The Sixth Book.


                         CHAPTER XVIII.





           Seventeenth Year of the War - The Sicilian


                Campaign - Affair of the Hermae -


                   Departure of the Expedition





  THE same winter the Athenians resolved to sail again to Sicily, with


a greater armament than that under Laches and Eurymedon, and, if


possible, to conquer the island; most of them being ignorant of its


size and of the number of its inhabitants, Hellenic and barbarian, and


of the fact that they were undertaking a war not much inferior to that


against the Peloponnesians. For the voyage round Sicily in a


merchantman is not far short of eight days; and yet, large as the


island is, there are only two miles of sea to prevent its being


mainland.


  It was settled originally as follows, and the peoples that


occupied it are these. The earliest inhabitants spoken of in any


part of the country are the Cyclopes and Laestrygones; but I cannot


tell of what race they were, or whence they came or whither they went,


and must leave my readers to what the poets have said of them and to


what may be generally known concerning them. The Sicanians appear to


have been the next settlers, although they pretend to have been the


first of all and aborigines; but the facts show that they were


Iberians, driven by the Ligurians from the river Sicanus in Iberia. It


was from them that the island, before called Trinacria, took its


name of Sicania, and to the present day they inhabit the west of


Sicily. On the fall of Ilium, some of the Trojans escaped from the


Achaeans, came in ships to Sicily, and settled next to the Sicanians


under the general name of Elymi; their towns being called Eryx and


Egesta. With them settled some of the Phocians carried on their way


from Troy by a storm, first to Libya, and afterwards from thence to


Sicily. The Sicels crossed over to Sicily from their first home Italy,


flying from the Opicans, as tradition says and as seems not


unlikely, upon rafts, having watched till the wind set down the strait


to effect the passage; although perhaps they may have sailed over in


some other way. Even at the present day there are still Sicels in


Italy; and the country got its name of Italy from Italus, a king of


the Sicels, so called. These went with a great host to Sicily,


defeated the Sicanians in battle and forced them to remove to the


south and west of the island, which thus came to be called Sicily


instead of Sicania, and after they crossed over continued to enjoy the


richest parts of the country for near three hundred years before any


Hellenes came to Sicily; indeed they still hold the centre and north


of the island. There were also Phoenicians living all round Sicily,


who had occupied promontories upon the sea coasts and the islets


adjacent for the purpose of trading with the Sicels. But when the


Hellenes began to arrive in considerable numbers by sea, the


Phoenicians abandoned most of their stations, and drawing together


took up their abode in Motye, Soloeis, and Panormus, near the Elymi,


partly because they confided in their alliance, and also because these


are the nearest points for the voyage between Carthage and Sicily.


  These were the barbarians in Sicily, settled as I have said. Of


the Hellenes, the first to arrive were Chalcidians from Euboea with


Thucles, their founder. They founded Naxos and built the altar to


Apollo Archegetes, which now stands outside the town, and upon which


the deputies for the games sacrifice before sailing from Sicily.


Syracuse was founded the year afterwards by Archias, one of the


Heraclids from Corinth, who began by driving out the Sicels from the


island upon which the inner city now stands, though it is no longer


surrounded by water: in process of time the outer town also was


taken within the walls and became populous. Meanwhile Thucles and


the Chalcidians set out from Naxos in the fifth year after the


foundation of Syracuse, and drove out the Sicels by arms and founded


Leontini and afterwards Catana; the Catanians themselves choosing


Evarchus as their founder.


  About the same time Lamis arrived in Sicily with a colony from


Megara, and after founding a place called Trotilus beyond the river


Pantacyas, and afterwards leaving it and for a short while joining the


Chalcidians at Leontini, was driven out by them and founded Thapsus.


After his death his companions were driven out of Thapsus, and founded


a place called the Hyblaean Megara; Hyblon, a Sicel king, having given


up the place and inviting them thither. Here they lived two hundred


and forty-five years; after which they were expelled from the city and


the country by the Syracusan tyrant Gelo. Before their expulsion,


however, a hundred years after they had settled there, they sent out


Pamillus and founded Selinus; he having come from their mother country


Megara to join them in its foundation. Gela was founded by


Antiphemus from Rhodes and Entimus from Crete, who joined in leading a


colony thither, in the forty-fifth year after the foundation of


Syracuse. The town took its name from the river Gelas, the place where


the citadel now stands, and which was first fortified, being called


Lindii. The institutions which they adopted were Dorian. Near one


hundred and eight years after the foundation of Gela, the Geloans


founded Acragas (Agrigentum), so called from the river of that name,


and made Aristonous and Pystilus their founders; giving their own


institutions to the colony. Zancle was originally founded by pirates


from Cuma, the Chalcidian town in the country of the Opicans:


afterwards, however, large numbers came from Chalcis and the rest of


Euboea, and helped to people the place; the founders being Perieres


and Crataemenes from Cuma and Chalcis respectively. It first had the


name of Zancle given it by the Sicels, because the place is shaped


like a sickle, which the Sicels call zanclon; but upon the original


settlers being afterwards expelled by some Samians and other Ionians


who landed in Sicily flying from the Medes, and the Samians in their


turn not long afterwards by Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, the town


was by him colonized with a mixed population, and its name changed


to Messina, after his old country.


  Himera was founded from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon, most


of those who went to the colony being Chalcidians; though they were


joined by some exiles from Syracuse, defeated in a civil war, called


the Myletidae. The language was a mixture of Chalcidian and Doric, but


the institutions which prevailed were the Chalcidian. Acrae and


Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans; Acrae seventy years after


Syracuse, Casmenae nearly twenty after Acrae. Camarina was first


founded by the Syracusans, close upon a hundred and thirty-five


years after the building of Syracuse; its founders being Daxon and


Menecolus. But the Camarinaeans being expelled by arms by the


Syracusans for having revolted, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, some time


later receiving their land in ransom for some Syracusan prisoners,


resettled Camarina, himself acting as its founder. Lastly, it was


again depopulated by Gelo, and settled once more for the third time by


the Geloans.





  Such is the list of the peoples, Hellenic and barbarian,


inhabiting Sicily, and such the magnitude of the island which the


Athenians were now bent upon invading; being ambitious in real truth


of conquering the whole, although they had also the specious design of


succouring their kindred and other allies in the island. But they were


especially incited by envoys from Egesta, who had come to Athens and


invoked their aid more urgently than ever. The Egestaeans had gone


to war with their neighbours the Selinuntines upon questions of


marriage and disputed territory, and the Selinuntines had procured the


alliance of the Syracusans, and pressed Egesta hard by land and sea.


The Egestaeans now reminded the Athenians of the alliance made in


the time of Laches, during the former Leontine war, and begged them to


send a fleet to their aid, and among a number of other


considerations urged as a capital argument that if the Syracusans were


allowed to go unpunished for their depopulation of Leontini, to ruin


the allies still left to Athens in Sicily, and to get the whole


power of the island into their hands, there would be a danger of their


one day coming with a large force, as Dorians, to the aid of their


Dorian brethren, and as colonists, to the aid of the Peloponnesians


who had sent them out, and joining these in pulling down the


Athenian empire. The Athenians would, therefore, do well to unite with


the allies still left to them, and to make a stand against the


Syracusans; especially as they, the Egestaeans, were prepared to


furnish money sufficient for the war. The Athenians, hearing these


arguments constantly repeated in their assemblies by the Egestaeans


and their supporters, voted first to send envoys to Egesta, to see


if there was really the money that they talked of in the treasury


and temples, and at the same time to ascertain in what posture was the


war with the Selinuntines.


  The envoys of the Athenians were accordingly dispatched to Sicily.


The same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, the Corinthians


excepted, marched into the Argive territory, and ravaged a small


part of the land, and took some yokes of oxen and carried off some


corn. They also settled the Argive exiles at Orneae, and left them a


few soldiers taken from the rest of the army; and after making a truce


for a certain while, according to which neither Orneatae nor Argives


were to injure each other's territory, returned home with the army.


Not long afterwards the Athenians came with thirty ships and six


hundred heavy infantry, and the Argives joining them with all their


forces, marched out and besieged the men in Orneae for one day; but


the garrison escaped by night, the besiegers having bivouacked some


way off. The next day the Argives, discovering it, razed Orneae to the


ground, and went back again; after which the Athenians went home in


their ships. Meanwhile the Athenians took by sea to Methone on the


Macedonian border some cavalry of their own and the Macedonian


exiles that were at Athens, and plundered the country of Perdiccas.


Upon this the Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian Chalcidians, who had


a truce with Athens from one ten days to another, urging them to


join Perdiccas in the war, which they refused to do. And the winter


ended, and with it ended the sixteenth year of this war of which


Thucydides is the historian.


  Early in the spring of the following summer the Athenian envoys


arrived from Sicily, and the Egestaeans with them, bringing sixty


talents of uncoined silver, as a month's pay for sixty ships, which


they were to ask to have sent them. The Athenians held an assembly


and, after hearing from the Egestaeans and their own envoys a


report, as attractive as it was untrue, upon the state of affairs


generally, and in particular as to the money, of which, it was said,


there was abundance in the temples and the treasury, voted to send


sixty ships to Sicily, under the command of Alcibiades, son of


Clinias, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Lamachus, son of Xenophanes,


who were appointed with full powers; they were to help the


Egestaeans against the Selinuntines, to restore Leontini upon


gaining any advantage in the war, and to order all other matters in


Sicily as they should deem best for the interests of Athens. Five days


after this a second assembly was held, to consider the speediest means


of equipping the ships, and to vote whatever else might be required by


the generals for the expedition; and Nicias, who had been chosen to


the command against his will, and who thought that the state was not


well advised, but upon a slight aid specious pretext was aspiring to


the conquest of the whole of Sicily, a great matter to achieve, came


forward in the hope of diverting the Athenians from the enterprise,


and gave them the following counsel:


  "Although this assembly was convened to consider the preparations to


be made for sailing to Sicily, I think, notwithstanding, that we


have still this question to examine, whether it be better to send


out the ships at all, and that we ought not to give so little


consideration to a matter of such moment, or let ourselves be


persuaded by foreigners into undertaking a war with which we have


nothing to do. And yet, individually, I gain in honour by such a


course, and fear as little as other men for my person- not that I


think a man need be any the worse citizen for taking some thought for


his person and estate; on the contrary, such a man would for his own


sake desire the prosperity of his country more than others-


nevertheless, as I have never spoken against my convictions to gain


honour, I shall not begin to do so now, but shall say what I


think best. Against your character any words of mine would be weak


enough, if I were to advise your keeping what you have got and not


risking what is actually yours for advantages which are dubious in


themselves, and which you may or may not attain. I will, therefore,


content myself with showing that your ardour is out of season, and


your ambition not easy of accomplishment.


  "I affirm, then, that you leave many enemies behind you here to go


yonder and bring more back with you. You imagine, perhaps, that the


treaty which you have made can be trusted; a treaty that will continue


to exist nominally, as long as you keep quiet- for nominal it has


become, owing to the practices of certain men here and at Sparta- but


which in the event of a serious reverse in any quarter would not delay


our enemies a moment in attacking us; first, because the convention


was forced upon them by disaster and was less honourable to them


than to us; and secondly, because in this very convention there are


many points that are still disputed. Again, some of the most


powerful states have never yet accepted the arrangement at all. Some


of these are at open war with us; others (as the Lacedaemonians do not


yet move) are restrained by truces renewed every ten days, and it is


only too probable that if they found our power divided, as we are


hurrying to divide it, they would attack us vigorously with the


Siceliots, whose alliance they would have in the past valued as they


would that of few others. A man ought, therefore, to consider these


points, and not to think of running risks with a country placed so


critically, or of grasping at another empire before we have secured


the one we have already; for in fact the Thracian Chalcidians have


been all these years in revolt from us without being yet subdued,


and others on the continents yield us but a doubtful obedience.


Meanwhile the Egestaeans, our allies, have been wronged, and we run to


help them, while the rebels who have so long wronged us still wait for


punishment.


  "And yet the latter, if brought under, might be kept under; while


the Sicilians, even if conquered, are too far off and too numerous


to be ruled without difficulty. Now it is folly to go against men


who could not be kept under even if conquered, while failure would


leave us in a very different position from that which we occupied


before the enterprise. The Siceliots, again, to take them as they


are at present, in the event of a Syracusan conquest (the favourite


bugbear of the Egestaeans), would to my thinking be even less


dangerous to us than before. At present they might possibly come


here as separate states for love of Lacedaemon; in the other case


one empire would scarcely attack another; for after joining the


Peloponnesians to overthrow ours, they could only expect to see the


same hands overthrow their own in the same way. The Hellenes in Sicily


would fear us most if we never went there at all, and next to this, if


after displaying our power we went away again as soon as possible.


We all know that that which is farthest off, and the reputation of


which can least be tested, is the object of admiration; at the least


reverse they would at once begin to look down upon us, and would


join our enemies here against us. You have yourselves experienced this


with regard to the Lacedaemonians and their allies, whom your


unexpected success, as compared with what you feared at first, has


made you suddenly despise, tempting you further to aspire to the


conquest of Sicily. Instead, however, of being puffed up by the


misfortunes of your adversaries, you ought to think of breaking


their spirit before giving yourselves up to confidence, and to


understand that the one thought awakened in the Lacedaemonians by


their disgrace is how they may even now, if possible, overthrow us and


repair their dishonour; inasmuch as military reputation is their


oldest and chiefest study. Our struggle, therefore, if we are wise,


will not be for the barbarian Egestaeans in Sicily, but how to


defend ourselves most effectually against the oligarchical


machinations of Lacedaemon.


  "We should also remember that we are but now enjoying some respite


from a great pestilence and from war, to the no small benefit of our


estates and persons, and that it is right to employ these at home on


our own behalf, instead of using them on behalf of these exiles


whose interest it is to lie as fairly as they can, who do nothing


but talk themselves and leave the danger to others, and who if they


succeed will show no proper gratitude, and if they fail will drag down


their friends with them. And if there be any man here, overjoyed at


being chosen to command, who urges you to make the expedition,


merely for ends of his own- specially if he be still too young to


command- who seeks to be admired for his stud of horses, but on


account of its heavy expenses hopes for some profit from his


appointment, do not allow such a one to maintain his private splendour


at his country's risk, but remember that such persons injure the


public fortune while they squander their own, and that this is a


matter of importance, and not for a young man to decide or hastily to


take in hand.


  "When I see such persons now sitting here at the side of that same


individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn,


summon any of the older men that may have such a person sitting next


him not to let himself be shamed down, for fear of being thought a


coward if he do not vote for war, but, remembering how rarely


success is got by wishing and how often by forecast, to leave to


them the mad dream of conquest, and as a true lover of his country,


now threatened by the greatest danger in its history, to hold up his


hand on the other side; to vote that the Siceliots be left in the


limits now existing between us, limits of which no one can complain


(the Ionian sea for the coasting voyage, and the Sicilian across the


open main), to enjoy their own possessions and to settle their own


quarrels; that the Egestaeans, for their part, be told to end by


themselves with the Selinuntines the war which they began without


consulting the Athenians; and that for the future we do not enter into


alliance, as we have been used to do, with people whom we must help in


their need, and who can never help us in ours.


  "And you, Prytanis, if you think it your duty to care for the


commonwealth, and if you wish to show yourself a good citizen, put the


question to the vote, and take a second time the opinions of the


Athenians. If you are afraid to move the question again, consider that


a violation of the law cannot carry any prejudice with so many


abettors, that you will be the physician of your misguided city, and


that the virtue of men in office is briefly this, to do their


country as much good as they can, or in any case no harm that they can


avoid."


  Such were the words of Nicias. Most of the Athenians that came


forward spoke in favour of the expedition, and of not annulling what


had been voted, although some spoke on the other side. By far the


warmest advocate of the expedition was, however, Alcibiades, son of


Clinias, who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent


and also because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and


who was, besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped


to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and


reputation by means of his successes. For the position he held among


the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real


means would bear, both in keeping horses and in the rest of his


expenditure; and this later on had not a little to do with the ruin of


the Athenian state. Alarmed at the greatness of his licence in his own


life and habits, and of the ambition which he showed in all things


soever that he undertook, the mass of the people set him down as a


pretender to the tyranny, and became his enemies; and although


publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired,


individually, his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to


commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the


city. Meanwhile he now came forward and gave the following advice to


the Athenians:


  "Athenians, I have a better right to command than others- I must


begin with this as Nicias has attacked me- and at the same time I


believe myself to be worthy of it. The things for which I am abused,


bring fame to my ancestors and to myself, and to the country profit


besides. The Hellenes, after expecting to see our city ruined by the


war, concluded it to be even greater than it really is, by reason of


the magnificence with which I represented it at the Olympic games,


when I sent into the lists seven chariots, a number never before


entered by any private person, and won the first prize, and was second


and fourth, and took care to have everything else in a style worthy of


my victory. Custom regards such displays as honourable, and they


cannot be made without leaving behind them an impression of power.


Again, any splendour that I may have exhibited at home in providing


choruses or otherwise, is naturally envied by my fellow citizens,


but in the eyes of foreigners has an air of strength as in the other


instance. And this is no useless folly, when a man at his own


private cost benefits not himself only, but his city: nor is it unfair


that he who prides himself on his position should refuse to be upon an


equality with the rest. He who is badly off has his misfortunes all to


himself, and as we do not see men courted in adversity, on the like


principle a man ought to accept the insolence of prosperity; or


else, let him first mete out equal measure to all, and then demand


to have it meted out to him. What I know is that persons of this


kind and all others that have attained to any distinction, although


they may be unpopular in their lifetime in their relations with


their fellow-men and especially with their equals, leave to


posterity the desire of claiming connection with them even without any


ground, and are vaunted by the country to which they belonged, not


as strangers or ill-doers, but as fellow-countrymen and heroes. Such


are my aspirations, and however I am abused for them in private, the


question is whether any one manages public affairs better than I do.


Having united the most powerful states of Peloponnese, without great


danger or expense to you, I compelled the Lacedaemonians to stake


their all upon the issue of a single day at Mantinea; and although


victorious in the battle, they have never since fully recovered


confidence.


  "Thus did my youth and so-called monstrous folly find fitting


arguments to deal with the power of the Peloponnesians, and by its


ardour win their confidence and prevail. And do not be afraid of my


youth now, but while I am still in its flower, and Nicias appears


fortunate, avail yourselves to the utmost of the services of us


both. Neither rescind your resolution to sail to Sicily, on the ground


that you would be going to attack a great power. The cities in


Sicily are peopled by motley rabbles, and easily change their


institutions and adopt new ones in their stead; and consequently the


inhabitants, being without any feeling of patriotism, are not provided


with arms for their persons, and have not regularly established


themselves on the land; every man thinks that either by fair words


or by party strife he can obtain something at the public expense,


and then in the event of a catastrophe settle in some other country,


and makes his preparations accordingly. From a mob like this you


need not look for either unanimity in counsel or concert in action;


but they will probably one by one come in as they get a fair offer,


especially if they are torn by civil strife as we are told.


Moreover, the Siceliots have not so many heavy infantry as they boast;


just as the Hellenes generally did not prove so numerous as each state


reckoned itself, but Hellas greatly over-estimated their numbers,


and has hardly had an adequate force of heavy infantry throughout this


war. The states in Sicily, therefore, from all that I can hear, will


be found as I say, and I have not pointed out all our advantages,


for we shall have the help of many barbarians, who from their hatred


of the Syracusans will join us in attacking them; nor will the


powers at home prove any hindrance, if you judge rightly. Our


fathers with these very adversaries, which it is said we shall now


leave behind us when we sail, and the Mede as their enemy as well,


were able to win the empire, depending solely on their superiority


at sea. The Peloponnesians had never so little hope against us as at


present; and let them be ever so sanguine, although strong enough to


invade our country even if we stay at home, they can never hurt us


with their navy, as we leave one of our own behind us that is a


match for them.





  "In this state of things what reason can we give to ourselves for


holding back, or what excuse can we offer to our allies in Sicily


for not helping them? They are our confederates, and we are bound to


assist them, without objecting that they have not assisted us. We


did not take them into alliance to have them to help us in Hellas, but


that they might so annoy our enemies in Sicily as to prevent them from


coming over here and attacking us. It is thus that empire has been


won, both by us and by all others that have held it, by a constant


readiness to support all, whether barbarians or Hellenes, that


invite assistance; since if all were to keep quiet or to pick and


choose whom they ought to assist, we should make but few new


conquests, and should imperil those we have already won. Men do not


rest content with parrying the attacks of a superior, but often strike


the first blow to prevent the attack being made. And we cannot fix the


exact point at which our empire shall stop; we have reached a position


in which we must not be content with retaining but must scheme to


extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of


being ruled ourselves. Nor can you look at inaction from the same


point of view as others, unless you are prepared to change your habits


and make them like theirs.


  "Be convinced, then, that we shall augment our power at home by this


adventure abroad, and let us make the expedition, and so humble the


pride of the Peloponnesians by sailing off to Sicily, and letting them


see how little we care for the peace that we are now enjoying; and


at the same time we shall either become masters, as we very easily


may, of the whole of Hellas through the accession of the Sicilian


Hellenes, or in any case ruin the Syracusans, to the no small


advantage of ourselves and our allies. The faculty of staying if


successful, or of returning, will be secured to us by our navy, as


we shall be superior at sea to all the Siceliots put together. And


do not let the do-nothing policy which Nicias advocates, or his


setting of the young against the old, turn you from your purpose,


but in the good old fashion by which our fathers, old and young


together, by their united counsels brought our affairs to their


present height, do you endeavour still to advance them;


understanding that neither youth nor old age can do anything the one


without the other, but that levity, sobriety, and deliberate


judgment are strongest when united, and that, by sinking into


inaction, the city, like everything else, will wear itself out, and


its skill in everything decay; while each fresh struggle will give


it fresh experience, and make it more used to defend itself not in


word but in deed. In short, my conviction is that a city not


inactive by nature could not choose a quicker way to ruin itself


than by suddenly adopting such a policy, and that the safest rule of


life is to take one's character and institutions for better and for


worse, and to live up to them as closely as one can."


  Such were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing him and the


Egestaeans and some Leontine exiles, who came forward reminding them


of their oaths and imploring their assistance, the Athenians became


more eager for the expedition than before. Nicias, perceiving that


it would be now useless to try to deter them by the old line of


argument, but thinking that he might perhaps alter their resolution by


the extravagance of his estimates, came forward a second time and


spoke as follows:


  "I see, Athenians, that you are thoroughly bent upon the expedition,


and therefore hope that all will turn out as we wish, and proceed to


give you my opinion at the present juncture. From all that I hear we


are going against cities that are great and not subject to one


another, or in need of change, so as to be glad to pass from


enforced servitude to an easier condition, or in the least likely to


accept our rule in exchange for freedom; and, to take only the


Hellenic towns, they are very numerous for one island. Besides Naxos


and Catana, which I expect to join us from their connection with


Leontini, there are seven others armed at all points just like our own


power, particularly Selinus and Syracuse, the chief objects of our


expedition. These are full of heavy infantry, archers, and darters,


have galleys in abundance and crowds to man them; they have also


money, partly in the hands of private persons, partly in the temples


at Selinus, and at Syracuse first-fruits from some of the barbarians


as well. But their chief advantage over us lies in the number of their


horses, and in the fact that they grow their corn at home instead of


importing it.


  "Against a power of this kind it will not do to have merely a weak


naval armament, but we shall want also a large land army to sail


with us, if we are to do anything worthy of our ambition, and are


not to be shut out from the country by a numerous cavalry;


especially if the cities should take alarm and combine, and we


should be left without friends (except the Egestaeans) to furnish us


with horse to defend ourselves with. It would be disgraceful to have


to retire under compulsion, or to send back for reinforcements,


owing to want of reflection at first: we must therefore start from


home with a competent force, seeing that we are going to sail far from


our country, and upon an expedition not like any which you may


undertaken undertaken the quality of allies, among your subject states


here in Hellas, where any additional supplies needed were easily drawn


from the friendly territory; but we are cutting ourselves off, and


going to a land entirely strange, from which during four months in


winter it is not even easy for a messenger get to Athens.


  "I think, therefore, that we ought to take great numbers of heavy


infantry, both from Athens and from our allies, and not merely from


our subjects, but also any we may be able to get for love or for money


in Peloponnese, and great numbers also of archers and slingers, to


make head against the Sicilian horse. Meanwhile we must have an


overwhelming superiority at sea, to enable us the more easily to carry


in what we want; and we must take our own corn in merchant vessels,


that is to say, wheat and parched barley, and bakers from the mills


compelled to serve for pay in the proper proportion; in order that


in case of our being weather-bound the armament may not want


provisions, as it is not every city that will be able to entertain


numbers like ours. We must also provide ourselves with everything else


as far as we can, so as not to be dependent upon others; and above all


we must take with us from home as much money as possible, as the


sums talked of as ready at Egesta are readier, you may be sure, in


talk than in any other way.


  "Indeed, even if we leave Athens with a force not only equal to that


of the enemy except in the number of heavy infantry in the field,


but even at all points superior to him, we shall still find it


difficult to conquer Sicily or save ourselves. We must not disguise


from ourselves that we go to found a city among strangers and enemies,


and that he who undertakes such an enterprise should be prepared to


become master of the country the first day he lands, or failing in


this to find everything hostile to him. Fearing this, and knowing that


we shall have need of much good counsel and more good fortune- a hard


matter for mortal man to aspire to- I wish as far as may be to make


myself independent of fortune before sailing, and when I do sail, to


be as safe as a strong force can make me. This I believe to be


surest for the country at large, and safest for us who are to go on


the expedition. If any one thinks differently I resign to him my


command."


  With this Nicias concluded, thinking that he should either disgust


the Athenians by the magnitude of the undertaking, or, if obliged to


sail on the expedition, would thus do so in the safest way possible.


The Athenians, however, far from having their taste for the voyage


taken away by the burdensomeness of the preparations, became more


eager for it than ever; and just the contrary took place of what


Nicias had thought, as it was held that he had given good advice,


and that the expedition would be the safest in the world. All alike


fell in love with the enterprise. The older men thought that they


would either subdue the places against which they were to sail, or


at all events, with so large a force, meet with no disaster; those


in the prime of life felt a longing for foreign sights and spectacles,


and had no doubt that they should come safe home again; while the idea


of the common people and the soldiery was to earn wages at the moment,


and make conquests that would supply a never-ending fund of pay for


the future. With this enthusiasm of the majority, the few that liked


it not, feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands against


it, and so kept quiet.


  At last one of the Athenians came forward and called upon Nicias and


told him that he ought not to make excuses or put them off, but say at


once before them all what forces the Athenians should vote him. Upon


this he said, not without reluctance, that he would advise upon that


matter more at leisure with his colleagues; as far however as he could


see at present, they must sail with at least one hundred galleys- the


Athenians providing as many transports as they might determine, and


sending for others from the allies- not less than five thousand heavy


infantry in all, Athenian and allied, and if possible more; and the


rest of the armament in proportion; archers from home and from


Crete, and slingers, and whatever else might seem desirable, being got


ready by the generals and taken with them.


  Upon hearing this the Athenians at once voted that the generals


should have full powers in the matter of the numbers of the army and


of the expedition generally, to do as they judged best for the


interests of Athens. After this the preparations began; messages being


sent to the allies and the rolls drawn up at home. And as the city had


just recovered from the plague and the long war, and a number of young


men had grown up and capital had accumulated by reason of the truce,


everything was the more easily provided.


  In the midst of these preparations all the stone Hermae in the


city of Athens, that is to say the customary square figures, so common


in the doorways of private houses and temples, had in one night most


of them their fares mutilated. No one knew who had done it, but


large public rewards were offered to find the authors; and it was


further voted that any one who knew of any other act of impiety having


been committed should come and give information without fear of


consequences, whether he were citizen, alien, or slave. The matter was


taken up the more seriously, as it was thought to be ominous for the


expedition, and part of a conspiracy to bring about a revolution and


to upset the democracy.


  Information was given accordingly by some resident aliens and body


servants, not about the Hermae but about some previous mutilations


of other images perpetrated by young men in a drunken frolic, and of


mock celebrations of the mysteries, averred to take place in private


houses. Alcibiades being implicated in this charge, it was taken


hold of by those who could least endure him, because he stood in the


way of their obtaining the undisturbed direction of the people, and


who thought that if he were once removed the first place would be


theirs. These accordingly magnified the matter and loudly proclaimed


that the affair of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae were


part and parcel of a scheme to overthrow the democracy, and that


nothing of all this had been done without Alcibiades; the proofs


alleged being the general and undemocratic licence of his life and


habits.


  Alcibiades repelled on the spot the charges in question, and also


before going on the expedition, the preparations for which were now


complete, offered to stand his trial, that it might be seen whether he


was guilty of the acts imputed to him; desiring to be punished if


found guilty, but, if acquitted, to take the command. Meanwhile he


protested against their receiving slanders against him in his absence,


and begged them rather to put him to death at once if he were


guilty, and pointed out the imprudence of sending him out at the


head of so large an army, with so serious a charge still undecided.


But his enemies feared that he would have the army for him if he


were tried immediately, and that the people might relent in favour


of the man whom they already caressed as the cause of the Argives


and some of the Mantineans joining in the expedition, and did their


utmost to get this proposition rejected, putting forward other orators


who said that he ought at present to sail and not delay the


departure of the army, and be tried on his return within a fixed


number of days; their plan being to have him sent for and brought home


for trial upon some graver charge, which they would the more easily


get up in his absence. Accordingly it was decreed that he should sail.


  After this the departure for Sicily took place, it being now about


midsummer. Most of the allies, with the corn transports and the


smaller craft and the rest of the expedition, had already received


orders to muster at Corcyra, to cross the Ionian Sea from thence in


a body to the Iapygian promontory. But the Athenians themselves, and


such of their allies as happened to be with them, went down to Piraeus


upon a day appointed at daybreak, and began to man the ships for


putting out to sea. With them also went down the whole population, one


may say, of the city, both citizens and foreigners; the inhabitants of


the country each escorting those that belonged to them, their friends,


their relatives, or their sons, with hope and lamentation upon their


way, as they thought of the conquests which they hoped to make, or


of the friends whom they might never see again, considering the long


voyage which they were going to make from their country. Indeed, at


this moment, when they were now upon the point of parting from one


another, the danger came more home to them than when they voted for


the expedition; although the strength of the armament, and the profuse


provision which they remarked in every department, was a sight that


could not but comfort them. As for the foreigners and the rest of


the crowd, they simply went to see a sight worth looking at and


passing all belief.


  Indeed this armament that first sailed out was by far the most


costly and splendid Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a


single city up to that time. In mere number of ships and heavy


infantry that against Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same when


going against Potidaea under Hagnon, was not inferior; containing as


it did four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, three hundred horse, and


one hundred galleys accompanied by fifty Lesbian and Chian vessels and


many allies besides. But these were sent upon a short voyage and


with a scanty equipment. The present expedition was formed in


contemplation of a long term of service by land and sea alike, and was


furnished with ships and troops so as to be ready for either as


required. The fleet had been elaborately equipped at great cost to the


captains and the state; the treasury giving a drachma a day to each


seaman, and providing empty ships, sixty men-of-war and forty


transports, and manning these with the best crews obtainable; while


the captains gave a bounty in addition to the pay from the treasury to


the thranitae and crews generally, besides spending lavishly upon


figure-heads and equipments, and one and all making the utmost


exertions to enable their own ships to excel in beauty and fast


sailing. Meanwhile the land forces had been picked from the best


muster-rolls, and vied with each other in paying great attention to


their arms and personal accoutrements. From this resulted not only a


rivalry among themselves in their different departments, but an idea


among the rest of the Hellenes that it was more a display of power and


resources than an armament against an enemy. For if any one had


counted up the public expenditure of the state, and the private outlay


of individuals- that is to say, the sums which the state had already


spent upon the expedition and was sending out in the hands of the


generals, and those which individuals had expended upon their personal


outfit, or as captains of galleys had laid out and were still to lay


out upon their vessels; and if he had added to this the journey


money which each was likely to have provided himself with,


independently of the pay from the treasury, for a voyage of such


length, and what the soldiers or traders took with them for the


purpose of exchange- it would have been found that many talents in


all were being taken out of the city. Indeed the expedition became not


less famous for its wonderful boldness and for the splendour of its


appearance, than for its overwhelming strength as compared with the


peoples against whom it was directed, and for the fact that this was


the longest passage from home hitherto attempted, and the most


ambitious in its objects considering the resources of those who


undertook it.


  The ships being now manned, and everything put on board with which


they meant to sail, the trumpet commanded silence, and the prayers


customary before putting out to sea were offered, not in each ship


by itself, but by all together to the voice of a herald; and bowls


of wine were mixed through all the armament, and libations made by the


soldiers and their officers in gold and silver goblets. In their


prayers joined also the crowds on shore, the citizens and all others


that wished them well. The hymn sung and the libations finished,


they put out to sea, and first out in column then raced each other


as far as Aegina, and so hastened to reach Corcyra, where the rest


of the allied forces were also assembling.


                          CHAPTER XIX.





        Seventeenth Year of the War - Parties at Syracuse


             - Story of Harmodius and Aristogiton -


                     Disgrace of Alcibiades





  MEANWHILE at Syracuse news came in from many quarters of the


expedition, but for a long while met with no credence whatever.


Indeed, an assembly was held in which speeches, as will be seen,


were delivered by different orators, believing or contradicting the


report of the Athenian expedition; among whom Hermocrates, son of


Hermon, came forward, being persuaded that he knew the truth of the


matter, and gave the following counsel:


  "Although I shall perhaps be no better believed than others have


been when I speak upon the reality of the expedition, and although I


know that those who either make or repeat statements thought not


worthy of belief not only gain no converts but are thought fools for


their pains, I shall certainly not be frightened into holding my


tongue when the state is in danger, and when I am persuaded that I can


speak with more authority on the matter than other persons. Much as


you wonder at it, the Athenians nevertheless have set out against us


with a large force, naval and military, professedly to help the


Egestaeans and to restore Leontini, but really to conquer Sicily,


and above all our city, which once gained, the rest, they think,


will easily follow. Make up your minds, therefore, to see them


speedily here, and see how you can best repel them with the means


under your hand, and do be taken off your guard through despising


the news, or neglect the common weal through disbelieving it.


Meanwhile those who believe me need not be dismayed at the force or


daring of the enemy. They will not be able to do us more hurt than


we shall do them; nor is the greatness of their armament altogether


without advantage to us. Indeed, the greater it is the better, with


regard to the rest of the Siceliots, whom dismay will make more


ready to join us; and if we defeat or drive them away, disappointed of


the objects of their ambition (for I do not fear for a moment that


they will get what they want), it will be a most glorious exploit


for us, and in my judgment by no means an unlikely one. Few indeed


have been the large armaments, either Hellenic or barbarian, that have


gone far from home and been successful. They cannot be more numerous


than the people of the country and their neighbours, all of whom


fear leagues together; and if they miscarry for want of supplies in


a foreign land, to those against whom their plans were laid none the


less they leave renown, although they may themselves have been the


main cause of their own discomfort. Thus these very Athenians rose


by the defeat of the Mede, in a great measure due to accidental


causes, from the mere fact that Athens had been the object of his


attack; and this may very well be the case with us also.


  "Let us, therefore, confidently begin preparations here; let us send


and confirm some of the Sicels, and obtain the friendship and alliance


of others, and dispatch envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that


the danger is common to all, and to Italy to get them to become our


allies, or at all events to refuse to receive the Athenians. I also


think that it would be best to send to Carthage as well; they are by


no means there without apprehension, but it is their constant fear


that the Athenians may one day attack their city, and they may perhaps


think that they might themselves suffer by letting Sicily be


sacrificed, and be willing to help us secretly if not openly, in one


way if not in another. They are the best able to do so, if they


will, of any of the present day, as they possess most gold and silver,


by which war, like everything else, flourishes. Let us also send to


Lacedaemon and Corinth, and ask them to come here and help us as


soon as possible, and to keep alive the war in Hellas. But the true


thing of all others, in my opinion, to do at the present moment, is


what you, with your constitutional love of quiet, will be slow to see,


and what I must nevertheless mention. If we Siceliots, all together,


or at least as many as possible besides ourselves, would only launch


the whole of our actual navy with two months' provisions, and meet the


Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory, and show them


that before fighting for Sicily they must first fight for their


passage across the Ionian Sea, we should strike dismay into their


army, and set them on thinking that we have a base for our


defensive- for Tarentum is ready to receive us- while they have a wide


sea to cross with all their armament, which could with difficulty keep


its order through so long a voyage, and would be easy for us to attack


as it came on slowly and in small detachments. On the other hand, if


they were to lighten their vessels, and draw together their fast


sailers and with these attack us, we could either fall upon them


when they were wearied with rowing, or if we did not choose to do


so, we could retire to Tarentum; while they, having crossed with few


provisions just to give battle, would be hard put to it in desolate


places, and would either have to remain and be blockaded, or to try to


sail along the coast, abandoning the rest of their armament, and being


further discouraged by not knowing for certain whether the cities


would receive them. In my opinion this consideration alone would be


sufficient to deter them from putting out from Corcyra; and what


with deliberating and reconnoitring our numbers and whereabouts,


they would let the season go on until winter was upon them, or,


confounded by so unexpected a circumstance, would break up the


expedition, especially as their most experienced general has, as I


hear, taken the command against his will, and would grasp at the first


excuse offered by any serious demonstration of ours. We should also be


reported, I am certain, as more numerous than we really are, and men's


minds are affected by what they hear, and besides the first to attack,


or to show that they mean to defend themselves against an attack,


inspire greater fear because men see that they are ready for the


emergency. This would just be the case with the Athenians at


present. They are now attacking us in the belief that we shall not


resist, having a right to judge us severely because we did not help


the Lacedaemonians in crushing them; but if they were to see us


showing a courage for which they are not prepared, they would be


more dismayed by the surprise than they could ever be by our actual


power. I could wish to persuade you to show this courage; but if


this cannot be, at all events lose not a moment in preparing generally


for the war; and remember all of you that contempt for an assailant is


best shown by bravery in action, but that for the present the best


course is to accept the preparations which fear inspires as giving the


surest promise of safety, and to act as if the danger was real. That


the Athenians are coming to attack us, and are already upon the


voyage, and all but here- this is what I am sure of."


  Thus far spoke Hermocrates. Meanwhile the people of Syracuse were at


great strife among themselves; some contending that the Athenians


had no idea of coming and that there was no truth in what he said;


some asking if they did come what harm they could do that would not be


repaid them tenfold in return; while others made light of the whole


affair and turned it into ridicule. In short, there were few that


believed Hermocrates and feared for the future. Meanwhile Athenagoras,


the leader of the people and very powerful at that time with the


masses, came forward and spoke as follows:


  "For the Athenians, he who does not wish that they may be as


misguided as they are supposed to be, and that they may come here to


become our subjects, is either a coward or a traitor to his country;


while as for those who carry such tidings and fill you with so much


alarm, I wonder less at their audacity than at their folly if they


flatter themselves that we do not see through them. The fact is that


they have their private reasons to be afraid, and wish to throw the


city into consternation to have their own terrors cast into the


shade by the public alarm. In short, this is what these reports are


worth; they do not arise of themselves, but are concocted by men who


are always causing agitation here in Sicily. However, if you are


well advised, you will not be guided in your calculation of


probabilities by what these persons tell you, but by what shrewd men


and of large experience, as I esteem the Athenians to be, would be


likely to do. Now it is not likely that they would leave the


Peloponnesians behind them, and before they have well ended the war in


Hellas wantonly come in quest of a new war quite as arduous in Sicily;


indeed, in my judgment, they are only too glad that we do not go and


attack them, being so many and so great cities as we are.


  "However, if they should come as is reported, I consider Sicily


better able to go through with the war than Peloponnese, as being at


all points better prepared, and our city by itself far more than a


match for this pretended army of invasion, even were it twice as large


again. I know that they will not have horses with them, or get any


here, except a few perhaps from the Egestaeans; or be able to bring


a force of heavy infantry equal in number to our own, in ships which


will already have enough to do to come all this distance, however


lightly laden, not to speak of the transport of the other stores


required against a city of this magnitude, which will be no slight


quantity. In fact, so strong is my opinion upon the subject, that I do


not well see how they could avoid annihilation if they brought with


them another city as large as Syracuse, and settled down and carried


on war from our frontier; much less can they hope to succeed with


all Sicily hostile to them, as all Sicily will be, and with only a


camp pitched from the ships, and composed of tents and bare


necessaries, from which they would not be able to stir far for fear of


our cavalry.


  "But the Athenians see this as I tell you, and as I have reason to


know are looking after their possessions at home, while persons here


invent stories that neither are true nor ever will be. Nor is this the


first time that I see these persons, when they cannot resort to deeds,


trying by such stories and by others even more abominable to


frighten your people and get into their hands the government: it is


what I see always. And I cannot help fearing that trying so often they


may one day succeed, and that we, as long as we do not feel the smart,


may prove too weak for the task of prevention, or, when the


offenders are known, of pursuit. The result is that our city is rarely


at rest, but is subject to constant troubles and to contests as


frequent against herself as against the enemy, not to speak of


occasional tyrannies and infamous cabals. However, I will try, if


you will support me, to let nothing of this happen in our time, by


gaining you, the many, and by chastising the authors of such


machinations, not merely when they are caught in the act- a difficult


feat to accomplish- but also for what they have the wish though not


the power to do; as it is necessary to punish an enemy not only for


what he does, but also beforehand for what he intends to do, if the


first to relax precaution would not be also the first to suffer. I


shall also reprove, watch, and on occasion warn the few- the most


effectual way, in my opinion, of turning them from their evil courses.


And after all, as I have often asked, what would you have, young men?


Would you hold office at once? The law forbids it, a law enacted


rather because you are not competent than to disgrace you when


competent. Meanwhile you would not be on a legal equality with the


many! But how can it be right that citizens of the same state should


be held unworthy of the same privileges?


 "It will be said, perhaps, that democracy is neither wise nor


equitable, but that the holders of property are also the best fitted


to rule. I say, on the contrary, first, that the word demos, or


people, includes the whole state, oligarchy only a part; next, that if


the best guardians of property are the rich, and the best


counsellors the wise, none can hear and decide so well as the many;


and that all these talents, severally and collectively, have their


just place in a democracy. But an oligarchy gives the many their share


of the danger, and not content with the largest part takes and keeps


the whole of the profit; and this is what the powerful and young among


you aspire to, but in a great city cannot possibly obtain.


  "But even now, foolish men, most senseless of all the Hellenes


that I know, if you have no sense of the wickedness of your designs,


or most criminal if you have that sense and still dare to pursue


them- even now, if it is not a case for repentance, you may still


learn wisdom, and thus advance the interest of the country, the common


interest of us all. Reflect that in the country's prosperity the men


of merit in your ranks will have a share and a larger share than the


great mass of your fellow countrymen, but that if you have other


designs you run a risk of being deprived of all; and desist from


reports like these, as the people know your object and will not put up


with it. If the Athenians arrive, this city will repulse them in a


manner worthy of itself; we have moreover, generals who will see to


this matter. And if nothing of this be true, as I incline to


believe, the city will not be thrown into a panic by your


intelligence, or impose upon itself a self-chosen servitude by


choosing you for its rulers; the city itself will look into the


matter, and will judge your words as if they were acts, and, instead


of allowing itself to be deprived of its liberty by listening to


you, will strive to preserve that liberty, by taking care to have


always at hand the means of making itself respected."


  Such were the words of Athenagoras. One of the generals now stood up


and stopped any other speakers coming forward, adding these words of


his own with reference to the matter in hand: "It is not well for


speakers to utter calumnies against one another, or for their


hearers to entertain them; we ought rather to look to the intelligence


that we have received, and see how each man by himself and the city as


a whole may best prepare to repel the invaders. Even if there be no


need, there is no harm in the state being furnished with horses and


arms and all other insignia of war; and we will undertake to see to


and order this, and to send round to the cities to reconnoitre and


do all else that may appear desirable. Part of this we have seen to


already, and whatever we discover shall be laid before you." After


these words from the general, the Syracusans departed from the


assembly.


  In the meantime the Athenians with all their allies had now


arrived at Corcyra. Here the generals began by again reviewing the


armament, and made arrangements as to the order in which they were


to anchor and encamp, and dividing the whole fleet into three


divisions, allotted one to each of their number, to avoid sailing


all together and being thus embarrassed for water, harbourage, or


provisions at the stations which they might touch at, and at the


same time to be generally better ordered and easier to handle, by each


squadron having its own commander. Next they sent on three ships to


Italy and Sicily to find out which of the cities would receive them,


with instructions to meet them on the way and let them know before


they put in to land.


  After this the Athenians weighed from Corcyra, and proceeded to


cross to Sicily with an armament now consisting of one hundred and


thirty-four galleys in all (besides two Rhodian fifty-oars), of


which one hundred were Athenian vessels- sixty men-of-war, and forty


troopships- and the remainder from Chios and the other allies; five


thousand and one hundred heavy infantry in all, that is to say,


fifteen hundred Athenian citizens from the rolls at Athens and seven


hundred Thetes shipped as marines, and the rest allied troops, some of


them Athenian subjects, and besides these five hundred Argives, and


two hundred and fifty Mantineans serving for hire; four hundred and


eighty archers in all, eighty of whom were Cretans, seven hundred


slingers from Rhodes, one hundred and twenty light-armed exiles from


Megara, and one horse-transport carrying thirty horses.


  Such was the strength of the first armament that sailed over for the


war. The supplies for this force were carried by thirty ships of


burden laden with corn, which conveyed the bakers, stone-masons, and


carpenters, and the tools for raising fortifications, accompanied by


one hundred boats, like the former pressed into the service, besides


many other boats and ships of burden which followed the armament


voluntarily for purposes of trade; all of which now left Corcyra and


struck across the Ionian Sea together. The whole force making land


at the Iapygian promontory and Tarentum, with more or less good


fortune, coasted along the shores of Italy, the cities shutting


their markets and gates against them, and according them nothing but


water and liberty to anchor, and Tarentum and Locri not even that,


until they arrived at Rhegium, the extreme point of Italy. Here at


length they reunited, and not gaining admission within the walls


pitched a camp outside the city in the precinct of Artemis, where a


market was also provided for them, and drew their ships on shore and


kept quiet. Meanwhile they opened negotiations with the Rhegians,


and called upon them as Chalcidians to assist their Leontine


kinsmen; to which the Rhegians replied that they would not side with


either party, but should await the decision of the rest of the


Italiots, and do as they did. Upon this the Athenians now began to


consider what would be the best action to take in the affairs of


Sicily, and meanwhile waited for the ships sent on to come back from


Egesta, in order to know whether there was really there the money


mentioned by the messengers at Athens.


  In the meantime came in from all quarters to the Syracusans, as well


as from their own officers sent to reconnoitre, the positive tidings


that the fleet was at Rhegium; upon which they laid aside their


incredulity and threw themselves heart and soul into the work of


preparation. Guards or envoys, as the case might be, were sent round


to the Sicels, garrisons put into the posts of the Peripoli in the


country, horses and arms reviewed in the city to see that nothing


was wanting, and all other steps taken to prepare for a war which


might be upon them at any moment.


  Meanwhile the three ships that had been sent on came from Egesta


to the Athenians at Rhegium, with the news that so far from there


being the sums promised, all that could be produced was thirty


talents. The generals were not a little disheartened at being thus


disappointed at the outset, and by the refusal to join in the


expedition of the Rhegians, the people they had first tried to gain


and had had had most reason to count upon, from their relationship


to the Leontines and constant friendship for Athens. If Nicias was


prepared for the news from Egesta, his two colleagues were taken


completely by surprise. The Egestaeans had had recourse to the


following stratagem, when the first envoys from Athens came to inspect


their resources. They took the envoys in question to the temple of


Aphrodite at Eryx and showed them the treasures deposited there:


bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and a large number of other pieces of


plate, which from being in silver gave an impression of wealth quite


out of proportion to their really small value. They also privately


entertained the ships' crews, and collected all the cups of gold and


silver that they could find in Egesta itself or could borrow in the


neighbouring Phoenician and Hellenic towns, and each brought them to


the banquets as their own; and as all used pretty nearly the same, and


everywhere a great quantity of plate was shown, the effect was most


dazzling upon the Athenian sailors, and made them talk loudly of the


riches they had seen when they got back to Athens. The dupes in


question- who had in their turn persuaded the rest- when the news got


abroad that there was not the money supposed at Egesta, were much


blamed by the soldiers.


  Meanwhile the generals consulted upon what was to be done. The


opinion of Nicias was to sail with all the armament to Selinus, the


main object of the expedition, and if the Egestaeans could provide


money for the whole force, to advise accordingly; but if they could


not, to require them to supply provisions for the sixty ships that


they had asked for, to stay and settle matters between them and the


Selinuntines either by force or by agreement, and then to coast past


the other cities, and after displaying the power of Athens and proving


their zeal for their friends and allies, to sail home again (unless


they should have some sudden and unexpected opportunity of serving the


Leontines, or of bringing over some of the other cities), and not to


endanger the state by wasting its home resources.


  Alcibiades said that a great expedition like the present must not


disgrace itself by going away without having done anything; heralds


must be sent to all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse, and


efforts be made to make some of the Sicels revolt from the Syracusans,


and to obtain the friendship of others, in order to have corn and


troops; and first of all to gain the Messinese, who lay right in the


passage and entrance to Sicily, and would afford an excellent


harbour and base for the army. Thus, after bringing over the towns and


knowing who would be their allies in the war, they might at length


attack Syracuse and Selinus; unless the latter came to terms with


Egesta and the former ceased to oppose the restoration of Leontini.


  Lamachus, on the other hand, said that they ought to sail straight


to Syracuse, and fight their battle at once under the walls of the


town while the people were still unprepared, and the panic at its


height. Every armament was most terrible at first; if it allowed


time to run on without showing itself, men's courage revived, and they


saw it appear at last almost with indifference. By attacking suddenly,


while Syracuse still trembled at their coming, they would have the


best chance of gaining a victory for themselves and of striking a


complete panic into the enemy by the aspect of their numbers- which


would never appear so considerable as at present- by the anticipation


of coming disaster, and above all by the immediate danger of the


engagement. They might also count upon surprising many in the fields


outside, incredulous of their coming; and at the moment that the enemy


was carrying in his property the army would not want for booty if it


sat down in force before the city. The rest of the Siceliots would


thus be immediately less disposed to enter into alliance with the


Syracusans, and would join the Athenians, without waiting to see which


were the strongest. They must make Megara their naval station as a


place to retreat to and a base from which to attack: it was an


uninhabited place at no great distance from Syracuse either by land or


by sea.


  After speaking to this effect, Lamachus nevertheless gave his


support to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this Alcibiades sailed


in his own vessel across to Messina with proposals of alliance, but


met with no success, the inhabitants answering that they could not


receive him within their walls, though they would provide him with a


market outside. Upon this he sailed back to Rhegium. Immediately


upon his return the generals manned and victualled sixty ships out


of the whole fleet and coasted along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the


armament behind them at Rhegium with one of their number. Received


by the Naxians, they then coasted on to Catana, and being refused


admittance by the inhabitants, there being a Syracusan party in the


town, went on to the river Terias. Here they bivouacked, and the


next day sailed in single file to Syracuse with all their ships except


ten which they sent on in front to sail into the great harbour and see


if there was any fleet launched, and to proclaim by herald from


shipboard that the Athenians were come to restore the Leontines to


their country, as being their allies and kinsmen, and that such of


them, therefore, as were in Syracuse should leave it without fear


and join their friends and benefactors the Athenians. After making


this proclamation and reconnoitring the city and the harbours, and the


features of the country which they would have to make their base of


operations in the war, they sailed back to Catana.





  An assembly being held here, the inhabitants refused to receive


the armament, but invited the generals to come in and say what they


desired; and while Alcibiades was speaking and the citizens were


intent on the assembly, the soldiers broke down an ill-walled-up


postern gate without being observed, and getting inside the town,


flocked into the marketplace. The Syracusan party in the town no


sooner saw the army inside than they became frightened and withdrew,


not being at all numerous; while the rest voted for an alliance with


the Athenians and invited them to fetch the rest of their forces


from Rhegium. After this the Athenians sailed to Rhegium, and put off,


this time with all the armament, for Catana, and fell to work at their


camp immediately upon their arrival.


  Meanwhile word was brought them from Camarina that if they went


there the town would go over to them, and also that the Syracusans


were manning a fleet. The Athenians accordingly sailed alongshore with


all their armament, first to Syracuse, where they found no fleet


manning, and so always along the coast to Camarina, where they brought


to at the beach, and sent a herald to the people, who, however,


refused to receive them, saying that their oaths bound them to receive


the Athenians only with a single vessel, unless they themselves sent


for more. Disappointed here, the Athenians now sailed back again,


and after landing and plundering on Syracusan territory and losing


some stragglers from their light infantry through the coming up of the


Syracusan horse, so got back to Catana.


  There they found the Salaminia come from Athens for Alcibiades, with


orders for him to sail home to answer the charges which the state


brought against him, and for certain others of the soldiers who with


him were accused of sacrilege in the matter of the mysteries and of


the Hermae. For the Athenians, after the departure of the


expedition, had continued as active as ever in investigating the facts


of the mysteries and of the Hermae, and, instead of testing the


informers, in their suspicious temper welcomed all indifferently,


arresting and imprisoning the best citizens upon the evidence of


rascals, and preferring to sift the matter to the bottom sooner than


to let an accused person of good character pass unquestioned, owing to


the rascality of the informer. The commons had heard how oppressive


the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had become before it ended,


and further that that had been put down at last, not by themselves and


Harmodius, but by the Lacedaemonians, and so were always in fear and


took everything suspiciously.


  Indeed, the daring action of Aristogiton and Harmodius was


undertaken in consequence of a love affair, which I shall relate at


some length, to show that the Athenians are not more accurate than the


rest of the world in their accounts of their own tyrants and of the


facts of their own history. Pisistratus dying at an advanced age in


possession of the tyranny, was succeeded by his eldest son, Hippias,


and not Hipparchus, as is vulgarly believed. Harmodius was then in the


flower of youthful beauty, and Aristogiton, a citizen in the middle


rank of life, was his lover and possessed him. Solicited without


success by Hipparchus, son of Pisistratus, Harmodius told Aristogiton,


and the enraged lover, afraid that the powerful Hipparchus might


take Harmodius by force, immediately formed a design, such as his


condition in life permitted, for overthrowing the tyranny. In the


meantime Hipparchus, after a second solicitation of Harmodius,


attended with no better success, unwilling to use violence, arranged


to insult him in some covert way. Indeed, generally their government


was not grievous to the multitude, or in any way odious in practice;


and these tyrants cultivated wisdom and virtue as much as any, and


without exacting from the Athenians more than a twentieth of their


income, splendidly adorned their city, and carried on their wars,


and provided sacrifices for the temples. For the rest, the city was


left in full enjoyment of its existing laws, except that care was


always taken to have the offices in the hands of some one of the


family. Among those of them that held the yearly archonship at


Athens was Pisistratus, son of the tyrant Hippias, and named after his


grandfather, who dedicated during his term of office the altar to


the twelve gods in the market-place, and that of Apollo in the Pythian


precinct. The Athenian people afterwards built on to and lengthened


the altar in the market-place, and obliterated the inscription; but


that in the Pythian precinct can still be seen, though in faded


letters, and is to the following effect:





    Pisistratus, the son of Hippias,


    Sent up this record of his archonship


    In precinct of Apollo Pythias.





  That Hippias was the eldest son and succeeded to the government,


is what I positively assert as a fact upon which I have had more exact


accounts than others, and may be also ascertained by the following


circumstance. He is the only one of the legitimate brothers that


appears to have had children; as the altar shows, and the pillar


placed in the Athenian Acropolis, commemorating the crime of the


tyrants, which mentions no child of Thessalus or of Hipparchus, but


five of Hippias, which he had by Myrrhine, daughter of Callias, son of


Hyperechides; and naturally the eldest would have married first.


Again, his name comes first on the pillar after that of his father;


and this too is quite natural, as he was the eldest after him, and the


reigning tyrant. Nor can I ever believe that Hippias would have


obtained the tyranny so easily, if Hipparchus had been in power when


he was killed, and he, Hippias, had had to establish himself upon


the same day; but he had no doubt been long accustomed to overawe


the citizens, and to be obeyed by his mercenaries, and thus not only


conquered, but conquered with ease, without experiencing any of the


embarrassment of a younger brother unused to the exercise of


authority. It was the sad fate which made Hipparchus famous that got


him also the credit with posterity of having been tyrant.


  To return to Harmodius; Hipparchus having been repulsed in his


solicitations insulted him as he had resolved, by first inviting a


sister of his, a young girl, to come and bear a basket in a certain


procession, and then rejecting her, on the plea that she had never


been invited at all owing to her unworthiness. If Harmodius was


indignant at this, Aristogiton for his sake now became more


exasperated than ever; and having arranged everything with those who


were to join them in the enterprise, they only waited for the great


feast of the Panathenaea, the sole day upon which the citizens forming


part of the procession could meet together in arms without


suspicion. Aristogiton and Harmodius were to begin, but were to be


supported immediately by their accomplices against the bodyguard.


The conspirators were not many, for better security, besides which


they hoped that those not in the plot would be carried away by the


example of a few daring spirits, and use the arms in their hands to


recover their liberty.


  At last the festival arrived; and Hippias with his bodyguard was


outside the city in the Ceramicus, arranging how the different parts


of the procession were to proceed. Harmodius and Aristogiton had


already their daggers and were getting ready to act, when seeing one


of their accomplices talking familiarly with Hippias, who was easy


of access to every one, they took fright, and concluded that they were


discovered and on the point of being taken; and eager if possible to


be revenged first upon the man who had wronged them and for whom


they had undertaken all this risk, they rushed, as they were, within


the gates, and meeting with Hipparchus by the Leocorium recklessly


fell upon him at once, infuriated, Aristogiton by love, and


Harmodius by insult, and smote him and slew him. Aristogiton escaped


the guards at the moment, through the crowd running up, but was


afterwards taken and dispatched in no merciful way: Harmodius was


killed on the spot.


  When the news was brought to Hippias in the Ceramicus, he at once


proceeded not to the scene of action, but to the armed men in the


procession, before they, being some distance away, knew anything of


the matter, and composing his features for the occasion, so as not


to betray himself, pointed to a certain spot, and bade them repair


thither without their arms. They withdrew accordingly, fancying he had


something to say; upon which he told the mercenaries to remove the


arms, and there and then picked out the men he thought guilty and


all found with daggers, the shield and spear being the usual weapons


for a procession.


  In this way offended love first led Harmodius and Aristogiton to


conspire, and the alarm of the moment to commit the rash action


recounted. After this the tyranny pressed harder on the Athenians, and


Hippias, now grown more fearful, put to death many of the citizens,


and at the same time began to turn his eyes abroad for a refuge in


case of revolution. Thus, although an Athenian, he gave his


daughter, Archedice, to a Lampsacene, Aeantides, son of the tyrant


of Lampsacus, seeing that they had great influence with Darius. And


there is her tomb in Lampsacus with this inscription:





    Archedice lies buried in this earth,


    Hippias her sire, and Athens gave her birth;


    Unto her bosom pride was never known,


    Though daughter, wife, and sister to the throne.





Hippias, after reigning three years longer over the Athenians, was


deposed in the fourth by the Lacedaemonians and the banished


Alcmaeonidae, and went with a safe conduct to Sigeum, and to Aeantides


at Lampsacus, and from thence to King Darius; from whose court he


set out twenty years after, in his old age, and came with the Medes to


Marathon.


  With these events in their minds, and recalling everything they knew


by hearsay on the subject, the Athenian people grow difficult of


humour and suspicious of the persons charged in the affair of the


mysteries, and persuaded that all that had taken place was part of


an oligarchical and monarchical conspiracy. In the state of irritation


thus produced, many persons of consideration had been already thrown


into prison, and far from showing any signs of abating, public feeling


grew daily more savage, and more arrests were made; until at last


one of those in custody, thought to be the most guilty of all, was


induced by a fellow prisoner to make a revelation, whether true or not


is a matter on which there are two opinions, no one having been


able, either then or since, to say for certain who did the deed.


However this may be, the other found arguments to persuade him, that


even if he had not done it, he ought to save himself by gaining a


promise of impunity, and free the state of its present suspicions;


as he would be surer of safety if he confessed after promise of


impunity than if he denied and were brought to trial. He accordingly


made a revelation, affecting himself and others in the affair of the


Hermae; and the Athenian people, glad at last, as they supposed, to


get at the truth, and furious until then at not being able to discover


those who had conspired against the commons, at once let go the


informer and all the rest whom he had not denounced, and bringing


the accused to trial executed as many as were apprehended, and


condemned to death such as had fled and set a price upon their


heads. In this it was, after all, not clear whether the sufferers


had been punished unjustly, while in any case the rest of the city


received immediate and manifest relief.


  To return to Alcibiades: public feeling was very hostile to him,


being worked on by the same enemies who had attacked him before he


went out; and now that the Athenians fancied that they had got at


the truth of the matter of the Hermae, they believed more firmly


than ever that the affair of the mysteries also, in which he was


implicated, had been contrived by him in the same intention and was


connected with the plot against the democracy. Meanwhile it so


happened that, just at the time of this agitation, a small force of


Lacedaemonians had advanced as far as the Isthmus, in pursuance of


some scheme with the Boeotians. It was now thought that this had


come by appointment, at his instigation, and not on account of the


Boeotians, and that, if the citizens had not acted on the


information received, and forestalled them by arresting the prisoners,


the city would have been betrayed. The citizens went so far as to


sleep one night armed in the temple of Theseus within the walls. The


friends also of Alcibiades at Argos were just at this time suspected


of a design to attack the commons; and the Argive hostages deposited


in the islands were given up by the Athenians to the Argive people


to be put to death upon that account: in short, everywhere something


was found to create suspicion against Alcibiades. It was therefore


decided to bring him to trial and execute him, and the Salaminia was


sent to Sicily for him and the others named in the information, with


instructions to order him to come and answer the charges against


him, but not to arrest him, because they wished to avoid causing any


agitation in the army or among the enemy in Sicily, and above all to


retain the services of the Mantineans and Argives, who, it was


thought, had been induced to join by his influence. Alcibiades, with


his own ship and his fellow accused, accordingly sailed off with the


Salaminia from Sicily, as though to return to Athens, and went with


her as far as Thurii, and there they left the ship and disappeared,


being afraid to go home for trial with such a prejudice existing


against them. The crew of the Salaminia stayed some time looking for


Alcibiades and his companions, and at length, as they were nowhere


to be found, set sail and departed. Alcibiades, now an outlaw, crossed


in a boat not long after from Thurii to Peloponnese; and the Athenians


passed sentence of death by default upon him and those in his company.


                           CHAPTER XX.





          Seventeenth and Eighteenth Years of the War -


           Inaction of the Athenian Army - Alcibiades


               at Sparta - Investment of Syracuse





  THE Athenian generals left in Sicily now divided the armament into


two parts, and, each taking one by lot, sailed with the whole for


Selinus and Egesta, wishing to know whether the Egestaeans would


give the money, and to look into the question of Selinus and ascertain


the state of the quarrel between her and Egesta. Coasting along


Sicily, with the shore on their left, on the side towards the Tyrrhene


Gulf they touched at Himera, the only Hellenic city in that part of


the island, and being refused admission resumed their voyage. On their


way they took Hyccara, a petty Sicanian seaport, nevertheless at war


with Egesta, and making slaves of the inhabitants gave up the town


to the Egestaeans, some of whose horse had joined them; after which


the army proceeded through the territory of the Sicels until it


reached Catana, while the fleet sailed along the coast with the slaves


on board. Meanwhile Nicias sailed straight from Hyccara along the


coast and went to Egesta and, after transacting his other business and


receiving thirty talents, rejoined the forces. They now sold their


slaves for the sum of one hundred and twenty talents, and sailed round


to their Sicel allies to urge them to send troops; and meanwhile


went with half their own force to the hostile town of Hybla in the


territory of Gela, but did not succeed in taking it.


  Summer was now over. The winter following, the Athenians at once


began to prepare for moving on Syracuse, and the Syracusans on their


side for marching against them. From the moment when the Athenians


failed to attack them instantly as they at first feared and


expected, every day that passed did something to revive their courage;


and when they saw them sailing far away from them on the other side of


Sicily, and going to Hybla only to fail in their attempts to storm it,


they thought less of them than ever, and called upon their generals,


as the multitude is apt to do in its moments of confidence, to lead


them to Catana, since the enemy would not come to them. Parties also


of the Syracusan horse employed in reconnoitring constantly rode up to


the Athenian armament, and among other insults asked them whether they


had not really come to settle with the Syracusans in a foreign country


rather than to resettle the Leontines in their own.


  Aware of this, the Athenian generals determined to draw them out


in mass as far as possible from the city, and themselves in the


meantime to sail by night alongshore, and take up at their leisure a


convenient position. This they knew they could not so well do, if they


had to disembark from their ships in front of a force prepared for


them, or to go by land openly. The numerous cavalry of the


Syracusans (a force which they were themselves without) would then


be able to do the greatest mischief to their light troops and the


crowd that followed them; but this plan would enable them to take up a


position in which the horse could do them no hurt worth speaking of,


some Syracusan exiles with the army having told them of the spot


near the Olympieum, which they afterwards occupied. In pursuance of


their idea, the generals imagined the following stratagem. They sent


to Syracuse a man devoted to them, and by the Syracusan generals


thought to be no less in their interest; he was a native of Catana,


and said he came from persons in that place, whose names the Syracusan


generals were acquainted with, and whom they knew to be among the


members of their party still left in the city. He told them that the


Athenians passed the night in the town, at some distance from their


arms, and that if the Syracusans would name a day and come with all


their people at daybreak to attack the armament, they, their


friends, would close the gates upon the troops in the city, and set


fire to the vessels, while the Syracusans would easily take the camp


by an attack upon the stockade. In this they would be aided by many of


the Catanians, who were already prepared to act, and from whom he


himself came.


  The generals of the Syracusans, who did not want confidence, and who


had intended even without this to march on Catana, believed the man


without any sufficient inquiry, fixed at once a day upon which they


would be there, and dismissed him, and the Selinuntines and others


of their allies having now arrived, gave orders for all the Syracusans


to march out in mass. Their preparations completed, and the time fixed


for their arrival being at hand, they set out for Catana, and passed


the night upon the river Symaethus, in the Leontine territory.


Meanwhile the Athenians no sooner knew of their approach than they


took all their forces and such of the Sicels or others as had joined


them, put them on board their ships and boats, and sailed by night


to Syracuse. Thus, when morning broke the Athenians were landing


opposite the Olympieum ready to seize their camping ground, and the


Syracusan horse having ridden up first to Catana and found that all


the armament had put to sea, turned back and told the infantry, and


then all turned back together, and went to the relief of the city.


  In the meantime, as the march before the Syracusans was a long


one, the Athenians quietly sat down their army in a convenient


position, where they could begin an engagement when they pleased,


and where the Syracusan cavalry would have least opportunity of


annoying them, either before or during the action, being fenced off on


one side by walls, houses, trees, and by a marsh, and on the other


by cliffs. They also felled the neighbouring trees and carried them


down to the sea, and formed a palisade alongside of their ships, and


with stones which they picked up and wood hastily raised a fort at


Daskon, the most vulnerable point of their position, and broke down


the bridge over the Anapus. These preparations were allowed to go on


without any interruption from the city, the first hostile force to


appear being the Syracusan cavalry, followed afterwards by all the


foot together. At first they came close up to the Athenian army, and


then, finding that they did not offer to engage, crossed the


Helorine road and encamped for the night.


  The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle,


their dispositions being as follows: Their right wing was occupied


by the Argives and Mantineans, the centre by the Athenians, and the


rest of the field by the other allies. Half their army was drawn up


eight deep in advance, half close to their tents in a hollow square,


formed also eight deep, which had orders to look out and be ready to


go to the support of the troops hardest pressed. The camp followers


were placed inside this reserve. The Syracusans, meanwhile, formed


their heavy infantry sixteen deep, consisting of the mass levy of


their own people, and such allies as had joined them, the strongest


contingent being that of the Selinuntines; next to them the cavalry of


the Geloans, numbering two hundred in all, with about twenty horse and


fifty archers from Camarina. The cavalry was posted on their right,


full twelve hundred strong, and next to it the darters. As the


Athenians were about to begin the attack, Nicias went along the lines,


and addressed these words of encouragement to the army and the nations


composing it:


  "Soldiers, a long exhortation is little needed by men like


ourselves, who are here to fight in the same battle, the force


itself being, to my thinking, more fit to inspire confidence than a


fine speech with a weak army. Where we have Argives, Mantineans,


Athenians, and the first of the islanders in the ranks together, it


were strange indeed, with so many and so brave companions in arms,


if we did not feel confident of victory; especially when we have


mass levies opposed to our picked troops, and what is more, Siceliots,


who may disdain us but will not stand against us, their skill not


being at all commensurate to their rashness. You may also remember


that we are far from home and have no friendly land near, except


what your own swords shall win you; and here I put before you a motive


just the reverse of that which the enemy are appealing to; their cry


being that they shall fight for their country, mine that we shall


fight for a country that is not ours, where we must conquer or


hardly get away, as we shall have their horse upon us in great


numbers. Remember, therefore, your renown, and go boldly against the


enemy, thinking the present strait and necessity more terrible than


they."


  After this address Nicias at once led on the army. The Syracusans


were not at that moment expecting an immediate engagement, and some


had even gone away to the town, which was close by; these now ran up


as hard as they could and, though behind time, took their places


here or there in the main body as fast as they joined it. Want of zeal


or daring was certainly not the fault of the Syracusans, either in


this or the other battles, but although not inferior in courage, so


far as their military science might carry them, when this failed


them they were compelled to give up their resolution also. On the


present occasion, although they had not supposed that the Athenians


would begin the attack, and although constrained to stand upon their


defence at short notice, they at once took up their arms and


advanced to meet them. First, the stone-throwers, slingers, and


archers of either army began skirmishing, and routed or were routed by


one another, as might be expected between light troops; next,


soothsayers brought forward the usual victims, and trumpeters urged on


the heavy infantry to the charge; and thus they advanced, the


Syracusans to fight for their country, and each individual for his


safety that day and liberty hereafter; in the enemy's army, the


Athenians to make another's country theirs and to save their own


from suffering by their defeat; the Argives and independent allies


to help them in getting what they came for, and to earn by victory


another sight of the country they had left behind; while the subject


allies owed most of their ardour to the desire of self-preservation,


which they could only hope for if victorious; next to which, as a


secondary motive, came the chance of serving on easier terms, after


helping the Athenians to a fresh conquest.


  The armies now came to close quarters, and for a long while fought


without either giving ground. Meanwhile there occurred some claps of


thunder with lightning and heavy rain, which did not fail to add to


the fears of the party fighting for the first time, and very little


acquainted with war; while to their more experienced adversaries these


phenomena appeared to be produced by the time of year, and much more


alarm was felt at the continued resistance of the enemy. At last the


Argives drove in the Syracusan left, and after them the Athenians


routed the troops opposed to them, and the Syracusan army was thus cut


in two and betook itself to flight. The Athenians did not pursue


far, being held in check by the numerous and undefeated Syracusan


horse, who attacked and drove back any of their heavy infantry whom


they saw pursuing in advance of the rest; in spite of which the


victors followed so far as was safe in a body, and then went back


and set up a trophy. Meanwhile the Syracusans rallied at the


Helorine road, where they re-formed as well as they could under the


circumstances, and even sent a garrison of their own citizens to the


Olympieum, fearing that the Athenians might lay hands on some of the


treasures there. The rest returned to the town.


  The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple, but collected


their dead and laid them upon a pyre, and passed the night upon the


field. The next day they gave the enemy back their dead under truce,


to the number of about two hundred and sixty, Syracusans and allies,


and gathered together the bones of their own, some fifty, Athenians


and allies, and taking the spoils of the enemy, sailed back to Catana.


It was now winter; and it did not seem possible for the moment to


carry on the war before Syracuse, until horse should have been sent


for from Athens and levied among the allies in Sicily- to do away


with their utter inferiority in cavalry- and money should have been


collected in the country and received from Athens, and until some of


the cities, which they hoped would be now more disposed to listen to


them after the battle, should have been brought over, and corn and all


other necessaries provided, for a campaign in the spring against


Syracuse.


  With this intention they sailed off to Naxos and Catana for the


winter. Meanwhile the Syracusans burned their dead and then held an


assembly, in which Hermocrates, son of Hermon, a man who with a


general ability of the first order had given proofs of military


capacity and brilliant courage in the war, came forward and encouraged


them, and told them not to let what had occurred make them give way,


since their spirit had not been conquered, but their want of


discipline had done the mischief. Still they had not been beaten by so


much as might have been expected, especially as they were, one might


say, novices in the art of war, an army of artisans opposed to the


most practised soldiers in Hellas. What had also done great mischief


was the number of the generals (there were fifteen of them) and the


quantity of orders given, combined with the disorder and


insubordination of the troops. But if they were to have a few


skilful generals, and used this winter in preparing their heavy


infantry, finding arms for such as had not got any, so as to make them


as numerous as possible, and forcing them to attend to their


training generally, they would have every chance of beating their


adversaries, courage being already theirs and discipline in the


field having thus been added to it. Indeed, both these qualities would


improve, since danger would exercise them in discipline, while their


courage would be led to surpass itself by the confidence which skill


inspires. The generals should be few and elected with full powers, and


an oath should be taken to leave them entire discretion in their


command: if they adopted this plan, their secrets would be better


kept, all preparations would be properly made, and there would be no


room for excuses.


  The Syracusans heard him, and voted everything as he advised, and


elected three generals, Hermocrates himself, Heraclides, son of


Lysimachus, and Sicanus, son of Execestes. They also sent envoys to


Corinth and Lacedaemon to procure a force of allies to join them,


and to induce the Lacedaemonians for their sakes openly to address


themselves in real earnest to the war against the Athenians, that they


might either have to leave Sicily or be less able to send


reinforcements to their army there.


  The Athenian forces at Catana now at once sailed against Messina, in


the expectation of its being betrayed to them. The intrigue,


however, after all came to nothing: Alcibiades, who was in the secret,


when he left his command upon the summons from home, foreseeing that


he would be outlawed, gave information of the plot to the friends of


the Syracusans in Messina, who had at once put to death its authors,


and now rose in arms against the opposite faction with those of


their way of thinking, and succeeded in preventing the admission of


the Athenians. The latter waited for thirteen days, and then, as


they were exposed to the weather and without provisions, and met


with no success, went back to Naxos, where they made places for


their ships to lie in, erected a palisade round their camp, and


retired into winter quarters; meanwhile they sent a galley to Athens


for money and cavalry to join them in the spring. During the winter


the Syracusans built a wall on to the city, so as to take in the


statue of Apollo Temenites, all along the side looking towards


Epipolae, to make the task of circumvallation longer and more


difficult, in case of their being defeated, and also erected a fort at


Megara and another in the Olympieum, and stuck palisades along the sea


wherever there was a landing Place. Meanwhile, as they knew that the


Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they marched with all their


people to Catana, and ravaged the land and set fire to the tents and


encampment of the Athenians, and so returned home. Learning also


that the Athenians were sending an embassy to Camarina, on the


strength of the alliance concluded in the time of Laches, to gain,


if possible, that city, they sent another from Syracuse to oppose


them. They had a shrewd suspicion that the Camarinaeans had not sent


what they did send for the first battle very willingly; and they now


feared that they would refuse to assist them at all in future, after


seeing the success of the Athenians in the action, and would join


the latter on the strength of their old friendship. Hermocrates,


with some others, accordingly arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and


Euphemus and others from the Athenians; and an assembly of the


Camarinaeans having been convened, Hermocrates spoke as follows, in


the hope of prejudicing them against the Athenians:





  "Camarinaeans, we did not come on this embassy because we were


afraid of your being frightened by the actual forces of the Athenians,


but rather of your being gained by what they would say to you before


you heard anything from us. They are come to Sicily with the pretext


that you know, and the intention which we all suspect, in my opinion


less to restore the Leontines to their homes than to oust us from


ours; as it is out of all reason that they should restore in Sicily


the cities that they lay waste in Hellas, or should cherish the


Leontine Chalcidians because of their Ionian blood and keep in


servitude the Euboean Chalcidians, of whom the Leontines are a colony.


No; but the same policy which has proved so successful in Hellas is


now being tried in Sicily. After being chosen as the leaders of the


Ionians and of the other allies of Athenian origin, to punish the


Mede, the Athenians accused some of failure in military service,


some of fighting against each other, and others, as the case might be,


upon any colourable pretext that could be found, until they thus


subdued them all. In fine, in the struggle against the Medes, the


Athenians did not fight for the liberty of the Hellenes, or the


Hellenes for their own liberty, but the former to make their


countrymen serve them instead of him, the latter to change one


master for another, wiser indeed than the first, but wiser for evil.


  "But we are not now come to declare to an audience familiar with


them the misdeeds of a state so open to accusation as is the Athenian,


but much rather to blame ourselves, who, with the warnings we


possess in the Hellenes in those parts that have been enslaved through


not supporting each other, and seeing the same sophisms being now


tried upon ourselves- such as restorations of Leontine kinsfolk and


support of Egestaean allies- do not stand together and resolutely


show them that here are no Ionians, or Hellespontines, or islanders,


who change continually, but always serve a master, sometimes the


Mede and sometimes some other, but free Dorians from independent


Peloponnese, dwelling in Sicily. Or, are we waiting until we be


taken in detail, one city after another; knowing as we do that in no


other way can we be conquered, and seeing that they turn to this plan,


so as to divide some of us by words, to draw some by the bait of an


alliance into open war with each other, and to ruin others by such


flattery as different circumstances may render acceptable? And do we


fancy when destruction first overtakes a distant fellow countryman


that the danger will not come to each of us also, or that he who


suffers before us will suffer in himself alone?


  "As for the Camarinaean who says that it is the Syracusan, not he,


that is the enemy of the Athenian, and who thinks it hard to have to


encounter risk in behalf of my country, I would have him bear in


mind that he will fight in my country, not more for mine than for


his own, and by so much the more safely in that he will enter on the


struggle not alone, after the way has been cleared by my ruin, but


with me as his ally, and that the object of the Athenian is not so


much to punish the enmity of the Syracusan as to use me as a blind


to secure the friendship of the Camarinaean. As for him who envies


or even fears us (and envied and feared great powers must always


be), and who on this account wishes Syracuse to be humbled to teach us


a lesson, but would still have her survive, in the interest of his own


security the wish that he indulges is not humanly possible. A man


can control his own desires, but he cannot likewise control


circumstances; and in the event of his calculations proving


mistaken, he may live to bewail his own misfortune, and wish to be


again envying my prosperity. An idle wish, if he now sacrifice us


and refuse to take his share of perils which are the same, in


reality though not in name, for him as for us; what is nominally the


preservation of our power being really his own salvation. It was to be


expected that you, of all people in the world, Camarinaeans, being our


immediate neighbours and the next in danger, would have foreseen this,


and instead of supporting us in the lukewarm way that you are now


doing, would rather come to us of your own accord, and be now offering


at Syracuse the aid which you would have asked for at Camarina, if


to Camarina the Athenians had first come, to encourage us to resist


the invader. Neither you, however, nor the rest have as yet


bestirred yourselves in this direction.


  "Fear perhaps will make you study to do right both by us and by


the invaders, and plead that you have an alliance with the


Athenians. But you made that alliance, not against your friends, but


against the enemies that might attack you, and to help the Athenians


when they were wronged by others, not when as now they are wronging


their neighbours. Even the Rhegians, Chalcidians though they be,


refuse to help to restore the Chalcidian Leontines; and it would be


strange if, while they suspect the gist of this fine pretence and


are wise without reason, you, with every reason on your side, should


yet choose to assist your natural enemies, and should join with


their direst foes in undoing those whom nature has made your own


kinsfolk. This is not to do right; but you should help us without fear


of their armament, which has no terrors if we hold together, but


only if we let them succeed in their endeavours to separate us;


since even after attacking us by ourselves and being victorious in


battle, they had to go off without effecting their purpose.


  "United, therefore, we have no cause to despair, but rather new


encouragement to league together; especially as succour will come to


us from the Peloponnesians, in military matters the undoubted


superiors of the Athenians. And you need not think that your prudent


policy of taking sides with neither, because allies of both, is either


safe for you or fair to us. Practically it is not as fair as it


pretends to be. If the vanquished be defeated, and the victor conquer,


through your refusing to join, what is the effect of your abstention


but to leave the former to perish unaided, and to allow the latter


to offend unhindered? And yet it were more honourable to join those


who are not only the injured party, but your own kindred, and by so


doing to defend the common interests of Sicily and save your friends


the Athenians from doing wrong.


  "In conclusion, we Syracusans say that it is useless for us to


demonstrate either to you or to the rest what you know already as well


as we do; but we entreat, and if our entreaty fail, we protest that we


are menaced by our eternal enemies the Ionians, and are betrayed by


you our fellow Dorians. If the Athenians reduce us, they will owe


their victory to your decision, but in their own name will reap the


honour, and will receive as the prize of their triumph the very men


who enabled them to gain it. On the other hand, if we are the


conquerors, you will have to pay for having been the cause of our


danger. Consider, therefore; and now make your choice between the


security which present servitude offers and the prospect of conquering


with us and so escaping disgraceful submission to an Athenian master


and avoiding the lasting enmity of Syracuse."


  Such were the words of Hermocrates; after whom Euphemus, the


Athenian ambassador, spoke as follows:


  "Although we came here only to renew the former alliance, the attack


of the Syracusans compels us to speak of our empire and of the good


right we have to it. The best proof of this the speaker himself


furnished, when he called the Ionians eternal enemies of the


Dorians. It is the fact; and the Peloponnesian Dorians being our


superiors in numbers and next neighbours, we Ionians looked out for


the best means of escaping their domination. After the Median War we


had a fleet, and so got rid of the empire and supremacy of the


Lacedaemonians, who had no right to give orders to us more than we


to them, except that of being the strongest at that moment; and


being appointed leaders of the King's former subjects, we continue


to be so, thinking that we are least likely to fall under the dominion


of the Peloponnesians, if we have a force to defend ourselves with,


and in strict truth having done nothing unfair in reducing to


subjection the Ionians and islanders, the kinsfolk whom the Syracusans


say we have enslaved. They, our kinsfolk, came against their mother


country, that is to say against us, together with the Mede, and,


instead of having the courage to revolt and sacrifice their property


as we did when we abandoned our city, chose to be slaves themselves,


and to try to make us so.


  "We, therefore, deserve to rule because we placed the largest


fleet and an unflinching patriotism at the service of the Hellenes,


and because these, our subjects, did us mischief by their ready


subservience to the Medes; and, desert apart, we seek to strengthen


ourselves against the Peloponnesians. We make no fine profession of


having a right to rule because we overthrew the barbarian


single-handed, or because we risked what we did risk for the freedom


of the subjects in question any more than for that of all, and for our


own: no one can be quarrelled with for providing for his proper


safety. If we are now here in Sicily, it is equally in the interest of


our security, with which we perceive that your interest also


coincides. We prove this from the conduct which the Syracusans cast


against us and which you somewhat too timorously suspect; knowing that


those whom fear has made suspicious may be carried away by the charm


of eloquence for the moment, but when they come to act follow their


interests.


  "Now, as we have said, fear makes us hold our empire in Hellas,


and fear makes us now come, with the help of our friends, to order


safely matters in Sicily, and not to enslave any but rather to prevent


any from being enslaved. Meanwhile, let no one imagine that we are


interesting ourselves in you without your having anything to do with


us, seeing that, if you are preserved and able to make head against


the Syracusans, they will be less likely to harm us by sending


troops to the Peloponnesians. In this way you have everything to do


with us, and on this account it is perfectly reasonable for us to


restore the Leontines, and to make them, not subjects like their


kinsmen in Euboea, but as powerful as possible, to help us by annoying


the Syracusans from their frontier. In Hellas we are alone a match for


our enemies; and as for the assertion that it is out of all reason


that we should free the Sicilian, while we enslave the Chalcidian, the


fact is that the latter is useful to us by being without arms and


contributing money only; while the former, the Leontines and our other


friends, cannot be too independent.


  "Besides, for tyrants and imperial cities nothing is unreasonable if


expedient, no one a kinsman unless sure; but friendship or enmity is


everywhere an affair of time and circumstance. Here, in Sicily, our


interest is not to weaken our friends, but by means of their


strength to cripple our enemies. Why doubt this? In Hellas we treat


our allies as we find them useful. The Chians and Methymnians govern


themselves and furnish ships; most of the rest have harder terms and


pay tribute in money; while others, although islanders and easy for us


to take, are free altogether, because they occupy convenient positions


round Peloponnese. In our settlement of the states here in Sicily,


we should therefore; naturally be guided by our interest, and by fear,


as we say, of the Syracusans. Their ambition is to rule you, their


object to use the suspicions that we excite to unite you, and then,


when we have gone away without effecting anything, by force or through


your isolation, to become the masters of Sicily. And masters they must


become, if you unite with them; as a force of that magnitude would


be no longer easy for us to deal with united, and they would be more


than a match for you as soon as we were away.


  "Any other view of the case is condemned by the facts. When you


first asked us over, the fear which you held out was that of danger to


Athens if we let you come under the dominion of Syracuse; and it is


not right now to mistrust the very same argument by which you


claimed to convince us, or to give way to suspicion because we are


come with a larger force against the power of that city. Those whom


you should really distrust are the Syracusans. We are not able to stay


here without you, and if we proved perfidious enough to bring you into


subjection, we should be unable to keep you in bondage, owing to the


length of the voyage and the difficulty of guarding large, and in a


military sense continental, towns: they, the Syracusans, live close to


you, not in a camp, but in a city greater than the force we have


with us, plot always against you, never let slip an opportunity once


offered, as they have shown in the case of the Leontines and others,


and now have the face, just as if you were fools, to invite you to aid


them against the power that hinders this, and that has thus far


maintained Sicily independent. We, as against them, invite you to a


much more real safety, when we beg you not to betray that common


safety which we each have in the other, and to reflect that they, even


without allies, will, by their numbers, have always the way open to


you, while you will not often have the opportunity of defending


yourselves with such numerous auxiliaries; if, through your


suspicions, you once let these go away unsuccessful or defeated, you


will wish to see if only a handful of them back again, when the day is


past in which their presence could do anything for you.


  "But we hope, Camarinaeans, that the calumnies of the Syracusans


will not be allowed to succeed either with you or with the rest: we


have told you the whole truth upon the things we are suspected of, and


will now briefly recapitulate, in the hope of convincing you. We


assert that we are rulers in Hellas in order not to be subjects;


liberators in Sicily that we may not be harmed by the Sicilians;


that we are compelled to interfere in many things, because we have


many things to guard against; and that now, as before, we are come


as allies to those of you who suffer wrong in this island, not without


invitation but upon invitation. Accordingly, instead of making


yourselves judges or censors of our conduct, and trying to turn us,


which it were now difficult to do, so far as there is anything in


our interfering policy or in our character that chimes in with your


interest, this take and make use of; and be sure that, far from


being injurious to all alike, to most of the Hellenes that policy is


even beneficial. Thanks to it, all men in all places, even where we


are not, who either apprehend or meditate aggression, from the near


prospect before them, in the one case, of obtaining our intervention


in their favour, in the other, of our arrival making the venture


dangerous, find themselves constrained, respectively, to be moderate


against their will, and to be preserved without trouble of their


own. Do not you reject this security that is open to all who desire


it, and is now offered to you; but do like others, and instead of


being always on the defensive against the Syracusans, unite with us,


and in your turn at last threaten them."


  Such were the words of Euphemus. What the Camarinaeans felt was


this. Sympathizing with the Athenians, except in so far as they


might be afraid of their subjugating Sicily, they had always been at


enmity with their neighbour Syracuse. From the very fact, however,


that they were their neighbours, they feared the Syracusans most of


the two, and being apprehensive of their conquering even without them,


both sent them in the first instance the few horsemen mentioned, and


for the future determined to support them most in fact, although as


sparingly as possible; but for the moment in order not to seem to


slight the Athenians, especially as they had been successful in the


engagement, to answer both alike. Agreeably to this resolution they


answered that as both the contending parties happened to be allies


of theirs, they thought it most consistent with their oaths at present


to side with neither; with which answer the ambassadors of either


party departed.


  In the meantime, while Syracuse pursued her preparations for war,


the Athenians were encamped at Naxos, and tried by negotiation to gain


as many of the Sicels as possible. Those more in the low lands, and


subjects of Syracuse, mostly held aloof; but the peoples of the


interior who had never been otherwise than independent, with few


exceptions, at once joined the Athenians, and brought down corn to the


army, and in some cases even money. The Athenians marched against


those who refused to join, and forced some of them to do so; in the


case of others they were stopped by the Syracusans sending garrisons


and reinforcements. Meanwhile the Athenians moved their winter


quarters from Naxos to Catana, and reconstructed the camp burnt by the


Syracusans, and stayed there the rest of the winter. They also sent


a galley to Carthage, with proffers of friendship, on the chance of


obtaining assistance, and another to Tyrrhenia; some of the cities


there having spontaneously offered to join them in the war. They


also sent round to the Sicels and to Egesta, desiring them to send


them as many horses as possible, and meanwhile prepared bricks,


iron, and all other things necessary for the work of


circumvallation, intending by the spring to begin hostilities.


  In the meantime the Syracusan envoys dispatched to Corinth and


Lacedaemon tried as they passed along the coast to persuade the


Italiots to interfere with the proceedings of the Athenians, which


threatened Italy quite as much as Syracuse, and having arrived at


Corinth made a speech calling on the Corinthians to assist them on the


ground of their common origin. The Corinthians voted at once to aid


them heart and soul themselves, and then sent on envoys with them to


Lacedaemon, to help them to persuade her also to prosecute the war


with the Athenians more openly at home and to send succours to Sicily.


The envoys from Corinth having reached Lacedaemon found there


Alcibiades with his fellow refugees, who had at once crossed over in a


trading vessel from Thurii, first to Cyllene in Elis, and afterwards


from thence to Lacedaemon; upon the Lacedaemonians' own invitation,


after first obtaining a safe conduct, as he feared them for the part


he had taken in the affair of Mantinea. The result was that the


Corinthians, Syracusans, and Alcibiades, pressing all the same request


in the assembly of the Lacedaemonians, succeeded in persuading them;


but as the ephors and the authorities, although resolved to send


envoys to Syracuse to prevent their surrendering to the Athenians,


showed no disposition to send them any assistance, Alcibiades now came


forward and inflamed and stirred the Lacedaemonians by speaking as


follows:


  "I am forced first to speak to you of the prejudice with which I


am regarded, in order that suspicion may not make you disinclined to


listen to me upon public matters. The connection, with you as your


proxeni, which the ancestors of our family by reason of some


discontent renounced, I personally tried to renew by my good offices


towards you, in particular upon the occasion of the disaster at Pylos.


But although I maintained this friendly attitude, you yet chose to


negotiate the peace with the Athenians through my enemies, and thus to


strengthen them and to discredit me. You had therefore no right to


complain if I turned to the Mantineans and Argives, and seized other


occasions of thwarting and injuring you; and the time has now come


when those among you, who in the bitterness of the moment may have


been then unfairly angry with me, should look at the matter in its


true light, and take a different view. Those again who judged me


unfavourably, because I leaned rather to the side of the commons, must


not think that their dislike is any better founded. We have always


been hostile to tyrants, and all who oppose arbitrary power are called


commons; hence we continued to act as leaders of the multitude;


besides which, as democracy was the government of the city, it was


necessary in most things to conform to established conditions.


However, we endeavoured to be more moderate than the licentious temper


of the times; and while there were others, formerly as now, who


tried to lead the multitude astray- the same who banished me- our


party was that of the whole people, our creed being to do our part


in preserving the form of government under which the city enjoyed


the utmost greatness and freedom, and which we had found existing.


As for democracy, the men of sense among us knew what it was, and I


perhaps as well as any, as I have the more cause to complain of it;


but there is nothing new to be said of a patent absurdity; meanwhile


we did not think it safe to alter it under the pressure of your


hostility.


  "So much then for the prejudices with which I am regarded: I now can


call your attention to the questions you must consider, and upon which


superior knowledge perhaps permits me to speak. We sailed to Sicily


first to conquer, if possible, the Siceliots, and after them the


Italiots also, and finally to assail the empire and city of


Carthage. In the event of all or most of these schemes succeeding,


we were then to attack Peloponnese, bringing with us the entire


force of the Hellenes lately acquired in those parts, and taking a


number of barbarians into our pay, such as the Iberians and others


in those countries, confessedly the most warlike known, and building


numerous galleys in addition to those which we had already, timber


being plentiful in Italy; and with this fleet blockading Peloponnese


from the sea and assailing it with our armies by land, taking some


of the cities by storm, drawing works of circumvallation round others,


we hoped without difficulty to effect its reduction, and after this to


rule the whole of the Hellenic name. Money and corn meanwhile for


the better execution of these plans were to be supplied in


sufficient quantities by the newly acquired places in those countries,


independently of our revenues here at home.


  "You have thus heard the history of the present expedition from


the man who most exactly knows what our objects were; and the


remaining generals will, if they can, carry these out just the same.


But that the states in Sicily must succumb if you do not help them,


I will now show. Although the Siceliots, with all their


inexperience, might even now be saved if their forces were united, the


Syracusans alone, beaten already in one battle with all their people


and blockaded from the sea, will be unable to withstand the Athenian


armament that is now there. But if Syracuse falls, all Sicily falls


also, and Italy immediately afterwards; and the danger which I just


now spoke of from that quarter will before long be upon you. None need


therefore fancy that Sicily only is in question; Peloponnese will be


so also, unless you speedily do as I tell you, and send on board


ship to Syracuse troops that shall able to row their ships themselves,


and serve as heavy infantry the moment that they land; and what I


consider even more important than the troops, a Spartan as


commanding officer to discipline the forces already on foot and to


compel recusants to serve. The friends that you have already will thus


become more confident, and the waverers will be encouraged to join


you. Meanwhile you must carry on the war here more openly, that the


Syracusans, seeing that you do not forget them, may put heart into


their resistance, and that the Athenians may be less able to reinforce


their armament. You must fortify Decelea in Attica, the blow of


which the Athenians are always most afraid and the only one that


they think they have not experienced in the present war; the surest


method of harming an enemy being to find out what he most fears, and


to choose this means of attacking him, since every one naturally knows


best his own weak points and fears accordingly. The fortification in


question, while it benefits you, will create difficulties for your


adversaries, of which I shall pass over many, and shall only mention


the chief. Whatever property there is in the country will most of it


become yours, either by capture or surrender; and the Athenians will


at once be deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at


Laurium, of their present gains from their land and from the law


courts, and above all of the revenue from their allies, which will


be paid less regularly, as they lose their awe of Athens and see you


addressing yourselves with vigour to the war. The zeal and speed


with which all this shall be done depends, Lacedaemonians, upon


yourselves; as to its possibility, I am quite confident, and I have


little fear of being mistaken.


  "Meanwhile I hope that none of you will think any the worse of me


if, after having hitherto passed as a lover of my country, I now


actively join its worst enemies in attacking it, or will suspect


what I say as the fruit of an outlaw's enthusiasm. I am an outlaw from


the iniquity of those who drove me forth, not, if you will be guided


by me, from your service; my worst enemies are not you who only harmed


your foes, but they who forced their friends to become enemies; and


love of country is what I do not feel when I am wronged, but what I


felt when secure in my rights as a citizen. Indeed I do not consider


that I am now attacking a country that is still mine; I am rather


trying to recover one that is mine no longer; and the true lover of


his country is not he who consents to lose it unjustly rather than


attack it, but he who longs for it so much that he will go all lengths


to recover it. For myself, therefore, Lacedaemonians, I beg you to use


me without scruple for danger and trouble of every kind, and to


remember the argument in every one's mouth, that if I did you great


harm as an enemy, I could likewise do you good service as a friend,


inasmuch as I know the plans of the Athenians, while I only guessed


yours. For yourselves I entreat you to believe that your most


capital interests are now under deliberation; and I urge you to send


without hesitation the expeditions to Sicily and Attica; by the


presence of a small part of your forces you will save important cities


in that island, and you will destroy the power of Athens both


present and prospective; after this you will dwell in security and


enjoy the supremacy over all Hellas, resting not on force but upon


consent and affection."


  Such were the words of Alcibiades. The Lacedaemonians, who had


themselves before intended to march against Athens, but were still


waiting and looking about them, at once became much more in earnest


when they received this particular information from Alcibiades, and


considered that they had heard it from the man who best knew the truth


of the matter. Accordingly they now turned their attention to the


fortifying of Decelea and sending immediate aid to the Sicilians;


and naming Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, to the command of the


Syracusans, bade him consult with that people and with the Corinthians


and arrange for succours reaching the island, in the best and


speediest way possible under the circumstances. Gylippus desired the


Corinthians to send him at once two ships to Asine, and to prepare the


rest that they intended to send, and to have them ready to sail at the


proper time. Having settled this, the envoys departed from Lacedaemon.


  In the meantime arrived the Athenian galley from Sicily sent by


the generals for money and cavalry; and the Athenians, after hearing


what they wanted, voted to send the supplies for the armament and


the cavalry. And the winter ended, and with it ended the seventeenth


year of the present war of which Thucydides is the historian.


  The next summer, at the very beginning of the season, the


Athenians in Sicily put out from Catana, and sailed along shore to


Megara in Sicily, from which, as I have mentioned above, the


Syracusans expelled the inhabitants in the time of their tyrant


Gelo, themselves occupying the territory. Here the Athenians landed


and laid waste the country, and after an unsuccessful attack upon a


fort of the Syracusans, went on with the fleet and army to the river


Terias, and advancing inland laid waste the plain and set fire to


the corn; and after killing some of a small Syracusan party which they


encountered, and setting up a trophy, went back again to their


ships. They now sailed to Catana and took in provisions there, and


going with their whole force against Centoripa, a town of the


Sicels, acquired it by capitulation, and departed, after also


burning the corn of the Inessaeans and Hybleans. Upon their return


to Catana they found the horsemen arrived from Athens, to the number


of two hundred and fifty (with their equipments, but without their


horses which were to be procured upon the spot), and thirty mounted


archers and three hundred talents of silver.


  The same spring the Lacedaemonians marched against Argos, and went


as far as Cleonae, when an earthquake occurred and caused them to


return. After this the Argives invaded the Thyreatid, which is on


their border, and took much booty from the Lacedaemonians, which was


sold for no less than twenty-five talents. The same summer, not long


after, the Thespian commons made an attack upon the party in office,


which was not successful, but succours arrived from Thebes, and some


were caught, while others took refuge at Athens.


  The same summer the Syracusans learned that the Athenians had been


joined by their cavalry, and were on the point of marching against


them; and seeing that without becoming masters of Epipolae, a


precipitous spot situated exactly over the town, the Athenians could


not, even if victorious in battle, easily invest them, they determined


to guard its approaches, in order that the enemy might not ascend


unobserved by this, the sole way by which ascent was possible, as


the remainder is lofty ground, and falls right down to the city, and


can all be seen from inside; and as it lies above the rest the place


is called by the Syracusans Epipolae or Overtown. They accordingly


went out in mass at daybreak into the meadow along the river Anapus,


their new generals, Hermocrates and his colleagues, having just come


into office, and held a review of their heavy infantry, from whom they


first selected a picked body of six hundred, under the command of


Diomilus, an exile from Andros, to guard Epipolae, and to be ready


to muster at a moment's notice to help wherever help should be


required.


  Meanwhile the Athenians, the very same morning, were holding a


review, having already made land unobserved with all the armament from


Catana, opposite a place called Leon, not much more than half a mile


from Epipolae, where they disembarked their army, bringing the fleet


to anchor at Thapsus, a peninsula running out into the sea, with a


narrow isthmus, and not far from the city of Syracuse either by land


or water. While the naval force of the Athenians threw a stockade


across the isthmus and remained quiet at Thapsus, the land army


immediately went on at a run to Epipolae, and succeeded in getting


up by Euryelus before the Syracusans perceived them, or could come


up from the meadow and the review. Diomilus with his six hundred and


the rest advanced as quickly as they could, but they had nearly


three miles to go from the meadow before reaching them. Attacking in


this way in considerable disorder, the Syracusans were defeated in


battle at Epipolae and retired to the town, with a loss of about three


hundred killed, and Diomilus among the number. After this the


Athenians set up a trophy and restored to the Syracusans their dead


under truce, and next day descended to Syracuse itself; and no one


coming out to meet them, reascended and built a fort at Labdalum, upon


the edge of the cliffs of Epipolae, looking towards Megara, to serve


as a magazine for their baggage and money, whenever they advanced to


battle or to work at the lines.


  Not long afterwards three hundred cavalry came to them from


Egesta, and about a hundred from the Sicels, Naxians, and others;


and thus, with the two hundred and fifty from Athens, for whom they


had got horses from the Egestaeans and Catanians, besides others


that they bought, they now mustered six hundred and fifty cavalry in


all. After posting a garrison in Labdalum, they advanced to Syca,


where they sat down and quickly built the Circle or centre of their


wall of circumvallation. The Syracusans, appalled at the rapidity with


which the work advanced, determined to go out against them and give


battle and interrupt it; and the two armies were already in battle


array, when the Syracusan generals observed that their troops found


such difficulty in getting into line, and were in such disorder,


that they led them back into the town, except part of the cavalry.


These remained and hindered the Athenians from carrying stones or


dispersing to any great distance, until a tribe of the Athenian


heavy infantry, with all the cavalry, charged and routed the Syracusan


horse with some loss; after which they set up a trophy for the cavalry


action.


  The next day the Athenians began building the wall to the north of


the Circle, at the same time collecting stone and timber, which they


kept laying down towards Trogilus along the shortest line for their


works from the great harbour to the sea; while the Syracusans,


guided by their generals, and above all by Hermocrates, instead of


risking any more general engagements, determined to build a


counterwork in the direction in which the Athenians were going to


carry their wall. If this could be completed in time, the enemy's


lines would be cut; and meanwhile, if he were to attempt to


interrupt them by an attack, they would send a part of their forces


against him, and would secure the approaches beforehand with their


stockade, while the Athenians would have to leave off working with


their whole force in order to attend to them. They accordingly sallied


forth and began to build, starting from their city, running a cross


wall below the Athenian Circle, cutting down the olives and erecting


wooden towers. As the Athenian fleet had not yet sailed round into the


great harbour, the Syracusans still commanded the seacoast, and the


Athenians brought their provisions by land from Thapsus.


  The Syracusans now thought the stockades and stonework of their


counterwall sufficiently far advanced; and as the Athenians, afraid of


being divided and so fighting at a disadvantage, and intent upon their


own wall, did not come out to interrupt them, they left one tribe to


guard the new work and went back into the city. Meanwhile the


Athenians destroyed their pipes of drinking-water carried


underground into the city; and watching until the rest of the


Syracusans were in their tents at midday, and some even gone away into


the city, and those in the stockade keeping but indifferent guard,


appointed three hundred picked men of their own, and some men picked


from the light troops and armed for the purpose, to run suddenly as


fast as they could to the counterwork, while the rest of the army


advanced in two divisions, the one with one of the generals to the


city in case of a sortie, the other with the other general to the


stockade by the postern gate. The three hundred attacked and took


the stockade, abandoned by its garrison, who took refuge in the


outworks round the statue of Apollo Temenites. Here the pursuers burst


in with them, and after getting in were beaten out by the


Syracusans, and some few of the Argives and Athenians slain; after


which the whole army retired, and having demolished the counterwork


and pulled up the stockade, carried away the stakes to their own


lines, and set up a trophy.


  The next day the Athenians from the Circle proceeded to fortify


the cliff above the marsh which on this side of Epipolae looks towards


the great harbour; this being also the shortest line for their work to


go down across the plain and the marsh to the harbour. Meanwhile the


Syracusans marched out and began a second stockade, starting from


the city, across the middle of the marsh, digging a trench alongside


to make it impossible for the Athenians to carry their wall down to


the sea. As soon as the Athenians had finished their work at the cliff


they again attacked the stockade and ditch of the Syracusans. Ordering


the fleet to sail round from Thapsus into the great harbour of


Syracuse, they descended at about dawn from Epipolae into the plain,


and laying doors and planks over the marsh, where it was muddy and


firmest, crossed over on these, and by daybreak took the ditch and the


stockade, except a small portion which they captured afterwards. A


battle now ensued, in which the Athenians were victorious, the right


wing of the Syracusans flying to the town and the left to the river.


The three hundred picked Athenians, wishing to cut off their


passage, pressed on at a run to the bridge, when the alarmed


Syracusans, who had with them most of their cavalry, closed and routed


them, hurling them back upon the Athenian right wing, the first


tribe of which was thrown into a panic by the shock. Seeing this,


Lamachus came to their aid from the Athenian left with a few archers


and with the Argives, and crossing a ditch, was left alone with a


few that had crossed with him, and was killed with five or six of


his men. These the Syracusans managed immediately to snatch up in


haste and get across the river into a place of security, themselves


retreating as the rest of the Athenian army now came up.


  Meanwhile those who had at first fled for refuge to the city, seeing


the turn affairs were taking, now rallied from the town and formed


against the Athenians in front of them, sending also a part of their


number to the Circle on Epipolae, which they hoped to take while


denuded of its defenders. These took and destroyed the Athenian


outwork of a thousand feet, the Circle itself being saved by Nicias,


who happened to have been left in it through illness, and who now


ordered the servants to set fire to the engines and timber thrown down


before the wall; want of men, as he was aware, rendering all other


means of escape impossible. This step was justified by the result, the


Syracusans not coming any further on account of the fire, but


retreating. Meanwhile succours were coming up from the Athenians


below, who had put to flight the troops opposed to them; and the fleet


also, according to orders, was sailing from Thapsus into the great


harbour. Seeing this, the troops on the heights retired in haste,


and the whole army of the Syracusans re-entered the city, thinking


that with their present force they would no longer be able to hinder


the wall reaching the sea.


  After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored to the


Syracusans their dead under truce, receiving in return Lamachus and


those who had fallen with him. The whole of their forces, naval and


military, being now with them, they began from Epipolae and the cliffs


and enclosed the Syracusans with a double wall down to the sea.


Provisions were now brought in for the armament from all parts of


Italy; and many of the Sicels, who had hitherto been looking to see


how things went, came as allies to the Athenians: there also arrived


three ships of fifty oars from Tyrrhenia. Meanwhile everything else


progressed favourably for their hopes. The Syracusans began to despair


of finding safety in arms, no relief having reached them from


Peloponnese, and were now proposing terms of capitulation among


themselves and to Nicias, who after the death of Lamachus was left


sole commander. No decision was come to, but, as was natural with


men in difficulties and besieged more straitly than before, there


was much discussion with Nicias and still more in the town. Their


present misfortunes had also made them suspicious of one another;


and the blame of their disasters was thrown upon the ill-fortune or


treachery of the generals under whose command they had happened; and


these were deposed and others, Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias,


elected in their stead.


  Meanwhile the Lacedaemonian, Gylippus, and the ships from Corinth


were now off Leucas, intent upon going with all haste to the relief of


Sicily. The reports that reached them being of an alarming kind, and


all agreeing in the falsehood that Syracuse was already completely


invested, Gylippus abandoned all hope of Sicily, and wishing to save


Italy, rapidly crossed the Ionian Sea to Tarentum with the Corinthian,


Pythen, two Laconian, and two Corinthian vessels, leaving the


Corinthians to follow him after manning, in addition to their own ten,


two Leucadian and two Ambraciot ships. From Tarentum Gylippus first


went on an embassy to Thurii, and claimed anew the rights of


citizenship which his father had enjoyed; failing to bring over the


townspeople, he weighed anchor and coasted along Italy. Opposite the


Terinaean Gulf he was caught by the wind which blows violently and


steadily from the north in that quarter, and was carried out to sea;


and after experiencing very rough weather, remade Tarentum, where he


hauled ashore and refitted such of his ships as had suffered most from


the tempest. Nicias heard of his approach, but, like the Thurians,


despised the scanty number of his ships, and set down piracy as the


only probable object of the voyage, and so took no precautions for the


present.


  About the same time in this summer, the Lacedaemonians invaded Argos


with their allies, and laid waste most of the country. The Athenians


went with thirty ships to the relief of the Argives, thus breaking


their treaty with the Lacedaemonians in the most overt manner. Up to


this time incursions from Pylos, descents on the coast of the rest


of Peloponnese, instead of on the Laconian, had been the extent of


their co-operation with the Argives and Mantineans; and although the


Argives had often begged them to land, if only for a moment, with


their heavy infantry in Laconia, lay waste ever so little of it with


them, and depart, they had always refused to do so. Now, however,


under the command of Phytodorus, Laespodius, and Demaratus, they


landed at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiae, and other places, and plundered


the country; and thus furnished the Lacedaemonians with a better


pretext for hostilities against Athens. After the Athenians had


retired from Argos with their fleet, and the Lacedaemonians also,


the Argives made an incursion into the Phlisaid, and returned home


after ravaging their land and killing some of the inhabitants.