The Fourth Book.


                          CHAPTER XII.





         Seventh Year of the War - Occupation of Pylos -


           Surrender of the Spartan Army in Sphacteria





  NEXT summer, about the time of the corn's coming into ear, ten


Syracusan and as many Locrian vessels sailed to Messina, in Sicily,


and occupied the town upon the invitation of the inhabitants; and


Messina revolted from the Athenians. The Syracusans contrived this


chiefly because they saw that the place afforded an approach to


Sicily, and feared that the Athenians might hereafter use it as a base


for attacking them with a larger force; the Locrians because they


wished to carry on hostilities from both sides of the strait and to


reduce their enemies, the people of Rhegium. Meanwhile, the Locrians


had invaded the Rhegian territory with all their forces, to prevent


their succouring Messina, and also at the instance of some exiles from


Rhegium who were with them; the long factions by which that town had


been torn rendering it for the moment incapable of resistance, and


thus furnishing an additional temptation to the invaders. After


devastating the country the Locrian land forces retired, their ships


remaining to guard Messina, while others were being manned for the


same destination to carry on the war from thence.


  About the same time in the spring, before the corn was ripe, the


Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica under Agis, the son


of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and sat down and laid waste


the country. Meanwhile the Athenians sent off the forty ships which


they had been preparing to Sicily, with the remaining generals


Eurymedon and Sophocles; their colleague Pythodorus having already


preceded them thither. These had also instructions as they sailed by


to look to the Corcyraeans in the town, who were being plundered by


the exiles in the mountain. To support these exiles sixty


Peloponnesian vessels had lately sailed, it being thought that the


famine raging in the city would make it easy for them to reduce it.


Demosthenes also, who had remained without employment since his return


from Acarnania, applied and obtained permission to use the fleet, if


he wished it, upon the coast of Peloponnese.





  Off Laconia they heard that the Peloponnesian ships were already


at Corcyra, upon which Eurymedon and Sophocles wished to hasten to the


island, but Demosthenes required them first to touch at Pylos and do


what was wanted there, before continuing their voyage. While they were


making objections, a squall chanced to come on and carried the fleet


into Pylos. Demosthenes at once urged them to fortify the place, it


being for this that he had come on the voyage, and made them observe


there was plenty of stone and timber on the spot, and that the place


was strong by nature, and together with much of the country round


unoccupied; Pylos, or Coryphasium, as the Lacedaemonians call it,


being about forty-five miles distant from Sparta, and situated in


the old country of the Messenians. The commanders told him that


there was no lack of desert headlands in Peloponnese if he wished to


put the city to expense by occupying them. He, however, thought that


this place was distinguished from others of the kind by having a


harbour close by; while the Messenians, the old natives of the


country, speaking the same dialect as the Lacedaemonians, could do


them the greatest mischief by their incursions from it, and would at


the same time be a trusty garrison.


  After speaking to the captains of companies on the subject, and


failing to persuade either the generals or the soldiers, he remained


inactive with the rest from stress of weather; until the soldiers


themselves wanting occupation were seized with a sudden impulse to


go round and fortify the place. Accordingly they set to work in


earnest, and having no iron tools, picked up stones, and put them


together as they happened to fit, and where mortar was needed, carried


it on their backs for want of hods, stooping down to make it stay


on, and clasping their hands together behind to prevent it falling


off; sparing no effort to be able to complete the most vulnerable


points before the arrival of the Lacedaemonians, most of the place


being sufficiently strong by nature without further fortifications.


  Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians were celebrating a festival, and also


at first made light of the news, in the idea that whenever they


chose to take the field the place would be immediately evacuated by


the enemy or easily taken by force; the absence of their army before


Athens having also something to do with their delay. The Athenians


fortified the place on the land side, and where it most required it,


in six days, and leaving Demosthenes with five ships to garrison it,


with the main body of the fleet hastened on their voyage to Corcyra


and Sicily.


  As soon as the Peloponnesians in Attica heard of the occupation of


Pylos, they hurried back home; the Lacedaemonians and their king


Agis thinking that the matter touched them nearly. Besides having made


their invasion early in the season, and while the corn was still


green, most of their troops were short of provisions: the weather also


was unusually bad for the time of year, and greatly distressed their


army. Many reasons thus combined to hasten their departure and to make


this invasion a very short one; indeed they only stayed fifteen days


in Attica.


  About the same time the Athenian general Simonides getting


together a few Athenians from the garrisons, and a number of the


allies in those parts, took Eion in Thrace, a Mendaean colony and


hostile to Athens, by treachery, but had no sooner done so than the


Chalcidians and Bottiaeans came up and beat him out of it, with the


loss of many of his soldiers.


  On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans


themselves and the nearest of the Perioeci at once set out for


Pylos, the other Lacedaemonians following more slowly, as they had


just come in from another campaign. Word was also sent round


Peloponnese to come up as quickly as possible to Pylos; while the


sixty Peloponnesian ships were sent for from Corcyra, and being


dragged by their crews across the isthmus of Leucas, passed


unperceived by the Athenian squadron at Zacynthus, and reached


Pylos, where the land forces had arrived before them. Before the


Peloponnesian fleet sailed in, Demosthenes found time to send out


unobserved two ships to inform Eurymedon and the Athenians on board


the fleet at Zacynthus of the danger of Pylos and to summon them to


his assistance. While the ships hastened on their voyage in


obedience to the orders of Demosthenes, the Lacedaemonians prepared to


assault the fort by land and sea, hoping to capture with ease a work


constructed in haste, and held by a feeble garrison. Meanwhile, as


they expected the Athenian ships to arrive from Zacynthus, they


intended, if they failed to take the place before, to block up the


entrances of the harbour to prevent their being able to anchor


inside it. For the island of Sphacteria, stretching along in a line


close in front of the harbour, at once makes it safe and narrows its


entrances, leaving a passage for two ships on the side nearest Pylos


and the Athenian fortifications, and for eight or nine on that next


the rest of the mainland: for the rest, the island was entirely


covered with wood, and without paths through not being inhabited,


and about one mile and five furlongs in length. The inlets the


Lacedaemonians meant to close with a line of ships placed close


together, with their prows turned towards the sea, and, meanwhile,


fearing that the enemy might make use of the island to operate against


them, carried over some heavy infantry thither, stationing others


along the coast. By this means the island and the continent would be


alike hostile to the Athenians, as they would be unable to land on


either; and the shore of Pylos itself outside the inlet towards the


open sea having no harbour, and, therefore, presenting no point


which they could use as a base to relieve their countrymen, they,


the Lacedaemonians, without sea-fight or risk would in all probability


become masters of the place, occupied as it had been on the spur of


the moment, and unfurnished with provisions. This being determined,


they carried over to the island the heavy infantry, drafted by lot


from all the companies. Some others had crossed over before in


relief parties, but these last who were left there were four hundred


and twenty in number, with their Helot attendants, commanded by


Epitadas, son of Molobrus.


  Meanwhile Demosthenes, seeing the Lacedaemonians about to attack him


by sea and land at once, himself was not idle. He drew up under the


fortification and enclosed in a stockade the galleys remaining to


him of those which had been left him, arming the sailors taken out


of them with poor shields made most of them of osier, it being


impossible to procure arms in such a desert place, and even these


having been obtained from a thirty-oared Messenian privateer and a


boat belonging to some Messenians who happened to have come to them.


Among these Messenians were forty heavy infantry, whom he made use


of with the rest. Posting most of his men, unarmed and armed, upon the


best fortified and strong points of the place towards the interior,


with orders to repel any attack of the land forces, he picked sixty


heavy infantry and a few archers from his whole force, and with


these went outside the wall down to the sea, where he thought that the


enemy would most likely attempt to land. Although the ground was


difficult and rocky, looking towards the open sea, the fact that


this was the weakest part of the wall would, he thought, encourage


their ardour, as the Athenians, confident in their naval


superiority, had here paid little attention to their defences, and the


enemy if he could force a landing might feel secure of taking the


place. At this point, accordingly, going down to the water's edge,


he posted his heavy infantry to prevent, if possible, a landing, and


encouraged them in the following terms:


  "Soldiers and comrades in this adventure, I hope that none of you in


our present strait will think to show his wit by exactly calculating


all the perils that encompass us, but that you will rather hasten to


close with the enemy, without staying to count the odds, seeing in


this your best chance of safety. In emergencies like ours


calculation is out of place; the sooner the danger is faced the


better. To my mind also most of the chances are for us, if we will


only stand fast and not throw away our advantages, overawed by the


numbers of the enemy. One of the points in our favour is the


awkwardness of the landing. This, however, only helps us if we stand


our ground. If we give way it will be practicable enough, in spite


of its natural difficulty, without a defender; and the enemy will


instantly become more formidable from the difficulty he will have in


retreating, supposing that we succeed in repulsing him, which we shall


find it easier to do, while he is on board his ships, than after he


has landed and meets us on equal terms. As to his numbers, these


need not too much alarm you. Large as they may be he can only engage


in small detachments, from the impossibility of bringing to.


Besides, the numerical superiority that we have to meet is not that of


an army on land with everything else equal, but of troops on board


ship, upon an element where many favourable accidents are required


to act with effect. I therefore consider that his difficulties may


be fairly set against our numerical deficiencies, and at the same time


I charge you, as Athenians who know by experience what landing from


ships on a hostile territory means, and how impossible it is to


drive back an enemy determined enough to stand his ground and not to


be frightened away by the surf and the terrors of the ships sailing


in, to stand fast in the present emergency, beat back the enemy at the


water's edge, and save yourselves and the place."


  Thus encouraged by Demosthenes, the Athenians felt more confident,


and went down to meet the enemy, posting themselves along the edge


of the sea. The Lacedaemonians now put themselves in movement and


simultaneously assaulted the fortification with their land forces


and with their ships, forty-three in number, under their admiral,


Thrasymelidas, son of Cratesicles, a Spartan, who made his attack just


where Demosthenes expected. The Athenians had thus to defend


themselves on both sides, from the land and from the sea; the enemy


rowing up in small detachments, the one relieving the other- it being


impossible for many to bring to at once- and showing great ardour and


cheering each other on, in the endeavour to force a passage and to


take the fortification. He who most distinguished himself was


Brasidas. Captain of a galley, and seeing that the captains and


steersmen, impressed by the difficulty of the position, hung back even


where a landing might have seemed possible, for fear of wrecking their


vessels, he shouted out to them, that they must never allow the


enemy to fortify himself in their country for the sake of saving


timber, but must shiver their vessels and force a landing; and bade


the allies, instead of hesitating in such a moment to sacrifice


their ships for Lacedaemon in return for her many benefits, to run


them boldly aground, land in one way or another, and make themselves


masters of the place and its garrison.


  Not content with this exhortation, he forced his own steersman to


run his ship ashore, and stepping on to the gangway, was


endeavouring to land, when he was cut down by the Athenians, and after


receiving many wounds fainted away. Falling into the bows, his


shield slipped off his arm into the sea, and being thrown ashore was


picked up by the Athenians, and afterwards used for the trophy which


they set up for this attack. The rest also did their best, but were


not able to land, owing to the difficulty of the ground and the


unflinching tenacity of the Athenians. It was a strange reversal of


the order of things for Athenians to be fighting from the land, and


from Laconian land too, against Lacedaemonians coming from the sea;


while Lacedaemonians were trying to land from shipboard in their own


country, now become hostile, to attack Athenians, although the


former were chiefly famous at the time as an inland people and


superior by land, the latter as a maritime people with a navy that had


no equal.


  After continuing their attacks during that day and most of the next,


the Peloponnesians desisted, and the day after sent some of their


ships to Asine for timber to make engines, hoping to take by their


aid, in spite of its height, the wall opposite the harbour, where


the landing was easiest. At this moment the Athenian fleet from


Zacynthus arrived, now numbering fifty sail, having been reinforced by


some of the ships on guard at Naupactus and by four Chian vessels.


Seeing the coast and the island both crowded with heavy infantry,


and the hostile ships in harbour showing no signs of sailing out, at a


loss where to anchor, they sailed for the moment to the desert


island of Prote, not far off, where they passed the night. The next


day they got under way in readiness to engage in the open sea if the


enemy chose to put out to meet them, being determined in the event


of his not doing so to sail in and attack him. The Lacedaemonians


did not put out to sea, and having omitted to close the inlets as they


had intended, remained quiet on shore, engaged in manning their


ships and getting ready, in the case of any one sailing in, to fight


in the harbour, which is a fairly large one.


  Perceiving this, the Athenians advanced against them by each


inlet, and falling on the enemy's fleet, most of which was by this


time afloat and in line, at once put it to flight, and giving chase as


far as the short distance allowed, disabled a good many vessels and


took five, one with its crew on board; dashing in at the rest that had


taken refuge on shore, and battering some that were still being


manned, before they could put out, and lashing on to their own ships


and towing off empty others whosc crews had fled. At this sight the


Lacedaemonians, maddened by a disaster which cut off their men on


the island, rushed to the rescue, and going into the sea with their


heavy armour, laid hold of the ships and tried to drag them back, each


man thinking that success depended on his individual exertions.


Great was the melee, and quite in contradiction to the naval tactics


usual to the two combatants; the Lacedaemonians in their excitement


and dismay being actually engaged in a sea-fight on land, while the


victorious Athenians, in their eagerness to push their success as


far as possible, were carrying on a land-fight from their ships. After


great exertions and numerous wounds on both sides they separated,


the Lacedaemonians saving their empty ships, except those first taken;


and both parties returning to their camp, the Athenians set up a


trophy, gave back the dead, secured the wrecks, and at once began to


cruise round and jealously watch the island, with its intercepted


garrison, while the Peloponnesians on the mainland, whose


contingents had now all come up, stayed where they were before Pylos.


  When the news of what had happened at Pylos reached Sparta, the


disaster was thought so serious that the Lacedaemonians resolved


that the authorities should go down to the camp, and decide on the


spot what was best to be done. There, seeing that it was impossible to


help their men, and not wishing to risk their being reduced by


hunger or overpowered by numbers, they determined, with the consent of


the Athenian generals, to conclude an armistice at Pylos and send


envoys to Athens to obtain a convention, and to endeavour to get


back their men as quickly as possible.


  The generals accepting their offers, an armistice was concluded upon


the terms following:


    That the Lacedaemonians should bring to Pylos and deliver up to


the Athenians the ships that had fought in the late engagement, and


all in Laconia that were vessels of war, and should make no attack


on the fortification either by land or by sea.


    That the Athenians should allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland


to send to the men in the island a certain fixed quantity of corn


ready kneaded, that is to say, two quarts of barley meal, one pint


of wine, and a piece of meat for each man, and half the same


quantity for a servant.


    That this allowance should be sent in under the eyes of the


Athenians, and that no boat should sail to the island except openly.


    That the Athenians should continue to the island same as before,


without however landing upon it, and should refrain from attacking the


Peloponnesian troops either by land or by sea.


    That if either party should infringe any of these terms in the


slightest particular, the armistice should be at once void.


    That the armistice should hold good until the return of the


Lacedaemonian envoys from Athens- the Athenians sending them thither


in a galley and bringing them back again- and upon the arrival of the


envoys should be at an end, and the ships be restored by the Athenians


in the same state as they received them.


  Such were the terms of the armistice, and the ships were delivered


over to the number of sixty, and the envoys sent off accordingly.


Arrived at Athens they spoke as follows:


  "Athenians, the Lacedaemonians sent us to try to find some way of


settling the affair of our men on the island, that shall be at once


satisfactory to our interests, and as consistent with our dignity in


our misfortune as circumstances permit. We can venture to speak at


some length without any departure from the habit of our country. Men


of few words where many are not wanted, we can be less brief when


there is a matter of importance to be illustrated and an end to be


served by its illustration. Meanwhile we beg you to take what we may


say, not in a hostile spirit, nor as if we thought you ignorant and


wished to lecture you, but rather as a suggestion on the best course


to be taken, addressed to intelligent judges. You can now, if you


choose, employ your present success to advantage, so as to keep what


you have got and gain honour and reputation besides, and you can avoid


the mistake of those who meet with an extraordinary piece of good


fortune, and are led on by hope to grasp continually at something


further, through having already succeeded without expecting it.


While those who have known most vicissitudes of good and bad, have


also justly least faith in their prosperity; and to teach your city


and ours this lesson experience has not been wanting.





  "To be convinced of this you have only to look at our present


misfortune. What power in Hellas stood higher than we did? and yet


we are come to you, although we formerly thought ourselves more able


to grant what we are now here to ask. Nevertheless, we have not been


brought to this by any decay in our power, or through having our heads


turned by aggrandizement; no, our resources are what they have


always been, and our error has been an error of judgment, to which all


are equally liable. Accordingly, the prosperity which your city now


enjoys, and the accession that it has lately received, must not make


you fancy that fortune will be always with you. Indeed sensible men


are prudent enough to treat their gains as precarious, just as they


would also keep a clear head in adversity, and think that war, so


far from staying within the limit to which a combatant may wish to


confine it, will run the course that its chances prescribe; and


thus, not being puffed up by confidence in military success, they


are less likely to come to grief, and most ready to make peace, if


they can, while their fortune lasts. This, Athenians, you have a


good opportunity to do now with us, and thus to escape the possible


disasters which may follow upon your refusal, and the consequent


imputation of having owed to accident even your present advantages,


when you might have left behind you a reputation for power and


wisdom which nothing could endanger.


  "The Lacedaemonians accordingly invite you to make a treaty and to


end the war, and offer peace and alliance and the most friendly and


intimate relations in every way and on every occasion between us;


and in return ask for the men on the island, thinking it better for


both parties not to stand out to the end, on the chance of some


favourable accident enabling the men to force their way out, or of


their being compelled to succumb under the pressure of blockade.


Indeed if great enmities are ever to be really settled, we think it


will be, not by the system of revenge and military success, and by


forcing an opponent to swear to a treaty to his disadvantage, but when


the more fortunate combatant waives these his privileges, to be guided


by gentler feelings conquers his rival in generosity, and accords


peace on more moderate conditions than he expected. From that


moment, instead of the debt of revenge which violence must entail, his


adversary owes a debt of generosity to be paid in kind, and is


inclined by honour to stand to his agreement. And men oftener act in


this manner towards their greatest enemies than where the quarrel is


of less importance; they are also by nature as glad to give way to


those who first yield to them, as they are apt to be provoked by


arrogance to risks condemned by their own judgment.


  "To apply this to ourselves: if peace was ever desirable for both


parties, it is surely so at the present moment, before anything


irremediable befall us and force us to hate you eternally,


personally as well as politically, and you to miss the advantages that


we now offer you. While the issue is still in doubt, and you have


reputation and our friendship in prospect, and we the compromise of


our misfortune before anything fatal occur, let us be reconciled,


and for ourselves choose peace instead of war, and grant to the rest


of the Hellenes a remission from their sufferings, for which be sure


they will think they have chiefly you to thank. The war that they


labour under they know not which began, but the peace that concludes


it, as it depends on your decision, will by their gratitude be laid to


your door. By such a decision you can become firm friends with the


Lacedaemonians at their own invitation, which you do not force from


them, but oblige them by accepting. And from this friendship


consider the advantages that are likely to follow: when Attica and


Sparta are at one, the rest of Hellas, be sure, will remain in


respectful inferiority before its heads."


  Such were the words of the Lacedaemonians, their idea being that the


Athenians, already desirous of a truce and only kept back by their


opposition, would joyfully accept a peace freely offered, and give


back the men. The Athenians, however, having the men on the island,


thought that the treaty would be ready for them whenever they chose to


make it, and grasped at something further. Foremost to encourage


them in this policy was Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, a popular leader


of the time and very powerful with the multitude, who persuaded them


to answer as follows: First, the men in the island must surrender


themselves and their arms and be brought to Athens. Next, the


Lacedaemonians must restore Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia, all


places acquired not by arms, but by the previous convention, under


which they had been ceded by Athens herself at a moment of disaster,


when a truce was more necessary to her than at present. This done they


might take back their men, and make a truce for as long as both


parties might agree.


  To this answer the envoys made no reply, but asked that


commissioners might be chosen with whom they might confer on each


point, and quietly talk the matter over and try to come to some


agreement. Hereupon Cleon violently assailed them, saying that he knew


from the first that they had no right intentions, and that it was


clear enough now by their refusing to speak before the people, and


wanting to confer in secret with a committee of two or three. No, if


they meant anything honest let them say it out before all. The


Lacedaemonians, however, seeing that whatever concessions they might


be prepared to make in their misfortune, it was impossible for them to


speak before the multitude and lose credit with their allies for a


negotiation which might after all miscarry, and on the other hand,


that the Athenians would never grant what they asked upon moderate


terms, returned from Athens without having effected anything.


  Their arrival at once put an end to the armistice at Pylos, and


the Lacedaemonians asked back their ships according to the convention.


The Athenians, however, alleged an attack on the fort in contravention


of the truce, and other grievances seemingly not worth mentioning, and


refused to give them back, insisting upon the clause by which the


slightest infringement made the armistice void. The Lacedaemonians,


after denying the contravention and protesting against their bad faith


in the matter of the ships, went away and earnestly addressed


themselves to the war. Hostilities were now carried on at Pylos upon


both sides with vigour. The Athenians cruised round the island all day


with two ships going different ways; and by night, except on the


seaward side in windy weather, anchored round it with their whole


fleet, which, having been reinforced by twenty ships from Athens


come to aid in the blockade, now numbered seventy sail; while the


Peloponnesians remained encamped on the continent, making attacks on


the fort, and on the look-out for any opportunity which might offer


itself for the deliverance of their men.


  Meanwhile the Syracusans and their allies in Sicily had brought up


to the squadron guarding Messina the reinforcement which we left


them preparing, and carried on the war from thence, incited chiefly by


the Locrians from hatred of the Rhegians, whose territory they had


invaded with all their forces. The Syracusans also wished to try their


fortune at sea, seeing that the Athenians had only a few ships


actually at Rhegium, and hearing that the main fleet destined to


join them was engaged in blockading the island. A naval victory,


they thought, would enable them to blockade Rhegium by sea and land,


and easily to reduce it; a success which would at once place their


affairs upon a solid basis, the promontory of Rhegium in Italy and


Messina in Sicily being so near each other that it would be impossible


for the Athenians to cruise against them and command the strait. The


strait in question consists of the sea between Rhegium and Messina, at


the point where Sicily approaches nearest to the continent, and is the


Charybdis through which the story makes Ulysses sail; and the


narrowness of the passage and the strength of the current that pours


in from the vast Tyrrhenian and Sicilian mains, have rightly given


it a bad reputation.


  In this strait the Syracusans and their allies were compelled to


fight, late in the day, about the passage of a boat, putting out


with rather more than thirty ships against sixteen Athenian and


eight Rhegian vessels. Defeated by the Athenians they hastily set off,


each for himself, to their own stations at Messina and Rhegium, with


the loss of one ship; night coming on before the battle was


finished. After this the Locrians retired from the Rhegian


territory, and the ships of the Syracusans and their allies united and


came to anchor at Cape Pelorus, in the territory of Messina, where


their land forces joined them. Here the Athenians and Rhegians


sailed up, and seeing the ships unmanned, made an attack, in which


they in their turn lost one vessel, which was caught by a grappling


iron, the crew saving themselves by swimming. After this the


Syracusans got on board their ships, and while they were being towed


alongshore to Messina, were again attacked by the Athenians, but


suddenly got out to sea and became the assailants, and caused them


to lose another vessel. After thus holding their own in the voyage


alongshore and in the engagement as above described, the Syracusans


sailed on into the harbour of Messina.


  Meanwhile the Athenians, having received warning that Camarina was


about to be betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his party,


sailed thither; and the Messinese took this opportunity to attack by


sea and land with all their forces their Chalcidian neighbour,


Naxos. The first day they forced the Naxians to keep their walls,


and laid waste their country; the next they sailed round with their


ships, and laid waste their land on the river Akesines, while their


land forces menaced the city. Meanwhile the Sicels came down from


the high country in great numbers, to aid against the Messinese; and


the Naxians, elated at the sight, and animated by a belief that the


Leontines and their other Hellenic allies were coming to their


support, suddenly sallied out from the town, and attacked and routed


the Messinese, killing more than a thousand of them; while the


remainder suffered severely in their retreat home, being attacked by


the barbarians on the road, and most of them cut off. The ships put in


to Messina, and afterwards dispersed for their different homes. The


Leontines and their allies, with the Athenians, upon this at once


turned their arms against the now weakened Messina, and attacked,


the Athenians with their ships on the side of the harbour, and the


land forces on that of the town. The Messinese, however, sallying


out with Demoteles and some Locrians who had been left to garrison the


city after the disaster, suddenly attacked and routed most of the


Leontine army, killing a great number; upon seeing which the Athenians


landed from their ships, and falling on the Messinese in disorder


chased them back into the town, and setting up a trophy retired to


Rhegium. After this the Hellenes in Sicily continued to make war on


each other by land, without the Athenians.


  Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos were still besieging the


Lacedaemonians in the island, the Peloponnesian forces on the


continent remaining where they were. The blockade was very laborious


for the Athenians from want of food and water; there was no spring


except one in the citadel of Pylos itself, and that not a large one,


and most of them were obliged to grub up the shingle on the sea


beach and drink such water as they could find. They also suffered from


want of room, being encamped in a narrow space; and as there was no


anchorage for the ships, some took their meals on shore in their turn,


while the others were anchored out at sea. But their greatest


discouragement arose from the unexpectedly long time which it took


to reduce a body of men shut up in a desert island, with only brackish


water to drink, a matter which they had imagined would take them


only a few days. The fact was that the Lacedaemonians had made


advertisement for volunteers to carry into the island ground corn,


wine, cheese, and any other food useful in a siege; high prices


being offered, and freedom promised to any of the Helots who should


succeed in doing so. The Helots accordingly were most forward to


engage in this risky traffic, putting off from this or that part of


Peloponnese, and running in by night on the seaward side of the


island. They were best pleased, however, when they could catch a


wind to carry them in. It was more easy to elude the look-out of the


galleys, when it blew from the seaward, as it became impossible for


them to anchor round the island; while the Helots had their boats


rated at their value in money, and ran them ashore, without caring how


they landed, being sure to find the soldiers waiting for them at the


landing-places. But all who risked it in fair weather were taken.


Divers also swam in under water from the harbour, dragging by a cord


in skins poppyseed mixed with honey, and bruised linseed; these at


first escaped notice, but afterwards a look-out was kept for them.


In short, both sides tried every possible contrivance, the one to


throw in provisions, and the other to prevent their introduction.


  At Athens, meanwhile, the news that the army was in great


distress, and that corn found its way in to the men in the island,


caused no small perplexity; and the Athenians began to fear that


winter might come on and find them still engaged in the blockade. They


saw that the convoying of provisions round Peloponnese would be then


impossible. The country offered no resources in itself, and even in


summer they could not send round enough. The blockade of a place


without harbours could no longer be kept up; and the men would


either escape by the siege being abandoned, or would watch for bad


weather and sail out in the boats that brought in their corn. What


caused still more alarm was the attitude of the Lacedaemonians, who


must, it was thought by the Athenians, feel themselves on strong


ground not to send them any more envoys; and they began to repent


having rejected the treaty. Cleon, perceiving the disfavour with which


he was regarded for having stood in the way of the convention, now


said that their informants did not speak the truth; and upon the


messengers recommending them, if they did not believe them, to send


some commissioners to see, Cleon himself and Theagenes were chosen


by the Athenians as commissioners. Aware that he would now be


obliged either to say what had been already said by the men whom he


was slandering, or be proved a liar if he said the contrary, he told


the Athenians, whom he saw to be not altogether disinclined for a


fresh expedition, that instead of sending and wasting their time and


opportunities, if they believed what was told them, they ought to sail


against the men. And pointing at Nicias, son of Niceratus, then


general, whom he hated, he tauntingly said that it would be easy, if


they had men for generals, to sail with a force and take those in


the island, and that if he had himself been in command, he would


have done it.


  Nicias, seeing the Athenians murmuring against Cleon for not sailing


now if it seemed to him so easy, and further seeing himself the object


of attack, told him that for all that the generals cared, he might


take what force he chose and make the attempt. At first Cleon


fancied that this resignation was merely a figure of speech, and was


ready to go, but finding that it was seriously meant, he drew back,


and said that Nicias, not he, was general, being now frightened, and


having never supposed that Nicias would go so far as to retire in


his favour. Nicias, however, repeated his offer, and resigned the


command against Pylos, and called the Athenians to witness that he did


so. And as the multitude is wont to do, the more Cleon shrank from the


expedition and tried to back out of what he had said, the more they


encouraged Nicias to hand over his command, and clamoured at Cleon


to go. At last, not knowing how to get out of his words, he


undertook the expedition, and came forward and said that he was not


afraid of the Lacedaemonians, but would sail without taking any one


from the city with him, except the Lemnians and Imbrians that were


at Athens, with some targeteers that had come up from Aenus, and


four hundred archers from other quarters. With these and the


soldiers at Pylos, he would within twenty days either bring the


Lacedaemonians alive, or kill them on the spot. The Athenians could


not help laughing at his fatuity, while sensible men comforted


themselves with the reflection that they must gain in either


circumstance; either they would be rid of Cleon, which they rather


hoped, or if disappointed in this expectation, would reduce the


Lacedaemonians.


  After he had settled everything in the assembly, and the Athenians


had voted him the command of the expedition, he chose as his colleague


Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, and pushed forward the


preparations for his voyage. His choice fell upon Demosthenes


because he heard that he was contemplating a descent on the island;


the soldiers distressed by the difficulties of the position, and


rather besieged than besiegers, being eager to fight it out, while the


firing of the island had increased the confidence of the general. He


had been at first afraid, because the island having never been


inhabited was almost entirely covered with wood and without paths,


thinking this to be in the enemy's favour, as he might land with a


large force, and yet might suffer loss by an attack from an unseen


position. The mistakes and forces of the enemy the wood would in a


great measure conceal from him, while every blunder of his own


troops would be at once detected, and they would be thus able to


fall upon him unexpectedly just where they pleased, the attack being


always in their power. If, on the other hand, he should force them


to engage in the thicket, the smaller number who knew the country


would, he thought, have the advantage over the larger who were


ignorant of it, while his own army might be cut off imperceptibly,


in spite of its numbers, as the men would not be able to see where


to succour each other.


  The Aetolian disaster, which had been mainly caused by the wood, had


not a little to do with these reflections. Meanwhile, one of the


soldiers who were compelled by want of room to land on the extremities


of the island and take their dinners, with outposts fixed to prevent a


surprise, set fire to a little of the wood without meaning to do so;


and as it came on to blow soon afterwards, almost the whole was


consumed before they were aware of it. Demosthenes was now able for


the first time to see how numerous the Lacedaemonians really were,


having up to this moment been under the impression that they took in


provisions for a smaller number; he also saw that the Athenians


thought success important and were anxious about it, and that it was


now easier to land on the island, and accordingly got ready for the


attempt, sent for troops from the allies in the neighbourhood, and


pushed forward his other preparations. At this moment Cleon arrived at


Pylos with the troops which he had asked for, having sent on word to


say that he was coming. The first step taken by the two generals after


their meeting was to send a herald to the camp on the mainland, to ask


if they were disposed to avoid all risk and to order the men on the


island to surrender themselves and their arms, to be kept in gentle


custody until some general convention should be concluded.


  On the rejection of this proposition the generals let one day


pass, and the next, embarking all their heavy infantry on board a


few ships, put out by night, and a little before dawn landed on both


sides of the island from the open sea and from the harbour, being


about eight hundred strong, and advanced with a run against the


first post in the island.


  The enemy had distributed his force as follows: In this first post


there were about thirty heavy infantry; the centre and most level


part, where the water was, was held by the main body, and by


Epitadas their commander; while a small party guarded the very end


of the island, towards Pylos, which was precipitous on the sea-side


and very difficult to attack from the land, and where there was also a


sort of old fort of stones rudely put together, which they thought


might be useful to them, in case they should be forced to retreat.


Such was their disposition.


  The advanced post thus attacked by the Athenians was at once put


to the sword, the men being scarcely out of bed and still arming,


the landing having taken them by surprise, as they fancied the ships


were only sailing as usual to their stations for the night. As soon as


day broke, the rest of the army landed, that is to say, all the


crews of rather more than seventy ships, except the lowest rank of


oars, with the arms they carried, eight hundred archers, and as many


targeteers, the Messenian reinforcements, and all the other troops


on duty round Pylos, except the garrison on the fort. The tactics of


Demosthenes had divided them into companies of two hundred, more or


less, and made them occupy the highest points in order to paralyse the


enemy by surrounding him on every side and thus leaving him without


any tangible adversary, exposed to the cross-fire of their host; plied


by those in his rear if he attacked in front, and by those on one


flank if he moved against those on the other. In short, wherever he


went he would have the assailants behind him, and these light-armed


assailants, the most awkward of all; arrows, darts, stones, and slings


making them formidable at a distance, and there being no means of


getting at them at close quarters, as they could conquer flying, and


the moment their pursuer turned they were upon him. Such was the


idea that inspired Demosthenes in his conception of the descent, and


presided over its execution.


  Meanwhile the main body of the troops in the island (that under


Epitadas), seeing their outpost cut off and an army advancing


against them, serried their ranks and pressed forward to close with


the Athenian heavy infantry in front of them, the light troops being


upon their flanks and rear. However, they were not able to engage or


to profit by their superior skill, the light troops keeping them in


check on either side with their missiles, and the heavy infantry


remaining stationary instead of advancing to meet them; and although


they routed the light troops wherever they ran up and approached too


closely, yet they retreated fighting, being lightly equipped, and


easily getting the start in their flight, from the difficult and


rugged nature of the ground, in an island hitherto desert, over


which the Lacedaemonians could not pursue them with their heavy


armour.


  After this skirmishing had lasted some little while, the


Lacedaemonians became unable to dash out with the same rapidity as


before upon the points attacked, and the light troops finding that


they now fought with less vigour, became more confident. They could


see with their own eyes that they were many times more numerous than


the enemy; they were now more familiar with his aspect and found him


less terrible, the result not having justified the apprehensions which


they had suffered, when they first landed in slavish dismay at the


idea of attacking Lacedaemonians; and accordingly their fear


changing to disdain, they now rushed all together with loud shouts


upon them, and pelted them with stones, darts, and arrows, whichever


came first to hand. The shouting accompanying their onset confounded


the Lacedaemonians, unaccustomed to this mode of fighting; dust rose


from the newly burnt wood, and it was impossible to see in front of


one with the arrows and stones flying through clouds of dust from


the hands of numerous assailants. The Lacedaemonians had now to


sustain a rude conflict; their caps would not keep out the arrows,


darts had broken off in the armour of the wounded, while they


themselves were helpless for offence, being prevented from using their


eyes to see what was before them, and unable to hear the words of


command for the hubbub raised by the enemy; danger encompassed them on


every side, and there was no hope of any means of defence or safety.


  At last, after many had been already wounded in the confined space


in which they were fighting, they formed in close order and retired on


the fort at the end of the island, which was not far off, and to their


friends who held it. The moment they gave way, the light troops became


bolder and pressed upon them, shouting louder than ever, and killed as


many as they came up with in their retreat, but most of the


Lacedaemonians made good their escape to the fort, and with the


garrison in it ranged themselves all along its whole extent to repulse


the enemy wherever it was assailable. The Athenians pursuing, unable


to surround and hem them in, owing to the strength of the ground,


attacked them in front and tried to storm the position. For a long


time, indeed for most of the day, both sides held out against all


the torments of the battle, thirst, and sun, the one endeavouring to


drive the enemy from the high ground, the other to maintain himself


upon it, it being now more easy for the Lacedaemonians to defend


themselves than before, as they could not be surrounded on the flanks.


  The struggle began to seem endless, when the commander of the


Messenians came to Cleon and Demosthenes, and told them that they were


losing their labour: but if they would give him some archers and light


troops to go round on the enemy's rear by a way he would undertake


to find, he thought he could force the approach. Upon receiving what


he asked for, he started from a point out of sight in order not to


be seen by the enemy, and creeping on wherever the precipices of the


island permitted, and where the Lacedaemonians, trusting to the


strength of the ground, kept no guard, succeeded after the greatest


difficulty in getting round without their seeing him, and suddenly


appeared on the high ground in their rear, to the dismay of the


surprised enemy and the still greater joy of his expectant friends.


The Lacedaemonians thus placed between two fires, and in the same


dilemma, to compare small things with great, as at Thermopylae,


where the defenders were cut off through the Persians getting round by


the path, being now attacked in front and behind, began to give way,


and overcome by the odds against them and exhausted from want of food,


retreated.


  The Athenians were already masters of the approaches when Cleon


and Demosthenes perceiving that, if the enemy gave way a single step


further, they would be destroyed by their soldiery, put a stop to


the battle and held their men back; wishing to take the Lacedaemonians


alive to Athens, and hoping that their stubbornness might relax on


hearing the offer of terms, and that they might surrender and yield to


the present overwhelming danger. Proclamation was accordingly made, to


know if they would surrender themselves and their arms to the


Athenians to be dealt at their discretion.


  The Lacedaemonians hearing this offer, most of them lowered their


shields and waved their hands to show that they accepted it.


Hostilities now ceased, and a parley was held between Cleon and


Demosthenes and Styphon, son of Pharax, on the other side; since


Epitadas, the first of the previous commanders, had been killed, and


Hippagretas, the next in command, left for dead among the slain,


though still alive, and thus the command had devolved upon Styphon


according to the law, in case of anything happening to his


superiors. Styphon and his companions said they wished to send a


herald to the Lacedaemonians on the mainland, to know what they were


to do. The Athenians would not let any of them go, but themselves


called for heralds from the mainland, and after questions had been


carried backwards and forwards two or three times, the last man that


passed over from the Lacedaemonians on the continent brought this


message: "The Lacedaemonians bid you to decide for yourselves so


long as you do nothing dishonourable"; upon which after consulting


together they surrendered themselves and their arms. The Athenians,


after guarding them that day and night, the next morning set up a


trophy in the island, and got ready to sail, giving their prisoners in


batches to be guarded by the captains of the galleys; and the


Lacedaemonians sent a herald and took up their dead. The number of the


killed and prisoners taken in the island was as follows: four


hundred and twenty heavy infantry had passed over; three hundred all


but eight were taken alive to Athens; the rest were killed. About a


hundred and twenty of the prisoners were Spartans. The Athenian loss


was small, the battle not having been fought at close quarters.


  The blockade in all, counting from the fight at sea to the battle in


the island, had lasted seventy-two days. For twenty of these, during


the absence of the envoys sent to treat for peace, the men had


provisions given them, for the rest they were fed by the smugglers.


Corn and other victual was found in the island; the commander Epitadas


having kept the men upon half rations. The Athenians and


Peloponnesians now each withdrew their forces from Pylos, and went


home, and crazy as Cleon's promise was, he fulfilled it, by bringing


the men to Athens within the twenty days as he had pledged himself


to do.


  Nothing that happened in the war surprised the Hellenes so much as


this. It was the opinion that no force or famine could make the


Lacedaemonians give up their arms, but that they would fight on as


they could, and die with them in their hands: indeed people could


scarcely believe that those who had surrendered were of the same stuff


as the fallen; and an Athenian ally, who some time after insultingly


asked one of the prisoners from the island if those that had fallen


were men of honour, received for answer that the atraktos- that is,


the arrow- would be worth a great deal if it could tell men of honour


from the rest; in allusion to the fact that the killed were those whom


the stones and the arrows happened to hit.


  Upon the arrival of the men the Athenians determined to keep them in


prison until the peace, and if the Peloponnesians invaded their


country in the interval, to bring them out and put them to death.


Meanwhile the defence of Pylos was not forgotten; the Messenians


from Naupactus sent to their old country, to which Pylos formerly


belonged, some of the likeliest of their number, and began a series of


incursions into Laconia, which their common dialect rendered most


destructive. The Lacedaemonians, hitherto without experience of


incursions or a warfare of the kind, finding the Helots deserting, and


fearing the march of revolution in their country, began to be


seriously uneasy, and in spite of their unwillingness to betray this


to the Athenians began to send envoys to Athens, and tried to


recover Pylos and the prisoners. The Athenians, however, kept grasping


at more, and dismissed envoy after envoy without their having effected


anything. Such was the history of the affair of Pylos.


                          CHAPTER XIII.





          Seventh and Eighth Years of the War - End of


             Corcyraean Revolution - Peace of Gela -


                        Capture of Nisaea





  THE same summer, directly after these events, the Athenians made


an expedition against the territory of Corinth with eighty ships and


two thousand Athenian heavy infantry, and two hundred cavalry on board


horse transports, accompanied by the Milesians, Andrians, and


Carystians from the allies, under the command of Nicias, son of


Niceratus, with two colleagues. Putting out to sea they made land at


daybreak between Chersonese and Rheitus, at the beach of the country


underneath the Solygian hill, upon which the Dorians in old times


established themselves and carried on war against the Aeolian


inhabitants of Corinth, and where a village now stands called Solygia.


The beach where the fleet came to is about a mile and a half from


the village, seven miles from Corinth, and two and a quarter from


the Isthmus. The Corinthians had heard from Argos of the coming of the


Athenian armament, and had all come up to the Isthmus long before,


with the exception of those who lived beyond it, and also of five


hundred who were away in garrison in Ambracia and Leucadia; and they


were there in full force watching for the Athenians to land. These


last, however, gave them the slip by coming in the dark; and being


informed by signals of the fact the Corinthians left half their number


at Cenchreae, in case the Athenians should go against Crommyon, and


marched in all haste to the rescue.


  Battus, one of the two generals present at the action, went with a


company to defend the village of Solygia, which was unfortified;


Lycophron remaining to give battle with the rest. The Corinthians


first attacked the right wing of the Athenians, which had just


landed in front of Chersonese, and afterwards the rest of the army.


The battle was an obstinate one, and fought throughout hand to hand.


The right wing of the Athenians and Carystians, who had been placed at


the end of the line, received and with some difficulty repulsed the


Corinthians, who thereupon retreated to a wall upon the rising


ground behind, and throwing down the stones upon them, came on again


singing the paean, and being received by the Athenians, were again


engaged at close quarters. At this moment a Corinthian company


having come to the relief of the left wing, routed and pursued the


Athenian right to the sea, whence they were in their turn driven


back by the Athenians and Carystians from the ships. Meanwhile the


rest of the army on either side fought on tenaciously, especially


the right wing of the Corinthians, where Lycophron sustained the


attack of the Athenian left, which it was feared might attempt the


village of Solygia.


  After holding on for a long while without either giving way, the


Athenians aided by their horse, of which the enemy had none, at


length routed the Corinthians, who retired to the hill and, halting,


remained quiet there, without coming down again. It was in this rout


of the right wing that they had the most killed, Lycophron their


general being among the number. The rest of the army, broken and put


to flight in this way without being seriously pursued or hurried,


retired to the high ground and there took up its position. The


Athenians, finding that the enemy no longer offered to engage them,


stripped his dead and took up their own and immediately set up a


trophy. Meanwhile, the half of the Corinthians left at Cenchreae to


guard against the Athenians sailing on Crommyon, although unable to


see the battle for Mount Oneion, found out what was going on by the


dust, and hurried up to the rescue; as did also the older Corinthians


from the town, upon discovering what had occurred. The Athenians


seeing them all coming against them, and thinking that they were


reinforcements arriving from the neighbouring Peloponnesians,


withdrew in haste to their ships with their spoils and their own


dead, except two that they left behind, not being able to find them,


and going on board crossed over to the islands opposite, and from


thence sent a herald, and took up under truce the bodies which they


had left behind. Two hundred and twelve Corinthians fell in the


battle, and rather less than fifty Athenians.


  Weighing from the islands, the Athenians sailed the same day to


Crommyon in the Corinthian territory, about thirteen miles from the


city, and coming to anchor laid waste the country, and passed the


night there. The next day, after first coasting along to the territory


of Epidaurus and making a descent there, they came to Methana


between Epidaurus and Troezen, and drew a wall across and fortified


the isthmus of the peninsula, and left a post there from which


incursions were henceforth made upon the country of Troezen, Haliae,


and Epidaurus. After walling off this spot, the fleet sailed off home.


  While these events were going on, Eurymedon and Sophocles had put to


sea with the Athenian fleet from Pylos on their way to Sicily and,


arriving at Corcyra, joined the townsmen in an expedition against


the party established on Mount Istone, who had crossed over, as I have


mentioned, after the revolution and become masters of the country,


to the great hurt of the inhabitants. Their stronghold having been


taken by an attack, the garrison took refuge in a body upon some


high ground and there capitulated, agreeing to give up their mercenary


auxiliaries, lay down their arms, and commit themselves to the


discretion of the Athenian people. The generals carried them across


under truce to the island of Ptychia, to be kept in custody until they


could be sent to Athens, upon the understanding that, if any were


caught running away, all would lose the benefit of the treaty.


Meanwhile the leaders of the Corcyraean commons, afraid that the


Athenians might spare the lives of the prisoners, had recourse to


the following stratagem. They gained over some few men on the island


by secretly sending friends with instructions to provide them with a


boat, and to tell them, as if for their own sakes, that they had


best escape as quickly as possible, as the Athenian generals were


going to give them up to the Corcyraean people.


  These representations succeeding, it was so arranged that the men


were caught sailing out in the boat that was provided, and the


treaty became void accordingly, and the whole body were given up to


the Corcyraeans. For this result the Athenian generals were in a great


measure responsible; their evident disinclination to sail for


Sicily, and thus to leave to others the honour of conducting the men


to Athens, encouraged the intriguers in their design and seemed to


affirm the truth of their representations. The prisoners thus handed


over were shut up by the Corcyraeans in a large building, and


afterwards taken out by twenties and led past two lines of heavy


infantry, one on each side, being bound together, and beaten and


stabbed by the men in the lines whenever any saw pass a personal


enemy; while men carrying whips went by their side and hastened on the


road those that walked too slowly.


  As many as sixty men were taken out and killed in this way without


the knowledge of their friends in the building, who fancied they


were merely being moved from one prison to another. At last,


however, someone opened their eyes to the truth, upon which they


called upon the Athenians to kill them themselves, if such was their


pleasure, and refused any longer to go out of the building, and said


they would do all they could to prevent any one coming in. The


Corcyraeans, not liking themselves to force a passage by the doors,


got up on the top of the building, and breaking through the roof,


threw down the tiles and let fly arrows at them, from which the


prisoners sheltered themselves as well as they could. Most of their


number, meanwhile, were engaged in dispatching themselves by thrusting


into their throats the arrows shot by the enemy, and hanging


themselves with the cords taken from some beds that happened to be


there, and with strips made from their clothing; adopting, in short,


every possible means of self-destruction, and also falling victims


to the missiles of their enemies on the roof. Night came on while


these horrors were enacting, and most of it had passed before they


were concluded. When it was day the Corcyraeans threw them in layers


upon wagons and carried them out of the city. All the women taken in


the stronghold were sold as slaves. In this way the Corcyraeans of the


mountain were destroyed by the commons; and so after terrible excesses


the party strife came to an end, at least as far as the period of this


war is concerned, for of one party there was practically nothing left.


Meanwhile the Athenians sailed off to Sicily, their primary


destination, and carried on the war with their allies there.


  At the close of the summer, the Athenians at Naupactus and the


Acarnanians made an expedition against Anactorium, the Corinthian town


lying at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, and took it by treachery;


and the Acarnanians themselves, sending settlers from all parts of


Acarnania, occupied the place.


  Summer was now over. During the winter ensuing, Aristides, son of


Archippus, one of the commanders of the Athenian ships sent to collect


money from the allies, arrested at Eion, on the Strymon,


Artaphernes, a Persian, on his way from the King to Lacedaemon. He was


conducted to Athens, where the Athenians got his dispatches translated


from the Assyrian character and read them. With numerous references to


other subjects, they in substance told the Lacedaemonians that the


King did not know what they wanted, as of the many ambassadors they


had sent him no two ever told the same story; if however they were


prepared to speak plainly they might send him some envoys with this


Persian. The Athenians afterwards sent back Artaphernes in a galley to


Ephesus, and ambassadors with him, who heard there of the death of


King Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, which took place about that time,


and so returned home.


  The same winter the Chians pulled down their new wall at the command


of the Athenians, who suspected them of meditating an insurrection,


after first however obtaining pledges from the Athenians, and security


as far as this was possible for their continuing to treat them as


before. Thus the winter ended, and with it ended the seventh year of


this war of which Thucydides is the historian.


  In first days of the next summer there was an eclipse of the sun


at the time of new moon, and in the early part of the same month an


earthquake. Meanwhile, the Mitylenian and other Lesbian exiles set


out, for the most part from the continent, with mercenaries hired in


Peloponnese, and others levied on the spot, and took Rhoeteum, but


restored it without injury on the receipt of two thousand Phocaean


staters. After this they marched against Antandrus and took the town


by treachery, their plan being to free Antandrus and the rest of the


Actaean towns, formerly owned by Mitylene but now held by the


Athenians. Once fortified there, they would have every facility for


ship-building from the vicinity of Ida and the consequent abundance of


timber, and plenty of other supplies, and might from this base


easily ravage Lesbos, which was not far off, and make themselves


masters of the Aeolian towns on the continent.


  While these were the schemes of the exiles, the Athenians in the


same summer made an expedition with sixty ships, two thousand heavy


infantry, a few cavalry, and some allied troops from Miletus and other


parts, against Cythera, under the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus,


Nicostratus, son of Diotrephes, and Autocles, son of Tolmaeus. Cythera


is an island lying off Laconia, opposite Malea; the inhabitants are


Lacedaemonians of the class of the Perioeci; and an officer called the


judge of Cythera went over to the place annually from Sparta. A


garrison of heavy infantry was also regularly sent there, and great


attention paid to the island, as it was the landing-place for the


merchantmen from Egypt and Libya, and at the same time secured Laconia


from the attacks of privateers from the sea, at the only point where


it is assailable, as the whole coast rises abruptly towards the


Sicilian and Cretan seas.


  Coming to land here with their armament, the Athenians with ten


ships and two thousand Milesian heavy infantry took the town of


Scandea, on the sea; and with the rest of their forces landing on


the side of the island looking towards Malea, went against the lower


town of Cythera, where they found all the inhabitants encamped. A


battle ensuing, the Cytherians held their ground for some little


while, and then turned and fled into the upper town, where they soon


afterwards capitulated to Nicias and his colleagues, agreeing to leave


their fate to the decision of the Athenians, their lives only being


safe. A correspondence had previously been going on between Nicias and


certain of the inhabitants, which caused the surrender to be


effected more speedily, and upon terms more advantageous, present


and future, for the Cytherians; who would otherwise have been expelled


by the Athenians on account of their being Lacedaemonians and their


island being so near to Laconia. After the capitulation, the Athenians


occupied the town of Scandea near the harbour, and appointing a


garrison for Cythera, sailed to Asine, Helus, and most of the places


on the sea, and making descents and passing the night on shore at such


spots as were convenient, continued ravaging the country for about


seven days.


  The Lacedaemonians seeing the Athenians masters of Cythera, and


expecting descents of the kind upon their coasts, nowhere opposed them


in force, but sent garrisons here and there through the country,


consisting of as many heavy infantry as the points menaced seemed to


require, and generally stood very much upon the defensive. After the


severe and unexpected blow that had befallen them in the island, the


occupation of Pylos and Cythera, and the apparition on every side of a


war whose rapidity defied precaution, they lived in constant fear of


internal revolution, and now took the unusual step of raising four


hundred horse and a force of archers, and became more timid than


ever in military matters, finding themselves involved in a maritime


struggle, which their organization had never contemplated, and that


against Athenians, with whom an enterprise unattempted was always


looked upon as a success sacrificed. Besides this, their late numerous


reverses of fortune, coming close one upon another without any reason,


had thoroughly unnerved them, and they were always afraid of a


second disaster like that on the island, and thus scarcely dared to


take the field, but fancied that they could not stir without a


blunder, for being new to the experience of adversity they had lost


all confidence in themselves.


  Accordingly they now allowed the Athenians to ravage their seaboard,


without making any movement, the garrisons in whose neighbourhood


the descents were made always thinking their numbers insufficient, and


sharing the general feeling. A single garrison which ventured to


resist, near Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, struck terror by its charge


into the scattered mob of light troops, but retreated, upon being


received by the heavy infantry, with the loss of a few men and some


arms, for which the Athenians set up a trophy, and then sailed off


to Cythera. From thence they sailed round to Epidaurus Limera, ravaged


part of the country, and so came to Thyrea in the Cynurian


territory, upon the Argive and Laconian border. This district had been


given by its Lacedaemonian owners to the expelled Aeginetans to


inhabit, in return for their good offices at the time of the


earthquake and the rising of the Helots; and also because, although


subjects of Athens, they had always sided with Lacedaemon.


  While the Athenians were still at sea, the Aeginetans evacuated a


fort which they were building upon the coast, and retreated into the


upper town where they lived, rather more than a mile from the sea. One


of the Lacedaemonian district garrisons which was helping them in


the work, refused to enter here with them at their entreaty,


thinking it dangerous to shut themselves up within the wall, and


retiring to the high ground remained quiet, not considering themselves


a match for the enemy. Meanwhile the Athenians landed, and instantly


advanced with all their forces and took Thyrea. The town they burnt,


pillaging what was in it; the Aeginetans who were not slain in


action they took with them to Athens, with Tantalus, son of Patrocles,


their Lacedaemonian commander, who had been wounded and taken


prisoner. They also took with them a few men from Cythera whom they


thought it safest to remove. These the Athenians determined to lodge


in the islands: the rest of the Cytherians were to retain their


lands and pay four talents tribute; the Aeginetans captured to be


all put to death, on account of the old inveterate feud; and


Tantalus to share the imprisonment of the Lacedaemonians taken on


the island.


  The same summer, the inhabitants of Camarina and Gela in Sicily


first made an armistice with each other, after which embassies from


all the other Sicilian cities assembled at Gela to try to bring


about a pacification. After many expressions of opinion on one side


and the other, according to the griefs and pretensions of the


different parties complaining, Hermocrates, son of Hermon, a


Syracusan, the most influential man among them, addressed the


following words to the assembly:


  "If I now address you, Sicilians, it is not because my city is the


least in Sicily or the greatest sufferer by the war, but in order to


state publicly what appears to me to be the best policy for the


whole island. That war is an evil is a proposition so familiar to


every one that it would be tedious to develop it. No one is forced


to engage in it by ignorance, or kept out of it by fear, if he fancies


there is anything to be gained by it. To the former the gain appears


greater than the danger, while the latter would rather stand the


risk than put up with any immediate sacrifice. But if both should


happen to have chosen the wrong moment for acting in this way,


advice to make peace would not be unserviceable; and this, if we did


but see it, is just what we stand most in need of at the present


juncture.


  "I suppose that no one will dispute that we went to war at first


in order to serve our own several interests, that we are now, in


view of the same interests, debating how we can make peace; and that


if we separate without having as we think our rights, we shall go to


war again. And yet, as men of sense, we ought to see that our separate


interests are not alone at stake in the present congress: there is


also the question whether we have still time to save Sicily, the whole


of which in my opinion is menaced by Athenian ambition; and we ought


to find in the name of that people more imperious arguments for


peace than any which I can advance, when we see the first power in


Hellas watching our mistakes with the few ships that she has at


present in our waters, and under the fair name of alliance


speciously seeking to turn to account the natural hostility that


exists between us. If we go to war, and call in to help us a people


that are ready enough to carry their arms even where they are not


invited; and if we injure ourselves at our own expense, and at the


same time serve as the pioneers of their dominion, we may expect, when


they see us worn out, that they will one day come with a larger


armament, and seek to bring all of us into subjection.


  "And yet as sensible men, if we call in allies and court danger,


it should be in order to enrich our different countries with new


acquisitions, and not to ruin what they possess already; and we should


understand that the intestine discords which are so fatal to


communities generally, will be equally so to Sicily, if we, its


inhabitants, absorbed in our local quarrels, neglect the common enemy.


These considerations should reconcile individual with individual,


and city with city, and unite us in a common effort to save the


whole of Sicily. Nor should any one imagine that the Dorians only


are enemies of Athens, while the Chalcidian race is secured by its


Ionian blood; the attack in question is not inspired by hatred of


one of two nationalities, but by a desire for the good things in


Sicily, the common property of us all. This is proved by the


Athenian reception of the Chalcidian invitation: an ally who has never


given them any assistance whatever, at once receives from them


almost more than the treaty entitles him to. That the Athenians should


cherish this ambition and practise this policy is very excusable;


and I do not blame those who wish to rule, but those who are


over-ready to serve. It is just as much in men's nature to rule


those who submit to them, as it is to resist those who molest them;


one is not less invariable than the other. Meanwhile all who see these


dangers and refuse to provide for them properly, or who have come here


without having made up their minds that our first duty is to unite


to get rid of the common peril, are mistaken. The quickest way to be


rid of it is to make peace with each other; since the Athenians menace


us not from their own country, but from that of those who invited them


here. In this way instead of war issuing in war, peace quietly ends


our quarrels; and the guests who come hither under fair pretences


for bad ends, will have good reason for going away without having


attained them.


  "So far as regards the Athenians, such are the great advantages


proved inherent in a wise policy. Independently of this, in the face


of the universal consent, that peace is the first of blessings, how


can we refuse to make it amongst ourselves; or do you not think that


the good which you have, and the ills that you complain of, would be


better preserved and cured by quiet than by war; that peace has its


honours and splendours of a less perilous kind, not to mention the


numerous other blessings that one might dilate on, with the not less


numerous miseries of war? These considerations should teach you not to


disregard my words, but rather to look in them every one for his own


safety. If there be any here who feels certain either by right or


might to effect his object, let not this surprise be to him too severe


a disappointment. Let him remember that many before now have tried


to chastise a wrongdoer, and failing to punish their enemy have not


even saved themselves; while many who have trusted in force to gain an


advantage, instead of gaining anything more, have been doomed to


lose what they had. Vengeance is not necessarily successful because


wrong has been done, or strength sure because it is confident; but the


incalculable element in the future exercises the widest influence, and


is the most treacherous, and yet in fact the most useful of all


things, as it frightens us all equally, and thus makes us consider


before attacking each other.


  "Let us therefore now allow the undefined fear of this unknown


future, and the immediate terror of the Athenians' presence, to


produce their natural impression, and let us consider any failure to


carry out the programmes that we may each have sketched out for


ourselves as sufficiently accounted for by these obstacles, and send


away the intruder from the country; and if everlasting peace be


impossible between us, let us at all events make a treaty for as


long a term as possible, and put off our private differences to


another day. In fine, let us recognize that the adoption of my


advice will leave us each citizens of a free state, and as such


arbiters of our own destiny, able to return good or bad offices with


equal effect; while its rejection will make us dependent on others,


and thus not only impotent to repel an insult, but on the most


favourable supposition, friends to our direst enemies, and at feud


with our natural friends.


  "For myself, though, as I said at first, the representative of a


great city, and able to think less of defending myself than of


attacking others, I am prepared to concede something in prevision of


these dangers. I am not inclined to ruin myself for the sake of


hurting my enemies, or so blinded by animosity as to think myself


equally master of my own plans and of fortune which I cannot


command; but I am ready to give up anything in reason. I call upon the


rest of you to imitate my conduct of your own free will, without being


forced to do so by the enemy. There is no disgrace in connections


giving way to one another, a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to


his brethren; above and beyond this we are neighbours, live in the


same country, are girt by the same sea, and go by the same name of


Sicilians. We shall go to war again, I suppose, when the time comes,


and again make peace among ourselves by means of future congresses;


but the foreign invader, if we are wise, will always find us united


against him, since the hurt of one is the danger of all; and we


shall never, in future, invite into the island either allies or


mediators. By so acting we shall at the present moment do for Sicily a


double service, ridding her at once of the Athenians, and of civil


war, and in future shall live in freedom at home, and be less


menaced from abroad."


  Such were the words of Hermocrates. The Sicilians took his advice,


and came to an understanding among themselves to end the war, each


keeping what they had- the Camarinaeans taking Morgantina at a price


fixed to be paid to the Syracusans- and the allies of the Athenians


called the officers in command, and told them that they were going


to make peace and that they would be included in the treaty. The


generals assenting, the peace was concluded, and the Athenian fleet


afterwards sailed away from Sicily. Upon their arrival at Athens,


the Athenians banished Pythodorus and Sophocles, and fined Eurymedon


for having taken bribes to depart when they might have subdued Sicily.


So thoroughly had the present prosperity persuaded the citizens that


nothing could withstand them, and that they could achieve what was


possible and impracticable alike, with means ample or inadequate it


mattered not. The secret of this was their general extraordinary


success, which made them confuse their strength with their hopes.


  The same summer the Megarians in the city, pressed by the


hostilities of the Athenians, who invaded their country twice every


year with all their forces, and harassed by the incursions of their


own exiles at Pegae, who had been expelled in a revolution by the


popular party, began to ask each other whether it would not be


better to receive back their exiles, and free the town from one of its


two scourges. The friends of the emigrants, perceiving the


agitation, now more openly than before demanded the adoption of this


proposition; and the leaders of the commons, seeing that the


sufferings of the times had tired out the constancy of their


supporters, entered in their alarm into correspondence with the


Athenian generals, Hippocrates, son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes,


son of Alcisthenes, and resolved to betray the town, thinking this


less dangerous to themselves than the return of the party which they


had banished. It was accordingly arranged that the Athenians should


first take the long walls extending for nearly a mile from the city to


the port of Nisaea, to prevent the Peloponnesians coming to the rescue


from that place, where they formed the sole garrison to secure the


fidelity of Megara; and that after this the attempt should be made


to put into their hands the upper town, which it was thought would


then come over with less difficulty.


  The Athenians, after plans had been arranged between themselves


and their correspondents both as to words and actions, sailed by night


to Minoa, the island off Megara, with six hundred heavy infantry under


the command of Hippocrates, and took post in a quarry not far off, out


of which bricks used to be taken for the walls; while Demosthenes, the


other commander, with a detachment of Plataean light troops and


another of Peripoli, placed himself in ambush in the precinct of


Enyalius, which was still nearer. No one knew of it, except those


whose business it was to know that night. A little before daybreak,


the traitors in Megara began to act. Every night for a long time back,


under pretence of marauding, in order to have a means of opening the


gates, they had been used, with the consent of the officer in command,


to carry by night a sculling boat upon a cart along the ditch to the


sea, and so to sail out, bringing it back again before day upon the


cart, and taking it within the wall through the gates, in order, as


they pretended, to baffle the Athenian blockade at Minoa, there


being no boat to be seen in the harbour. On the present occasion the


cart was already at the gates, which had been opened in the usual


way for the boat, when the Athenians, with whom this had been


concerted, saw it, and ran at the top of their speed from the ambush


in order to reach the gates before they were shut again, and while the


cart was still there to prevent their being closed; their Megarian


accomplices at the same moment killing the guard at the gates. The


first to run in was Demosthenes with his Plataeans and Peripoli,


just where the trophy now stands; and he was no sooner within the


gates than the Plataeans engaged and defeated the nearest party of


Peloponnesians who had taken the alarm and come to the rescue, and


secured the gates for the approaching Athenian heavy infantry.


  After this, each of the Athenians as fast as they entered went


against the wall. A few of the Peloponnesian garrison stood their


ground at first, and tried to repel the assault, and some of them were


killed; but the main body took fright and fled; the night attack and


the sight of the Megarian traitors in arms against them making them


think that all Megara had gone over to the enemy. It so happened


also that the Athenian herald of his own idea called out and invited


any of the Megarians that wished, to join the Athenian ranks; and this


was no sooner heard by the garrison than they gave way, and, convinced


that they were the victims of a concerted attack, took refuge in


Nisaea. By daybreak, the walls being now taken and the Megarians in


the city in great agitation, the persons who had negotiated with the


Athenians, supported by the rest of the popular party which was


privy to the plot, said that they ought to open the gates and march


out to battle. It had been concerted between them that the Athenians


should rush in, the moment that the gates were opened, while the


conspirators were to be distinguished from the rest by being


anointed with oil, and so to avoid being hurt. They could open the


gates with more security, as four thousand Athenian heavy infantry


from Eleusis, and six hundred horse, had marched all night, according


to agreement, and were now close at hand. The conspirators were all


ready anointed and at their posts by the gates, when one of their


accomplices denounced the plot to the opposite party, who gathered


together and came in a body, and roundly said that they must not march


out- a thing they had never yet ventured on even when in greater force


than at present- or wantonly compromise the safety of the town, and


that if what they said was not attended to, the battle would have to


be fought in Megara. For the rest, they gave no signs of their


knowledge of the intrigue, but stoutly maintained that their advice


was the best, and meanwhile kept close by and watched the gates,


making it impossible for the conspirators to effect their purpose.


  The Athenian generals seeing that some obstacle had arisen, and that


the capture of the town by force was no longer practicable, at once


proceeded to invest Nisaea, thinking that, if they could take it


before relief arrived, the surrender of Megara would soon follow.


Iron, stone-masons, and everything else required quickly coming up


from Athens, the Athenians started from the wall which they


occupied, and from this point built a cross wall looking towards


Megara down to the sea on either side of Nisaea; the ditch and the


walls being divided among the army, stones and bricks taken from the


suburb, and the fruit-trees and timber cut down to make a palisade


wherever this seemed necessary; the houses also in the suburb with the


addition of battlements sometimes entering into the fortification. The


whole of this day the work continued, and by the afternoon of the next


the wall was all but completed, when the garrison in Nisaea, alarmed


by the absolute want of provisions, which they used to take in for the


day from the upper town, not anticipating any speedy relief from the


Peloponnesians, and supposing Megara to be hostile, capitulated to the


Athenians on condition that they should give up their arms, and should


each be ransomed for a stipulated sum; their Lacedaemonian


commander, and any others of his countrymen in the place, being left


to the discretion of the Athenians. On these conditions they


surrendered and came out, and the Athenians broke down the long


walls at their point of junction with Megara, took possession of


Nisaea, and went on with their other preparations.


  Just at this time the Lacedaemonian Brasidas, son of Tellis,


happened to be in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, getting


ready an army for Thrace. As soon as he heard of the capture of the


walls, fearing for the Peloponnesians in Nisaea and the safety of


Megara, he sent to the Boeotians to meet him as quickly as possible at


Tripodiscus, a village so called of the Megarid, under Mount Geraneia,


and went himself, with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian heavy


infantry, four hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and such


troops of his own as he had already levied, expecting to find Nisaea


not yet taken. Hearing of its fall (he had marched out by night to


Tripodiscus), he took three hundred picked men from the army,


without waiting till his coming should be known, and came up to Megara


unobserved by the Athenians, who were down by the sea, ostensibly, and


really if possible, to attempt Nisaea, but above all to get into


Megara and secure the town. He accordingly invited the townspeople


to admit his party, saying that he had hopes of recovering Nisaea.


  However, one of the Megarian factions feared that he might expel


them and restore the exiles; the other that the commons,


apprehensive of this very danger, might set upon them, and the city be


thus destroyed by a battle within its gates under the eyes of the


ambushed Athenians. He was accordingly refused admittance, both


parties electing to remain quiet and await the event; each expecting a


battle between the Athenians and the relieving army, and thinking it


safer to see their friends victorious before declaring in their


favour.


  Unable to carry his point, Brasidas went back to the rest of the


army. At daybreak the Boeotians joined him. Having determined to


relieve Megara, whose danger they considered their own, even before


hearing from Brasidas, they were already in full force at Plataea,


when his messenger arrived to add spurs to their resolution; and


they at once sent on to him two thousand two hundred heavy infantry,


and six hundred horse, returning home with the main body. The whole


army thus assembled numbered six thousand heavy infantry. The Athenian


heavy infantry were drawn up by Nisaea and the sea; but the light


troops being scattered over the plain were attacked by the Boeotian


horse and driven to the sea, being taken entirely by surprise, as on


previous occasions no relief had ever come to the Megarians from any


quarter. Here the Boeotians were in their turn charged and engaged


by the Athenian horse, and a cavalry action ensued which lasted a long


time, and in which both parties claimed the victory. The Athenians


killed and stripped the leader of the Boeotian horse and some few of


his comrades who had charged right up to Nisaea, and remaining masters


of the bodies gave them back under truce, and set up a trophy; but


regarding the action as a whole the forces separated without either


side having gained a decisive advantage, the Boeotians returning to


their army and the Athenians to Nisaea.


  After this Brasidas and the army came nearer to the sea and to


Megara, and taking up a convenient position, remained quiet in order


of battle, expecting to be attacked by the Athenians and knowing


that the Megarians were waiting to see which would be the victor. This


attitude seemed to present two advantages. Without taking the


offensive or willingly provoking the hazards of a battle, they


openly showed their readiness to fight, and thus without bearing the


burden of the day would fairly reap its honours; while at the same


time they effectually served their interests at Megara. For if they


had failed to show themselves they would not have had a chance, but


would have certainly been considered vanquished, and have lost the


town. As it was, the Athenians might possibly not be inclined to


accept their challenge, and their object would be attained without


fighting. And so it turned out. The Athenians formed outside the


long walls and, the enemy not attacking, there remained motionless;


their generals having decided that the risk was too unequal. In fact


most of their objects had been already attained; and they would have


to begin a battle against superior numbers, and if victorious could


only gain Megara, while a defeat would destroy the flower of their


heavy soldiery. For the enemy it was different; as even the states


actually represented in his army risked each only a part of its entire


force, he might well be more audacious. Accordingly, after waiting for


some time without either side attacking, the Athenians withdrew to


Nisaea, and the Peloponnesians after them to the point from which they


had set out. The friends of the Megarian exiles now threw aside


their hesitation, and opened the gates to Brasidas and the


commanders from the different states- looking upon him as the victor


and upon the Athenians as having declined the battle- and receiving


them into the town proceeded to discuss matters with them; the party


in correspondence with the Athenians being paralysed by the turn


things had taken.


  Afterwards Brasidas let the allies go home, and himself went back to


Corinth, to prepare for his expedition to Thrace, his original


destination. The Athenians also returning home, the Megarians in the


city most implicated in the Athenian negotiation, knowing that they


had been detected, presently disappeared; while the rest conferred


with the friends of the exiles, and restored the party at Pegae, after


binding them under solemn oaths to take no vengeance for the past, and


only to consult the real interests of the town. However, as soon as


they were in office, they held a review of the heavy infantry, and


separating the battalions, picked out about a hundred of their


enemies, and of those who were thought to be most involved in the


correspondence with the Athenians, brought them before the people, and


compelling the vote to be given openly, had them condemned and


executed, and established a close oligarchy in the town- a revolution


which lasted a very long while, although effected by a very few


partisans.


                          CHAPTER XIV.





          Eighth and Ninth Years of the War - Invasion


           of Boeotia - Fall of Amphipolis - Brilliant


                      Successes of Brasidas





  THE same summer the Mitylenians were about to fortify Antandrus,


as they had intended, when Demodocus and Aristides, the commanders


of the Athenian squadron engaged in levying subsidies, heard on the


Hellespont of what was being done to the place (Lamachus their


colleague having sailed with ten ships into the Pontus) and


conceived fears of its becoming a second Anaia-the place in which


the Samian exiles had established themselves to annoy Samos, helping


the Peloponnesians by sending pilots to their navy, and keeping the


city in agitation and receiving all its outlaws. They accordingly


got together a force from the allies and set sail, defeated in


battle the troops that met them from Antandrus, and retook the


place. Not long after, Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus,


lost his ships at anchor in the river Calex, in the territory of


Heraclea, rain having fallen in the interior and the flood coming


suddenly down upon them; and himself and his troops passed by land


through the Bithynian Thracians on the Asiatic side, and arrived at


Chalcedon, the Megarian colony at the mouth of the Pontus.


  The same summer the Athenian general, Demosthenes, arrived at


Naupactus with forty ships immediately after the return from the


Megarid. Hippocrates and himself had had overtures made to them by


certain men in the cities in Boeotia, who wished to change the


constitution and introduce a democracy as at Athens; Ptoeodorus, a


Theban exile, being the chief mover in this intrigue. The seaport


town of Siphae, in the bay of Crisae, in the Thespian territory, was


to be betrayed to them by one party; Chaeronea (a dependency of what


was formerly called the Minyan, now the Boeotian, Orchomenus) to be


put into their hands by another from that town, whose exiles were


very active in the business, hiring men in Peloponnese. Some Phocians


also were in the plot, Chaeronea being the frontier town of Boeotia


and close to Phanotis in Phocia. Meanwhile the Athenians were to


seize Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the territory of Tanagra


looking towards Euboea; and all these events were to take place


simultaneously upon a day appointed, in order that the Boeotians


might be unable to unite to oppose them at Delium, being everywhere


detained by disturbances at home. Should the enterprise succeed, and


Delium be fortified, its authors confidently expected that even if no


revolution should immediately follow in Boeotia, yet with these


places in their hands, and the country being harassed by incursions,


and a refuge in each instance near for the partisans engaged in them,


things would not remain as they were, but that the rebels being


supported by the Athenians and the forces of the oligarchs divided,


it would be possible after a while to settle matters according to


their wishes.


  Such was the plot in contemplation. Hippocrates with a force


raised at home awaited the proper moment to take the field against the


Boeotians; while he sent on Demosthenes with the forty ships above


mentioned to Naupactus, to raise in those parts an army of Acarnanians


and of the other allies, and sail and receive Siphae from the


conspirators; a day having been agreed on for the simultaneous


execution of both these operations. Demosthenes on his arrival found


Oeniadae already compelled by the united Acarnanians to join the


Athenian confederacy, and himself raising all the allies in those


countries marched against and subdued Salynthius and the Agraeans;


after which he devoted himself to the preparations necessary to enable


him to be at Siphae by the time appointed.


  About the same time in the summer, Brasidas set out on his march for


the Thracian places with seventeen hundred heavy infantry, and


arriving at Heraclea in Trachis, from thence sent on a messenger to


his friends at Pharsalus, to ask them to conduct himself and his


army through the country. Accordingly there came to Melitia in


Achaia Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus, the


Chalcidian proxenus, under whose escort he resumed his march, being


accompanied also by other Thessalians, among whom was Niconidas from


Larissa, a friend of Perdiccas. It was never very easy to traverse


Thessaly without an escort; and throughout all Hellas for an armed


force to pass without leave through a neighbour's country was a


delicate step to take. Besides this the Thessalian people had always


sympathized with the Athenians. Indeed if instead of the customary


dose oligarchy there had been a constitutional government in Thessaly,


he would never have been able to proceed; since even as it was, he was


met on his march at the river Enipeus by certain of the opposite party


who forbade his further progress, and complained of his making the


attempt without the consent of the nation. To this his escort answered


that they had no intention of taking him through against their will;


they were only friends in attendance on an unexpected visitor.


Brasidas himself added that he came as a friend to Thessaly and its


inhabitants, his arms not being directed against them but against


the Athenians, with whom he was at war, and that although he knew of


no quarrel between the Thessalians and Lacedaemonians to prevent the


two nations having access to each other's territory, he neither


would nor could proceed against their wishes; he could only beg them


not to stop him. With this answer they went away, and he took the


advice of his escort, and pushed on without halting, before a


greater force might gather to prevent him. Thus in the day that he set


out from Melitia he performed the whole distance to Pharsalus, and


encamped on the river Apidanus; and so to Phacium and from thence to


Perrhaebia. Here his Thessalian escort went back, and the


Perrhaebians, who are subjects of Thessaly, set him down at Dium in


the dominions of Perdiccas, a Macedonian town under Mount Olympus,


looking towards Thessaly.


  In this way Brasidas hurried through Thessaly before any one could


be got ready to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice. The


departure of the army from Peloponnese had been procured by the


Thracian towns in revolt against Athens and by Perdiccas, alarmed at


the successes of the Athenians. The Chalcidians thought that they


would be the first objects of an Athenian expedition, not that the


neighbouring towns which had not yet revolted did not also secretly


join in the invitation; and Perdiccas also had his apprehensions on


account of his old quarrels with the Athenians, although not openly at


war with them, and above all wished to reduce Arrhabaeus, king of


the Lyncestians. It had been less difficult for them to get an army to


leave Peloponnese, because of the ill fortune of the Lacedaemonians at


the present moment. The attacks of the Athenians upon Peloponnese, and


in particular upon Laconia, might, it was hoped, be diverted most


effectually by annoying them in return, and by sending an army to


their allies, especially as they were willing to maintain it and asked


for it to aid them in revolting. The Lacedaemonians were also glad


to have an excuse for sending some of the Helots out of the country,


for fear that the present aspect of affairs and the occupation of


Pylos might encourage them to move. Indeed fear of their numbers and


obstinacy even persuaded the Lacedaemonians to the action which I


shall now relate, their policy at all times having been governed by


the necessity of taking precautions against them. The Helots were


invited by a proclamation to pick out those of their number who


claimed to have most distinguished themselves against the enemy, in


order that they might receive their freedom; the object being to


test them, as it was thought that the first to claim their freedom


would be the most high-spirited and the most apt to rebel. As many


as two thousand were selected accordingly, who crowned themselves


and went round the temples, rejoicing in their new freedom. The


Spartans, however, soon afterwards did away with them, and no one ever


knew how each of them perished. The Spartans now therefore gladly sent


seven hundred as heavy infantry with Brasidas, who recruited the


rest of his force by means of money in Peloponnese.


  Brasidas himself was sent out by the Lacedaemonians mainly at his


own desire, although the Chalcidians also were eager to have a man


so thorough as he had shown himself whenever there was anything to


be done at Sparta, and whose after-service abroad proved of the utmost


use to his country. At the present moment his just and moderate


conduct towards the towns generally succeeded in procuring their


revolt, besides the places which he managed to take by treachery;


and thus when the Lacedaemonians desired to treat, as they


ultimately did, they had places to offer in exchange, and the burden


of war meanwhile shifted from Peloponnese. Later on in the war,


after the events in Sicily, the present valour and conduct of


Brasidas, known by experience to some, by hearsay to others, was


what mainly created in the allies of Athens a feeling for the


Lacedaemonians. He was the first who went out and showed himself so


good a man at all points as to leave behind him the conviction that


the rest were like him.


  Meanwhile his arrival in the Thracian country no sooner became known


to the Athenians than they declared war against Perdiccas, whom they


regarded as the author of the expedition, and kept a closer watch on


their allies in that quarter.


  Upon the arrival of Brasidas and his army, Perdiccas immediately


started with them and with his own forces against Arrhabaeus, son of


Bromerus, king of the Lyncestian Macedonians, his neighbour, with whom


he had a quarrel and whom he wished to subdue. However, when he


arrived with his army and Brasidas at the pass leading into Lyncus,


Brasidas told him that before commencing hostilities he wished to go


and try to persuade Arrhabaeus to become the ally of Lacedaemon,


this latter having already made overtures intimating his willingness


to make Brasidas arbitrator between them, and the Chalcidian envoys


accompanying him having warned him not to remove the apprehensions


of Perdiccas, in order to ensure his greater zeal in their cause.


Besides, the envoys of Perdiccas had talked at Lacedaemon about his


bringing many of the places round him into alliance with them; and


thus Brasidas thought he might take a larger view of the question of


Arrhabaeus. Perdiccas however retorted that he had not brought him


with him to arbitrate in their quarrel, but to put down the enemies


whom he might point out to him; and that while he, Perdiccas,


maintained half his army it was a breach of faith for Brasidas to


parley with Arrhabaeus. Nevertheless Brasidas disregarded the wishes


of Perdiccas and held the parley in spite of him, and suffered himself


to be persuaded to lead off the army without invading the country of


Arrhabaeus; after which Perdiccas, holding that faith had not been


kept with him, contributed only a third instead of half of the support


of the army.


  The same summer, without loss of time, Brasidas marched with the


Chalcidians against Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians, a little


before vintage. The inhabitants were divided into two parties on the


question of receiving him; those who had joined the Chalcidians in


inviting him, and the popular party. However, fear for their fruit,


which was still out, enabled Brasidas to persuade the multitude to


admit him alone, and to hear what he had to say before making a


decision; and he was admitted accordingly and appeared before the


people, and not being a bad speaker for a Lacedaemonian, addressed


them as follows:


  "Acanthians, the Lacedaemonians have sent out me and my army to make


good the reason that we gave for the war when we began it, viz.,


that we were going to war with the Athenians in order to free


Hellas. Our delay in coming has been caused by mistaken expectations


as to the war at home, which led us to hope, by our own unassisted


efforts and without your risking anything, to effect the speedy


downfall of the Athenians; and you must not blame us for this, as we


are now come the moment that we were able, prepared with your aid to


do our best to subdue them. Meanwhile I am astonished at finding


your gates shut against me, and at not meeting with a better


welcome. We Lacedaemonians thought of you as allies eager to have


us, to whom we should come in spirit even before we were with you in


body; and in this expectation undertook all the risks of a march of


many days through a strange country, so far did our zeal carry us.


It will be a terrible thing if after this you have other intentions,


and mean to stand in the way of your own and Hellenic freedom. It is


not merely that you oppose me yourselves; but wherever I may go people


will be less inclined to join me, on the score that you, to whom I


first came- an important town like Acanthus, and prudent men like the


Acanthians- refused to admit me. I shall have nothing to prove that


the reason which I advance is the true one; it will be said either


that there is something unfair in the freedom which I offer, or that


I am in insufficient force and unable to protect you against an


attack from Athens. Yet when I went with the army which I now have to


the relief of Nisaea, the Athenians did not venture to engage me


although in greater force than I; and it is not likely they will


ever send across sea against you an army as numerous as they had at


Nisaea. And for myself, I have come here not to hurt but to free the


Hellenes, witness the solemn oaths by which I have bound my government


that the allies that I may bring over shall be independent; and


besides my object in coming is not by force or fraud to obtain your


alliance, but to offer you mine to help you against your Athenian


masters. I protest, therefore, against any suspicions of my intentions


after the guarantees which I offer, and equally so against doubts of


my ability to protect you, and I invite you to join me without


hesitation.


  "Some of you may hang back because they have private enemies, and


fear that I may put the city into the hands of a party: none need be


more tranquil than they. I am not come here to help this party or


that; and I do not consider that I should be bringing you freedom in


any real sense, if I should disregard your constitution, and enslave


the many to the few or the few to the many. This would be heavier than


a foreign yoke; and we Lacedaemonians, instead of being thanked for


our pains, should get neither honour nor glory, but, contrariwise,


reproaches. The charges which strengthen our hands in the war


against the Athenians would on our own showing be merited by


ourselves, and more hateful in us than in those who make no


pretensions to honesty; as it is more disgraceful for persons of


character to take what they covet by fair-seeming fraud than by open


force; the one aggression having for its justification the might which


fortune gives, the other being simply a piece of clever roguery. A


matter which concerns us thus nearly we naturally look to most


jealously; and over and above the oaths that I have mentioned, what


stronger assurance can you have, when you see that our words, compared


with the actual facts, produce the necessary conviction that it is our


interest to act as we say?


  "If to these considerations of mine you put in the plea of


inability, and claim that your friendly feeling should save you from


being hurt by your refusal; if you say that freedom, in your


opinion, is not without its dangers, and that it is right to offer


it to those who can accept it, but not to force it on any against


their will, then I shall take the gods and heroes of your country to


witness that I came for your good and was rejected, and shall do my


best to compel you by laying waste your land. I shall do so without


scruple, being justified by the necessity which constrains me,


first, to prevent the Lacedaemonians from being damaged by you,


their friends, in the event of your nonadhesion, through the moneys


that you pay to the Athenians; and secondly, to prevent the Hellenes


from being hindered by you in shaking off their servitude. Otherwise


indeed we should have no right to act as we propose; except in the


name of some public interest, what call should we Lacedaemonians


have to free those who do not wish it? Empire we do not aspire to:


it is what we are labouring to put down; and we should wrong the


greater number if we allowed you to stand in the way of the


independence that we offer to all. Endeavour, therefore, to decide


wisely, and strive to begin the work of liberation for the Hellenes,


and lay up for yourselves endless renown, while you escape private


loss, and cover your commonwealth with glory."


  Such were the words of Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much had been


said on both sides of the question, gave their votes in secret, and


the majority, influenced by the seductive arguments of Brasidas and by


fear for their fruit, decided to revolt from Athens; not however


admitting the army until they had taken his personal security for


the oaths sworn by his government before they sent him out, assuring


the independence of the allies whom he might bring over. Not long


after, Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, followed their example


and revolted.


  Such were the events of this summer. It was in the first days of the


winter following that the places in Boeotia were to be put into the


hands of the Athenian generals, Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the


latter of whom was to go with his ships to Siphae, the former to


Delium. A mistake, however, was made in the days on which they were


each to start; and Demosthenes, sailing first to Siphae, with the


Acarnanians and many of the allies from those parts on board, failed


to effect anything, through the plot having been betrayed by


Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanotis, who told the Lacedaemonians,


and they the Boeotians. Succours accordingly flocked in from all parts


of Boeotia, Hippocrates not being yet there to make his diversion, and


Siphae and Chaeronea were promptly secured, and the conspirators,


informed of the mistake, did not venture on any movement in the towns.


  Meanwhile Hippocrates made a levy in mass of the citizens,


resident aliens, and foreigners in Athens, and arrived at his


destination after the Boeotians had already come back from Siphae, and


encamping his army began to fortify Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo,


in the following manner. A trench was dug all round the temple and the


consecrated ground, and the earth thrown up from the excavation was


made to do duty as a wall, in which stakes were also planted, the


vines round the sanctuary being cut down and thrown in, together


with stones and bricks pulled down from the houses near; every


means, in short, being used to run up the rampart. Wooden towers


were also erected where they were wanted, and where there was no


part of the temple buildings left standing, as on the side where the


gallery once existing had fallen in. The work was begun on the third


day after leaving home, and continued during the fourth, and till


dinnertime on the fifth, when most of it being now finished the army


removed from Delium about a mile and a quarter on its way home. From


this point most of the light troops went straight on, while the


heavy infantry halted and remained where they were; Hippocrates having


stayed behind at Delium to arrange the posts, and to give directions


for the completion of such part of the outworks as had been left


unfinished.


  During the days thus employed the Boeotians were mustering at


Tanagra, and by the time that they had come in from all the towns,


found the Athenians already on their way home. The rest of the


eleven Boeotarchs were against giving battle, as the enemy was no


longer in Boeotia, the Athenians being just over the Oropian border,


when they halted; but Pagondas, son of Aeolidas, one of the Boeotarchs


of Thebes (Arianthides, son of Lysimachidas, being the other), and


then commander-in-chief, thought it best to hazard a battle. He


accordingly called the men to him, company after company, to prevent


their all leaving their arms at once, and urged them to attack the


Athenians, and stand the issue of a battle, speaking as follows:


  "Boeotians, the idea that we ought not to give battle to the


Athenians, unless we came up with them in Boeotia, is one which should


never have entered into the head of any of us, your generals. It was


to annoy Boeotia that they crossed the frontier and built a fort in


our country; and they are therefore, I imagine, our enemies wherever


we may come up with them, and from wheresoever they may have come to


act as enemies do. And if any one has taken up with the idea in


question for reasons of safety, it is high time for him to change


his mind. The party attacked, whose own country is in danger, can


scarcely discuss what is prudent with the calmness of men who are in


full enjoyment of what they have got, and are thinking of attacking


a neighbour in order to get more. It is your national habit, in your


country or out of it, to oppose the same resistance to a foreign


invader; and when that invader is Athenian, and lives upon your


frontier besides, it is doubly imperative to do so. As between


neighbours generally, freedom means simply a determination to hold


one's own; and with neighbours like these, who are trying to enslave


near and far alike, there is nothing for it but to fight it out to the


last. Look at the condition of the Euboeans and of most of the rest of


Hellas, and be convinced that others have to fight with their


neighbours for this frontier or that, but that for us conquest means


one frontier for the whole country, about which no dispute can be


made, for they will simply come and take by force what we have. So


much more have we to fear from this neighbour than from another.


Besides, people who, like the Athenians in the present instance, are


tempted by pride of strength to attack their neighbours, usually march


most confidently against those who keep still, and only defend


themselves in their own country, but think twice before they grapple


with those who meet them outside their frontier and strike the first


blow if opportunity offers. The Athenians have shown us this


themselves; the defeat which we inflicted upon them at Coronea, at the


time when our quarrels had allowed them to occupy the country, has


given great security to Boeotia until the present day. Remembering


this, the old must equal their ancient exploits, and the young, the


sons of the heroes of that time, must endeavour not to disgrace


their native valour; and trusting in the help of the god whose


temple has been sacrilegiously fortified, and in the victims which


in our sacrifices have proved propitious, we must march against the


enemy, and teach him that he must go and get what he wants by


attacking someone who will not resist him, but that men whose glory it


is to be always ready to give battle for the liberty of their own


country, and never unjustly to enslave that of others, will not let


him go without a struggle."


  By these arguments Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to attack the


Athenians, and quickly breaking up his camp led his army forward, it


being now late in the day. On nearing the enemy, he halted in a


position where a hill intervening prevented the two armies from seeing


each other, and then formed and prepared for action. Meanwhile


Hippocrates at Delium, informed of the approach of the Boeotians, sent


orders to his troops to throw themselves into line, and himself joined


them not long afterwards, leaving about three hundred horse behind him


at Delium, at once to guard the place in case of attack, and to


watch their opportunity and fall upon the Boeotians during the battle.


The Boeotians placed a detachment to deal with these, and when


everything was arranged to their satisfaction appeared over the


hill, and halted in the order which they had determined on, to the


number of seven thousand heavy infantry, more than ten thousand


light troops, one thousand horse, and five hundred targeteers. On


their right were the Thebans and those of their province, in the


centre the Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copaeans, and the other people


around the lake, and on the left the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and


Orchomenians, the cavalry and the light troops being at the


extremity of each wing. The Thebans formed twenty-five shields deep,


the rest as they pleased. Such was the strength and disposition of the


Boeotian army.


  On the side of the Athenians, the heavy infantry throughout the


whole army formed eight deep, being in numbers equal to the enemy,


with the cavalry upon the two wings. Light troops regularly armed


there were none in the army, nor had there ever been any at Athens.


Those who had joined in the invasion, though many times more


numerous than those of the enemy, had mostly followed unarmed, as part


of the levy in mass of the citizens and foreigners at Athens, and


having started first on their way home were not present in any number.


The armies being now in line and upon the point of engaging,


Hippocrates, the general, passed along the Athenian ranks, and


encouraged them as follows:


  "Athenians, I shall only say a few words to you, but brave men


require no more, and they are addressed more to your understanding


than to your courage. None of you must fancy that we are going out


of our way to run this risk in the country of another. Fought in their


territory the battle will be for ours: if we conquer, the


Peloponnesians will never invade your country without the Boeotian


horse, and in one battle you will win Boeotia and in a manner free


Attica. Advance to meet them then like citizens of a country in


which you all glory as the first in Hellas, and like sons of the


fathers who beat them at Oenophyta with Myronides and thus gained


possession of Boeotia."


  Hippocrates had got half through the army with his exhortation, when


the Boeotians, after a few more hasty words from Pagondas, struck up


the paean, and came against them from the hill; the Athenians


advancing to meet them, and closing at a run. The extreme wing of


neither army came into action, one like the other being stopped by the


water-courses in the way; the rest engaged with the utmost


obstinacy, shield against shield. The Boeotian left, as far as the


centre, was worsted by the Athenians. The Thespians in that part of


the field suffered most severely. The troops alongside them having


given way, they were surrounded in a narrow space and cut down


fighting hand to hand; some of the Athenians also fell into


confusion in surrounding the enemy and mistook and so killed each


other. In this part of the field the Boeotians were beaten, and


retreated upon the troops still fighting; but the right, where the


Thebans were, got the better of the Athenians and shoved them


further and further back, though gradually at first. It so happened


also that Pagondas, seeing the distress of his left, had sent two


squadrons of horse, where they could not be seen, round the hill,


and their sudden appearance struck a panic into the victorious wing of


the Athenians, who thought that it was another army coming against


them. At length in both parts of the field, disturbed by this panic,


and with their line broken by the advancing Thebans, the whole


Athenian army took to flight. Some made for Delium and the sea, some


for Oropus, others for Mount Parnes, or wherever they had hopes of


safety, pursued and cut down by the Boeotians, and in particular by


the cavalry, composed partly of Boeotians and partly of Locrians,


who had come up just as the rout began. Night however coming on to


interrupt the pursuit, the mass of the fugitives escaped more easily


than they would otherwise have done. The next day the troops at Oropus


and Delium returned home by sea, after leaving a garrison in the


latter place, which they continued to hold notwithstanding the defeat.


  The Boeotians set up a trophy, took up their own dead, and


stripped those of the enemy, and leaving a guard over them retired


to Tanagra, there to take measures for attacking Delium. Meanwhile a


herald came from the Athenians to ask for the dead, but was met and


turned back by a Boeotian herald, who told him that he would effect


nothing until the return of himself the Boeotian herald, and who


then went on to the Athenians, and told them on the part of the


Boeotians that they had done wrong in transgressing the law of the


Hellenes. Of what use was the universal custom protecting the


temples in an invaded country, if the Athenians were to fortify Delium


and live there, acting exactly as if they were on unconsecrated


ground, and drawing and using for their purposes the water which they,


the Boeotians, never touched except for sacred uses? Accordingly for


the god as well as for themselves, in the name of the deities


concerned, and of Apollo, the Boeotians invited them first to evacuate


the temple, if they wished to take up the dead that belonged to them.


  After these words from the herald, the Athenians sent their own


herald to the Boeotians to say that they had not done any wrong to the


temple, and for the future would do it no more harm than they could


help; not having occupied it originally in any such design, but to


defend themselves from it against those who were really wronging them.


The law of the Hellenes was that conquest of a country, whether more


or less extensive, carried with it possession of the temples in that


country, with the obligation to keep up the usual ceremonies, at least


as far as possible. The Boeotians and most other people who had turned


out the owners of a country, and put themselves in their places by


force, now held as of right the temples which they originally


entered as usurpers. If the Athenians could have conquered more of


Boeotia this would have been the case with them: as things stood,


the piece of it which they had got they should treat as their own, and


not quit unless obliged. The water they had disturbed under the


impulsion of a necessity which they had not wantonly incurred,


having been forced to use it in defending themselves against the


Boeotians who first invaded Attica. Besides, anything done under the


pressure of war and danger might reasonably claim indulgence even in


the eye of the god; or why, pray, were the altars the asylum for


involuntary offences? Transgression also was a term applied to


presumptuous offenders, not to the victims of adverse circumstances.


In short, which were most impious- the Boeotians who wished to barter


dead bodies for holy places, or the Athenians who refused to give up


holy places to obtain what was theirs by right? The condition of


evacuating Boeotia must therefore be withdrawn. They were no longer in


Boeotia. They stood where they stood by the right of the sword. All


that the Boeotians had to do was to tell them to take up their dead


under a truce according to the national custom.


  The Boeotians replied that if they were in Boeotia, they must


evacuate that country before taking up their dead; if they were in


their own territory, they could do as they pleased: for they knew


that, although the Oropid where the bodies as it chanced were lying


(the battle having been fought on the borders) was subject to


Athens, yet the Athenians could not get them without their leave.


Besides, why should they grant a truce for Athenian ground? And what


could be fairer than to tell them to evacuate Boeotia if they wished


to get what they asked? The Athenian herald accordingly returned


with this answer, without having accomplished his object.


  Meanwhile the Boeotians at once sent for darters and slingers from


the Malian Gulf, and with two thousand Corinthian heavy infantry who


had joined them after the battle, the Peloponnesian garrison which had


evacuated Nisaea, and some Megarians with them, marched against


Delium, and attacked the fort, and after divers efforts finally


succeeded in taking it by an engine of the following description. They


sawed in two and scooped out a great beam from end to end, and fitting


it nicely together again like a pipe, hung by chains a cauldron at one


extremity, with which communicated an iron tube projecting from the


beam, which was itself in great part plated with iron. This they


brought up from a distance upon carts to the part of the wall


principally composed of vines and timber, and when it was near,


inserted huge bellows into their end of the beam and blew with them.


The blast passing closely confined into the cauldron, which was filled


with lighted coals, sulphur and pitch, made a great blaze, and set


fire to the wall, which soon became untenable for its defenders, who


left it and fled; and in this way the fort was taken. Of the


garrison some were killed and two hundred made prisoners; most of


the rest got on board their ships and returned home.


  Soon after the fall of Delium, which took place seventeen days after


the battle, the Athenian herald, without knowing what had happened,


came again for the dead, which were now restored by the Boeotians, who


no longer answered as at first. Not quite five hundred Boeotians


fell in the battle, and nearly one thousand Athenians, including


Hippocrates the general, besides a great number of light troops and


camp followers.


  Soon after this battle Demosthenes, after the failure of his


voyage to Siphae and of the plot on the town, availed himself of the


Acarnanian and Agraean troops and of the four hundred Athenian heavy


infantry which he had on board, to make a descent on the Sicyonian


coast. Before however all his ships had come to shore, the


Sicyonians came up and routed and chased to their ships those that had


landed, killing some and taking others prisoners; after which they set


up a trophy, and gave back the dead under truce.


  About the same time with the affair of Delium took place the death


of Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, who was defeated in battle, in a


campaign against the Triballi; Seuthes, son of Sparadocus, his nephew,


succeeding to the kingdom of the Odrysians, and of the rest of


Thrace ruled by Sitalces.


  The same winter Brasidas, with his allies in the Thracian places,


marched against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the river


Strymon. A settlement upon the spot on which the city now stands was


before attempted by Aristagoras, the Milesian (when he fled from


King Darius), who was however dislodged by the Edonians; and


thirty-two years later by the Athenians, who sent thither ten thousand


settlers of their own citizens, and whoever else chose to go. These


were cut off at Drabescus by the Thracians. Twenty-nine years after,


the Athenians returned (Hagnon, son of Nicias, being sent out as


leader of the colony) and drove out the Edonians, and founded a town


on the spot, formerly called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways. The base from


which they started was Eion, their commercial seaport at the mouth


of the river, not more than three miles from the present town, which


Hagnon named Amphipolis, because the Strymon flows round it on two


sides, and he built it so as to be conspicuous from the sea and land


alike, running a long wall across from river to river, to complete the


circumference.


  Brasidas now marched against this town, starting from Arne in


Chalcidice. Arriving about dusk at Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake


of Bolbe runs into the sea, he supped there, and went on during the


night. The weather was stormy and it was snowing a little, which


encouraged him to hurry on, in order, if possible, to take every one


at Amphipolis by surprise, except the party who were to betray it. The


plot was carried on by some natives of Argilus, an Andrian colony,


residing in Amphipolis, where they had also other accomplices gained


over by Perdiccas or the Chalcidians. But the most active in the


matter were the inhabitants of Argilus itself, which is close by,


who had always been suspected by the Athenians, and had had designs on


the place. These men now saw their opportunity arrive with Brasidas,


and having for some time been in correspondence with their


countrymen in Amphipolis for the betrayal of the town, at once


received him into Argilus, and revolted from the Athenians, and that


same night took him on to the bridge over the river; where he found


only a small guard to oppose him, the town being at some distance from


the passage, and the walls not reaching down to it as at present. This


guard he easily drove in, partly through there being treason in


their ranks, partly from the stormy state of the weather and the


suddenness of his attack, and so got across the bridge, and


immediately became master of all the property outside; the


Amphipolitans having houses all over the quarter.


  The passage of Brasidas was a complete surprise to the people in the


town; and the capture of many of those outside, and the flight of


the rest within the wall, combined to produce great confusion among


the citizens; especially as they did not trust one another. It is even


said that if Brasidas, instead of stopping to pillage, had advanced


straight against the town, he would probably have taken it. In fact,


however, he established himself where he was and overran the country


outside, and for the present remained inactive, vainly awaiting a


demonstration on the part of his friends within. Meanwhile the party


opposed to the traitors proved numerous enough to prevent the gates


being immediately thrown open, and in concert with Eucles, the


general, who had come from Athens to defend the place, sent to the


other commander in Thrace, Thucydides, son of Olorus, the author of


this history, who was at the isle of Thasos, a Parian colony, half a


day's sail from Amphipolis, to tell him to come to their relief. On


receipt of this message he at once set sail with seven ships which


he had with him, in order, if possible, to reach Amphipolis in time to


prevent its capitulation, or in any case to save Eion.


  Meanwhile Brasidas, afraid of succours arriving by sea from


Thasos, and learning that Thucydides possessed the right of working


the gold mines in that part of Thrace, and had thus great influence


with the inhabitants of the continent, hastened to gain the town, if


possible, before the people of Amphipolis should be encouraged by


his arrival to hope that he could save them by getting together a


force of allies from the sea and from Thrace, and so refuse to


surrender. He accordingly offered moderate terms, proclaiming that any


of the Amphipolitans and Athenians who chose, might continue to


enjoy their property with full rights of citizenship; while those


who did not wish to stay had five days to depart, taking their


property with them.


  The bulk of the inhabitants, upon hearing this, began to change


their minds, especially as only a small number of the citizens were


Athenians, the majority having come from different quarters, and


many of the prisoners outside had relations within the walls. They


found the proclamation a fair one in comparison of what their fear had


suggested; the Athenians being glad to go out, as they thought they


ran more risk than the rest, and further, did not expect any speedy


relief, and the multitude generally being content at being left in


possession of their civic rights, and at such an unexpected reprieve


from danger. The partisans of Brasidas now openly advocated this


course, seeing that the feeling of the people had changed, and that


they no longer gave ear to the Athenian general present; and thus


the surrender was made and Brasidas was admitted by them on the


terms of his proclamation. In this way they gave up the city, and late


in the same day Thucydides and his ships entered the harbour of


Eion, Brasidas having just got hold of Amphipolis, and having been


within a night of taking Eion: had the ships been less prompt in


relieving it, in the morning it would have been his.


  After this Thucydides put all in order at Eion to secure it


against any present or future attack of Brasidas, and received such as


had elected to come there from the interior according to the terms


agreed on. Meanwhile Brasidas suddenly sailed with a number of boats


down the river to Eion to see if he could not seize the point


running out from the wall, and so command the entrance; at the same


time he attempted it by land, but was beaten off on both sides and had


to content himself with arranging matters at Amphipolis and in the


neighbourhood. Myrcinus, an Edonian town, also came over to him; the


Edonian king Pittacus having been killed by the sons of Goaxis and his


own wife Brauro; and Galepsus and Oesime, which are Thasian


colonies, not long after followed its example. Perdiccas too came up


immediately after the capture and joined in these arrangements.


  The news that Amphipolis was in the hands of the enemy caused


great alarm at Athens. Not only was the town valuable for the timber


it afforded for shipbuilding, and the money that it brought in; but


also, although the escort of the Thessalians gave the Lacedaemonians a


means of reaching the allies of Athens as far as the Strymon, yet as


long as they were not masters of the bridge but were watched on the


side of Eion by the Athenian galleys, and on the land side impeded


by a large and extensive lake formed by the waters of the river, it


was impossible for them to go any further. Now, on the contrary, the


path seemed open. There was also the fear of the allies revolting,


owing to the moderation displayed by Brasidas in all his conduct,


and to the declarations which he was everywhere making that he sent


out to free Hellas. The towns subject to the Athenians, hearing of the


capture of Amphipolis and of the terms accorded to it, and of the


gentleness of Brasidas, felt most strongly encouraged to change


their condition, and sent secret messages to him, begging him to


come on to them; each wishing to be the first to revolt. Indeed


there seemed to be no danger in so doing; their mistake in their


estimate of the Athenian power was as great as that power afterwards


turned out to be, and their judgment was based more upon blind wishing


than upon any sound prevision; for it is a habit of mankind to entrust


to careless hope what they long for, and to use sovereign reason to


thrust aside what they do not fancy. Besides the late severe blow


which the Athenians had met with in Boeotia, joined to the


seductive, though untrue, statements of Brasidas, about the


Athenians not having ventured to engage his single army at Nisaea,


made the allies confident, and caused them to believe that no Athenian


force would be sent against them. Above all the wish to do what was


agreeable at the moment, and the likelihood that they should find


the Lacedaemonians full of zeal at starting, made them eager to


venture. Observing this, the Athenians sent garrisons to the different


towns, as far as was possible at such short notice and in winter;


while Brasidas sent dispatches to Lacedaemon asking for


reinforcements, and himself made preparations for building galleys


in the Strymon. The Lacedaemonians however did not send him any,


partly through envy on the part of their chief men, partly because


they were more bent on recovering the prisoners of the island and


ending the war.


  The same winter the Megarians took and razed to the foundations


the long walls which had been occupied by the Athenians; and


Brasidas after the capture of Amphipolis marched with his allies


against Acte, a promontory running out from the King's dike with an


inward curve, and ending in Athos, a lofty mountain looking towards


the Aegean Sea. In it are various towns, Sane, an Andrian colony,


close to the canal, and facing the sea in the direction of Euboea; the


others being Thyssus, Cleone, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium, inhabited


by mixed barbarian races speaking the two languages. There is also a


small Chalcidian element; but the greater number are


Tyrrheno-Pelasgians once settled in Lemnos and Athens, and Bisaltians,


Crestonians, and Edonians; the towns being all small ones. Most of


these came over to Brasidas; but Sane and Dium held out and saw


their land ravaged by him and his army.


  Upon their not submitting, he at once marched against Torone in


Chalcidice, which was held by an Athenian garrison, having been


invited by a few persons who were prepared to hand over the town.


Arriving in the dark a little before daybreak, he sat down with his


army near the temple of the Dioscuri, rather more than a quarter of


a mile from the city. The rest of the town of Torone and the Athenians


in garrison did not perceive his approach; but his partisans knowing


that he was coming (a few of them had secretly gone out to meet him)


were on the watch for his arrival, and were no sooner aware of it than


they took it to them seven light-armed men with daggers, who alone


of twenty men ordered on this service dared to enter, commanded by


Lysistratus an Olynthian. These passed through the sea wall, and


without being seen went up and put to the sword the garrison of the


highest post in the town, which stands on a hill, and broke open the


postern on the side of Canastraeum.


  Brasidas meanwhile came a little nearer and then halted with his


main body, sending on one hundred targeteers to be ready to rush in


first, the moment that a gate should be thrown open and the beacon


lighted as agreed. After some time passed in waiting and wondering


at the delay, the targeteers by degrees got up close to the town.


The Toronaeans inside at work with the party that had entered had by


this time broken down the postern and opened the gates leading to


the market-place by cutting through the bar, and first brought some


men round and let them in by the postern, in order to strike a panic


into the surprised townsmen by suddenly attacking them from behind and


on both sides at once; after which they raised the fire-signal as


had been agreed, and took in by the market gates the rest of the


targeteers.


  Brasidas seeing the signal told the troops to rise, and dashed


forward amid the loud hurrahs of his men, which carried dismay among


the astonished townspeople. Some burst in straight by the gate, others


over some square pieces of timber placed against the wall (which has


fallen down and was being rebuilt) to draw up stones; Brasidas and the


greater number making straight uphill for the higher part of the town,


in order to take it from top to bottom, and once for all, while the


rest of the multitude spread in all directions.


  The capture of the town was effected before the great body of the


Toronaeans had recovered from their surprise and confusion; but the


conspirators and the citizens of their party at once joined the


invaders. About fifty of the Athenian heavy infantry happened to be


sleeping in the market-place when the alarm reached them. A few of


these were killed fighting; the rest escaped, some by land, others


to the two ships on the station, and took refuge in Lecythus, a fort


garrisoned by their own men in the corner of the town running out into


the sea and cut off by a narrow isthmus; where they were joined by the


Toronaeans of their party.


  Day now arrived, and the town being secured, Brasidas made a


proclamation to the Toronaeans who had taken refuge with the


Athenians, to come out, as many as chose, to their homes without


fearing for their rights or persons, and sent a herald to invite the


Athenians to accept a truce, and to evacuate Lecythus with their


property, as being Chalcidian ground. The Athenians refused this


offer, but asked for a truce for a day to take up their dead. Brasidas


granted it for two days, which he employed in fortifying the houses


near, and the Athenians in doing the same to their positions.


Meanwhile he called a meeting of the Toronaeans, and said very much


what he had said at Acanthus, namely, that they must not look upon


those who had negotiated with him for the capture of the town as bad


men or as traitors, as they had not acted as they had done from


corrupt motives or in order to enslave the city, but for the good


and freedom of Torone; nor again must those who had not shared in


the enterprise fancy that they would not equally reap its fruits, as


he had not come to destroy either city or individual. This was the


reason of his proclamation to those that had fled for refuge to the


Athenians: he thought none the worse of them for their friendship


for the Athenians; he believed that they had only to make trial of the


Lacedaemonians to like them as well, or even much better, as acting


much more justly: it was for want of such a trial that they were now


afraid of them. Meanwhile he warned all of them to prepare to be


staunch allies, and for being held responsible for all faults in


future: for the past, they had not wronged the Lacedaemonians but


had been wronged by others who were too strong for them, and any


opposition that they might have offered him could be excused.


  Having encouraged them with this address, as soon as the truce


expired he made his attack upon Lecythus; the Athenians defending


themselves from a poor wall and from some houses with parapets. One


day they beat him off; the next the enemy were preparing to bring up


an engine against them from which they meant to throw fire upon the


wooden defences, and the troops were already coming up to the point


where they fancied they could best bring up the engine, and where


place was most assailable; meanwhile the Athenians put a wooden


tower upon a house opposite, and carried up a quantity of jars and


casks of water and big stones, and a large number of men also


climbed up. The house thus laden too heavily suddenly broke down


with a loud crash; at which the men who were near and saw it were more


vexed than frightened; but those not so near, and still more those


furthest off, thought that the place was already taken at that


point, and fled in haste to the sea and the ships.


  Brasidas, perceiving that they were deserting the parapet, and


seeing what was going on, dashed forward with his troops, and


immediately took the fort, and put to the sword all whom he found in


it. In this way the place was evacuated by the Athenians, who went


across in their boats and ships to Pallene. Now there is a temple of


Athene in Lecythus, and Brasidas had proclaimed in the moment of


making the assault that he would give thirty silver minae to the man


first on the wall. Being now of opinion that the capture was


scarcely due to human means, he gave the thirty minae to the goddess


for her temple, and razed and cleared Lecythus, and made the whole


of it consecrated ground. The rest of the winter he spent in


settling the places in his hands, and in making designs upon the rest;


and with the expiration of the winter the eighth year of this war


ended.


  In the spring of the summer following, the Lacedaemonians and


Athenians made an armistice for a year; the Athenians thinking that


they would thus have full leisure to take their precautions before


Brasidas could procure the revolt of any more of their towns, and


might also, if it suited them, conclude a general peace; the


Lacedaemonians divining the actual fears of the Athenians, and


thinking that after once tasting a respite from trouble and misery


they would be more disposed to consent to a reconciliation, and to


give back the prisoners, and make a treaty for the longer period.


The great idea of the Lacedaemonians was to get back their men while


Brasidas's good fortune lasted: further successes might make the


struggle a less unequal one in Chalcidice, but would leave them


still deprived of their men, and even in Chalcidice not more than a


match for the Athenians and by no means certain of victory. An


armistice was accordingly concluded by Lacedaemon and her allies


upon the terms following:


    1. As to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, we are


agreed that whosoever will shall have access to it, without fraud or


fear, according to the usages of his forefathers. The Lacedaemonians


and the allies present agree to this, and promise to send heralds to


the Boeotians and Phocians, and to do their best to persuade them to


agree likewise.


    2. As to the treasure of the god, we agree to exert ourselves to


detect all malversators, truly and honestly following the customs of


our forefathers, we and you and all others willing to do so, all


following the customs of our forefathers. As to these points the


Lacedaemonians and the other allies are agreed as has been said.


    3. As to what follows, the Lacedaemonians and the other allies


agree, if the Athenians conclude a treaty, to remain, each of us in


our own territory, retaining our respective acquisitions: the garrison


in Coryphasium keeping within Buphras and Tomeus: that in Cythera


attempting no communication with the Peloponnesian confederacy,


neither we with them, nor they with us: that in Nisaea and Minoa not


crossing the road leading from the gates of the temple of Nisus to


that of Poseidon and from thence straight to the bridge at Minoa:


the Megarians and the allies being equally bound not to cross this


road, and the Athenians retaining the island they have taken,


without any communication on either side: as to Troezen, each side


retaining what it has, and as was arranged with the Athenians.


    4. As to the use of the sea, so far as refers to their own coast


and to that of their confederacy, that the Lacedaemonians and their


allies may voyage upon it in any vessel rowed by oars and of not


more than five hundred talents tonnage, not a vessel of war.


    5. That all heralds and embassies, with as many attendants as they


please, for concluding the war and adjusting claims, shall have free


passage, going and coming, to Peloponnese or Athens by land and by


sea.


    6. That during the truce, deserters whether bond or free shall


be received neither by you, nor by us.


    7. Further, that satisfaction shall be given by you to us and by


us to you according to the public law of our several countries, all


disputes being settled by law without recourse to hostilities.


    The Lacedaemonians and allies agree to these articles; but if


you have anything fairer or juster to suggest, come to Lacedaemon


and let us know: whatever shall be just will meet with no objection


either from the Lacedaemonians or from the allies. Only let those


who come come with full powers, as you desire us. The truce shall be


for one year.


    Approved by the people.


    The tribe of Acamantis had the prytany, Phoenippus was


secretary, Niciades chairman. Laches moved, in the name of the good


luck of the Athenians, that they should conclude the armistice upon


the terms agreed upon by the Lacedaemonians and the allies. It was


agreed accordingly in the popular assembly that the armistice should


be for one year, beginning that very day, the fourteenth of the


month of Elaphebolion; during which time ambassadors and heralds


should go and come between the two countries to discuss the bases of a


pacification. That the generals and prytanes should call an assembly


of the people, in which the Athenians should first consult on the


peace, and on the mode in which the embassy for putting an end to


the war should be admitted. That the embassy now present should at


once take the engagement before the people to keep well and truly this


truce for one year.


  On these terms the Lacedaemonians concluded with the Athenians and


their allies on the twelfth day of the Spartan month Gerastius; the


allies also taking the oaths. Those who concluded and poured the


libation were Taurus, son of Echetimides, Athenaeus, son of


Pericleidas, and Philocharidas, son of Eryxidaidas, Lacedaemonians;


Aeneas, son of Ocytus, and Euphamidas, son of Aristonymus,


Corinthians; Damotimus, son of Naucrates, and Onasimus, son of


Megacles, Sicyonians; Nicasus, son of Cecalus, and Menecrates, son


of Amphidorus, Megarians; and Amphias, son of Eupaidas, an Epidaurian;


and the Athenian generals Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes, Nicias,


son of Niceratus, and Autocles, son of Tolmaeus. Such was the


armistice, and during the whole of it conferences went on on the


subject of a pacification.


  In the days in which they were going backwards and forwards to these


conferences, Scione, a town in Pallene, revolted from Athens, and went


over to Brasidas. The Scionaeans say that they are Pallenians from


Peloponnese, and that their first founders on their voyage from Troy


were carried in to this spot by the storm which the Achaeans were


caught in, and there settled. The Scionaeans had no sooner revolted


than Brasidas crossed over by night to Scione, with a friendly


galley ahead and himself in a small boat some way behind; his idea


being that if he fell in with a vessel larger than the boat he would


have the galley to defend him, while a ship that was a match for the


galley would probably neglect the small vessel to attack the large


one, and thus leave him time to escape. His passage effected, he


called a meeting of the Scionaeans and spoke to the same effect as


at Acanthus and Torone, adding that they merited the utmost


commendation, in that, in spite of Pallene within the isthmus being


cut off by the Athenian occupation of Potidaea and of their own


practically insular position, they had of their own free will gone


forward to meet their liberty instead of timorously waiting until they


had been by force compelled to their own manifest good. This was a


sign that they would valiantly undergo any trial, however great; and


if he should order affairs as he intended, he should count them


among the truest and sincerest friends of the Lacedaemonians, and


would in every other way honour them.


  The Scionaeans were elated by his language, and even those who had


at first disapproved of what was being done catching the general


confidence, they determined on a vigorous conduct of the war, and


welcomed Brasidas with all possible honours, publicly crowning him


with a crown of gold as the liberator of Hellas; while private persons


crowded round him and decked him with garlands as though he had been


an athlete. Meanwhile Brasidas left them a small garrison for the


present and crossed back again, and not long afterwards sent over a


larger force, intending with the help of the Scionaeans to attempt


Mende and Potidaea before the Athenians should arrive; Scione, he


felt, being too like an island for them not to relieve it. He had


besides intelligence in the above towns about their betrayal.


  In the midst of his designs upon the towns in question, a galley


arrived with the commissioners carrying round the news of the


armistice, Aristonymus for the Athenians and Athenaeus for the


Lacedaemonians. The troops now crossed back to Torone, and the


commissioners gave Brasidas notice of the convention. All the


Lacedaemonian allies in Thrace accepted what had been done; and


Aristonymus made no difficulty about the rest, but finding, on


counting the days, that the Scionaeans had revolted after the date


of the convention, refused to include them in it. To this Brasidas


earnestly objected, asserting that the revolt took place before, and


would not give up the town. Upon Aristonymus reporting the case to


Athens, the people at once prepared to send an expedition to Scione.


Upon this, envoys arrived from Lacedaemon, alleging that this would be


a breach of the truce, and laying claim to the town upon the faith


of the assertion of Brasidas, and meanwhile offering to submit the


question to arbitration. Arbitration, however, was what the


Athenians did not choose to risk; being determined to send troops at


once to the place, and furious at the idea of even the islanders now


daring to revolt, in a vain reliance upon the power of the


Lacedaemonians by land. Besides the facts of the revolt were rather as


the Athenians contended, the Scionaeans having revolted two days after


the convention. Cleon accordingly succeeded in carrying a decree to


reduce and put to death the Scionaeans; and the Athenians employed the


leisure which they now enjoyed in preparing for the expedition.


 Meanwhile Mende revolted, a town in Pallene and a colony of the


Eretrians, and was received without scruple by Brasidas, in spite of


its having evidently come over during the armistice, on account of


certain infringements of the truce alleged by him against the


Athenians. This audacity of Mende was partly caused by seeing Brasidas


forward in the matter and by the conclusions drawn from his refusal to


betray Scione; and besides, the conspirators in Mende were few, and,


as I have already intimated, had carried on their practices too long


not to fear detection for themselves, and not to wish to force the


inclination of the multitude. This news made the Athenians more


furious than ever, and they at once prepared against both towns.


Brasidas, expecting their arrival, conveyed away to Olynthus in


Chalcidice the women and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans, and


sent over to them five hundred Peloponnesian heavy infantry and


three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, all under the command of


Polydamidas.


  Leaving these two towns to prepare together against the speedy


arrival of the Athenians, Brasidas and Perdiccas started on a second


joint expedition into Lyncus against Arrhabaeus; the latter with the


forces of his Macedonian subjects, and a corps of heavy infantry


composed of Hellenes domiciled in the country; the former with the


Peloponnesians whom he still had with him and the Chalcidians,


Acanthians, and the rest in such force as they were able. In all there


were about three thousand Hellenic heavy infantry, accompanied by


all the Macedonian cavalry with the Chalcidians, near one thousand


strong, besides an immense crowd of barbarians. On entering the


country of Arrhabaeus, they found the Lyncestians encamped awaiting


them, and themselves took up a position opposite. The infantry on


either side were upon a hill, with a plain between them, into which


the horse of both armies first galloped down and engaged a cavalry


action. After this the Lyncestian heavy infantry advanced from their


hill to join their cavalry and offered battle; upon which Brasidas and


Perdiccas also came down to meet them, and engaged and routed them


with heavy loss; the survivors taking refuge upon the heights and


there remaining inactive. The victors now set up a trophy and waited


two or three days for the Illyrian mercenaries who were to join


Perdiccas. Perdiccas then wished to go on and attack the villages of


Arrhabaeus, and to sit still no longer; but Brasidas, afraid that


the Athenians might sail up during his absence, and of something


happening to Mende, and seeing besides that the Illyrians did not


appear, far from seconding this wish was anxious to return.


  While they were thus disputing, the news arrived that the


Illyrians had actually betrayed Perdiccas and had joined Arrhabaeus;


and the fear inspired by their warlike character made both parties now


think it best to retreat. However, owing to the dispute, nothing had


been settled as to when they should start; and night coming on, the


Macedonians and the barbarian crowd took fright in a moment in one


of those mysterious panics to which great armies are liable; and


persuaded that an army many times more numerous than that which had


really arrived was advancing and all but upon them, suddenly broke and


fled in the direction of home, and thus compelled Perdiccas, who at


first did not perceive what had occurred, to depart without seeing


Brasidas, the two armies being encamped at a considerable distance


from each other. At daybreak Brasidas, perceiving that the Macedonians


had gone on, and that the Illyrians and Arrhabaeus were on the point


of attacking him, formed his heavy infantry into a square, with the


light troops in the centre, and himself also prepared to retreat.


Posting his youngest soldiers to dash out wherever the enemy should


attack them, he himself with three hundred picked men in the rear


intended to face about during the retreat and beat off the most


forward of their assailants, Meanwhile, before the enemy approached,


he sought to sustain the courage of his soldiers with the following


hasty exhortation:


  "Peloponnesians, if I did not suspect you of being dismayed at being


left alone to sustain the attack of a numerous and barbarian enemy,


I should just have said a few words to you as usual without further


explanation. As it is, in the face of the desertion of our friends and


the numbers of the enemy, I have some advice and information to offer,


which, brief as they must be, will, I hope, suffice for the more


important points. The bravery that you habitually display in war


does not depend on your having allies at your side in this or that


encounter, but on your native courage; nor have numbers any terrors


for citizens of states like yours, in which the many do not rule the


few, but rather the few the many, owing their position to nothing else


than to superiority in the field. Inexperience now makes you afraid of


barbarians; and yet the trial of strength which you had with the


Macedonians among them, and my own judgment, confirmed by what I


hear from others, should be enough to satisfy you that they will not


prove formidable. Where an enemy seems strong but is really weak, a


true knowledge of the facts makes his adversary the bolder, just as


a serious antagonist is encountered most confidently by those who do


not know him. Thus the present enemy might terrify an inexperienced


imagination; they are formidable in outward bulk, their loud yelling


is unbearable, and the brandishing of their weapons in the air has a


threatening appearance. But when it comes to real fighting with an


opponent who stands his ground, they are not what they seemed; they


have no regular order that they should be ashamed of deserting their


positions when hard pressed; flight and attack are with them equally


honourable, and afford no test of courage; their independent mode of


fighting never leaving any one who wants to run away without a fair


excuse for so doing. In short, they think frightening you at a


secure distance a surer game than meeting you hand to hand;


otherwise they would have done the one and not the other. You can thus


plainly see that the terrors with which they were at first invested


are in fact trifling enough, though to the eye and ear very prominent.


Stand your ground therefore when they advance, and again wait your


opportunity to retire in good order, and you will reach a place of


safety all the sooner, and will know for ever afterwards that rabble


such as these, to those who sustain their first attack, do but show


off their courage by threats of the terrible things that they are


going to do, at a distance, but with those who give way to them are


quick enough to display their heroism in pursuit when they can do so


without danger."


  With this brief address Brasidas began to lead off his army.


Seeing this, the barbarians came on with much shouting and hubbub,


thinking that he was flying and that they would overtake him and cut


him off. But wherever they charged they found the young men ready to


dash out against them, while Brasidas with his picked company


sustained their onset. Thus the Peloponnesians withstood the first


attack, to the surprise of the enemy, and afterwards received and


repulsed them as fast as they came on, retiring as soon as their


opponents became quiet. The main body of the barbarians ceased


therefore to molest the Hellenes with Brasidas in the open country,


and leaving behind a certain number to harass their march, the rest


went on after the flying Macedonians, slaying those with whom they


came up, and so arrived in time to occupy the narrow pass between


two hills that leads into the country of Arrhabaeus. They knew that


this was the only way by which Brasidas could retreat, and now


proceeded to surround him just as he entered the most impracticable


part of the road, in order to cut him off.


  Brasidas, perceiving their intention, told his three hundred to


run on without order, each as quickly as he could, to the hill which


seemed easiest to take, and to try to dislodge the barbarians


already there, before they should be joined by the main body closing


round him. These attacked and overpowered the party upon the hill, and


the main army of the Hellenes now advanced with less difficulty


towards it- the barbarians being terrified at seeing their men on


that side driven from the height and no longer following the main


body, who, they considered, had gained the frontier and made good


their escape. The heights once gained, Brasidas now proceeded more


securely, and the same day arrived at Arnisa, the first town in the


dominions of Perdiccas. The soldiers, enraged at the desertion of


the Macedonians, vented their rage on all their yokes of oxen which


they found on the road, and on any baggage which had tumbled off (as


might easily happen in the panic of a night retreat), by unyoking


and cutting down the cattle and taking the baggage for themselves.


From this moment Perdiccas began to regard Brasidas as an enemy and to


feel against the Peloponnesians a hatred which could not be


congenial to the adversary of the Athenians. However, he departed from


his natural interests and made it his endeavour to come to terms


with the latter and to get rid of the former.


  On his return from Macedonia to Torone, Brasidas found the Athenians


already masters of Mende, and remained quiet where he was, thinking it


now out of his power to cross over into Pallene and assist the


Mendaeans, but he kept good watch over Torone. For about the same time


as the campaign in Lyncus, the Athenians sailed upon the expedition


which we left them preparing against Mende and Scione, with fifty


ships, ten of which were Chians, one thousand Athenian heavy


infantry and six hundred archers, one hundred Thracian mercenaries and


some targeteers drawn from their allies in the neighbourhood, under


the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus, son of


Diitrephes. Weighing from Potidaea, the fleet came to land opposite


the temple of Poseidon, and proceeded against Mende; the men of


which town, reinforced by three hundred Scionaeans, with their


Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred heavy infantry in all,


under Polydamidas, they found encamped upon a strong hill outside


the city. These Nicias, with one hundred and twenty light-armed


Methonaeans, sixty picked men from the Athenian heavy infantry, and


all the archers, tried to reach by a path running up the hill, but


received a wound and found himself unable to force the position; while


Nicostratus, with all the rest of the army, advancing upon the hill,


which was naturally difficult, by a different approach further off,


was thrown into utter disorder; and the whole Athenian army narrowly


escaped being defeated. For that day, as the Mendaeans and their


allies showed no signs of yielding, the Athenians retreated and


encamped, and the Mendaeans at nightfall returned into the town.


  The next day the Athenians sailed round to the Scione side, and took


the suburb, and all day plundered the country, without any one


coming out against them, partly because of intestine disturbances in


the town; and the following night the three hundred Scionaeans


returned home. On the morrow Nicias advanced with half the army to the


frontier of Scione and laid waste the country; while Nicostratus


with the remainder sat down before the town near the upper gate on the


road to Potidaea. The arms of the Mendaeans and of their Peloponnesian


auxiliaries within the wall happened to be piled in that quarter,


where Polydamidas accordingly began to draw them up for battle,


encouraging the Mendaeans to make a sortie. At this moment one of


the popular party answered him factiously that they would not go out


and did not want a war, and for thus answering was dragged by the


arm and knocked about by Polydamidas. Hereupon the infuriated


commons at once seized their arms and rushed at the Peloponnesians and


at their allies of the opposite faction. The troops thus assaulted


were at once routed, partly from the suddenness of the conflict and


partly through fear of the gates being opened to the Athenians, with


whom they imagined that the attack had been concerted. As many as were


not killed on the spot took refuge in the citadel, which they had held


from the first; and the whole, Athenian army, Nicias having by this


time returned and being close to the city, now burst into Mende, which


had opened its gates without any convention, and sacked it just as


if they had taken it by storm, the generals even finding some


difficulty in restraining them from also massacring the inhabitants.


After this the Athenians told the Mendaeans that they might retain


their civil rights, and themselves judge the supposed authors of the


revolt; and cut off the party in the citadel by a wall built down to


the sea on either side, appointing troops to maintain the blockade.


Having thus secured Mende, they proceeded against Scione.


  The Scionaeans and Peloponnesians marched out against them,


occupying a strong hill in front of the town, which had to be captured


by the enemy before they could invest the place. The Athenians stormed


the hill, defeated and dislodged its occupants, and, having encamped


and set up a trophy, prepared for the work of circumvallation. Not


long after they had begun their operations, the auxiliaries besieged


in the citadel of Mende forced the guard by the sea-side and arrived


by night at Scione, into which most of them succeeded in entering,


passing through the besieging army.


  While the investment of Scione was in progress, Perdiccas sent a


herald to the Athenian generals and made peace with the Athenians,


through spite against Brasidas for the retreat from Lyncus, from which


moment indeed he had begun to negotiate. The Lacedaemonian


Ischagoras was just then upon the point of starting with an army


overland to join Brasidas; and Perdiccas, being now required by Nicias


to give some proof of the sincerity of his reconciliation to the


Athenians, and being himself no longer disposed to let the


Peloponnesians into his country, put in motion his friends in


Thessaly, with whose chief men he always took care to have


relations, and so effectually stopped the army and its preparation


that they did not even try the Thessalians. Ischagoras himself,


however, with Ameinias and Aristeus, succeeded in reaching Brasidas;


they had been commissioned by the Lacedaemonians to inspect the


state of affairs, and brought out from Sparta (in violation of all


precedent) some of their young men to put in command of the towns,


to guard against their being entrusted to the persons upon the spot.


Brasidas accordingly placed Clearidas, son of Cleonymus, in


Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas, son of Hegesander, in Torone.


  The same summer the Thebans dismantled the wall of the Thespians


on the charge of Atticism, having always wished to do so, and now


finding it an easy matter, as the flower of the Thespian youth had


perished in the battle with the Athenians. The same summer also the


temple of Hera at Argos was burnt down, through Chrysis, the


priestess, placing a lighted torch near the garlands and then


falling asleep, so that they all caught fire and were in a blaze


before she observed it. Chrysis that very night fled to Phlius for


fear of the Argives, who, agreeably to the law in such a case,


appointed another priestess named Phaeinis. Chrysis at the time of her


flight had been priestess for eight years of the present war and


half the ninth. At the close of the summer the investment of Scione


was completed, and the Athenians, leaving a detachment to maintain the


blockade, returned with the rest of their army.


  During the winter following, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were


kept quiet by the armistice; but the Mantineans and Tegeans, and their


respective allies, fought a battle at Laodicium, in the Oresthid.


The victory remained doubtful, as each side routed one of the wings


opposed to them, and both set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi.


After heavy loss on both sides the battle was undecided, and night


interrupted the action; yet the Tegeans passed the night on the


field and set up a trophy at once, while the Mantineans withdrew to


Bucolion and set up theirs afterwards.


  At the close of the same winter, in fact almost in spring,


Brasidas made an attempt upon Potidaea. He arrived by night, and


succeeded in planting a ladder against the wall without being


discovered, the ladder being planted just in the interval between


the passing round of the bell and the return of the man who brought it


back. Upon the garrison, however, taking the alarm immediately


afterwards, before his men came up, he quickly led off his troops,


without waiting until it was day. So ended the winter and the ninth


year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian.