Thera. Of


these, ships were furnished by Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra, infantry


and money by the rest. Such were the allies of either party and


their resources for the war.


  Immediately after the affair at Plataea, Lacedaemon sent round


orders to the cities in Peloponnese and the rest of her confederacy to


prepare troops and the provisions requisite for a foreign campaign, in


order to invade Attica. The several states were ready at the time


appointed and assembled at the Isthmus: the contingent of each city


being two-thirds of its whole force. After the whole army had


mustered, the Lacedaemonian king, Archidamus, the leader of the


expedition, called together the generals of all the states and the


principal persons and officers, and exhorted them as follows:


  "Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made many campaigns both


within and without Peloponnese, and the elder men among us here are


not without experience in war. Yet we have never set out with a larger


force than the present; and if our numbers and efficiency are


remarkable, so also is the power of the state against which we


march. We ought not then to show ourselves inferior to our


ancestors, or unequal to our own reputation. For the hopes and


attention of all Hellas are bent upon the present effort, and its


sympathy is with the enemy of the hated Athens. Therefore, numerous as


the invading army may appear to be, and certain as some may think it


that our adversary will not meet us in the field, this is no sort of


justification for the least negligence upon the march; but the


officers and men of each particular city should always be prepared for


the advent of danger in their own quarters. The course of war cannot


be foreseen, and its attacks are generally dictated by the impulse


of the moment; and where overweening self-confidence has despised


preparation, a wise apprehension often been able to make head


against superior numbers. Not that confidence is out of place in an


army of invasion, but in an enemy's country it should also be


accompanied by the precautions of apprehension: troops will by this


combination be best inspired for dealing a blow, and best secured


against receiving one. In the present instance, the city against which


we are going, far from being so impotent for defence, is on the


contrary most excellently equipped at all points; so that we have


every reason to expect that they will take the field against us, and


that if they have not set out already before we are there, they will


certainly do so when they see us in their territory wasting and


destroying their property. For men are always exasperated at suffering


injuries to which they are not accustomed, and on seeing them


inflicted before their very eyes; and where least inclined for


reflection, rush with the greatest heat to action. The Athenians are


the very people of all others to do this, as they aspire to rule the


rest of the world, and are more in the habit of invading and


ravaging their neighbours' territory, than of seeing their own treated


in the like fashion. Considering, therefore, the power of the state


against which we are marching, and the greatness of the reputation


which, according to the event, we shall win or lose for our


ancestors and ourselves, remember as you follow where you may be led


to regard discipline and vigilance as of the first importance, and


to obey with alacrity the orders transmitted to you; as nothing


contributes so much to the credit and safety of an army as the union


of large bodies by a single discipline."


  With this brief speech dismissing the assembly, Archidamus first


sent off Melesippus, son of Diacritus, a Spartan, to Athens, in case


she should be more inclined to submit on seeing the Peloponnesians


actually on the march. But the Athenians did not admit into the city


or to their assembly, Pericles having already carried a motion against


admitting either herald or embassy from the Lacedaemonians after


they had once marched out.


  The herald was accordingly sent away without an audience, and


ordered to be beyond the frontier that same day; in future, if those


who sent him had a proposition to make, they must retire to their


own territory before they dispatched embassies to Athens. An escort


was sent with Melesippus to prevent his holding communication with any


one. When he reached the frontier and was just going to be


dismissed, he departed with these words: "This day will be the


beginning of great misfortunes to the Hellenes." As soon as he arrived


at the camp, and Archidamus learnt that the Athenians had still no


thoughts of submitting, he at length began his march, and advanced


with his army into their territory. Meanwhile the Boeotians, sending


their contingent and cavalry to join the Peloponnesian expedition,


went to Plataea with the remainder and laid waste the country.


  While the Peloponnesians were still mustering at the Isthmus, or


on the march before they invaded Attica, Pericles, son of


Xanthippus, one of the ten generals of the Athenians, finding that the


invasion was to take place, conceived the idea that Archidamus, who


happened to be his friend, might possibly pass by his estate without


ravaging it. This he might do, either from a personal wish to oblige


him, or acting under instructions from Lacedaemon for the purpose of


creating a prejudice against him, as had been before attempted in


the demand for the expulsion of the accursed family. He accordingly


took the precaution of announcing to the Athenians in the assembly


that, although Archidamus was his friend, yet this friendship should


not extend to the detriment of the state, and that in case the enemy


should make his houses and lands an exception to the rest and not


pillage them, he at once gave them up to be public property, so that


they should not bring him into suspicion. He also gave the citizens


some advice on their present affairs in the same strain as before.


They were to prepare for the war, and to carry in their property


from the country. They were not to go out to battle, but to come


into the city and guard it, and get ready their fleet, in which


their real strength lay. They were also to keep a tight rein on


their allies- the strength of Athens being derived from the money


brought in by their payments, and success in war depending principally


upon conduct and capital. had no reason to despond. Apart from other


sources of income, an average revenue of six hundred talents of silver


was drawn from the tribute of the allies; and there were still six


thousand talents of coined silver in the Acropolis, out of nine


thousand seven hundred that had once been there, from which the


money had been taken for the porch of the Acropolis, the other


public buildings, and for Potidaea. This did not include the


uncoined gold and silver in public and private offerings, the sacred


vessels for the processions and games, the Median spoils, and


similar resources to the amount of five hundred talents. To this he


added the treasures of the other temples. These were by no means


inconsiderable, and might fairly be used. Nay, if they were ever


absolutely driven to it, they might take even the gold ornaments of


Athene herself; for the statue contained forty talents of pure gold


and it was all removable. This might be used for self-preservation,


and must every penny of it be restored. Such was their financial


position- surely a satisfactory one. Then they had an army of


thirteen thousand heavy infantry, besides sixteen thousand more in the


garrisons and on home duty at Athens. This was at first the number


of men on guard in the event of an invasion: it was composed of the


oldest and youngest levies and the resident aliens who had heavy


armour. The Phaleric wall ran for four miles, before it joined that


round the city; and of this last nearly five had a guard, although


part of it was left without one, viz., that between the Long Wall


and the Phaleric. Then there were the Long Walls to Piraeus, a


distance of some four miles and a half, the outer of which was manned.


Lastly, the circumference of Piraeus with Munychia was nearly seven


miles and a half; only half of this, however, was guarded. Pericles


also showed them that they had twelve hundred horse including


mounted archers, with sixteen hundred archers unmounted, and three


hundred galleys fit for service. Such were the resources of Athens


in the different departments when the Peloponnesian invasion was


impending and hostilities were being commenced. Pericles also urged


his usual arguments for expecting a favourable issue to the war.


  The Athenians listened to his advice, and began to carry in their


wives and children from the country, and all their household


furniture, even to the woodwork of their houses which they took


down. Their sheep and cattle they sent over to Euboea and the adjacent


islands. But they found it hard to move, as most of them had been


always used to live in the country.


  From very early times this had been more the case with the Athenians


than with others. Under Cecrops and the first kings, down to the reign


of Theseus, Attica had always consisted of a number of independent


townships, each with its own town hall and magistrates. Except in


times of danger the king at Athens was not consulted; in ordinary


seasons they carried on their government and settled their affairs


without his interference; sometimes even they waged war against him,


as in the case of the Eleusinians with Eumolpus against Erechtheus. In


Theseus, however, they had a king of equal intelligence and power; and


one of the chief features in his organization of the country was to


abolish the council-chambers and magistrates of the petty cities,


and to merge them in the single council-chamber and town hall of the


present capital. Individuals might still enjoy their private


property just as before, but they were henceforth compelled to have


only one political centre, viz., Athens; which thus counted all the


inhabitants of Attica among her citizens, so that when Theseus died he


left a great state behind him. Indeed, from him dates the Synoecia, or


Feast of Union; which is paid for by the state, and which the


Athenians still keep in honour of the goddess. Before this the city


consisted of the present citadel and the district beneath it looking


rather towards the south. This is shown by the fact that the temples


of the other deities, besides that of Athene, are in the citadel;


and even those that are outside it are mostly situated in this quarter


of the city, as that of the Olympian Zeus, of the Pythian Apollo, of


Earth, and of Dionysus in the Marshes, the same in whose honour the


older Dionysia are to this day celebrated in the month of Anthesterion


not only by the Athenians but also by their Ionian descendants.


There are also other ancient temples in this quarter. The fountain


too, which, since the alteration made by the tyrants, has been


called Enneacrounos, or Nine Pipes, but which, when the spring was


open, went by the name of Callirhoe, or Fairwater, was in those


days, from being so near, used for the most important offices. Indeed,


the old fashion of using the water before marriage and for other


sacred purposes is still kept up. Again, from their old residence in


that quarter, the citadel is still known among Athenians as the city.





  The Athenians thus long lived scattered over Attica in independent


townships. Even after the centralization of Theseus, old habit still


prevailed; and from the early times down to the present war most


Athenians still lived in the country with their families and


households, and were consequently not at all inclined to move now,


especially as they had only just restored their establishments after


the Median invasion. Deep was their trouble and discontent at


abandoning their houses and the hereditary temples of the ancient


constitution, and at having to change their habits of life and to


bid farewell to what each regarded as his native city.


  When they arrived at Athens, though a few had houses of their own to


go to, or could find an asylum with friends or relatives, by far the


greater number had to take up their dwelling in the parts of the


city that were not built over and in the temples and chapels of the


heroes, except the Acropolis and the temple of the Eleusinian


Demeter and such other Places as were always kept closed. The


occupation of the plot of ground lying below the citadel called the


Pelasgian had been forbidden by a curse; and there was also an ominous


fragment of a Pythian oracle which said:





    Leave the Pelasgian parcel desolate,


    Woe worth the day that men inhabit it!





Yet this too was now built over in the necessity of the moment. And in


my opinion, if the oracle proved true, it was in the opposite sense to


what was expected. For the misfortunes of the state did not arise from


the unlawful occupation, but the necessity of the occupation from


the war; and though the god did not mention this, he foresaw that it


would be an evil day for Athens in which the plot came to be


inhabited. Many also took up their quarters in the towers of the walls


or wherever else they could. For when they were all come in, the


city proved too small to hold them; though afterwards they divided the


Long Walls and a great part of Piraeus into lots and settled there.


All this while great attention was being given to the war; the


allies were being mustered, and an armament of a hundred ships


equipped for Peloponnese. Such was the state of preparation at Athens.


  Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians was advancing. The first


town they came to in Attica was Oenoe, where they to enter the


country. Sitting down before it, they prepared to assault the wall


with engines and otherwise. Oenoe, standing upon the Athenian and


Boeotian border, was of course a walled town, and was used as a


fortress by the Athenians in time of war. So the Peloponnesians


prepared for their assault, and wasted some valuable time before the


place. This delay brought the gravest censure upon Archidamus. Even


during the levying of the war he had credit for weakness and


Athenian sympathies by the half measures he had advocated; and after


the army had assembled he had further injured himself in public


estimation by his loitering at the Isthmus and the slowness with which


the rest of the march had been conducted. But all this was as


nothing to the delay at Oenoe. During this interval the Athenians were


carrying in their property; and it was the belief of the


Peloponnesians that a quick advance would have found everything


still out, had it not been for his procrastination. Such was the


feeling of the army towards Archidamus during the siege. But he, it is


said, expected that the Athenians would shrink from letting their land


be wasted, and would make their submission while it was still


uninjured; and this was why he waited.


  But after he had assaulted Oenoe, and every possible attempt to take


it had failed, as no herald came from Athens, he at last broke up


his camp and invaded Attica. This was about eighty days after the


Theban attempt upon Plataea, just in the middle of summer, when the


corn was ripe, and Archidamus, son of Zeuxis, king of Lacedaemon,


was in command. Encamping in Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, they


began their ravages, and putting to flight some Athenian horse at a


place called Rheiti, or the Brooks, they then advanced, keeping


Mount Aegaleus on their right, through Cropia, until they reached


Acharnae, the largest of the Athenian demes or townships. Sitting down


before it, they formed a camp there, and continued their ravages for a


long while.


  The reason why Archidamus remained in order of battle at Acharnae


during this incursion, instead of descending into the plain, is said


to have been this. He hoped that the Athenians might possibly be


tempted by the multitude of their youth and the unprecedented


efficiency of their service to come out to battle and attempt to


stop the devastation of their lands. Accordingly, as they had met


him at Eleusis or the Thriasian plain, he tried if they could be


provoked to a sally by the spectacle of a camp at Acharnae. He thought


the place itself a good position for encamping; and it seemed likely


that such an important part of the state as the three thousand heavy


infantry of the Acharnians would refuse to submit to the ruin of their


property, and would force a battle on the rest of the citizens. On the


other hand, should the Athenians not take the field during this


incursion, he could then fearlessly ravage the plain in future


invasions, and extend his advance up to the very walls of Athens.


After the Acharnians had lost their own property they would be less


willing to risk themselves for that of their neighbours; and so


there would be division in the Athenian counsels. These were the


motives of Archidamus for remaining at Acharnae.


  In the meanwhile, as long as the army was at Eleusis and the


Thriasian plain, hopes were still entertained of its not advancing any


nearer. It was remembered that Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king


of Lacedaemon, had invaded Attica with a Peloponnesian army fourteen


years before, but had retreated without advancing farther than Eleusis


and Thria, which indeed proved the cause of his exile from Sparta,


as it was thought he had been bribed to retreat. But when they saw the


army at Acharnae, barely seven miles from Athens, they lost all


patience. The territory of Athens was being ravaged before the very


eyes of the Athenians, a sight which the young men had never seen


before and the old only in the Median wars; and it was naturally


thought a grievous insult, and the determination was universal,


especially among the young men, to sally forth and stop it. Knots were


formed in the streets and engaged in hot discussion; for if the


proposed sally was warmly recommended, it was also in some cases


opposed. Oracles of the most various import were recited by the


collectors, and found eager listeners in one or other of the


disputants. Foremost in pressing for the sally were the Acharnians, as


constituting no small part of the army of the state, and as it was


their land that was being ravaged. In short, the whole city was in a


most excited state; Pericles was the object of general indignation;


his previous counsels were totally forgotten; he was abused for not


leading out the army which he commanded, and was made responsible


for the whole of the public suffering.


  He, meanwhile, seeing anger and infatuation just now in the


ascendant, and of his wisdom in refusing a sally, would not call


either assembly or meeting of the people, fearing the fatal results of


a debate inspired by passion and not by prudence. Accordingly he


addressed himself to the defence of the city, and kept it as quiet


as possible, though he constantly sent out cavalry to prevent raids on


the lands near the city from flying parties of the enemy. There was


a trifling affair at Phrygia between a squadron of the Athenian


horse with the Thessalians and the Boeotian cavalry; in which the


former had rather the best of it, until the heavy infantry advanced to


the support of the Boeotians, when the Thessalians and Athenians


were routed and lost a few men, whose bodies, however, were


recovered the same day without a truce. The next day the


Peloponnesians set up a trophy. Ancient alliance brought the


Thessalians to the aid of Athens; those who came being the Larisaeans,


Pharsalians, Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheraeans. The


Larisaean commanders were Polymedes and Aristonus, two party leaders


in Larisa; the Pharsalian general was Menon; each of the other


cities had also its own commander.


  In the meantime the Peloponnesians, as the Athenians did not come


out to engage them, broke up from Acharnae and ravaged some of the


demes between Mount Parnes and Brilessus. While they were in Attica


the Athenians sent off the hundred ships which they had been preparing


round Peloponnese, with a thousand heavy infantry and four hundred


archers on board, under the command of Carcinus, son of Xenotimus,


Proteas, son of Epicles, and Socrates, son of Antigenes. This armament


weighed anchor and started on its cruise, and the Peloponnesians,


after remaining in Attica as long as their provisions lasted,


retired through Boeotia by a different road to that by which they


had entered. As they passed Oropus they ravaged the territory of


Graea, which is held by the Oropians from Athens, and reaching


Peloponnese broke up to their respective cities.


  After they had retired the Athenians set guards by land and sea at


the points at which they intended to have regular stations during


the war. They also resolved to set apart a special fund of a


thousand talents from the moneys in the Acropolis. This was not to


be spent, but the current expenses of the war were to be otherwise


provided for. If any one should move or put to the vote a


proposition for using the money for any purpose whatever except that


of defending the city in the event of the enemy bringing a fleet to


make an attack by sea, it should be a capital offence. With this sum


of money they also set aside a special fleet of one hundred galleys,


the best ships of each year, with their captains. None of these were


to be used except with the money and against the same peril, should


such peril arise.


  Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred ships round Peloponnese,


reinforced by a Corcyraean squadron of fifty vessels and some others


of the allies in those parts, cruised about the coasts and ravaged the


country. Among other places they landed in Laconia and made an assault


upon Methone; there being no garrison in the place, and the wall being


weak. But it so happened that Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Spartan,


was in command of a guard for the defence of the district. Hearing


of the attack, he hurried with a hundred heavy infantry to the


assistance of the besieged, and dashing through the army of the


Athenians, which was scattered over the country and had its


attention turned to the wall, threw himself into Methone. He lost a


few men in making good his entrance, but saved the place and won the


thanks of Sparta by his exploit, being thus the first officer who


obtained this notice during the war. The Athenians at once weighed


anchor and continued their cruise. Touching at Pheia in Elis, they


ravaged the country for two days and defeated a picked force of


three hundred men that had come from the vale of Elis and the


immediate neighbourhood to the rescue. But a stiff squall came down


upon them, and, not liking to face it in a place where there was no


harbour, most of them got on board their ships, and doubling Point


Ichthys sailed into the port of Pheia. In the meantime the Messenians,


and some others who could not get on board, marched over by land and


took Pheia. The fleet afterwards sailed round and picked them up and


then put to sea; Pheia being evacuated, as the main army of the Eleans


had now come up. The Athenians continued their cruise, and ravaged


other places on the coast.


  About the same time the Athenians sent thirty ships to cruise


round Locris and also to guard Euboea; Cleopompus, son of Clinias,


being in command. Making descents from the fleet he ravaged certain


places on the sea-coast, and captured Thronium and took hostages


from it. He also defeated at Alope the Locrians that had assembled


to resist him.





  During the summer the Athenians also expelled the Aeginetans with


their wives and children from Aegina, on the ground of their having


been the chief agents in bringing the war upon them. Besides, Aegina


lies so near Peloponnese that it seemed safer to send colonists of


their own to hold it, and shortly afterwards the settlers were sent


out. The banished Aeginetans found an asylum in Thyrea, which was


given to them by Lacedaemon, not only on account of her quarrel with


Athens, but also because the Aeginetans had laid her under obligations


at the time of the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots. The


territory of Thyrea is on the frontier of Argolis and Laconia,


reaching down to the sea. Those of the Aeginetans who did not settle


here were scattered over the rest of Hellas.


  The same summer, at the beginning of a new lunar month, the only


time by the way at which it appears possible, the sun was eclipsed


after noon. After it had assumed the form of a crescent and some of


the stars had come out, it returned to its natural shape.


  During the same summer Nymphodorus, son of Pythes, an Abderite,


whose sister Sitalces had married, was made their proxenus by the


Athenians and sent for to Athens. They had hitherto considered him


their enemy; but he had great influence with Sitalces, and they wished


this prince to become their ally. Sitalces was the son of Teres and


King of the Thracians. Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first to


establish the great kingdom of the Odrysians on a scale quite


unknown to the rest of Thrace, a large portion of the Thracians


being independent. This Teres is in no way related to Tereus who


married Pandion's daughter Procne from Athens; nor indeed did they


belong to the same part of Thrace. Tereus lived in Daulis, part of


what is now called Phocis, but which at that time was inhabited by


Thracians. It was in this land that the women perpetrated the


outrage upon Itys; and many of the poets when they mention the


nightingale call it the Daulian bird. Besides, Pandion in


contracting an alliance for his daughter would consider the advantages


of mutual assistance, and would naturally prefer a match at the


above moderate distance to the journey of many days which separates


Athens from the Odrysians. Again the names are different; and this


Teres was king of the Odrysians, the first by the way who attained


to any power. Sitalces, his son, was now sought as an ally by the


Athenians, who desired his aid in the reduction of the Thracian


towns and of Perdiccas. Coming to Athens, Nymphodorus concluded the


alliance with Sitalces and made his son Sadocus an Athenian citizen,


and promised to finish the war in Thrace by persuading Sitalces to


send the Athenians a force of Thracian horse and targeteers. He also


reconciled them with Perdiccas, and induced them to restore Therme


to him; upon which Perdiccas at once joined the Athenians and


Phormio in an expedition against the Chalcidians. Thus Sitalces, son


of Teres, King of the Thracians, and Perdiccas, son of Alexander, King


of the Macedonians, became allies of Athens.


  Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred vessels were still cruising


round Peloponnese. After taking Sollium, a town belonging to


Corinth, and presenting the city and territory to the Acarnanians of


Palaira, they stormed Astacus, expelled its tyrant Evarchus, and


gained the place for their confederacy. Next they sailed to the island


of Cephallenia and brought it over without using force. Cephallenia


lies off Acarnania and Leucas, and consists of four states, the


Paleans, Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronaeans. Not long afterwards the


fleet returned to Athens. Towards the autumn of this year the


Athenians invaded the Megarid with their whole levy, resident aliens


included, under the command of Pericles, son of Xanthippus. The


Athenians in the hundred ships round Peloponnese on their journey home


had just reached Aegina, and hearing that the citizens at home were in


full force at Megara, now sailed over and joined them. This was


without doubt the largest army of Athenians ever assembled, the


state being still in the flower of her strength and yet unvisited by


the plague. Full ten thousand heavy infantry were in the field, all


Athenian citizens, besides the three thousand before Potidaea. Then


the resident aliens who joined in the incursion were at least three


thousand strong; besides which there was a multitude of light


troops. They ravaged the greater part of the territory, and then


retired. Other incursions into the Megarid were afterwards made by the


Athenians annually during the war, sometimes only with cavalry,


sometimes with all their forces. This went on until the capture of


Nisaea. Atalanta also, the desert island off the Opuntian coast, was


towards the end of this summer converted into a fortified post by


the Athenians, in order to prevent privateers issuing from Opus and


the rest of Locris and plundering Euboea. Such were the events of this


summer after the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica.


  In the ensuing winter the Acarnanian Evarchus, wishing to return


to Astacus, persuaded the Corinthians to sail over with forty ships


and fifteen hundred heavy infantry and restore him; himself also


hiring some mercenaries. In command of the force were Euphamidas,


son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus, son of Timocrates, and Eumachus, son of


Chrysis, who sailed over and restored him and, after failing in an


attempt on some places on the Acarnanian coast which they were


desirous of gaining, began their voyage home. Coasting along shore


they touched at Cephallenia and made a descent on the Cranian


territory, and losing some men by the treachery of the Cranians, who


fell suddenly upon them after having agreed to treat, put to sea


somewhat hurriedly and returned home.


  In the same winter the Athenians gave a funeral at the public cost


to those who had first fallen in this war. It was a custom of their


ancestors, and the manner of it is as follows. Three days before the


ceremony, the bones of the dead are laid out in a tent which has


been erected; and their friends bring to their relatives such


offerings as they please. In the funeral procession cypress coffins


are borne in cars, one for each tribe; the bones of the deceased being


placed in the coffin of their tribe. Among these is carried one


empty bier decked for the missing, that is, for those whose bodies


could not be recovered. Any citizen or stranger who pleases, joins


in the procession: and the female relatives are there to wail at the


burial. The dead are laid in the public sepulchre in the Beautiful


suburb of the city, in which those who fall in war are always


buried; with the exception of those slain at Marathon, who for their


singular and extraordinary valour were interred on the spot where they


fell. After the bodies have been laid in the earth, a man chosen by


the state, of approved wisdom and eminent reputation, pronounces


over them an appropriate panegyric; after which all retire. Such is


the manner of the burying; and throughout the whole of the war,


whenever the occasion arose, the established custom was observed.


Meanwhile these were the first that had fallen, and Pericles, son of


Xanthippus, was chosen to pronounce their eulogium. When the proper


time arrived, he advanced from the sepulchre to an elevated platform


in order to be heard by as many of the crowd as possible, and spoke as


follows:


  "Most of my predecessors in this place have commended him who made


this speech part of the law, telling us that it is well that it should


be delivered at the burial of those who fall in battle. For myself,


I should have thought that the worth which had displayed itself in


deeds would be sufficiently rewarded by honours also shown by deeds;


such as you now see in this funeral prepared at the people's cost. And


I could have wished that the reputations of many brave men were not to


be imperilled in the mouth of a single individual, to stand or fall


according as he spoke well or ill. For it is hard to speak properly


upon a subject where it is even difficult to convince your hearers


that you are speaking the truth. On the one hand, the friend who is


familiar with every fact of the story may think that some point has


not been set forth with that fullness which he wishes and knows it


to deserve; on the other, he who is a stranger to the matter may be


led by envy to suspect exaggeration if he hears anything above his own


nature. For men can endure to hear others praised only so long as they


can severally persuade themselves of their own ability to equal the


actions recounted: when this point is passed, envy comes in and with


it incredulity. However, since our ancestors have stamped this


custom with their approval, it becomes my duty to obey the law and


to try to satisfy your several wishes and opinions as best I may.


  "I shall begin with our ancestors: it is both just and proper that


they should have the honour of the first mention on an occasion like


the present. They dwelt in the country without break in the succession


from generation to generation, and handed it down free to the


present time by their valour. And if our more remote ancestors deserve


praise, much more do our own fathers, who added to their inheritance


the empire which we now possess, and spared no pains to be able to


leave their acquisitions to us of the present generation. Lastly,


there are few parts of our dominions that have not been augmented by


those of us here, who are still more or less in the vigour of life;


while the mother country has been furnished by us with everything that


can enable her to depend on her own resources whether for war or for


peace. That part of our history which tells of the military


achievements which gave us our several possessions, or of the ready


valour with which either we or our fathers stemmed the tide of


Hellenic or foreign aggression, is a theme too familiar to my


hearers for me to dilate on, and I shall therefore pass it by. But


what was the road by which we reached our position, what the form of


government under which our greatness grew, what the national habits


out of which it sprang; these are questions which I may try to solve


before I proceed to my panegyric upon these men; since I think this to


be a subject upon which on the present occasion a speaker may properly


dwell, and to which the whole assemblage, whether citizens or


foreigners, may listen with advantage.


  "Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighbouring states;


we are rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its


administration favours the many instead of the few; this is why it


is called a democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal


justice to all in their private differences; if no social standing,


advancement in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class


considerations not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again


does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve the state, he is


not hindered by the obscurity of his condition. The freedom which we


enjoy in our government extends also to our ordinary life. There,


far from exercising a jealous surveillance over each other, we do


not feel called upon to be angry with our neighbour for doing what


he likes, or even to indulge in those injurious looks which cannot


fail to be offensive, although they inflict no positive penalty. But


all this ease in our private relations does not make us lawless as


citizens. Against this fear is our chief safeguard, teaching us to


obey the magistrates and the laws, particularly such as regard the


protection of the injured, whether they are actually on the statute


book, or belong to that code which, although unwritten, yet cannot


be broken without acknowledged disgrace.


  "Further, we provide plenty of means for the mind to refresh


itself from business. We celebrate games and sacrifices all the year


round, and the elegance of our private establishments forms a daily


source of pleasure and helps to banish the spleen; while the magnitude


of our city draws the produce of the world into our harbour, so that


to the Athenian the fruits of other countries are as familiar a luxury


as those of his own.


  "If we turn to our military policy, there also we differ from our


antagonists. We throw open our city to the world, and never by alien


acts exclude foreigners from any opportunity of learning or observing,


although the eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit by our


liberality; trusting less in system and policy than to the native


spirit of our citizens; while in education, where our rivals from


their very cradles by a painful discipline seek after manliness, at


Athens we live exactly as we please, and yet are just as ready to


encounter every legitimate danger. In proof of this it may be


noticed that the Lacedaemonians do not invade our country alone, but


bring with them all their confederates; while we Athenians advance


unsupported into the territory of a neighbour, and fighting upon a


foreign soil usually vanquish with ease men who are defending their


homes. Our united force was never yet encountered by any enemy,


because we have at once to attend to our marine and to dispatch our


citizens by land upon a hundred different services; so that,


wherever they engage with some such fraction of our strength, a


success against a detachment is magnified into a victory over the


nation, and a defeat into a reverse suffered at the hands of our


entire people. And yet if with habits not of labour but of ease, and


courage not of art but of nature, we are still willing to encounter


danger, we have the double advantage of escaping the experience of


hardships in anticipation and of facing them in the hour of need as


fearlessly as those who are never free from them.


  "Nor are these the only points in which our city is worthy of


admiration. We cultivate refinement without extravagance and knowledge


without effeminacy; wealth we employ more for use than for show, and


place the real disgrace of poverty not in owning to the fact but in


declining the struggle against it. Our public men have, besides


politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary


citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still


fair judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, regarding


him who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as


useless, we Athenians are able to judge at all events if we cannot


originate, and, instead of looking on discussion as a


stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable


preliminary to any wise action at all. Again, in our enterprises we


present the singular spectacle of daring and deliberation, each


carried to its highest point, and both united in the same persons;


although usually decision is the fruit of ignorance, hesitation of


reflection. But the palm of courage will surely be adjudged most


justly to those, who best know the difference between hardship and


pleasure and yet are never tempted to shrink from danger. In


generosity we are equally singular, acquiring our friends by


conferring, not by receiving, favours. Yet, of course, the doer of the


favour is the firmer friend of the two, in order by continued kindness


to keep the recipient in his debt; while the debtor feels less


keenly from the very consciousness that the return he makes will be


a payment, not a free gift. And it is only the Athenians, who,


fearless of consequences, confer their benefits not from


calculations of expediency, but in the confidence of liberality.


  "In short, I say that as a city we are the school of Hellas, while I


doubt if the world can produce a man who, where he has only himself to


depend upon, is equal to so many emergencies, and graced by so happy a


versatility, as the Athenian. And that this is no mere boast thrown


out for the occasion, but plain matter of fact, the power of the state


acquired by these habits proves. For Athens alone of her


contemporaries is found when tested to be greater than her reputation,


and alone gives no occasion to her assailants to blush at the


antagonist by whom they have been worsted, or to her subjects to


question her title by merit to rule. Rather, the admiration of the


present and succeeding ages will be ours, since we have not left our


power without witness, but have shown it by mighty proofs; and far


from needing a Homer for our panegyrist, or other of his craft whose


verses might charm for the moment only for the impression which they


gave to melt at the touch of fact, we have forced every sea and land


to be the highway of our daring, and everywhere, whether for evil or


for good, have left imperishable monuments behind us. Such is the


Athens for which these men, in the assertion of their resolve not to


lose her, nobly fought and died; and well may every one of their


survivors be ready to suffer in her cause.


  "Indeed if I have dwelt at some length upon the character of our


country, it has been to show that our stake in the struggle is not the


same as theirs who have no such blessings to lose, and also that the


panegyric of the men over whom I am now speaking might be by


definite proofs established. That panegyric is now in a great


measure complete; for the Athens that I have celebrated is only what


the heroism of these and their like have made her, men whose fame,


unlike that of most Hellenes, will be found to be only commensurate


with their deserts. And if a test of worth be wanted, it is to be


found in their closing scene, and this not only in cases in which it


set the final seal upon their merit, but also in those in which it


gave the first intimation of their having any. For there is justice in


the claim that steadfastness in his country's battles should be as a


cloak to cover a man's other imperfections; since the good action


has blotted out the bad, and his merit as a citizen more than


outweighed his demerits as an individual. But none of these allowed


either wealth with its prospect of future enjoyment to unnerve his


spirit, or poverty with its hope of a day of freedom and riches to


tempt him to shrink from danger. No, holding that vengeance upon their


enemies was more to be desired than any personal blessings, and


reckoning this to be the most glorious of hazards, they joyfully


determined to accept the risk, to make sure of their vengeance, and to


let their wishes wait; and while committing to hope the uncertainty of


final success, in the business before them they thought fit to act


boldly and trust in themselves. Thus choosing to die resisting, rather


than to live submitting, they fled only from dishonour, but met danger


face to face, and after one brief moment, while at the summit of their


fortune, escaped, not from their fear, but from their glory.


  "So died these men as became Athenians. You, their survivors, must


determine to have as unfaltering a resolution in the field, though you


may pray that it may have a happier issue. And not contented with


ideas derived only from words of the advantages which are bound up


with the defence of your country, though these would furnish a


valuable text to a speaker even before an audience so alive to them as


the present, you must yourselves realize the power of Athens, and feed


your eyes upon her from day to day, till love of her fills your


hearts; and then, when all her greatness shall break upon you, you


must reflect that it was by courage, sense of duty, and a keen feeling


of honour in action that men were enabled to win all this, and that no


personal failure in an enterprise could make them consent to deprive


their country of their valour, but they laid it at her feet as the


most glorious contribution that they could offer. For this offering of


their lives made in common by them all they each of them


individually received that renown which never grows old, and for a


sepulchre, not so much that in which their bones have been


deposited, but that noblest of shrines wherein their glory is laid


up to be eternally remembered upon every occasion on which deed or


story shall call for its commemoration. For heroes have the whole


earth for their tomb; and in lands far from their own, where the


column with its epitaph declares it, there is enshrined in every


breast a record unwritten with no tablet to preserve it, except that


of the heart. These take as your model and, judging happiness to be


the fruit of freedom and freedom of valour, never decline the


dangers of war. For it is not the miserable that would most justly


be unsparing of their lives; these have nothing to hope for: it is


rather they to whom continued life may bring reverses as yet


unknown, and to whom a fall, if it came, would be most tremendous in


its consequences. And surely, to a man of spirit, the degradation of


cowardice must be immeasurably more grievous than the unfelt death


which strikes him in the midst of his strength and patriotism!


  "Comfort, therefore, not condolence, is what I have to offer to


the parents of the dead who may be here. Numberless are the chances to


which, as they know, the life of man is subject; but fortunate


indeed are they who draw for their lot a death so glorious as that


which has caused your mourning, and to whom life has been so exactly


measured as to terminate in the happiness in which it has been passed.


Still I know that this is a hard saying, especially when those are


in question of whom you will constantly be reminded by seeing in the


homes of others blessings of which once you also boasted: for grief is


felt not so much for the want of what we have never known, as for


the loss of that to which we have been long accustomed. Yet you who


are still of an age to beget children must bear up in the hope of


having others in their stead; not only will they help you to forget


those whom you have lost, but will be to the state at once a


reinforcement and a security; for never can a fair or just policy be


expected of the citizen who does not, like his fellows, bring to the


decision the interests and apprehensions of a father. While those of


you who have passed your prime must congratulate yourselves with the


thought that the best part of your life was fortunate, and that the


brief span that remains will be cheered by the fame of the departed.


For it is only the love of honour that never grows old; and honour


it is, not gain, as some would have it, that rejoices the heart of age


and helplessness.


  "Turning to the sons or brothers of the dead, I see an arduous


struggle before you. When a man is gone, all are wont to praise him,


and should your merit be ever so transcendent, you will still find


it difficult not merely to overtake, but even to approach their


renown. The living have envy to contend with, while those who are no


longer in our path are honoured with a goodwill into which rivalry


does not enter. On the other hand, if I must say anything on the


subject of female excellence to those of you who will now be in


widowhood, it will be all comprised in this brief exhortation. Great


will be your glory in not falling short of your natural character; and


greatest will be hers who is least talked of among the men, whether


for good or for bad.


  "My task is now finished. I have performed it to the best of my


ability, and in word, at least, the requirements of the law are now


satisfied. If deeds be in question, those who are here interred have


received part of their honours already, and for the rest, their


children will be brought up till manhood at the public expense: the


state thus offers a valuable prize, as the garland of victory in


this race of valour, for the reward both of those who have fallen


and their survivors. And where the rewards for merit are greatest,


there are found the best citizens.


  "And now that you have brought to a close your lamentations for your


relatives, you may depart."


                          CHAPTER VII.





          Second Year of the War - The Plague of Athens


            - Position and Policy of Pericles - Fall


                           of Potidaea





  SUCH was the funeral that took place during this winter, with


which the first year of the war came to an end. In the first days of


summer the Lacedaemonians and their allies, with two-thirds of their


forces as before, invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, son


of Zeuxidamus, King of Lacedaemon, and sat down and laid waste the


country. Not many days after their arrival in Attica the plague


first began to show itself among the Athenians. It was said that it


had broken out in many places previously in the neighbourhood of


Lemnos and elsewhere; but a pestilence of such extent and mortality


was nowhere remembered. Neither were the physicians at first of any


service, ignorant as they were of the proper way to treat it, but they


died themselves the most thickly, as they visited the sick most often;


nor did any human art succeed any better. Supplications in the


temples, divinations, and so forth were found equally futile, till the


overwhelming nature of the disaster at last put a stop to them


altogether.


  It first began, it is said, in the parts of Ethiopia above Egypt,


and thence descended into Egypt and Libya and into most of the


King's country. Suddenly falling upon Athens, it first attacked the


population in Piraeus- which was the occasion of their saying that


the Peloponnesians had poisoned the reservoirs, there being as yet


no wells there- and afterwards appeared in the upper city, when the


deaths became much more frequent. All speculation as to its origin and


its causes, if causes can be found adequate to produce so great a


disturbance, I leave to other writers, whether lay or professional;


for myself, I shall simply set down its nature, and explain the


symptoms by which perhaps it may be recognized by the student, if it


should ever break out again. This I can the better do, as I had the


disease myself, and watched its operation in the case of others.


  That year then is admitted to have been otherwise unprecedentedly


free from sickness; and such few cases as occurred all determined in


this. As a rule, however, there was no ostensible cause; but people in


good health were all of a sudden attacked by violent heats in the


head, and redness and inflammation in the eyes, the inward parts, such


as the throat or tongue, becoming bloody and emitting an unnatural and


fetid breath. These symptoms were followed by sneezing and hoarseness,


after which the pain soon reached the chest, and produced a hard


cough. When it fixed in the stomach, it upset it; and discharges of


bile of every kind named by physicians ensued, accompanied by very


great distress. In most cases also an ineffectual retching followed,


producing violent spasms, which in some cases ceased soon after, in


others much later. Externally the body was not very hot to the


touch, nor pale in its appearance, but reddish, livid, and breaking


out into small pustules and ulcers. But internally it burned so that


the patient could not bear to have on him clothing or linen even of


the very lightest description; or indeed to be otherwise than stark


naked. What they would have liked best would have been to throw


themselves into cold water; as indeed was done by some of the


neglected sick, who plunged into the rain-tanks in their agonies of


unquenchable thirst; though it made no difference whether they drank


little or much. Besides this, the miserable feeling of not being


able to rest or sleep never ceased to torment them. The body meanwhile


did not waste away so long as the distemper was at its height, but


held out to a marvel against its ravages; so that when they succumbed,


as in most cases, on the seventh or eighth day to the internal


inflammation, they had still some strength in them. But if they passed


this stage, and the disease descended further into the bowels,


inducing a violent ulceration there accompanied by severe diarrhoea,


this brought on a weakness which was generally fatal. For the disorder


first settled in the head, ran its course from thence through the


whole of the body, and, even where it did not prove mortal, it still


left its mark on the extremities; for it settled in the privy parts,


the fingers and the toes, and many escaped with the loss of these,


some too with that of their eyes. Others again were seized with an


entire loss of memory on their first recovery, and did not know either


themselves or their friends.


  But while the nature of the distemper was such as to baffle all


description, and its attacks almost too grievous for human nature to


endure, it was still in the following circumstance that its difference


from all ordinary disorders was most clearly shown. All the birds


and beasts that prey upon human bodies, either abstained from touching


them (though there were many lying unburied), or died after tasting


them. In proof of this, it was noticed that birds of this kind


actually disappeared; they were not about the bodies, or indeed to


be seen at all. But of course the effects which I have mentioned could


best be studied in a domestic animal like the dog.


  Such then, if we pass over the varieties of particular cases which


were many and peculiar, were the general features of the distemper.


Meanwhile the town enjoyed an immunity from all the ordinary


disorders; or if any case occurred, it ended in this. Some died in


neglect, others in the midst of every attention. No remedy was found


that could be used as a specific; for what did good in one case, did


harm in another. Strong and weak constitutions proved equally


incapable of resistance, all alike being swept away, although dieted


with the utmost precaution. By far the most terrible feature in the


malady was the dejection which ensued when any one felt himself


sickening, for the despair into which they instantly fell took away


their power of resistance, and left them a much easier prey to the


disorder; besides which, there was the awful spectacle of men dying


like sheep, through having caught the infection in nursing each other.


This caused the greatest mortality. On the one hand, if they were


afraid to visit each other, they perished from neglect; indeed many


houses were emptied of their inmates for want of a nurse: on the


other, if they ventured to do so, death was the consequence. This


was especially the case with such as made any pretensions to goodness:


honour made them unsparing of themselves in their attendance in


their friends' houses, where even the members of the family were at


last worn out by the moans of the dying, and succumbed to the force of


the disaster. Yet it was with those who had recovered from the disease


that the sick and the dying found most compassion. These knew what


it was from experience, and had now no fear for themselves; for the


same man was never attacked twice- never at least fatally. And such


persons not only received the congratulations of others, but


themselves also, in the elation of the moment, half entertained the


vain hope that they were for the future safe from any disease


whatsoever.


  An aggravation of the existing calamity was the influx from the


country into the city, and this was especially felt by the new


arrivals. As there were no houses to receive them, they had to be


lodged at the hot season of the year in stifling cabins, where the


mortality raged without restraint. The bodies of dying men lay one


upon another, and half-dead creatures reeled about the streets and


gathered round all the fountains in their longing for water. The


sacred places also in which they had quartered themselves were full of


corpses of persons that had died there, just as they were; for as


the disaster passed all bounds, men, not knowing what was to become of


them, became utterly careless of everything, whether sacred or


profane. All the burial rites before in use were entirely upset, and


they buried the bodies as best they could. Many from want of the


proper appliances, through so many of their friends having died


already, had recourse to the most shameless sepultures: sometimes


getting the start of those who had raised a pile, they threw their own


dead body upon the stranger's pyre and ignited it; sometimes they


tossed the corpse which they were carrying on the top of another


that was burning, and so went off.


  Nor was this the only form of lawless extravagance which owed its


origin to the plague. Men now coolly ventured on what they had


formerly done in a corner, and not just as they pleased, seeing the


rapid transitions produced by persons in prosperity suddenly dying and


those who before had nothing succeeding to their property. So they


resolved to spend quickly and enjoy themselves, regarding their


lives and riches as alike things of a day. Perseverance in what men


called honour was popular with none, it was so uncertain whether


they would be spared to attain the object; but it was settled that


present enjoyment, and all that contributed to it, was both honourable


and useful. Fear of gods or law of man there was none to restrain


them. As for the first, they judged it to be just the same whether


they worshipped them or not, as they saw all alike perishing; and


for the last, no one expected to live to be brought to trial for his


offences, but each felt that a far severer sentence had been already


passed upon them all and hung ever over their heads, and before this


fell it was only reasonable to enjoy life a little.


  Such was the nature of the calamity, and heavily did it weigh on the


Athenians; death raging within the city and devastation without. Among


other things which they remembered in their distress was, very


naturally, the following verse which the old men said had long ago


been uttered:





    A Dorian war shall come and with it death.





So a dispute arose as to whether dearth and not death had not been the


word in the verse; but at the present juncture, it was of course


decided in favour of the latter; for the people made their


recollection fit in with their sufferings. I fancy, however, that if


another Dorian war should ever afterwards come upon us, and a dearth


should happen to accompany it, the verse will probably be read


accordingly. The oracle also which had been given to the


Lacedaemonians was now remembered by those who knew of it. When the


god was asked whether they should go to war, he answered that if


they put their might into it, victory would be theirs, and that he


would himself be with them. With this oracle events were supposed to


tally. For the plague broke out as soon as the Peloponnesians


invaded Attica, and never entering Peloponnese (not at least to an


extent worth noticing), committed its worst ravages at Athens, and


next to Athens, at the most populous of the other towns. Such was


the history of the plague.


  After ravaging the plain, the Peloponnesians advanced into the


Paralian region as far as Laurium, where the Athenian silver mines


are, and first laid waste the side looking towards Peloponnese, next


that which faces Euboea and Andros. But Pericles, who was still


general, held the same opinion as in the former invasion, and would


not let the Athenians march out against them.


  However, while they were still in the plain, and had not yet entered


the Paralian land, he had prepared an armament of a hundred ships


for Peloponnese, and when all was ready put out to sea. On board the


ships he took four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, and three hundred


cavalry in horse transports, and then for the first time made out of


old galleys; fifty Chian and Lesbian vessels also joining in the


expedition. When this Athenian armament put out to sea, they left


the Peloponnesians in Attica in the Paralian region. Arriving at


Epidaurus in Peloponnese they ravaged most of the territory, and


even had hopes of taking the town by an assault: in this however


they were not successful. Putting out from Epidaurus, they laid


waste the territory of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, all towns on


the coast of Peloponnese, and thence sailing to Prasiai, a maritime


town in Laconia, ravaged part of its territory, and took and sacked


the place itself; after which they returned home, but found the


Peloponnesians gone and no longer in Attica.


  During the whole time that the Peloponnesians were in Attica and the


Athenians on the expedition in their ships, men kept dying of the


plague both in the armament and in Athens. Indeed it was actually


asserted that the departure of the Peloponnesians was hastened by fear


of the disorder; as they heard from deserters that it was in the city,


and also could see the burials going on. Yet in this invasion they


remained longer than in any other, and ravaged the whole country,


for they were about forty days in Attica.


  The same summer Hagnon, son of Nicias, and Cleopompus, son of


Clinias, the colleagues of Pericles, took the armament of which he had


lately made use, and went off upon an expedition against the


Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace and Potidaea, which was still


under siege. As soon as they arrived, they brought up their engines


against Potidaea and tried every means of taking it, but did not


succeed either in capturing the city or in doing anything else


worthy of their preparations. For the plague attacked them here


also, and committed such havoc as to cripple them completely, even the


previously healthy soldiers of the former expedition catching the


infection from Hagnon's troops; while Phormio and the sixteen


hundred men whom he commanded only escaped by being no longer in the


neighbourhood of the Chalcidians. The end of it was that Hagnon


returned with his ships to Athens, having lost one thousand and


fifty out of four thousand heavy infantry in about forty days;


though the soldiers stationed there before remained in the country and


carried on the siege of Potidaea.


  After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians a change came over


the spirit of the Athenians. Their land had now been twice laid waste;


and war and pestilence at once pressed heavy upon them. They began


to find fault with Pericles, as the author of the war and the cause of


all their misfortunes, and became eager to come to terms with


Lacedaemon, and actually sent ambassadors thither, who did not however


succeed in their mission. Their despair was now complete and all


vented itself upon Pericles. When he saw them exasperated at the


present turn of affairs and acting exactly as he had anticipated, he


called an assembly, being (it must be remembered) still general,


with the double object of restoring confidence and of leading them


from these angry feelings to a calmer and more hopeful state of


mind. He accordingly came forward and spoke as follows:


  "I was not unprepared for the indignation of which I have been the


object, as I know its causes; and I have called an assembly for the


purpose of reminding you upon certain points, and of protesting


against your being unreasonably irritated with me, or cowed by your


sufferings. I am of opinion that national greatness is more for the


advantage of private citizens, than any individual well-being


coupled with public humiliation. A man may be personally ever so


well off, and yet if his country be ruined he must be ruined with


it; whereas a flourishing commonwealth always affords chances of


salvation to unfortunate individuals. Since then a state can support


the misfortunes of private citizens, while they cannot support hers,


it is surely the duty of every one to be forward in her defence, and


not like you to be so confounded with your domestic afflictions as


to give up all thoughts of the common safety, and to blame me for


having counselled war and yourselves for having voted it. And yet if


you are angry with me, it is with one who, as I believe, is second


to no man either in knowledge of the proper policy, or in the


ability to expound it, and who is moreover not only a patriot but an


honest one. A man possessing that knowledge without that faculty of


exposition might as well have no idea at all on the matter: if he


had both these gifts, but no love for his country, he would be but a


cold advocate for her interests; while were his patriotism not proof


against bribery, everything would go for a price. So that if you


thought that I was even moderately distinguished for these qualities


when you took my advice and went to war, there is certainly no


reason now why I should be charged with having done wrong.


  "For those of course who have a free choice in the matter and


whose fortunes are not at stake, war is the greatest of follies. But


if the only choice was between submission with loss of independence,


and danger with the hope of preserving that independence, in such a


case it is he who will not accept the risk that deserves blame, not he


who will. I am the same man and do not alter, it is you who change,


since in fact you took my advice while unhurt, and waited for


misfortune to repent of it; and the apparent error of my policy lies


in the infirmity of your resolution, since the suffering that it


entails is being felt by every one among you, while its advantage is


still remote and obscure to all, and a great and sudden reverse having


befallen you, your mind is too much depressed to persevere in your


resolves. For before what is sudden, unexpected, and least within


calculation, the spirit quails; and putting all else aside, the plague


has certainly been an emergency of this kind. Born, however, as you


are, citizens of a great state, and brought up, as you have been, with


habits equal to your birth, you should be ready to face the greatest


disasters and still to keep unimpaired the lustre of your name. For


the judgment of mankind is as relentless to the weakness that falls


short of a recognized renown, as it is jealous of the arrogance that


aspires higher than its due. Cease then to grieve for your private


afflictions, and address yourselves instead to the safety of the


commonwealth.


  "If you shrink before the exertions which the war makes necessary,


and fear that after all they may not have a happy result, you know the


reasons by which I have often demonstrated to you the groundlessness


of your apprehensions. If those are not enough, I will now reveal an


advantage arising from the greatness of your dominion, which I think


has never yet suggested itself to you, which I never mentioned in my


previous speeches, and which has so bold a sound that I should


scarce adventure it now, were it not for the unnatural depression


which I see around me. You perhaps think that your empire extends only


over your allies; I will declare to you the truth. The visible field


of action has two parts, land and sea. In the whole of one of these


you are completely supreme, not merely as far as you use it at


present, but also to what further extent you may think fit: in fine,


your naval resources are such that your vessels may go where they


please, without the King or any other nation on earth being able to


stop them. So that although you may think it a great privation to lose


the use of your land and houses, still you must see that this power is


something widely different; and instead of fretting on their


account, you should really regard them in the light of the gardens and


other accessories that embellish a great fortune, and as, in


comparison, of little moment. You should know too that liberty


preserved by your efforts will easily recover for us what we have


lost, while, the knee once bowed, even what you have will pass from


you. Your fathers receiving these possessions not from others, but


from themselves, did not let slip what their labour had acquired,


but delivered them safe to you; and in this respect at least you


must prove yourselves their equals, remembering that to lose what


one has got is more disgraceful than to be balked in getting, and


you must confront your enemies not merely with spirit but with


disdain. Confidence indeed a blissful ignorance can impart, ay, even


to a coward's breast, but disdain is the privilege of those who,


like us, have been assured by reflection of their superiority to their


adversary. And where the chances are the same, knowledge fortifies


courage by the contempt which is its consequence, its trust being


placed, not in hope, which is the prop of the desperate, but in a


judgment grounded upon existing resources, whose anticipations are


more to be depended upon.


  "Again, your country has a right to your services in sustaining


the glories of her position. These are a common source of pride to you


all, and you cannot decline the burdens of empire and still expect


to share its honours. You should remember also that what you are


fighting against is not merely slavery as an exchange for


independence, but also loss of empire and danger from the


animosities incurred in its exercise. Besides, to recede is no


longer possible, if indeed any of you in the alarm of the moment has


become enamoured of the honesty of such an unambitious part. For


what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny; to take it


perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe. And men of these


retiring views, making converts of others, would quickly ruin a state;


indeed the result would be the same if they could live independent


by themselves; for the retiring and unambitious are never secure


without vigorous protectors at their side; in fine, such qualities are


useless to an imperial city, though they may help a dependency to an


unmolested servitude.


  "But you must not be seduced by citizens like these or angry with


me- who, if I voted for war, only did as you did yourselves- in spite


of the enemy having invaded your country and done what you could be


certain that he would do, if you refused to comply with his demands;


and although besides what we counted for, the plague has come upon


us- the only point indeed at which our calculation has been at fault.


It is this, I know, that has had a large share in making me more


unpopular than I should otherwise have been- quite undeservedly,


unless you are also prepared to give me the credit of any success with


which chance may present you. Besides, the hand of heaven must be


borne with resignation, that of the enemy with fortitude; this was the


old way at Athens, and do not you prevent it being so still. Remember,


too, that if your country has the greatest name in all the world, it


is because she never bent before disaster; because she has expended


more life and effort in war than any other city, and has won for


herself a power greater than any hitherto known, the memory of which


will descend to the latest posterity; even if now, in obedience to the


general law of decay, we should ever be forced to yield, still it will


be remembered that we held rule over more Hellenes than any other


Hellenic state, that we sustained the greatest wars against their


united or separate powers, and inhabited a city unrivalled by any


other in resources or magnitude. These glories may incur the censure


of the slow and unambitious; but in the breast of energy they will


awake emulation, and in those who must remain without them an


envious regret. Hatred and unpopularity at the moment have fallen to


the lot of all who have aspired to rule others; but where odium must


be incurred, true wisdom incurs it for the highest objects. Hatred


also is short-lived; but that which makes the splendour of the present


and the glory of the future remains for ever unforgotten. Make your


decision, therefore, for glory then and honour now, and attain both


objects by instant and zealous effort: do not send heralds to


Lacedaemon, and do not betray any sign of being oppressed by your


present sufferings, since they whose minds are least sensitive to


calamity, and whose hands are most quick to meet it, are the


greatest men and the greatest communities."


  Such were the arguments by which Pericles tried to cure the


Athenians of their anger against him and to divert their thoughts from


their immediate afflictions. As a community he succeeded in convincing


them; they not only gave up all idea of sending to Lacedaemon, but


applied themselves with increased energy to the war; still as


private individuals they could not help smarting under their


sufferings, the common people having been deprived of the little


that they were possessed, while the higher orders had lost fine


properties with costly establishments and buildings in the country,


and, worst of all, had war instead of peace. In fact, the public


feeling against him did not subside until he had been fined. Not


long afterwards, however, according to the way of the multitude,


they again elected him general and committed all their affairs to


his hands, having now become less sensitive to their private and


domestic afflictions, and understanding that he was the best man of


all for the public necessities. For as long as he was at the head of


the state during the peace, he pursued a moderate and conservative


policy; and in his time its greatness was at its height. When the


war broke out, here also he seems to have rightly gauged the power


of his country. He outlived its commencement two years and six months,


and the correctness of his previsions respecting it became better


known by his death. He told them to wait quietly, to pay attention


to their marine, to attempt no new conquests, and to expose the city


to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a


favourable result. What they did was the very contrary, allowing


private ambitions and private interests, in matters apparently quite


foreign to the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to


themselves and to their allies- projects whose success would only


conduce to the honour and advantage of private persons, and whose


failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war. The


causes of this are not far to seek. Pericles indeed, by his rank,


ability, and known integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent


control over the multitude- in short, to lead them instead of being


led by them; for as he never sought power by improper means, he was


never compelled to flatter them, but, on the contrary, enjoyed so high


an estimation that he could afford to anger them by contradiction.


Whenever he saw them unseasonably and insolently elated, he would with


a word reduce them to alarm; on the other hand, if they fell victims


to a panic, he could at once restore them to confidence. In short,


what was nominally a democracy became in his hands government by the


first citizen. With his successors it was different. More on a level


with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by


committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the


multitude. This, as might have been expected in a great and


sovereign state, produced a host of blunders, and amongst them the


Sicilian expedition; though this failed not so much through a


miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was sent, as


through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures


afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to


occupy themselves with private cabals for the leadership of the


commons, by which they not only paralysed operations in the field, but


also first introduced civil discord at home. Yet after losing most


of their fleet besides other forces in Sicily, and with faction


already dominant in the city, they could still for three years make


head against their original adversaries, joined not only by the


Sicilians, but also by their own allies nearly all in revolt, and at


last by the King's son, Cyrus, who furnished the funds for the


Peloponnesian navy. Nor did they finally succumb till they fell the


victims of their own intestine disorders. So superfluously abundant


were the resources from which the genius of Pericles foresaw an easy


triumph in the war over the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians.


  During the same summer the Lacedaemonians and their allies made an


expedition with a hundred ships against Zacynthus, an island lying off


the coast of Elis, peopled by a colony of Achaeans from Peloponnese,


and in alliance with Athens. There were a thousand Lacedaemonian heavy


infantry on board, and Cnemus, a Spartan, as admiral. They made a


descent from their ships, and ravaged most of the country; but as


the inhabitants would not submit, they sailed back home.


  At the end of the same summer the Corinthian Aristeus, Aneristus,


Nicolaus, and Stratodemus, envoys from Lacedaemon, Timagoras, a


Tegean, and a private individual named Pollis from Argos, on their way


to Asia to persuade the King to supply funds and join in the war, came


to Sitalces, son of Teres in Thrace, with the idea of inducing him, if


possible, to forsake the alliance of Athens and to march on Potidaea


then besieged by an Athenian force, and also of getting conveyed by


his means to their destination across the Hellespont to Pharnabazus,


who was to send them up the country to the King. But there chanced


to be with Sitalces some Athenian ambassadors- Learchus, son of


Callimachus, and Ameiniades, son of Philemon- who persuaded Sitalces'


son, Sadocus, the new Athenian citizen, to put the men into their


hands and thus prevent their crossing over to the King and doing their


part to injure the country of his choice. He accordingly had them


seized, as they were travelling through Thrace to the vessel in


which they were to cross the Hellespont, by a party whom he had sent


on with Learchus and Ameiniades, and gave orders for their delivery to


the Athenian ambassadors, by whom they were brought to Athens. On


their arrival, the Athenians, afraid that Aristeus, who had been


notably the prime mover in the previous affairs of Potidaea and


their Thracian possessions, might live to do them still more


mischief if he escaped, slew them all the same day, without giving


them a trial or hearing the defence which they wished to offer, and


cast their bodies into a pit; thinking themselves justified in using


in retaliation the same mode of warfare which the Lacedaemonians had


begun, when they slew and cast into pits all the Athenian and allied


traders whom they caught on board the merchantmen round Peloponnese.


Indeed, at the outset of the war, the Lacedaemonians butchered as


enemies all whom they took on the sea, whether allies of Athens or


neutrals.


  About the same time towards the close of the summer, the Ambraciot


forces, with a number of barbarians that they had raised, marched


against the Amphilochian Argos and the rest of that country. The


origin of their enmity against the Argives was this. This Argos and


the rest of Amphilochia were colonized by Amphilochus, son of


Amphiaraus. Dissatisfied with the state of affairs at home on his


return thither after the Trojan War, he built this city in the


Ambracian Gulf, and named it Argos after his own country. This was the


largest town in Amphilochia, and its inhabitants the most powerful.


Under the pressure of misfortune many generations afterwards, they


called in the Ambraciots, their neighbours on the Amphilochian border,


to join their colony; and it was by this union with the Ambraciots


that they learnt their present Hellenic speech, the rest of the


Amphilochians being barbarians. After a time the Ambraciots expelled


the Argives and held the city themselves. Upon this the


Amphilochians gave themselves over to the Acarnanians; and the two


together called the Athenians, who sent them Phormio as general and


thirty ships; upon whose arrival they took Argos by storm, and made


slaves of the Ambraciots; and the Amphilochians and Acarnanians


inhabited the town in common. After this began the alliance between


the Athenians and Acarnanians. The enmity of the Ambraciots against


the Argives thus commenced with the enslavement of their citizens; and


afterwards during the war they collected this armament among


themselves and the Chaonians, and other of the neighbouring


barbarians. Arrived before Argos, they became masters of the


country; but not being successful in their attacks upon the town,


returned home and dispersed among their different peoples.


  Such were the events of the summer. The ensuing winter the Athenians


sent twenty ships round Peloponnese, under the command of Phormio, who


stationed himself at Naupactus and kept watch against any one


sailing in or out of Corinth and the Crissaean Gulf. Six others went


to Caria and Lycia under Melesander, to collect tribute in those


parts, and also to prevent the Peloponnesian privateers from taking up


their station in those waters and molesting the passage of the


merchantmen from Phaselis and Phoenicia and the adjoining continent.


However, Melesander, going up the country into Lycia with a force of


Athenians from the ships and the allies, was defeated and killed in


battle, with the loss of a number of his troops.


  The same winter the Potidaeans at length found themselves no


longer able to hold out against their besiegers. The inroads of the


Peloponnesians into Attica had not had the desired effect of making


the Athenians raise the siege. Provisions there were none left; and so


far had distress for food gone in Potidaea that, besides a number of


other horrors, instances had even occurred of the people having


eaten one another. in this extremity they at last made proposals for


capitulating to the Athenian generals in command against


them- Xenophon, son of Euripides, Hestiodorus, son of Aristocleides,


and Phanomachus, son of Callimachus. The generals accepted their


proposals, seeing the sufferings of the army in so exposed a position;


besides which the state had already spent two thousand talents upon


the siege. The terms of the capitulation were as follows: a free


passage out for themselves, their children, wives and auxiliaries,


with one garment apiece, the women with two, and a fixed sum of


money for their journey. Under this treaty they went out to Chalcidice


and other places, according as was their power. The Athenians,


however, blamed the generals for granting terms without instructions


from home, being of opinion that the place would have had to surrender


at discretion. They afterwards sent settlers of their own to Potidaea,


and colonized it. Such were the events of the winter, and so ended the


second year of this war of which Thucydides was the historian.


                       CHAPTER VIII.





         Third Year of the War - Investment of Plataea -


              Naval Victories of Phormio - Thracian


             Irruption into Macedonia under Sitalces





  THE next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, instead of


invading Attica, marched against Plataea, under the command of


Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. He had


encamped his army and was about to lay waste the country, when the


Plataeans hastened to send envoys to him, and spoke as follows:


"Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, in invading the Plataean territory,


you do what is wrong in itself, and worthy neither of yourselves nor


of the fathers who begot you. Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, your


countryman, after freeing Hellas from the Medes with the help of


those Hellenes who were willing to undertake the risk of the battle


fought near our city, offered sacrifice to Zeus the Liberator in the


marketplace of Plataea, and calling all the allies together restored


to the Plataeans their city and territory, and declared it


independent and inviolate against aggression or conquest. Should any


such be attempted, the allies present were to help according to their


power. Your fathers rewarded us thus for the courage and patriotism


that we displayed at that perilous epoch; but you do just the


contrary, coming with our bitterest enemies, the Thebans, to enslave


us. We appeal, therefore, to the gods to whom the oaths were then


made, to the gods of your ancestors, and lastly to those of our


country, and call upon you to refrain from violating our territory


or transgressing the oaths, and to let us live independent, as


Pausanias decreed."


  The Plataeans had got thus far when they were cut short by


Archidamus saying: "There is justice, Plataeans, in what you say, if


you act up to your words. According, to the grant of Pausanias,


continue to be independent yourselves, and join in freeing those of


your fellow countrymen who, after sharing in the perils of that


period, joined in the oaths to you, and are now subject to the


Athenians; for it is to free them and the rest that all this provision


and war has been made. I could wish that you would share our labours


and abide by the oaths yourselves; if this is impossible, do what we


have already required of you- remain neutral, enjoying your own; join


neither side, but receive both as friends, neither as allies for the


war. With this we shall be satisfied." Such were the words of


Archidamus. The Plataeans, after hearing what he had to say, went into


the city and acquainted the people with what had passed, and presently


returned for answer that it was impossible for them to do what he


proposed without consulting the Athenians, with whom their children


and wives now were; besides which they had their fears for the town.


After his departure, what was to prevent the Athenians from coming and


taking it out of their hands, or the Thebans, who would be included in


the oaths, from taking advantage of the proposed neutrality to make


a second attempt to seize the city? Upon these points he tried to


reassure them by saying: "You have only to deliver over the city and


houses to us Lacedaemonians, to point out the boundaries of your land,


the number of your fruit-trees, and whatever else can be numerically


stated, and yourselves to withdraw wherever you like as long as the


war shall last. When it is over we will restore to you whatever we


received, and in the interim hold it in trust and keep it in


cultivation, paying you a sufficient allowance."


  When they had heard what he had to say, they re-entered the city,


and after consulting with the people said that they wished first to


acquaint the Athenians with this proposal, and in the event of their


approving to accede to it; in the meantime they asked him to grant


them a truce and not to lay waste their territory. He accordingly


granted a truce for the number of days requisite for the journey,


and meanwhile abstained from ravaging their territory. The Plataean


envoys went to Athens, and consulted with the Athenians, and


returned with the following message to those in the city: "The


Athenians say, Plataeans, that they never hitherto, since we became


their allies, on any occasion abandoned us to an enemy, nor will


they now neglect us, but will help us according to their ability;


and they adjure you by the oaths which your fathers swore, to keep the


alliance unaltered."


  On the delivery of this message by the envoys, the Plataeans


resolved not to be unfaithful to the Athenians but to endure, if it


must be, seeing their lands laid waste and any other trials that might


come to them, and not to send out again, but to answer from the wall


that it was impossible for them to do as the Lacedaemonians


proposed. As soon as he had received this answer, King Archidamus


proceeded first to make a solemn appeal to the gods and heroes of


the country in words following: "Ye gods and heroes of the Plataean


territory, be my witnesses that not as aggressors originally, nor


until these had first departed from the common oath, did we invade


this land, in which our fathers offered you their prayers before


defeating the Medes, and which you made auspicious to the Hellenic


arms; nor shall we be aggressors in the measures to which we may now


resort, since we have made many fair proposals but have not been


successful. Graciously accord that those who were the first to


offend may be punished for it, and that vengeance may be attained by


those who would righteously inflict it."


  After this appeal to the gods Archidamus put his army in motion.


First he enclosed the town with a palisade formed of the fruit-trees


which they cut down, to prevent further egress from Plataea; next they


threw up a mound against the city, hoping that the largeness of the


force employed would ensure the speedy reduction of the place. They


accordingly cut down timber from Cithaeron, and built it up on


either side, laying it like lattice-work to serve as a wall to keep


the mound from spreading abroad, and carried to it wood and stones and


earth and whatever other material might help to complete it. They


continued to work at the mound for seventy days and nights without


intermission, being divided into relief parties to allow of some being


employed in carrying while others took sleep and refreshment; the


Lacedaemonian officer attached to each contingent keeping the men to


the work. But the Plataeans, observing the progress of the mound,


constructed a wall of wood and fixed it upon that part of the city


wall against which the mound was being erected, and built up bricks


inside it which they took from the neighbouring houses. The timbers


served to bind the building together, and to prevent its becoming weak


as it advanced in height; it had also a covering of skins and hides,


which protected the woodwork against the attacks of burning missiles


and allowed the men to work in safety. Thus the wall was raised to a


great height, and the mound opposite made no less rapid progress.


The Plataeans also thought of another expedient; they pulled out


part of the wall upon which the mound abutted, and carried the earth


into the city.


  Discovering this the Peloponnesians twisted up clay in wattles of


reed and threw it into the breach formed in the mound, in order to


give it consistency and prevent its being carried away like the


soil. Stopped in this way the Plataeans changed their mode of


operation, and digging a mine from the town calculated their way under


the mound, and began to carry off its material as before. This went on


for a long while without the enemy outside finding it out, so that for


all they threw on the top their mound made no progress in


proportion, being carried away from beneath and constantly settling


down in the vacuum. But the Plataeans, fearing that even thus they


might not be able to hold out against the superior numbers of the


enemy, had yet another invention. They stopped working at the large


building in front of the mound, and starting at either end of it


inside from the old low wall, built a new one in the form of a


crescent running in towards the town; in order that in the event of


the great wall being taken this might remain, and the enemy have to


throw up a fresh mound against it, and as they advanced within might


not only have their trouble over again, but also be exposed to


missiles on their flanks. While raising the mound the Peloponnesians


also brought up engines against the city, one of which was brought


up upon the mound against the great building and shook down a good


piece of it, to the no small alarm of the Plataeans. Others were


advanced against different parts of the wall but were lassoed and


broken by the Plataeans; who also hung up great beams by long iron


chains from either extremity of two poles laid on the wall and


projecting over it, and drew them up at an angle whenever any point


was threatened by the engine, and loosing their hold let the beam go


with its chains slack, so that it fell with a run and snapped off


the nose of the battering ram.


  After this the Peloponnesians, finding that their engines effected


nothing, and that their mound was met by the counterwork, concluded


that their present means of offence were unequal to the taking of


the city, and prepared for its circumvallation. First, however, they


determined to try the effects of fire and see whether they could


not, with the help of a wind, burn the town, as it was not a large


one; indeed they thought of every possible expedient by which the


place might be reduced without the expense of a blockade. They


accordingly brought faggots of brushwood and threw them from the


mound, first into the space between it and the wall; and this soon


becoming full from the number of hands at work, they next heaped the


faggots up as far into the town as they could reach from the top,


and then lighted the wood by setting fire to it with sulphur and


pitch. The consequence was a fire greater than any one had ever yet


seen produced by human agency, though it could not of course be


compared to the spontaneous conflagrations sometimes known to occur


through the wind rubbing the branches of a mountain forest together.


And this fire was not only remarkable for its magnitude, but was also,


at the end of so many perils, within an ace of proving fatal to the


Plataeans; a great part of the town became entirely inaccessible,


and had a wind blown upon it, in accordance with the hopes of the


enemy, nothing could have saved them. As it was, there is also a story


of heavy rain and thunder having come on by which the fire was put out


and the danger averted.


  Failing in this last attempt the Peloponnesians left a portion of


their forces on the spot, dismissing the rest, and built a wall of


circumvallation round the town, dividing the ground among the


various cities present; a ditch being made within and without the


lines, from which they got their bricks. All being finished by about


the rising of Arcturus, they left men enough to man half the wall, the


rest being manned by the Boeotians, and drawing off their army


dispersed to their several cities. The Plataeans had before sent off


their wives and children and oldest men and the mass of the


non-combatants to Athens; so that the number of the besieged left in


the place comprised four hundred of their own citizens, eighty


Athenians, and a hundred and ten women to bake their bread. This was


the sum total at the commencement of the siege, and there was no one


else within the walls, bond or free. Such were the arrangements made


for the blockade of Plataea.


  The same summer and simultaneously with the expedition against


Plataea, the Athenians marched with two thousand heavy infantry and


two hundred horse against the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace


and the Bottiaeans, just as the corn was getting ripe, under the


command of Xenophon, son of Euripides, with two colleagues. Arriving


before Spartolus in Bottiaea, they destroyed the corn and had some


hopes of the city coming over through the intrigues of a faction


within. But those of a different way of thinking had sent to Olynthus;


and a garrison of heavy infantry and other troops arrived accordingly.


These issuing from Spartolus were engaged by the Athenians in front of


the town: the Chalcidian heavy infantry, and some auxiliaries with


them, were beaten and retreated into Spartolus; but the Chalcidian


horse and light troops defeated the horse and light troops of the


Athenians. The Chalcidians had already a few targeteers from Crusis,


and presently after the battle were joined by some others from


Olynthus; upon seeing whom the light troops from Spartolus, emboldened


by this accession and by their previous success, with the help of


the Chalcidian horse and the reinforcement just arrived again attacked


the Athenians, who retired upon the two divisions which they had


left with their baggage. Whenever the Athenians advanced, their


adversary gave way, pressing them with missiles the instant they began


to retire. The Chalcidian horse also, riding up and charging them just


as they pleased, at last caused a panic amongst them and routed and


pursued them to a great distance. The Athenians took refuge in


Potidaea, and afterwards recovered their dead under truce, and


returned to Athens with the remnant of their army; four hundred and


thirty men and all the generals having fallen. The Chalcidians and


Bottiaeans set up a trophy, took up their dead, and dispersed to their


several cities.


  The same summer, not long after this, the Ambraciots and


Chaonians, being desirous of reducing the whole of Acarnania and


detaching it from Athens, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to equip a


fleet from their confederacy and send a thousand heavy infantry to


Acarnania, representing that, if a combined movement were made by land


and sea, the coast Acarnanians would be unable to march, and the


conquest of Zacynthus and Cephallenia easily following on the


possession of Acarnania, the cruise round Peloponnese would be no


longer so convenient for the Athenians. Besides which there was a hope


of taking Naupactus. The Lacedaemonians accordingly at once sent off a


few vessels with Cnemus, who was still high admiral, and the heavy


infantry on board; and sent round orders for the fleet to equip as


quickly as possible and sail to Leucas. The Corinthians were the


most forward in the business; the Ambraciots being a colony of theirs.


While the ships from Corinth, Sicyon, and the neighbourhood were


getting ready, and those from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia,


which had arrived before, were walting for them at Leucas, Cnemus


and his thousand heavy infantry had run into the gulf, giving the slip


to Phormio, the commander of the Athenian squadron stationed off


Naupactus, and began at once to prepare for the land expedition. The


Hellenic troops with him consisted of the Ambraciots, Leucadians,


and Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians with whom he came;


the barbarian of a thousand Chaonians, who, belonging to a nation that


has no king, were led by Photys and Nicanor, the two members of the


royal family to whom the chieftainship for that year had been


confided. With the Chaonians came also some Thesprotians, like them


without a king, some Molossians and Atintanians led by Sabylinthus,


the guardian of King Tharyps who was still a minor, and some


Paravaeans, under their king Oroedus, accompanied by a thousand


Orestians, subjects of King Antichus and placed by him under the


command of Oroedus. There were also a thousand Macedonians sent by


Perdiccas without the knowledge of the Athenians, but they arrived too


late. With this force Cnemus set out, without waiting for the fleet


from Corinth. Passing through the territory of Amphilochian Argos, and


sacking the open village of Limnaea, they advanced to Stratus the


Acarnanian capital; this once taken, the rest of the country, they


felt convinced, would speedily follow.


  The Acarnanians, finding themselves invaded by a large army by land,


and from the sea threatened by a hostile fleet, made no combined


attempt at resistance, but remained to defend their homes, and sent


for help to Phormio, who replied that, when a fleet was on the point


of sailing from Corinth, it was impossible for him to leave


Naupactus unprotected. The Peloponnesians meanwhile and their allies


advanced upon Stratus in three divisions, with the intention of


encamping near it and attempting the wall by force if they failed to


succeed by negotiation. The order of march was as follows: the


centre was occupied by the Chaonians and the rest of the barbarians,


with the Leucadians and Anactorians and their followers on the


right, and Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots on the


left; each division being a long way off from, and sometimes even


out of sight of, the others. The Hellenes advanced in good order,


keeping a look-out till they encamped in a good position; but the


Chaonians, filled with self-confidence, and having the highest


character for courage among the tribes of that part of the


continent, without waiting to occupy their camp, rushed on with the


rest of the barbarians, in the idea that they should take the town


by assault and obtain the sole glory of the enterprise. While they


were coming on, the Stratians, becoming aware how things stood, and


thinking that the defeat of this division would considerably


dishearten the Hellenes behind it, occupied the environs of the town


with ambuscades, and as soon as they approached engaged them at


close quarters from the city and the ambuscades. A panic seizing the


Chaonians, great numbers of them were slain; and as soon as they


were seen to give way the rest of the barbarians turned and fled.


Owing to the distance by which their allies had preceded them, neither


of the Hellenic divisions knew anything of the battle, but fancied


they were hastening on to encamp. However, when the flying


barbarians broke in upon them, they opened their ranks to receive


them, brought their divisions together, and stopped quiet where they


were for the day; the Stratians not offering to engage them, as the


rest of the Acarnanians had not yet arrived, but contenting themselves


with slinging at them from a distance, which distressed them


greatly, as there was no stirring without their armour. The


Acarnanians would seem to excel in this mode of warfare.


  As soon as night fell, Cnemus hastily drew off his army to the river


Anapus, about nine miles from Stratus, recovering his dead next day


under truce, and being there joined by the friendly Oeniadae, fell


back upon their city before the enemy's reinforcements came up. From


hence each returned home; and the Stratians set up a trophy for the


battle with the barbarians.


  Meanwhile the fleet from Corinth and the rest of the confederates in


the Crissaean Gulf, which was to have co-operated with Cnemus and


prevented the coast Acarnanians from joining their countrymen in the


interior, was disabled from doing so by being compelled about the same


time as the battle at Stratus to fight with Phormio and the twenty


Athenian vessels stationed at Naupactus. For they were watched, as


they coasted along out of the gulf, by Phormio, who wished to attack


in the open sea. But the Corinthians and allies had started for


Acarnania without any idea of fighting at sea, and with vessels more


like transports for carrying soldiers; besides which, they never


dreamed of the twenty Athenian ships venturing to engage their


forty-seven. However, while they were coasting along their own


shore, there were the Athenians sailing along in line with them; and


when they tried to cross over from Patrae in Achaea to the mainland on


the other side, on their way to Acarnania, they saw them again


coming out from Chalcis and the river Evenus to meet them. They


slipped from their moorings in the night, but were observed, and


were at length compelled to fight in mid passage. Each state that


contributed to the armament had its own general; the Corinthian


commanders were Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The


Peloponnesians ranged their vessels in as large a circle as possible


without leaving an opening, with the prows outside and the sterns


in; and placed within all the small craft in company, and their five


best sailers to issue out at a moment's notice and strengthen any


point threatened by the enemy.


  The Athenians, formed in line, sailed round and round them, and


forced them to contract their circle, by continually brushing past and


making as though they would attack at once, having been previously


cautioned by Phormio not to do so till he gave the signal. His hope


was that the Peloponnesians would not retain their order like a


force on shore, but that the ships would fall foul of one another


and the small craft cause confusion; and if the wind should blow


from the gulf (in expectation of which he kept sailing round them, and


which usually rose towards morning), they would not, he felt sure,


remain steady an instant. He also thought that it rested with him to


attack when he pleased, as his ships were better sailers, and that


an attack timed by the coming of the wind would tell best. When the


wind came down, the enemy's ships were now in a narrow space, and what


with the wind and the small craft dashing against them, at once fell


into confusion: ship fell foul of ship, while the crews were pushing


them off with poles, and by their shouting, swearing, and struggling


with one another, made captains' orders and boatswains' cries alike


inaudible, and through being unable for want of practice to clear


their oars in the rough water, prevented the vessels from obeying


their helmsmen properly. At this moment Phormio gave the signal, and


the Athenians attacked. Sinking first one of the admirals, they then


disabled all they came across, so that no one thought of resistance


for the confusion, but fled for Patrae and Dyme in Achaea. The


Athenians gave chase and captured twelve ships, and taking most of the


men out of them sailed to Molycrium, and after setting up a trophy


on the promontory of Rhium and dedicating a ship to Poseidon, returned


to Naupactus. As for the Peloponnesians, they at once sailed with


their remaining ships along the coast from Dyme and Patrae to Cyllene,


the Eleian arsenal; where Cnemus, and the ships from Leucas that


were to have joined them, also arrived after the battle at Stratus.


  The Lacedaemonians now sent to the fleet to Cnemus three


commissioners- Timocrates, Bradidas, and Lycophron- with orders to


prepare to engage again with better fortune, and not to be driven from


the sea by a few vessels; for they could not at all account for


their discomfiture, the less so as it was their first attempt at


sea; and they fancied that it was not that their marine was so


inferior, but that there had been misconduct somewhere, not


considering the long experience of the Athenians as compared with


the little practice which they had had themselves. The commissioners


were accordingly sent in anger. As soon as they arrived they set to


work with Cnemus to order ships from the different states, and to


put those which they already had in fighting order. Meanwhile


Phormio sent word to Athens of their preparations and his own victory,


and desired as many ships as possible to be speedily sent to him, as


he stood in daily expectation of a battle. Twenty were accordingly


sent, but instructions were given to their commander to go first to


Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who was proxenus of the


Athenians, had persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, promising to


procure the reduction of that hostile town; his real wish being to


oblige the Polichnitans, neighbours of the Cydonians. He accordingly


went with the ships to Crete, and, accompanied by the Polichnitans,


laid waste the lands of the Cydonians; and, what with adverse winds


and stress of weather wasted no little time there.


  While the Athenians were thus detained in Crete, the


Peloponnesians in Cyllene got ready for battle, and coasted along to


Panormus in Achaea, where their land army had come to support them.


Phormio also coasted along to Molycrian Rhium, and anchored outside it


with twenty ships, the same as he had fought with before. This Rhium


was friendly to the Athenians. The other, in Peloponnese, lies


opposite to it; the sea between them is about three-quarters of a mile


broad, and forms the mouth of the Crissaean gulf. At this, the Achaean


Rhium, not far off Panormus, where their army lay, the


Peloponnesians now cast anchor with seventy-seven ships, when they saw


the Athenians do so. For six or seven days they remained opposite each


other, practising and preparing for the battle; the one resolved not


to sail out of the Rhia into the open sea, for fear of the disaster


which had already happened to them, the other not to sail into the


straits, thinking it advantageous to the enemy, to fight in the


narrows. At last Cnemus and Brasidas and the rest of the Peloponnesian


commanders, being desirous of bringing on a battle as soon as


possible, before reinforcements should arrive from Athens, and


noticing that the men were most of them cowed by the previous defeat


and out of heart for the business, first called them together and


encouraged them as follows:


  "Peloponnesians, the late engagement, which may have made some of


you afraid of the one now in prospect, really gives no just ground for


apprehension. Preparation for it, as you know, there was little


enough; and the object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea


as an expedition by land. Besides this, the chances of war were


largely against us; and perhaps also inexperience had something to


do with our failure in our first naval action. It was not,


therefore, cowardice that produced our defeat, nor ought the


determination which force has not quelled, but which still has a


word to say with its adversary, to lose its edge from the result of an


accident; but admitting the possibility of a chance miscarriage, we


should know that brave hearts must be always brave, and while they


remain so can never put forward inexperience as an excuse for


misconduct. Nor are you so behind the enemy in experience as you are


ahead of him in courage; and although the science of your opponents


would, if valour accompanied it, have also the presence of mind to


carry out at in emergency the lesson it has learnt, yet a faint


heart will make all art powerless in the face of danger. For fear


takes away presence of mind, and without valour art is useless.


Against their superior experience set your superior daring, and


against the fear induced by defeat the fact of your having been then


unprepared; remember, too, that you have always the advantage of


superior numbers, and of engaging off your own coast, supported by


your heavy infantry; and as a rule, numbers and equipment give


victory. At no point, therefore, is defeat likely; and as for our


previous mistakes, the very fact of their occurrence will teach us


better for the future. Steersmen and sailors may, therefore,


confidently attend to their several duties, none quitting the


station assigned to them: as for ourselves, we promise to prepare


for the engagement at least as well as your previous commanders, and


to give no excuse for any one misconducting himself. Should any insist


on doing so, he shall meet with the punishment he deserves, while


the brave shall be honoured with the appropriate rewards of valour."


  The Peloponnesian commanders encouraged their men after this


fashion. Phormio, meanwhile, being himself not without fears for the


courage of his men, and noticing that they were forming in groups


among themselves and were alarmed at the odds against them, desired to


call them together and give them confidence and counsel in the present


emergency. He had before continually told them, and had accustomed


their minds to the idea, that there was no numerical superiority


that they could not face; and the men themselves had long been


persuaded that Athenians need never retire before any quantity of


Peloponnesian vessels. At the moment, however, he saw that they were


dispirited by the sight before them, and wishing to refresh their


confidence, called them together and spoke as follows:


  "I see, my men, that you are frightened by the number of the


enemy, and I have accordingly called you together, not liking you to


be afraid of what is not really terrible. In the first place, the


Peloponnesians, already defeated, and not even themselves thinking


that they are a match for us, have not ventured to meet us on equal


terms, but have equipped this multitude of ships against us. Next,


as to that upon which they most rely, the courage which they suppose


constitutional to them, their confidence here only arises from the


success which their experience in land service usually gives them, and


which they fancy will do the same for them at sea. But this


advantage will in all justice belong to us on this element, if to them


on that; as they are not superior to us in courage, but we are each of


us more confident, according to our experience in our particular


department. Besides, as the Lacedaemonians use their supremacy over


their allies to promote their own glory, they are most of them being


brought into danger against their will, or they would never, after


such a decided defeat, have ventured upon a fresh engagement. You need


not, therefore, be afraid of their dash. You, on the contrary, inspire


a much greater and better founded alarm, both because of your late


victory and also of their belief that we should not face them unless


about to do something worthy of a success so signal. An adversary


numerically superior, like the one before us, comes into action


trusting more to strength than to resolution; while he who voluntarily


confronts tremendous odds must have very great internal resources to


draw upon. For these reasons the Peloponnesians fear our irrational


audacity more than they would ever have done a more commensurate


preparation. Besides, many armaments have before now succumbed to an


inferior through want of skill or sometimes of courage; neither of


which defects certainly are ours. As to the battle, it shall not be,


if I can help it, in the strait, nor will I sail in there at all;


seeing that in a contest between a number of clumsily managed


vessels and a small, fast, well-handled squadron, want of sea room


is an undoubted disadvantage. One cannot run down an enemy properly


without having a sight of him a good way off, nor can one retire at


need when pressed; one can neither break the line nor return upon


his rear, the proper tactics for a fast sailer; but the naval action


necessarily becomes a land one, in which numbers must decide the


matter. For all this I will provide as far as can be. Do you stay at


your posts by your ships, and be sharp at catching the word of


command, the more so as we are observing one another from so short a


distance; and in action think order and silence


all-important- qualities useful in war generally, and in naval


engagements in particular; and behave before the enemy in a manner


worthy of your past exploits. The issues you will fight for are


great- to destroy the naval hopes of the Peloponnesians or to bring


nearer to the Athenians their fears for the sea. And I may once more


remind you that you have defeated most of them already; and beaten men


do not face a danger twice with the same determination."


  Such was the exhortation of Phormio. The Peloponnesians finding that


the Athenians did not sail into the gulf and the narrows, in order


to lead them in whether they wished it or not, put out at dawn, and


forming four abreast, sailed inside the gulf in the direction of their


own country, the right wing leading as they had lain at anchor. In


this wing were placed twenty of their best sailers; so that in the


event of Phormio thinking that their object was Naupactus, and


coasting along thither to save the place, the Athenians might not be


able to escape their onset by getting outside their wing, but might be


cut off by the vessels in question. As they expected, Phormio, in


alarm for the place at that moment emptied of its garrison, as soon as


he saw them put out, reluctantly and hurriedly embarked and sailed


along shore; the Messenian land forces moving along also to support


him. The Peloponnesians seeing him coasting along with his ships in


single file, and by this inside the gulf and close inshore as they


so much wished, at one signal tacked suddenly and bore down in line at


their best speed on the Athenians, hoping to cut off the whole


squadron. The eleven leading vessels, however, escaped the


Peloponnesian wing and its sudden movement, and reached the more


open water; but the rest were overtaken as they tried to run


through, driven ashore and disabled; such of the crews being slain


as had not swum out of them. Some of the ships the Peloponnesians


lashed to their own, and towed off empty; one they took with the men


in it; others were just being towed off, when they were saved by the


Messenians dashing into the sea with their armour and fighting from


the decks that they had boarded.


  Thus far victory was with the Peloponnesians, and the Athenian fleet


destroyed; the twenty ships in the right wing being meanwhile in chase


of the eleven Athenian vessels that had escaped their sudden


movement and reached the more open water. These, with the exception of


one ship, all outsailed them and got safe into Naupactus, and


forming close inshore opposite the temple of Apollo, with their


prows facing the enemy, prepared to defend themselves in case the


Peloponnesians should sail inshore against them. After a while the


Peloponnesians came up, chanting the paean for their victory as they


sailed on; the single Athenian ship remaining being chased by a


Leucadian far ahead of the rest. But there happened to be a


merchantman lying at anchor in the roadstead, which the Athenian


ship found time to sail round, and struck the Leucadian in chase


amidships and sank her. An exploit so sudden and unexpected produced a


panic among the Peloponnesians; and having fallen out of order in


the excitement of victory, some of them dropped their oars and stopped


their way in order to let the main body come up- an unsafe thing to


do considering how near they were to the enemy's prows; while others


ran aground in the shallows, in their ignorance of the localities.


  Elated at this incident, the Athenians at one word gave a cheer, and


dashed at the enemy, who, embarrassed by his mistakes and the disorder


in which he found himself, only stood for an instant, and then fled


for Panormus, whence he had put out. The Athenians following on his


heels took the six vessels nearest them, and recovered those of


their own which had been disabled close inshore and taken in tow at


the beginning of the action; they killed some of the crews and took


some prisoners. On board the Leucadian which went down off the


merchantman, was the Lacedaemonian Timocrates, who killed himself when


the ship was sunk, and was cast up in the harbour of Naupactus. The


Athenians on their return set up a trophy on the spot from which


they had put out and turned the day, and picking up the wrecks and


dead that were on their shore, gave back to the enemy their dead under


truce. The Peloponnesians also set up a trophy as victors for the


defeat inflicted upon the ships they had disabled in shore, and


dedicated the vessel which they had taken at Achaean Rhium, side by


side with the trophy. After this, apprehensive of the reinforcement


expected from Athens, all except the Leucadians sailed into the


Crissaean Gulf for Corinth. Not long after their retreat, the twenty


Athenian ships, which were to have joined Phormio before the battle,


arrived at Naupactus.


  Thus the summer ended. Winter was now at hand; but dispersing the


fleet, which had retired to Corinth and the Crissaean Gulf, Cnemus,


Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian captains allowed themselves to


be persuaded by the Megarians to make an attempt upon Piraeus, the


port of Athens, which from her decided superiority at sea had been


naturally left unguarded and open. Their plan was as follows: The


men were each to take their oar, cushion, and rowlock thong, and,


going overland from Corinth to the sea on the Athenian side, to get to


Megara as quickly as they could, and launching forty vessels, which


happened to be in the docks at Nisaea, to sail at once to Piraeus.


There was no fleet on the look-out in the harbour, and no one had


the least idea of the enemy attempting a surprise; while an open


attack would, it was thought, never be deliberately ventured on, or,


if in contemplation, would be speedily known at Athens. Their plan


formed, the next step was to put it in execution. Arriving by night


and launching the vessels from Nisaea, they sailed, not to Piraeus


as they had originally intended, being afraid of the risk, besides


which there was some talk of a wind having stopped them, but to the


point of Salamis that looks towards Megara; where there was a fort and


a squadron of three ships to prevent anything sailing in or out of


Megara. This fort they assaulted, and towed off the galleys empty, and


surprising the inhabitants began to lay waste the rest of the island.


  Meanwhile fire signals were raised to alarm Athens, and a panic


ensued there as serious as any that occurred during the war. The


idea in the city was that the enemy had already sailed into Piraeus:


in Piraeus it was thought that they had taken Salamis and might at any


moment arrive in the port; as indeed might easily have been done if


their hearts had been a little firmer: certainly no wind would have


prevented them. As soon as day broke, the Athenians assembled in


full force, launched their ships, and embarking in haste and uproar


went with the fleet to Salamis, while their soldiery mounted guard


in Piraeus. The Peloponnesians, on becoming aware of the coming


relief, after they had overrun most of Salamis, hastily sailed off


with their plunder and captives and the three ships from Fort


Budorum to Nisaea; the state of their ships also causing them some


anxiety, as it was a long while since they had been launched, and they


were not water-tight. Arrived at Megara, they returned back on foot to


Corinth. The Athenians finding them no longer at Salamis, sailed


back themselves; and after this made arrangements for guarding Piraeus


more diligently in future, by closing the harbours, and by other


suitable precautions.


  About the same time, at the beginning of this winter, Sitalces,


son of Teres, the Odrysian king of Thrace, made an expedition


against Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and the


Chalcidians in the neighbourhood of Thrace; his object being to


enforce one promise and fulfil another. On the one hand Perdiccas


had made him a promise, when hard pressed at the commencement of the


war, upon condition that Sitalces should reconcile the Athenians to


him and not attempt to restore his brother and enemy, the pretender


Philip, but had not offered to fulfil his engagement; on the other he,


Sitalces, on entering into alliance with the Athenians, had agreed


to put an end to the Chalcidian war in Thrace. These were the two


objects of his invasion. With him he brought Amyntas, the son of


Philip, whom he destined for the throne of Macedonia, and some


Athenian envoys then at his court on this business, and Hagnon as


general; for the Athenians were to join him against the Chalcidians


with a fleet and as many soldiers as they could get together.


  Beginning with the Odrysians, he first called out the Thracian


tribes subject to him between Mounts Haemus and Rhodope and the Euxine


and Hellespont; next the Getae beyond Haemus, and the other hordes


settled south of the Danube in the neighbourhood of the Euxine, who,


like the Getae, border on the Scythians and are armed in the same


manner, being all mounted archers. Besides these he summoned many of


the hill Thracian independent swordsmen, called Dii and mostly


inhabiting Mount Rhodope, some of whom came as mercenaries, others


as volunteers; also the Agrianes and Laeaeans, and the rest of the


Paeonian tribes in his empire, at the confines of which these lay,


extending up to the Laeaean Paeonians and the river Strymon, which


flows from Mount Scombrus through the country of the Agrianes and


Laeaeans; there the empire of Sitalces ends and the territory of the


independent Paeonians begins. Bordering on the Triballi, also


independent, were the Treres and Tilataeans, who dwell to the north of


Mount Scombrus and extend towards the setting sun as far as the


river Oskius. This river rises in the same mountains as the Nestus and


Hebrus, a wild and extensive range connected with Rhodope.


  The empire of the Odrysians extended along the seaboard from


Abdera to the mouth of the Danube in the Euxine. The navigation of


this coast by the shortest route takes a merchantman four days and


four nights with a wind astern the whole way: by land an active man,


travelling by the shortest road, can get from Abdera to the Danube


in eleven days. Such was the length of its coast line. Inland from


Byzantium to the Laeaeans and the Strymon, the farthest limit of its


extension into the interior, it is a journey of thirteen days for an


active man. The tribute from all the barbarian districts and the


Hellenic cities, taking what they brought in under Seuthes, the


successor of Sitalces, who raised it to its greatest height,


amounted to about four hundred talents in gold and silver. There


were also presents in gold and silver to a no less amount, besides


stuff, plain and embroidered, and other articles, made not only for


the king, but also for the Odrysian lords and nobles. For there was


here established a custom opposite to that prevailing in the Persian


kingdom, namely, of taking rather than giving; more disgrace being


attached to not giving when asked than to asking and being refused;


and although this prevailed elsewhere in Thrace, it was practised most


extensively among the powerful Odrysians, it being impossible to get


anything done without a present. It was thus a very powerful


kingdom; in revenue and general prosperity surpassing all in Europe


between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine, and in numbers and military


resources coming decidedly next to the Scythians, with whom indeed


no people in Europe can bear comparison, there not being even in


Asia any nation singly a match for them if unanimous, though of course


they are not on a level with other races in general intelligence and


the arts of civilized life.


  It was the master of this empire that now prepared to take the


field. When everything was ready, he set out on his march for


Macedonia, first through his own dominions, next over the desolate


range of Cercine that divides the Sintians and Paeonians, crossing


by a road which he had made by felling the timber on a former campaign


against the latter people. Passing over these mountains, with the


Paeonians on his right and the Sintians and Maedians on the left, he


finally arrived at Doberus, in Paeonia, losing none of his army on the


march, except perhaps by sickness, but receiving some augmentations,


many of the independent Thracians volunteering to join him in the hope


of plunder; so that the whole is said to have formed a grand total


of a hundred and fifty thousand. Most of this was infantry, though


there was about a third cavalry, furnished principally by the


Odrysians themselves and next to them by the Getae. The most warlike


of the infantry were the independent swordsmen who came down from


Rhodope; the rest of the mixed multitude that followed him being


chiefly formidable by their numbers.


  Assembling in Doberus, they prepared for descending from the heights


upon Lower Macedonia, where the dominions of Perdiccas lay; for the


Lyncestae, Elimiots, and other tribes more inland, though


Macedonians by blood, and allies and dependants of their kindred,


still have their own separate governments. The country on the sea


coast, now called Macedonia, was first acquired by Alexander, the


father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors, originally Temenids from


Argos. This was effected by the expulsion from Pieria of the Pierians,


who afterwards inhabited Phagres and other places under Mount


Pangaeus, beyond the Strymon (indeed the country between Pangaeus


and the sea is still called the Pierian Gulf); of the Bottiaeans, at


present neighbours of the Chalcidians, from Bottia, and by the


acquisition in Paeonia of a narrow strip along the river Axius


extending to Pella and the sea; the district of Mygdonia, between


the Axius and the Strymon, being also added by the expulsion of the


Edonians. From Eordia also were driven the Eordians, most of whom


perished, though a few of them still live round Physca, and the


Almopians from Almopia. These Macedonians also conquered places


belonging to the other tribes, which are still theirs- Anthemus,


Crestonia, Bisaltia, and much of Macedonia proper. The whole is now


called Macedonia, and at the time of the invasion of Sitalces,


Perdiccas, Alexander's son, was the reigning king.


  These Macedonians, unable to take the field against so numerous an


invader, shut themselves up in such strong places and fortresses as


the country possessed. Of these there was no great number, most of


those now found in the country having been erected subsequently by


Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, on his accession, who also cut


straight roads, and otherwise put the kingdom on a better footing as


regards horses, heavy infantry, and other war material than had been


done by all the eight kings that preceded him. Advancing from Doberus,


the Thracian host first invaded what had been once Philip's


government, and took Idomene by assault, Gortynia, Atalanta, and


some other places by negotiation, these last coming over for love of


Philip's son, Amyntas, then with Sitalces. Laying siege to Europus,


and failing to take it, he next advanced into the rest of Macedonia to


the left of Pella and Cyrrhus, not proceeding beyond this into


Bottiaea and Pieria, but staying to lay waste Mygdonia, Crestonia, and


Anthemus.


  The Macedonians never even thought of meeting him with infantry; but


the Thracian host was, as opportunity offered, attacked by handfuls of


their horse, which had been reinforced from their allies in the


interior. Armed with cuirasses, and excellent horsemen, wherever these


charged they overthrew all before them, but ran considerable risk in


entangling themselves in the masses of the enemy, and so finally


desisted from these efforts, deciding that they were not strong enough


to venture against numbers so superior.


  Meanwhile Sitalces opened negotiations with Perdiccas on the objects


of his expedition; and finding that the Athenians, not believing


that he would come, did not appear with their fleet, though they


sent presents and envoys, dispatched a large part of his army


against the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and shutting them up inside


their walls laid waste their country. While he remained in these


parts, the people farther south, such as the Thessalians, Magnetes,


and the other tribes subject to the Thessalians, and the Hellenes as


far as Thermopylae, all feared that the army might advance against


them, and prepared accordingly. These fears were shared by the


Thracians beyond the Strymon to the north, who inhabited the plains,


such as the Panaeans, the Odomanti, the Droi, and the Dersaeans, all


of whom are independent. It was even matter of conversation among


the Hellenes who were enemies of Athens whether he might not be


invited by his ally to advance also against them. Meanwhile he held


Chalcidice and Bottice and Macedonia, and was ravaging them all; but


finding that he was not succeeding in any of the objects of his


invasion, and that his army was without provisions and was suffering


from the severity of the season, he listened to the advice of Seuthes,


son of Spardacus, his nephew and highest officer, and decided to


retreat without delay. This Seuthes had been secretly gained by


Perdiccas by the promise of his sister in marriage with a rich


dowry. In accordance with this advice, and after a stay of thirty days


in all, eight of which were spent in Chalcidice, he retired home as


quickly as he could; and Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister


Stratonice to Seuthes as he had promised. Such was the history of


the expedition of Sitalces.


  In the course of this winter, after the dispersion of the


Peloponnesian fleet, the Athenians in Naupactus, under Phormio,


coasted along to Astacus and disembarked, and marched into the


interior of Acarnania with four hundred Athenian heavy infantry and


four hundred Messenians. After expelling some suspected persons from


Stratus, Coronta, and other places, and restoring Cynes, son of


Theolytus, to Coronta, they returned to their ships, deciding that


it was impossible in the winter season to march against Oeniadae, a


place which, unlike the rest of Acarnania, had been always hostile


to them; for the river Achelous flowing from Mount Pindus through


Dolopia and the country of the Agraeans and Amphilochians and the


plain of Acarnania, past the town of Stratus in the upper part of


its course, forms lakes where it falls into the sea round Oeniadae,


and thus makes it impracticable for an army in winter by reason of the


water. Opposite to Oeniadae lie most of the islands called


Echinades, so close to the mouths of the Achelous that that powerful


stream is constantly forming deposits against them, and has already


joined some of the islands to the continent, and seems likely in no


long while to do the same with the rest. For the current is strong,


deep, and turbid, and the islands are so thick together that they


serve to imprison the alluvial deposit and prevent its dispersing,


lying, as they do, not in one line, but irregularly, so as to leave no


direct passage for the water into the open sea. The islands in


question are uninhabited and of no great size. There is also a story


that Alcmaeon, son of Amphiraus, during his wanderings after the


murder of his mother was bidden by Apollo to inhabit this spot,


through an oracle which intimated that he would have no release from


his terrors until he should find a country to dwell in which had not


been seen by the sun, or existed as land at the time he slew his


mother; all else being to him polluted ground. Perplexed at this,


the story goes on to say, he at last observed this deposit of the


Achelous, and considered that a place sufficient to support life upon,


might have been thrown up during the long interval that had elapsed


since the death of his mother and the beginning of his wanderings.


Settling, therefore, in the district round Oeniadae, he founded a


dominion, and left the country its name from his son Acarnan. Such


is the story we have received concerning Alcmaeon.


  The Athenians and Phormio putting back from Acarnania and arriving


at Naupactus, sailed home to Athens in the spring, taking with them


the ships that they had captured, and such of the prisoners made in


the late actions as were freemen; who were exchanged, man for man. And


so ended this winter, and the third year of this war, of which


Thucydides was the historian.