The Eighth Book.


                          CHAPTER XXIV.





           Nineteenth and Twentieth Years of the War -


                Revolt of Ionia - Intervention of


                    Persia - The War in Ionia





  WHEN the news was brought to Athens, for a long while they


disbelieved even the most respectable of the soldiers who had


themselves escaped from the scene of action and clearly reported the


matter, a destruction so complete not being thought credible. When the


conviction was forced upon them, they were angry with the orators


who had joined in promoting the expedition, just as if they had not


themselves voted it, and were enraged also with the reciters of


oracles and soothsayers, and all other omen-mongers of the time who


had encouraged them to hope that they should conquer Sicily. Already


distressed at all points and in all quarters, after what had now


happened, they were seized by a fear and consternation quite without


example. It was grievous enough for the state and for every man in his


proper person to lose so many heavy infantry, cavalry, and able-bodied


troops, and to see none left to replace them; but when they saw, also,


that they had not sufficient ships in their docks, or money in the


treasury, or crews for the ships, they began to despair of


salvation. They thought that their enemies in Sicily would immediately


sail with their fleet against Piraeus, inflamed by so signal a


victory; while their adversaries at home, redoubling all their


preparations, would vigorously attack them by sea and land at once,


aided by their own revolted confederates. Nevertheless, with such


means as they had, it was determined to resist to the last, and to


provide timber and money, and to equip a fleet as they best could,


to take steps to secure their confederates and above all Euboea, to


reform things in the city upon a more economical footing, and to elect


a board of elders to advise upon the state of affairs as occasion


should arise. In short, as is the way of a democracy, in the panic


of the moment they were ready to be as prudent as possible.


  These resolves were at once carried into effect. Summer was now


over. The winter ensuing saw all Hellas stirring under the


impression of the great Athenian disaster in Sicily. Neutrals now felt


that even if uninvited they ought no longer to stand aloof from the


war, but should volunteer to march against the Athenians, who, as they


severally reflected, would probably have come against them if the


Sicilian campaign had succeeded. Besides, they considered that the war


would now be short, and that it would be creditable for them to take


part in it. Meanwhile the allies of the Lacedaemonians felt all more


anxious than ever to see a speedy end to their heavy labours. But


above all, the subjects of the Athenians showed a readiness to


revolt even beyond their ability, judging the circumstances with


passion, and refusing even to hear of the Athenians being able to last


out the coming summer. Beyond all this, Lacedaemon was encouraged by


the near prospect of being joined in great force in the spring by


her allies in Sicily, lately forced by events to acquire their navy.


With these reasons for confidence in every quarter, the Lacedaemonians


now resolved to throw themselves without reserve into the war,


considering that, once it was happily terminated, they would be


finally delivered from such dangers as that which would have


threatened them from Athens, if she had become mistress of Sicily, and


that the overthrow of the Athenians would leave them in quiet


enjoyment of the supremacy over all Hellas.


  Their king, Agis, accordingly set out at once during this winter


with some troops from Decelea, and levied from the allies


contributions for the fleet, and turning towards the Malian Gulf


exacted a sum of money from the Oetaeans by carrying off most of their


cattle in reprisal for their old hostility, and, in spite of the


protests and opposition of the Thessalians, forced the Achaeans of


Phthiotis and the other subjects of the Thessalians in those parts


to give him money and hostages, and deposited the hostages at Corinth,


and tried to bring their countrymen into the confederacy. The


Lacedaemonians now issued a requisition to the cities for building a


hundred ships, fixing their own quota and that of the Boeotians at


twenty-five each; that of the Phocians and Locrians together at


fifteen; that of the Corinthians at fifteen; that of the Arcadians,


Pellenians, and Sicyonians together at ten; and that of the Megarians,


Troezenians, Epidaurians, and Hermionians together at ten also; and


meanwhile made every other preparation for commencing hostilities by


the spring.





  In the meantime the Athenians were not idle. During this same


winter, as they had determined, they contributed timber and pushed


on their ship-building, and fortified Sunium to enable their


corn-ships to round it in safety, and evacuated the fort in Laconia


which they had built on their way to Sicily; while they also, for


economy, cut down any other expenses that seemed unnecessary, and


above all kept a careful look-out against the revolt of their


confederates.


  While both parties were thus engaged, and were as intent upon


preparing for the war as they had been at the outset, the Euboeans


first of all sent envoys during this winter to Agis to treat of


their revolting from Athens. Agis accepted their proposals, and sent


for Alcamenes, son of Sthenelaidas, and Melanthus from Lacedaemon,


to take the command in Euboea. These accordingly arrived with some


three hundred Neodamodes, and Agis began to arrange for their crossing


over. But in the meanwhile arrived some Lesbians, who also wished to


revolt; and these being supported by the Boeotians, Agis was persuaded


to defer acting in the matter of Euboea, and made arrangements for the


revolt of the Lesbians, giving them Alcamenes, who was to have


sailed to Euboea, as governor, and himself promising them ten ships,


and the Boeotians the same number. All this was done without


instructions from home, as Agis while at Decelea with the army that he


commanded had power to send troops to whatever quarter he pleased, and


to levy men and money. During this period, one might say, the allies


obeyed him much more than they did the Lacedaemonians in the city,


as the force he had with him made him feared at once wherever he went.


While Agis was engaged with the Lesbians, the Chians and


Erythraeans, who were also ready to revolt, applied, not to him but at


Lacedaemon; where they arrived accompanied by an ambassador from


Tissaphernes, the commander of King Darius, son of Artaxerxes, in


the maritime districts, who invited the Peloponnesians to come over,


and promised to maintain their army. The King had lately called upon


him for the tribute from his government, for which he was in


arrears, being unable to raise it from the Hellenic towns by reason of


the Athenians; and he therefore calculated that by weakening the


Athenians he should get the tribute better paid, and should also


draw the Lacedaemonians into alliance with the King; and by this


means, as the King had commanded him, take alive or dead Amorges,


the bastard son of Pissuthnes, who was in rebellion on the coast of


Caria.


  While the Chians and Tissaphernes thus joined to effect the same


object, about the same time Calligeitus, son of Laophon, a Megarian,


and Timagoras, son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both of them exiles


from their country and living at the court of Pharnabazus, son of


Pharnaces, arrived at Lacedaemon upon a mission from Pharnabazus, to


procure a fleet for the Hellespont; by means of which, if possible, he


might himself effect the object of Tissaphernes' ambition and cause


the cities in his government to revolt from the Athenians, and so


get the tribute, and by his own agency obtain for the King the


alliance of the Lacedaemonians.


  The emissaries of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes treating apart, a


keen competition now ensued at Lacedaemon as to whether a fleet and


army should be sent first to Ionia and Chios, or to the Hellespont.


The Lacedaemonians, however, decidedly favoured the Chians and


Tissaphernes, who were seconded by Alcibiades, the family friend of


Endius, one of the ephors for that year. Indeed, this is how their


house got its Laconic name, Alcibiades being the family name of


Endius. Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians first sent to Chios Phrynis,


one of the Perioeci, to see whether they had as many ships as they


said, and whether their city generally was as great as was reported;


and upon his bringing word that they had been told the truth,


immediately entered into alliance with the Chians and Erythraeans, and


voted to send them forty ships, there being already, according to


the statement of the Chians, not less than sixty in the island. At


first the Lacedaemonians meant to send ten of these forty


themselves, with Melanchridas their admiral; but afterwards, an


earthquake having occurred, they sent Chalcideus instead of


Melanchridas, and instead of the ten ships equipped only five in


Laconia. And the winter ended, and with it ended also the nineteenth


year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian.


  At the beginning of the next summer the Chians were urging that


the fleet should be sent off, being afraid that the Athenians, from


whom all these embassies were kept a secret, might find out what was


going on, and the Lacedaemonians at once sent three Spartans to


Corinth to haul the ships as quickly as possible across the Isthmus


from the other sea to that on the side of Athens, and to order them


all to sail to Chios, those which Agis was equipping for Lesbos not


excepted. The number of ships from the allied states was thirty-nine


in all.


  Meanwhile Calligeitus and Timagoras did not join on behalf of


Pharnabazus in the expedition to Chios or give the


money- twenty-five talents- which they had brought with them to help


in dispatching a force, but determined to sail afterwards with another


force by themselves. Agis, on the other hand, seeing the


Lacedaemonians bent upon going to Chios first, himself came in to


their views; and the allies assembled at Corinth and held a council,


in which they decided to sail first to Chios under the command of


Chalcideus, who was equipping the five vessels in Laconia, then to


Lesbos, under the command of Alcamenes, the same whom Agis had fixed


upon, and lastly to go to the Hellespont, where the command was


given to Clearchus, son of Ramphias. Meanwhile they would take only


half the ships across the Isthmus first, and let those sail off at


once, in order that the Athenians might attend less to the departing


squadron than to those to be taken across afterwards, as no care had


been taken to keep this voyage secret through contempt of the


impotence of the Athenians, who had as yet no fleet of any account


upon the sea. Agreeably to this determination, twenty-one vessels were


at once conveyed across the Isthmus.


  They were now impatient to set sail, but the Corinthians were not


willing to accompany them until they had celebrated the Isthmian


festival, which fell at that time. Upon this Agis proposed to them


to save their scruples about breaking the Isthmian truce by taking the


expedition upon himself. The Corinthians not consenting to this, a


delay ensued, during which the Athenians conceived suspicions of


what was preparing at Chios, and sent Aristocrates, one of their


generals, and charged them with the fact, and, upon the denial of


the Chians, ordered them to send with them a contingent of ships, as


faithful confederates. Seven were sent accordingly. The reason of


the dispatch of the ships lay in the fact that the mass of the


Chians were not privy to the negotiations, while the few who were in


the secret did not wish to break with the multitude until they had


something positive to lean upon, and no longer expected the


Peloponnesians to arrive by reason of their delay.





  In the meantime the Isthmian games took place, and the Athenians,


who had been also invited, went to attend them, and now seeing more


clearly into the designs of the Chians, as soon as they returned to


Athens took measures to prevent the fleet putting out from Cenchreae


without their knowledge. After the festival the Peloponnesians set


sail with twenty-one ships for Chios, under the command of


Alcamenes. The Athenians first sailed against them with an equal


number, drawing off towards the open sea. The enemy, however,


turning back before he had followed them far, the Athenians returned


also, not trusting the seven Chian ships which formed part of their


number, and afterwards manned thirty-seven vessels in all and chased


him on his passage alongshore into Spiraeum, a desert Corinthian


port on the edge of the Epidaurian frontier. After losing one ship out


at sea, the Peloponnesians got the rest together and brought them to


anchor. The Athenians now attacked not only from the sea with their


fleet, but also disembarked upon the coast; and a melee ensued of


the most confused and violent kind, in which the Athenians disabled


most of the enemy's vessels and killed Alcamenes their commander,


losing also a few of their own men.


  After this they separated, and the Athenians, detaching a sufficient


number of ships to blockade those of the enemy, anchored with the rest


at the islet adjacent, upon whkh they proceeded to encamp, and sent to


Athens for reinforcements; the Peloponnesians having been joined on


the day after the battle by the Corinthians, who came to help the


ships, and by the other inhabitants in the vicinity not long


afterwards. These saw the difficulty of keeping guard in a desert


place, and in their perplexity at first thought of burning the


ships, but finally resolved to haul them up on shore and sit down


and guard them with their land forces until a convenient opportunity


for escaping should present itself. Agis also, on being informed of


the disaster, sent them a Spartan of the name of Thermon. The


Lacedaemonians first received the news of the fleet having put out


from the Isthmus, Alcamenes having been ordered by the ephors to


send off a horseman when this took place, and immediately resolved


to dispatch their own five vessels under Chalcideus, and Alcibiades


with him. But while they were full of this resolution came the


second news of the fleet having taken refuge in Spiraeum; and


disheartened at their first step in the Ionian war proving a


failure, they laid aside the idea of sending the ships from their


own country, and even wished to recall some that had already sailed.


  Perceiving this, Alcibiades again persuaded Endius and the other


ephors to persevere in the expedition, saying that the voyage would be


made before the Chians heard of the fleet's misfortune, and that as


soon as he set foot in Ionia, he should, by assuring them of the


weakness of the Athenians and the zeal of Lacedaemon, have no


difficulty in persuading the cities to revolt, as they would readily


believe his testimony. He also represented to Endius himself in


private that it would be glorious for him to be the means of making


Ionia revolt and the King become the ally of Lacedaemon, instead of


that honour being left to Agis (Agis, it must be remembered, was the


enemy of Alcibiades); and Endius and his colleagues thus persuaded, he


put to sea with the five ships and the Lacedaemonian Chalcideus, and


made all haste upon the voyage.


  About this time the sixteen Peloponnesian ships from Sicily, which


had served through the war with Gylippus, were caught on their


return off Leucadia and roughly handled by the twenty-seven Athenian


vessels under Hippocles, son of Menippus, on the lookout for the ships


from Sicily. After losing one of their number, the rest escaped from


the Athenians and sailed into Corinth.


  Meanwhile Chalcideus and Alcibiades seized all they met with on


their voyage, to prevent news of their coming, and let them go at


Corycus, the first point which they touched at in the continent.


Here they were visited by some of their Chian correspondents and,


being urged by them to sail up to the town without announcing their


coming, arrived suddenly before Chios. The many were amazed and


confounded, while the few had so arranged that the council should be


sitting at the time; and after speeches from Chalcideus and Alcibiades


stating that many more ships were sailing up, but saying nothing of


the fleet being blockaded in Spiraeum, the Chians revolted from the


Athenians, and the Erythraeans immediately afterwards. After this


three vessels sailed over to Clazomenae, and made that city revolt


also; and the Clazomenians immediately crossed over to the mainland


and began to fortify Polichna, in order to retreat there, in case of


necessity, from the island where they dwelt.


  While the revolted places were all engaged in fortifying and


preparing for the war, news of Chios speedily reached Athens. The


Athenians thought the danger by which they were now menaced great


and unmistakable, and that the rest of their allies would not


consent to keep quiet after the secession of the greatest of their


number. In the consternation of the moment they at once took off the


penalty attaching to whoever proposed or put to the vote a proposal


for using the thousand talents which they had jealously avoided


touching throughout the whole war, and voted to employ them to man a


large number of ships, and to send off at once under Strombichides,


son of Diotimus, the eight vessels, forming part of the blockading


fleet at Spiraeum, which had left the blockade and had returned


after pursuing and failing to overtake the vessels with Chalcideus.


These were to be followed shortly afterwards by twelve more under


Thrasycles, also taken from the blockade. They also recalled the seven


Chian vessels, forming part of their squadron blockading the fleet


in Spiraeum, and giving the slaves on board their liberty, put the


freemen in confinement, and speedily manned and sent out ten fresh


ships to blockade the Peloponnesians in the place of all those that


had departed, and decided to man thirty more. Zeal was not wanting,


and no effort was spared to send relief to Chios.


  In the meantime Strombichides with his eight ships arrived at Samos,


and, taking one Samian vessel, sailed to Teos and required them to


remain quiet. Chalcideus also set sail with twenty-three ships for


Teos from Chios, the land forces of the Clazomenians and Erythraeans


moving alongshore to support him. Informed of this in time,


Strombichides put out from Teos before their arrival, and while out at


sea, seeing the number of the ships from Chios, fled towards Samos,


chased by the enemy. The Teians at first would not receive the land


forces, but upon the flight of the Athenians took them into the


town. There they waited for some time for Chalcideus to return from


the pursuit, and as time went on without his appearing, began


themselves to demolish the wall which the Athenians had built on the


land side of the city of the Teians, being assisted by a few of the


barbarians who had come up under the command of Stages, the lieutenant


of Tissaphernes.


  Meanwhile Chalcideus and Alcibiades, after chasing Strombichides


into Samos, armed the crews of the ships from Peloponnese and left


them at Chios, and filling their places with substitutes from Chios


and manning twenty others, sailed off to effect the revolt of Miletus.


The wish of Alcibiades, who had friends among the leading men of the


Milesians, was to bring over the town before the arrival of the


ships from Peloponnese, and thus, by causing the revolt of as many


cities as possible with the help of the Chian power and of Chalcideus,


to secure the honour for the Chians and himself and Chalcideus, and,


as he had promised, for Endius who had sent them out. Not discovered


until their voyage was nearly completed, they arrived a little


before Strombichides and Thrasycles (who had just come with twelve


ships from Athens, and had joined Strombichides in pursuing them), and


occasioned the revolt of Miletus. The Athenians sailing up close on


their heels with nineteen ships found Miletus closed against them, and


took up their station at the adjacent island of Lade. The first


alliance between the King and the Lacedaemonians was now concluded


immediately upon the revolt of the Milesians, by Tissaphernes and


Chalcideus, and was as follows:


    The Lacedaemonians and their allies made a treaty with the King


and Tissaphernes upon the terms following:


    1. Whatever country or cities the King has, or the King's


ancestors had, shall be the king's: and whatever came in to the


Athenians from these cities, either money or any other thing, the King


and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall jointly hinder the


Athenians from receiving either money or any other thing.


    2. The war with the Athenians shall be carried on jointly by the


King and by the Lacedaemonians and their allies: and it shall not be


lawful to make peace with the Athenians except both agree, the King on


his side and the Lacedaemonians and their allies on theirs.


    3. If any revolt from the King, they shall be the enemies of the


Lacedaemonians and their allies. And if any revolt from the


Lacedaemonians and their allies, they shall be the enemies of the King


in like manner.


  This was the alliance. After this the Chians immediately manned


ten more vessels and sailed for Anaia, in order to gain intelligence


of those in Miletus, and also to make the cities revolt. A message,


however, reaching them from Chalcideus to tell them to go back


again, and that Amorges was at hand with an army by land, they


sailed to the temple of Zeus, and there sighting ten more ships


sailing up with which Diomedon had started from Athens after


Thrasycles, fled, one ship to Ephesus, the rest to Teos. The Athenians


took four of their ships empty, the men finding time to escape ashore;


the rest took refuge in the city of the Teians; after which the


Athenians sailed off to Samos, while the Chians put to sea with


their remaining vessels, accompanied by the land forces, and caused


Lebedos to revolt, and after it Erae. After this they both returned


home, the fleet and the army.


  About the same time the twenty ships of the Peloponnesians in


Spiraeum, which we left chased to land and blockaded by an equal


number of Athenians, suddenly sallied out and defeated the


blockading squadron, took four of their ships, and, sailing back to


Cenchreae, prepared again for the voyage to Chios and Ionia. Here they


were joined by Astyochus as high admiral from Lacedaemon, henceforth


invested with the supreme command at sea. The land forces now


withdrawing from Teos, Tissaphernes repaired thither in person with an


army and completed the demolition of anything that was left of the


wall, and so departed. Not long after his departure Diomedon arrived


with ten Athenian ships, and, having made a convention by which the


Teians admitted him as they had the enemy, coasted along to Erae, and,


failing in an attempt upon the town, sailed back again.


  About this time took place the rising of the commons at Samos


against the upper classes, in concert with some Athenians, who were


there in three vessels. The Samian commons put to death some two


hundred in all of the upper classes, and banished four hundred more,


and themselves took their land and houses; after which the Athenians


decreed their independence, being now sure of their fidelity, and


the commons henceforth governed the city, excluding the landholders


from all share in affairs, and forbidding any of the commons to give


his daughter in marriage to them or to take a wife from them in


future.


  After this, during the same summer, the Chians, whose zeal continued


as active as ever, and who even without the Peloponnesians found


themselves in sufficient force to effect the revolt of the cities


and also wished to have as many companions in peril as possible,


made an expedition with thirteen ships of their own to Lesbos; the


instructions from Lacedaemon being to go to that island next, and from


thence to the Hellespont. Meanwhile the land forces of the


Peloponnesians who were with the Chians and of the allies on the spot,


moved alongshore for Clazomenae and Cuma, under the command of Eualas,


a Spartan; while the fleet under Diniadas, one of the Perioeci,


first sailed up to Methymna and caused it to revolt, and, leaving four


ships there, with the rest procured the revolt of Mitylene.


  In the meantime Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, set sail


from Cenchreae with four ships, as he had intended, and arrived at


Chios. On the third day after his arrival, the Athenian ships,


twenty-five in number, sailed to Lesbos under Diomedon and Leon, who


had lately arrived with a reinforcement of ten ships from Athens. Late


in the same day Astyochus put to sea, and taking one Chian vessel with


him sailed to Lesbos to render what assistance he could. Arrived at


Pyrrha, and from thence the next day at Eresus, he there learned


that Mitylene had been taken, almost without a blow, by the Athenians,


who had sailed up and unexpectedly put into the harbour, had beaten


the Chian ships, and landing and defeating the troops opposed to


them had become masters of the city. Informed of this by the


Eresians and the Chian ships, which had been left with Eubulus at


Methymna, and had fled upon the capture of Mitylene, and three of


which he now fell in with, one having been taken by the Athenians,


Astyochus did not go on to Mitylene, but raised and armed Eresus, and,


sending the heavy infantry from his own ships by land under


Eteonicus to Antissa and Methymna, himself proceeded alongshore


thither with the ships which he had with him and with the three


Chians, in the hope that the Methymnians upon seeing them would be


encouraged to persevere in their revolt. As, however, everything


went against him in Lesbos, he took up his own force and sailed back


to Chios; the land forces on board, which were to have gone to the


Hellespont, being also conveyed back to their different cities.


After this six of the allied Peloponnesian ships at Cenchreae joined


the forces at Chios. The Athenians, after restoring matters to their


old state in Lesbos, set sail from thence and took Polichna, the place


that the Clazomenians were fortifying on the continent, and carried


the inhabitants back to their town upon the island, except the authors


of the revolt, who withdrew to Daphnus; and thus Clazomenae became


once more Athenian.


  The same summer the Athenians in the twenty ships at Lade,


blockading Miletus, made a descent at Panormus in the Milesian


territory, and killed Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian commander, who


had come with a few men against them, and the third day after sailed


over and set up a trophy, which, as they were not masters of the


country, was however pulled down by the Milesians. Meanwhile Leon


and Diomedon with the Athenian fleet from Lesbos issuing from the


Oenussae, the isles off Chios, and from their forts of Sidussa and


Pteleum in the Erythraeid, and from Lesbos, carried on the war against


the Chians from the ships, having on board heavy infantry from the


rolls pressed to serve as marines. Landing in Cardamyle and in


Bolissus they defeated with heavy loss the Chians that took the


field against them and, laying desolate the places in that


neighbourhood, defeated the Chians again in another battle at


Phanae, and in a third at Leuconium. After this the Chians ceased to


meet them in the field, while the Athenians devastated the country,


which was beautifully stocked and had remained uninjured ever since


the Median wars. Indeed, after the Lacedaemonians, the Chians are


the only people that I have known who knew how to be wise in


prosperity, and who ordered their city the more securely the greater


it grew. Nor was this revolt, in which they might seem to have erred


on the side of rashness, ventured upon until they had numerous and


gallant allies to share the danger with them, and until they perceived


the Athenians after the Sicilian disaster themselves no longer denying


the thoroughly desperate state of their affairs. And if they were


thrown out by one of the surprises which upset human calculations,


they found out their mistake in company with many others who believed,


like them, in the speedy collapse of the Athenian power. While they


were thus blockaded from the sea and plundered by land, some of the


citizens undertook to bring the city over to the Athenians. Apprised


of this the authorities took no action themselves, but brought


Astyochus, the admiral, from Erythrae, with four ships that he had


with him, and considered how they could most quietly, either by taking


hostages or by some other means, put an end to the conspiracy.


  While the Chians were thus engaged, a thousand Athenian heavy


infantry and fifteen hundred Argives (five hundred of whom were


light troops furnished with armour by the Athenians), and one thousand


of the allies, towards the close of the same summer sailed from Athens


in forty-eight ships, some of which were transports, under the command


of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides, and putting into Samos


crossed over and encamped at Miletus. Upon this the Milesians came out


to the number of eight hundred heavy infantry, with the Peloponnesians


who had come with Chalcideus, and some foreign mercenaries of


Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes himself and his cavalry, and engaged the


Athenians and their allies. While the Argives rushed forward on


their own wing with the careless disdain of men advancing against


Ionians who would never stand their charge, and were defeated by the


Milesians with a loss little short of three hundred men, the Athenians


first defeated the Peloponnesians, and driving before them the


barbarians and the ruck of the army, without engaging the Milesians,


who after the rout of the Argives retreated into the town upon


seeing their comrades worsted, crowned their victory by grounding


their arms under the very walls of Miletus. Thus, in this battle,


the Ionians on both sides overcame the Dorians, the Athenians


defeating the Peloponnesians opposed to them, and the Milesians the


Argives. After setting up a trophy, the Athenians prepared to draw a


wall round the place, which stood upon an isthmus; thinking that, if


they could gain Miletus, the other towns also would easily come over


to them.


  Meanwhile about dusk tidings reached them that the fifty-five


ships from Peloponnese and Sicily might be instantly expected. Of


these the Siceliots, urged principally by the Syracusan Hermocrates to


join in giving the finishing blow to the power of Athens, furnished


twenty-two- twenty from Syracuse, and two from Silenus; and the


ships that we left preparing in Peloponnese being now ready, both


squadrons had been entrusted to Therimenes, a Lacedaemonian, to take


to Astyochus, the admiral. They now put in first at Leros the island


off Miletus, and from thence, discovering that the Athenians were


before the town, sailed into the Iasic Gulf, in order to learn how


matters stood at Miletus. Meanwhile Alcibiades came on horseback to


Teichiussa in the Milesian territory, the point of the gulf at which


they had put in for the night, and told them of the battle in which he


had fought in person by the side of the Milesians and Tissaphernes,


and advised them, if they did not wish to sacrifice Ionia and their


cause, to fly to the relief of Miletus and hinder its investment.


  Accordingly they resolved to relieve it the next morning.


Meanwhile Phrynichus, the Athenian commander, had received precise


intelligence of the fleet from Leros, and when his colleagues


expressed a wish to keep the sea and fight it out, flatly refused


either to stay himself or to let them or any one else do so if he


could help it. Where they could hereafter contend, after full and


undisturbed preparation, with an exact knowledge of the number of


the enemy's fleet and of the force which they could oppose to him,


he would never allow the reproach of disgrace to drive him into a risk


that was unreasonable. It was no disgrace for an Athenian fleet to


retreat when it suited them: put it as they would, it would be more


disgraceful to be beaten, and to expose the city not only to disgrace,


but to the most serious danger. After its late misfortunes it could


hardly be justified in voluntarily taking the offensive even with


the strongest force, except in a case of absolute necessity: much less


then without compulsion could it rush upon peril of its own seeking.


He told them to take up their wounded as quickly as they could and the


troops and stores which they had brought with them, and leaving behind


what they had taken from the enemy's country, in order to lighten


the ships, to sail off to Samos, and there concentrating all their


ships to attack as opportunity served. As he spoke so he acted; and


thus not now more than afterwards, nor in this alone but in all that


he had to do with, did Phrynichus show himself a man of sense. In this


way that very evening the Athenians broke up from before Miletus,


leaving their victory unfinished, and the Argives, mortified at


their disaster, promptly sailed off home from Samos.


  As soon as it was morning the Peloponnesians weighed from Teichiussa


and put into Miletus after the departure of the Athenians; they stayed


one day, and on the next took with them the Chian vessels originally


chased into port with Chalcideus, and resolved to sail back for the


tackle which they had put on shore at Teichiussa. Upon their arrival


Tissaphernes came to them with his land forces and induced them to


sail to Iasus, which was held by his enemy Amorges. Accordingly they


suddenly attacked and took Iasus, whose inhabitants never imagined


that the ships could be other than Athenian. The Syracusans


distinguished themselves most in the action. Amorges, a bastard of


Pissuthnes and a rebel from the King, was taken alive and handed


over to Tissaphernes, to carry to the King, if he chose, according


to his orders: Iasus was sacked by the army, who found a very great


booty there, the place being wealthy from ancient date. The


mercenaries serving with Amorges the Peloponnesians received and


enrolled in their army without doing them any harm, since most of them


came from Peloponnese, and handed over the town to Tissaphernes with


all the captives, bond or free, at the stipulated price of one Doric


stater a head; after which they returned to Miletus. Pedaritus, son of


Leon, who had been sent by the Lacedaemonians to take the command at


Chios, they dispatched by land as far as Erythrae with the mercenaries


taken from Amorges; appointing Philip to remain as governor of


Miletus.


  Summer was now over. The winter following, Tissaphernes put Iasus in


a state of defence, and passing on to Miletus distributed a month's


pay to all the ships as he had promised at Lacedaemon, at the rate


of an Attic drachma a day for each man. In future, however, he was


resolved not to give more than three obols, until he had consulted the


King; when if the King should so order he would give, he said, the


full drachma. However, upon the protest of the Syracusan general


Hermocrates (for as Therimenes was not admiral, but only accompanied


them in order to hand over the ships to Astyochus, he made little


difficulty about the pay), it was agreed that the amount of five


ships' pay should be given over and above the three obols a day for


each man; Tissaphernes paying thirty talents a month for fifty-five


ships, and to the rest, for as many ships as they had beyond that


number, at the same rate.


  The same winter the Athenians in Samos, having been joined by


thirty-five more vessels from home under Charminus, Strombichides, and


Euctemon, called in their squadron at Chios and all the rest,


intending to blockade Miletus with their navy, and to send a fleet and


an army against Chios; drawing lots for the respective services.


This intention they carried into effect; Strombichides, Onamacles, and


Euctemon sailing against Chios, which fell to their lot, with thirty


ships and a part of the thousand heavy infantry, who had been to


Miletus, in transports; while the rest remained masters of the sea


with seventy-four ships at Samos, and advanced upon Miletus.


  Meanwhile Astyochus, whom we left at Chios collecting the hostages


required in consequence of the conspiracy, stopped upon learning


that the fleet with Therimenes had arrived, and that the affairs of


the league were in a more flourishing condition, and putting out to


sea with ten Peloponnesian and as many Chian vessels, after a futile


attack upon Pteleum, coasted on to Clazomenae, and ordered the


Athenian party to remove inland to Daphnus, and to join the


Peloponnesians, an order in which also joined Tamos the king's


lieutenant in Ionia. This order being disregarded, Astyochus made an


attack upon the town, which was unwalled, and having failed to take it


was himself carried off by a strong gale to Phocaea and Cuma, while


the rest of the ships put in at the islands adjacent to


Clazomenae- Marathussa, Pele, and Drymussa. Here they were detained


eight days by the winds, and, plundering and consuming all the


property of the Clazomenians there deposited, put the rest on


shipboard and sailed off to Phocaea and Cuma to join Astyochus.


  While he was there, envoys arrived from the Lesbians who wished to


revolt again. With Astyochus they were successful; but the Corinthians


and the other allies being averse to it by reason of their former


failure, he weighed anchor and set sail for Chios, where they


eventually arrived from different quarters, the fleet having been


scattered by a storm. After this Pedaritus, whom we left marching


along the coast from Miletus, arrived at Erythrae, and thence


crossed over with his army to Chios, where he found also about five


hundred soldiers who had been left there by Chalcideus from the five


ships with their arms. Meanwhile some Lesbians making offers to


revolt, Astyochus urged upon Pedaritus and the Chians that they


ought to go with their ships and effect the revolt of Lesbos, and so


increase the number of their allies, or, if not successful, at all


events harm the Athenians. The Chians, however, turned a deaf ear to


this, and Pedaritus flatly refused to give up to him the Chian


vessels.


  Upon this Astyochus took five Corinthian and one Megarian vessel,


with another from Hermione, and the ships which had come with him from


Laconia, and set sail for Miletus to assume his command as admiral;


after telling the Chians with many threats that he would certainly not


come and help them if they should be in need. At Corycus in the


Erythraeid he brought to for the night; the Athenian armament


sailing from Samos against Chios being only separated from him by a


hill, upon the other side of which it brought to; so that neither


perceived the other. But a letter arriving in the night from Pedaritus


to say that some liberated Erythraean prisoners had come from Samos to


betray Erythrae, Astyochus at once put back to Erythrae, and so just


escaped falling in with the Athenians. Here Pedaritus sailed over to


join him; and after inquiry into the pretended treachery, finding that


the whole story had been made up to procure the escape of the men from


Samos, they acquitted them of the charge, and sailed away, Pedaritus


to Chios and Astyochus to Miletus as he had intended.


  Meanwhile the Athenian armament sailing round Corycus fell in with


three Chian men-of-war off Arginus, and gave immediate chase. A


great storm coming on, the Chians with difficulty took refuge in the


harbour; the three Athenian vessels most forward in the pursuit


being wrecked and thrown up near the city of Chios, and the crews


slain or taken prisoners. The rest of the Athenian fleet took refuge


in the harbour called Phoenicus, under Mount Mimas, and from thence


afterwards put into Lesbos and prepared for the work of fortification.


  The same winter the Lacedaemonian Hippocrates sailed out from


Peloponnese with ten Thurian ships under the command of Dorieus, son


of Diagoras, and two colleagues, one Laconian and one Syracusan


vessel, and arrived at Cnidus, which had already revolted at the


instigation of Tissaphernes. When their arrival was known at


Miletus, orders came to them to leave half their squadron to guard


Cnidus, and with the rest to cruise round Triopium and seize all the


merchantmen arriving from Egypt. Triopium is a promontory of Cnidus


and sacred to Apollo. This coming to the knowledge of the Athenians,


they sailed from Samos and captured the six ships on the watch at


Triopium, the crews escaping out of them. After this the Athenians


sailed into Cnidus and made an assault upon the town, which was


unfortified, and all but took it; and the next day assaulted it again,


but with less effect, as the inhabitants had improved their defences


during the night, and had been reinforced by the crews escaped from


the ships at Triopium. The Athenians now withdrew, and after


plundering the Cnidian territory sailed back to Samos.


  About the same time Astyochus came to the fleet at Miletus. The


Peloponnesian camp was still plentifully supplied, being in receipt of


sufficient pay, and the soldiers having still in hand the large


booty taken at Iasus. The Milesians also showed great ardour for the


war. Nevertheless the Peloponnesians thought the first convention with


Tissaphernes, made with Chalcideus, defective, and more advantageous


to him than to them, and consequently while Therimenes was still there


concluded another, which was as follows:


    The convention of the Lacedaemonians and the allies with King


Darius and the sons of the King, and with Tissaphernes for a treaty


and friendship, as follows:


    1. Neither the Lacedaemonians nor the allies of the Lacedaemonians


shall make war against or otherwise injure any country or cities


that belong to King Darius or did belong to his father or to his


ancestors; neither shall the Lacedaemonians nor the allies of the


Lacedaemonians exact tribute from such cities. Neither shall King


Darius nor any of the subjects of the King make war against or


otherwise injure the Lacedaemonians or their allies.


    2. If the Lacedaemonians or their allies should require any


assistance from the King, or the King from the Lacedaemonians or their


allies, whatever they both agree upon they shall be right in doing.


    3. Both shall carry on jointly the war against the Athenians and


their allies: and if they make peace, both shall do so jointly.


    4. The expense of all troops in the King's country, sent for by


the King, shall be borne by the King.


    5. If any of the states comprised in this convention with the King


attack the King's country, the rest shall stop them and aid the King


to the best of their power. And if any in the King's country or in the


countries under the King's rule attack the country of the


Lacedaemonians or their allies, the King shall stop it and help them


to the best of his power.


  After this convention Therimenes handed over the fleet to Astyochus,


sailed off in a small boat, and was lost. The Athenian armament had


now crossed over from Lesbos to Chios, and being master by sea and


land began to fortify Delphinium, a place naturally strong on the land


side, provided with more than one harbour, and also not far from the


city of Chios. Meanwhile the Chians remained inactive. Already


defeated in so many battles, they were now also at discord among


themselves; the execution of the party of Tydeus, son of Ion, by


Pedaritus upon the charge of Atticism, followed by the forcible


imposition of an oligarchy upon the rest of the city, having made them


suspicious of one another; and they therefore thought neither


themselves not the mercenaries under Pedaritus a match for the


enemy. They sent, however, to Miletus to beg Astyochus to assist them,


which he refused to do, and was accordingly denounced at Lacedaemon by


Pedaritus as a traitor. Such was the state of the Athenian affairs


at Chios; while their fleet at Samos kept sailing out against the


enemy in Miletus, until they found that he would not accept their


challenge, and then retired again to Samos and remained quiet.


  In the same winter the twenty-seven ships equipped by the


Lacedaemonians for Pharnabazus through the agency of the Megarian


Calligeitus, and the Cyzicene Timagoras, put out from Peloponnese


and sailed for Ionia about the time of the solstice, under the command


of Antisthenes, a Spartan. With them the Lacedaemonians also sent


eleven Spartans as advisers to Astyochus; Lichas, son of Arcesilaus,


being among the number. Arrived at Miletus, their orders were to aid


in generally superintending the good conduct of the war; to send off


the above ships or a greater or less number to the Hellespont to


Pharnabazus, if they thought proper, appointing Clearchus, son of


Ramphias, who sailed with them, to the command; and further, if they


thought proper, to make Antisthenes admiral, dismissing Astyochus,


whom the letters of Pedaritus had caused to be regarded with


suspicion. Sailing accordingly from Malea across the open sea, the


squadron touched at Melos and there fell in with ten Athenian ships,


three of which they took empty and burned. After this, being afraid


that the Athenian vessels escaped from Melos might, as they in fact


did, give information of their approach to the Athenians at Samos,


they sailed to Crete, and having lengthened their voyage by way of


precaution made land at Caunus in Asia, from whence considering


themselves in safety they sent a message to the fleet at Miletus for a


convoy along the coast.


  Meanwhile the Chians and Pedaritus, undeterred by the backwardness


of Astyochus, went on sending messengers pressing him to come with all


the fleet to assist them against their besiegers, and not to leave the


greatest of the allied states in Ionia to be shut up by sea and


overrun and pillaged by land. There were more slaves at Chios than


in any one other city except Lacedaemon, and being also by reason of


their numbers punished more rigorously when they offended, most of


them, when they saw the Athenian armament firmly established in the


island with a fortified position, immediately deserted to the enemy,


and through their knowledge of the country did the greatest


mischief. The Chians therefore urged upon Astyochus that it was his


duty to assist them, while there was still a hope and a possibility of


stopping the enemy's progress, while Delphinium was still in process


of fortification and unfinished, and before the completion of a higher


rampart which was being added to protect the camp and fleet of their


besiegers. Astyochus now saw that the allies also wished it and


prepared to go, in spite of his intention to the contrary owing to the


threat already referred to.


  In the meantime news came from Caunus of the arrival of the


twenty-seven ships with the Lacedaemonian commissioners; and


Astyochus, postponing everything to the duty of convoying a fleet of


that importance, in order to be more able to command the sea, and to


the safe conduct of the Lacedaemonians sent as spies over his


behaviour, at once gave up going to Chios and set sail for Caunus.


As he coasted along he landed at the Meropid Cos and sacked the


city, which was unfortified and had been lately laid in ruins by an


earthquake, by far the greatest in living memory, and, as the


inhabitants had fled to the mountains, overran the country and made


booty of all it contained, letting go, however, the free men. From Cos


arriving in the night at Cnidus he was constrained by the


representations of the Cnidians not to disembark the sailors, but to


sail as he was straight against the twenty Athenian vessels, which


with Charminus, one of the commanders at Samos, were on the watch


for the very twenty-seven ships from Peloponnese which Astyochus was


himself sailing to join; the Athenians in Samos having heard from


Melos of their approach, and Charminus being on the look-out off Syme,


Chalce, Rhodes, and Lycia, as he now heard that they were at Caunus.


  Astyochus accordingly sailed as he was to Syme, before he was


heard of, in the hope of catching the enemy somewhere out at sea.


Rain, however, and foggy weather encountered him, and caused his ships


to straggle and get into disorder in the dark. In the morning his


fleet had parted company and was most of it still straggling round the


island, and the left wing only in sight of Charminus and the


Athenians, who took it for the squadron which they were watching for


from Caunus, and hastily put out against it with part only of their


twenty vessels, and attacking immediately sank three ships and


disabled others, and had the advantage in the action until the main


body of the fleet unexpectedly hove in sight, when they were


surrounded on every side. Upon this they took to flight, and after


losing six ships with the rest escaped to Teutlussa or Beet Island,


and from thence to Halicarnassus. After this the Peloponnesians put


into Cnidus and, being joined by the twenty-seven ships from Caunus,


sailed all together and set up a trophy in Syme, and then returned


to anchor at Cnidus.


  As soon as the Athenians knew of the sea-fight, they sailed with all


the ships at Samos to Syme, and, without attacking or being attacked


by the fleet at Cnidus, took the ships' tackle left at Syme, and


touching at Lorymi on the mainland sailed back to Samos. Meanwhile the


Peloponnesian ships, being now all at Cnidus, underwent such repairs


as were needed; while the eleven Lacedaemonian commissioners conferred


with Tissaphernes, who had come to meet them, upon the points which


did not satisfy them in the past transactions, and upon the best and


mutually most advantageous manner of conducting the war in future. The


severest critic of the present proceedings was Lichas, who said that


neither of the treaties could stand, neither that of Chalcideus, nor


that of Therimenes; it being monstrous that the King should at this


date pretend to the possession of all the country formerly ruled by


himself or by his ancestors- a pretension which implicitly put back


under the yoke all the islands- Thessaly, Locris, and everything as


far as Boeotia- and made the Lacedaemonians give to the Hellenes


instead of liberty a Median master. He therefore invited Tissaphernes


to conclude another and a better treaty, as they certainly would not


recognize those existing and did not want any of his pay upon such


conditions. This offended Tissaphernes so much that he went away in


a rage without settling anything.


                          CHAPTER XXV.





         Twentieth and Twenty - first Years of the War -


       Intrigues of Alcibiades - Withdrawal of the Persian


             Subsidies - Oligarchical Coup d'Etat at


            Athens - Patriotism of the Army at Samos





  THE Peloponnesians now determined to sail to Rhodes, upon the


invitation of some of the principal men there, hoping to gain an


island powerful by the number of its seamen and by its land forces,


and also thinking that they would be able to maintain their fleet from


their own confederacy, without having to ask for money from


Tissaphernes. They accordingly at once set sail that same winter


from Cnidus, and first put in with ninety-four ships at Camirus in the


Rhodian country, to the great alarm of the mass of the inhabitants,


who were not privy to the intrigue, and who consequently fled,


especially as the town was unfortified. They were afterwards, however,


assembled by the Lacedaemonians together with the inhabitants of the


two other towns of Lindus and Ialysus; and the Rhodians were persuaded


to revolt from the Athenians and the island went over to the


Peloponnesians. Meanwhile the Athenians had received the alarm and set


sail with the fleet from Samos to forestall them, and came within


sight of the island, but being a little too late sailed off for the


moment to Chalce, and from thence to Samos, and subsequently waged war


against Rhodes, issuing from Chalce, Cos, and Samos.


  The Peloponnesians now levied a contribution of thirty-two talents


from the Rhodians, after which they hauled their ships ashore and


for eighty days remained inactive. During this time, and even earlier,


before they removed to Rhodes, the following intrigues took place.


After the death of Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus, Alcibiades


began to be suspected by the Peloponnesians; and Astyochus received


from Lacedaemon an order from them to put him to death, he being the


personal enemy of Agis, and in other respects thought unworthy of


confidence. Alcibiades in his alarm first withdrew to Tissaphernes,


and immediately began to do all he could with him to injure the


Peloponnesian cause. Henceforth becoming his adviser in everything, he


cut down the pay from an Attic drachma to three obols a day, and


even this not paid too regularly; and told Tissaphernes to say to


the Peloponnesians that the Athenians, whose maritime experience was


of an older date than their own, only gave their men three obols,


not so much from poverty as to prevent their seamen being corrupted by


being too well off, and injuring their condition by spending money


upon enervating indulgences, and also paid their crews irregularly


in order to have a security against their deserting in the arrears


which they would leave behind them. He also told Tissaphernes to bribe


the captains and generals of the cities, and so to obtain their


connivance- an expedient which succeeded with all except the


Syracusans, Hermocrates alone opposing him on behalf of the whole


confederacy. Meanwhile the cities asking for money Alcibiades sent


off, by roundly telling them in the name of Tissaphernes that it was


great impudence in the Chians, the richest people in Hellas, not


content with being defended by a foreign force, to expect others to


risk not only their lives but their money as well in behalf of their


freedom; while the other cities, he said, had had to pay largely to


Athens before their rebellion, and could not justly refuse to


contribute as much or even more now for their own selves. He also


pointed out that Tissaphernes was at present carrying on the war at


his own charges, and had good cause for economy, but that as soon as


he received remittances from the king he would give them their pay


in full and do what was reasonable for the cities.


  Alcibiades further advised Tissaphernes not to be in too great a


hurry to end the war, or to let himself be persuaded to bring up the


Phoenician fleet which he was equipping, or to provide pay for more


Hellenes, and thus put the power by land and sea into the same


hands; but to leave each of the contending parties in possession of


one element, thus enabling the king when he found one troublesome to


call in the other. For if the command of the sea and land were


united in one hand, he would not know where to turn for help to


overthrow the dominant power; unless he at last chose to stand up


himself, and go through with the struggle at great expense and hazard.


The cheapest plan was to let the Hellenes wear each other out, at a


small share of the expense and without risk to himself. Besides, he


would find the Athenians the most convenient partners in empire as


they did not aim at conquests on shore, and carried on the war upon


principles and with a practice most advantageous to the King; being


prepared to combine to conquer the sea for Athens, and for the King


all the Hellenes inhabiting his country, whom the Peloponnesians, on


the contrary, had come to liberate. Now it was not likely that the


Lacedaemonians would free the Hellenes from the Hellenic Athenians,


without freeing them also from the barbarian Mede, unless overthrown


by him in the meanwhile. Alcibiades therefore urged him to wear them


both out at first, and, after docking the Athenian power as much as he


could, forthwith to rid the country of the Peloponnesians. In the main


Tissaphernes approved of this policy, so far at least as could be


conjectured from his behaviour; since he now gave his confidence to


Alcibiades in recognition of his good advice, and kept the


Peloponnesians short of money, and would not let them fight at sea,


but ruined their cause by pretending that the Phoenician fleet would


arrive, and that they would thus be enabled to contend with the odds


in their favour, and so made their navy lose its efficiency, which had


been very remarkable, and generally betrayed a coolness in the war


that was too plain to be mistaken.


  Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes and the King, with


whom he then was, not merely because he thought it really the best,


but because he was studying means to effect his restoration to his


country, well knowing that if he did not destroy it he might one day


hope to persuade the Athenians to recall him, and thinking that his


best chance of persuading them lay in letting them see that he


possessed the favour of Tissaphernes. The event proved him to be


right. When the Athenians at Samos found that he had influence with


Tissaphernes, principally of their own motion (though partly also


through Alcibiades himself sending word to their chief men to tell the


best men in the army that, if there were only an oligarchy in the


place of the rascally democracy that had banished him, he would be


glad to return to his country and to make Tissaphernes their


friend), the captains and chief men in the armament at once embraced


the idea of subverting the democracy.


  The design was first mooted in the camp, and afterwards from


thence reached the city. Some persons crossed over from Samos and


had an interview with Alcibiades, who immediately offered to make


first Tissaphernes, and afterwards the King, their friend, if they


would give up the democracy and make it possible for the King to trust


them. The higher class, who also suffered most severely from the


war, now conceived great hopes of getting the government into their


own hands, and of triumphing over the enemy. Upon their return to


Samos the emissaries formed their partisans into a club, and openly


told the mass of the armament that the King would be their friend, and


would provide them with money, if Alcibiades were restored and the


democracy abolished. The multitude, if at first irritated by these


intrigues, were nevertheless kept quiet by the advantageous prospect


of the pay from the King; and the oligarchical conspirators, after


making this communication to the people, now re-examined the proposals


of Alcibiades among themselves, with most of their associates.


Unlike the rest, who thought them advantageous and trustworthy,


Phrynichus, who was still general, by no means approved of the


proposals. Alcibiades, he rightly thought, cared no more for an


oligarchy than for a democracy, and only sought to change the


institutions of his country in order to get himself recalled by his


associates; while for themselves their one object should be to avoid


civil discord. It was not the King's interest, when the Peloponnesians


were now their equals at sea, and in possession of some of the chief


cities in his empire, to go out of his way to side with the


Athenians whom he did not trust, when he might make friends of the


Peloponnesians who had never injured him. And as for the allied states


to whom oligarchy was now offered, because the democracy was to be put


down at Athens, he well knew that this would not make the rebels


come in any the sooner, or confirm the loyal in their allegiance; as


the allies would never prefer servitude with an oligarchy or democracy


to freedom with the constitution which they actually enjoyed, to


whichever type it belonged. Besides, the cities thought that the


so-called better classes would prove just as oppressive as the


commons, as being those who originated, proposed, and for the most


part benefited from the acts of the commons injurious to the


confederates. Indeed, if it depended on the better classes, the


confederates would be put to death without trial and with violence;


while the commons were their refuge and the chastiser of these men.


This he positively knew that the cities had learned by experience, and


that such was their opinion. The propositions of Alcibiades, and the


intrigues now in progress, could therefore never meet with his


approval.


  However, the members of the club assembled, agreeably to their


original determination, accepted what was proposed, and prepared to


send Pisander and others on an embassy to Athens to treat for the


restoration of Alcibiades and the abolition of the democracy in the


city, and thus to make Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians.


  Phrynichus now saw that there would be a proposal to restore


Alcibiades, and that the Athenians would consent to it; and fearing


after what he had said against it that Alcibiades, if restored,


would revenge himself upon him for his opposition, had recourse to the


following expedient. He sent a secret letter to the Lacedaemonian


admiral Astyochus, who was still in the neighbourhood of Miletus, to


tell him that Alcibiades was ruining their cause by making


Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians, and containing an express


revelation of the rest of the intrigue, desiring to be excused if he


sought to harm his enemy even at the expense of the interests of his


country. However, Astyochus, instead of thinking of punishing


Alcibiades, who, besides, no longer ventured within his reach as


formerly, went up to him and Tissaphernes at Magnesia, communicated to


them the letter from Samos, and turned informer, and, if report may be


trusted, became the paid creature of Tissaphernes, undertaking to


inform him as to this and all other matters; which was also the reason


why he did not remonstrate more strongly against the pay not being


given in full. Upon this Alcibiades instantly sent to the


authorities at Samos a letter against Phrynichus, stating what he


had done, and requiring that he should be put to death. Phrynichus


distracted, and placed in the utmost peril by the denunciation, sent


again to Astyochus, reproaching him with having so ill kept the secret


of his previous letter, and saying that he was now prepared to give


them an opportunity of destroying the whole Athenian armament at


Samos; giving a detailed account of the means which he should


employ, Samos being unfortified, and pleading that, being in danger of


his life on their account, he could not now be blamed for doing this


or anything else to escape being destroyed by his mortal enemies. This


also Astyochus revealed to Alcibiades.


  Meanwhile Phrynichus having had timely notice that he was playing


him false, and that a letter on the subject was on the point of


arriving from Alcibiades, himself anticipated the news, and told the


army that the enemy, seeing that Samos was unfortified and the fleet


not all stationed within the harbour, meant to attack the camp, that


he could be certain of this intelligence, and that they must fortify


Samos as quickly as possible, and generally look to their defences. It


will be remembered that he was general, and had himself authority to


carry out these measures. Accordingly they addressed themselves to the


work of fortification, and Samos was thus fortified sooner than it


would otherwise have been. Not long afterwards came the letter from


Alcibiades, saying that the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and the


enemy about to attack it. Alcibiades, however, gained no credit, it


being thought that he was in the secret of the enemy's designs, and


had tried to fasten them upon Phrynichus, and to make out that he


was their accomplice, out of hatred; and consequently far from hurting


him he rather bore witness to what he had said by this intelligence.


  After this Alcibiades set to work to persuade Tissaphernes to become


the friend of the Athenians. Tissaphernes, although afraid of the


Peloponnesians because they had more ships in Asia than the Athenians,


was yet disposed to be persuaded if he could, especially after his


quarrel with the Peloponnesians at Cnidus about the treaty of


Therimenes. The quarrel had already taken place, as the Peloponnesians


were by this time actually at Rhodes; and in it the original


argument of Alcibiades touching the liberation of all the towns by the


Lacedaemonians had been verified by the declaration of Lichas that


it was impossible to submit to a convention which made the King master


of all the states at any former time ruled by himself or by his


fathers.


  While Alcibiades was besieging the favour of Tissaphernes with an


earnestness proportioned to the greatness of the issue, the Athenian


envoys who had been dispatched from Samos with Pisander arrived at


Athens, and made a speech before the people, giving a brief summary of


their views, and particularly insisting that, if Alcibiades were


recalled and the democratic constitution changed, they could have


the King as their ally, and would be able to overcome the


Peloponnesians. A number of speakers opposed them on the question of


the democracy, the enemies of Alcibiades cried out against the scandal


of a restoration to be effected by a violation of the constitution,


and the Eumolpidae and Ceryces protested in behalf of the mysteries,


the cause of his banishment, and called upon the gods to avert his


recall; when Pisander, in the midst of much opposition and abuse, came


forward, and taking each of his opponents aside asked him the


following question: In the face of the fact that the Peloponnesians


had as many ships as their own confronting them at sea, more cities in


alliance with them, and the King and Tissaphernes to supply them


with money, of which the Athenians had none left, had he any hope of


saving the state, unless someone could induce the King to come over to


their side? Upon their replying that they had not, he then plainly


said to them: "This we cannot have unless we have a more moderate form


of government, and put the offices into fewer hands, and so gain the


King's confidence, and forthwith restore Alcibiades, who is the only


man living that can bring this about. The safety of the state, not the


form of its government, is for the moment the most pressing


question, as we can always change afterwards whatever we do not like."


  The people were at first highly irritated at the mention of an


oligarchy, but upon understanding clearly from Pisander that this


was the only resource left, they took counsel of their fears, and


promised themselves some day to change the government again, and


gave way. They accordingly voted that Pisander should sail with ten


others and make the best arrangement that they could with Tissaphernes


and Alcibiades. At the same time the people, upon a false accusation


of Pisander, dismissed Phrynichus from his post together with his


colleague Scironides, sending Diomedon and Leon to replace them in the


command of the fleet. The accusation was that Phrynichus had


betrayed Iasus and Amorges; and Pisander brought it because he thought


him a man unfit for the business now in hand with Alcibiades. Pisander


also went the round of all the clubs already existing in the city


for help in lawsuits and elections, and urged them to draw together


and to unite their efforts for the overthrow of the democracy; and


after taking all other measures required by the circumstances, so that


no time might be lost, set off with his ten companions on his voyage


to Tissaphernes.


  In the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had by this time joined


the fleet, made an attack upon Rhodes. The ships of the Peloponnesians


they found hauled up on shore, and, after making a descent upon the


coast and defeating the Rhodians who appeared in the field against


them, withdrew to Chalce and made that place their base of


operations instead of Cos, as they could better observe from thence if


the Peloponnesian fleet put out to sea. Meanwhile Xenophantes, a


Laconian, came to Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios, with the news that


the fortification of the Athenians was now finished, and that,


unless the whole Peloponnesian fleet came to the rescue, the cause


in Chios must be lost. Upon this they resolved to go to his relief. In


the meantime Pedaritus, with the mercenaries that he had with him


and the whole force of the Chians, made an assault upon the work round


the Athenian ships and took a portion of it, and got possession of


some vessels that were hauled up on shore, when the Athenians


sallied out to the rescue, and first routing the Chians, next defeated


the remainder of the force round Pedaritus, who was himself killed,


with many of the Chians, a great number of arms being also taken.


  After this the Chians were besieged even more straitly than before


by land and sea, and the famine in the place was great. Meanwhile


the Athenian envoys with Pisander arrived at the court of


Tissaphernes, and conferred with him about the proposed agreement.


However, Alcibiades, not being altogether sure of Tissaphernes (who


feared the Peloponnesians more than the Athenians, and besides


wished to wear out both parties, as Alcibiades himself had


recommended), had recourse to the following stratagem to make the


treaty between the Athenians and Tissaphernes miscarry by reason of


the magnitude of his demands. In my opinion Tissaphernes desired


this result, fear being his motive; while Alcibiades, who now saw that


Tissaphernes was determined not to treat on any terms, wished the


Athenians to think, not that he was unable to persuade Tissaphernes,


but that after the latter had been persuaded and was willing to join


them, they had not conceded enough to him. For the demands of


Alcibiades, speaking for Tissaphernes, who was present, were so


extravagant that the Athenians, although for a long while they


agreed to whatever he asked, yet had to bear the blame of failure:


he required the cession of the whole of Ionia, next of the islands


adjacent, besides other concessions, and these passed without


opposition; at last, in the third interview, Alcibiades, who now


feared a complete discovery of his inability, required them to allow


the King to build ships and sail along his own coast wherever and with


as many as he pleased. Upon this the Athenians would yield no further,


and concluding that there was nothing to be done, but that they had


been deceived by Alcibiades, went away in a passion and proceeded to


Samos.


  Tissaphernes immediately after this, in the same winter, proceeded


along shore to Caunus, desiring to bring the Peloponnesian fleet


back to Miletus, and to supply them with pay, making a fresh


convention upon such terms as he could get, in order not to bring


matters to an absolute breach between them. He was afraid that if many


of their ships were left without pay they would be compelled to engage


and be defeated, or that their vessels being left without hands the


Athenians would attain their objects without his assistance. Still


more he feared that the Peloponnesians might ravage the continent in


search of supplies. Having calculated and considered all this,


agreeably to his plan of keeping the two sides equal, he now sent


for the Peloponnesians and gave them pay, and concluded with them a


third treaty in words following:


    In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, while Alexippidas


was ephor at Lacedaemon, a convention was concluded in the plain of


the Maeander by the Lacedaemonians and their allies with Tissaphernes,


Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces, concerning the affairs of the


King and of the Lacedaemonians and their allies.


    1. The country of the King in Asia shall be the King's, and the


King shall treat his own country as he pleases.


    2. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not invade or


injure the King's country: neither shall the King invade or injure


that of the Lacedaemonians or of their allies. If any of the


Lacedaemonians or of their allies invade or injure the King's country,


the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall prevent it: and if any


from the King's country invade or injure the country of the


Lacedaemonians or of their allies, the King shall prevent it.


    3. Tissaphernes shall provide pay for the ships now present,


according to the agreement, until the arrival of the King's vessels:


but after the arrival of the King's vessels the Lacedaemonians and


their allies may pay their own ships if they wish it. If, however,


they choose to receive the pay from Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes shall


furnish it: and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall repay him at


the end of the war such moneys as they shall have received.


    4. After the vessels have arrived, the ships of the Lacedaemonians


and of their allies and those of the King shall carry on the war


jointly, according as Tissaphernes and the Lacedaemonians and their


allies shall think best. If they wish to make peace with the


Athenians, they shall make peace also jointly.





  This was the treaty. After this Tissaphernes prepared to bring up


the Phoenician fleet according to agreement, and to make good his


other promises, or at all events wished to make it appear that he


was so preparing.


  Winter was now drawing towards its close, when the Boeotians took


Oropus by treachery, though held by an Athenian garrison. Their


accomplices in this were some of the Eretrians and of the Oropians


themselves, who were plotting the revolt of Euboea, as the place was


exactly opposite Eretria, and while in Athenian hands was


necessarily a source of great annoyance to Eretria and the rest of


Euboea. Oropus being in their hands, the Eretrians now came to


Rhodes to invite the Peloponnesians into Euboea. The latter,


however, were rather bent on the relief of the distressed Chians,


and accordingly put out to sea and sailed with all their ships from


Rhodes. Off Triopium they sighted the Athenian fleet out at sea


sailing from Chalce, and, neither attacking the other, arrived, the


latter at Samos, the Peloponnesians at Miletus, seeing that it was


no longer possible to relieve Chios without a battle. And this


winter ended, and with it ended the twentieth year of this war of


which Thucydides is the historian.


  Early in the spring of the summer following, Dercyllidas, a Spartan,


was sent with a small force by land to the Hellespont to effect the


revolt of Abydos, which is a Milesian colony; and the Chians, while


Astyochus was at a loss how to help them, were compelled to fight at


sea by the pressure of the siege. While Astyochus was still at


Rhodes they had received from Miletus, as their commander after the


death of Pedaritus, a Spartan named Leon, who had come out with


Antisthenes, and twelve vessels which had been on guard at Miletus,


five of which were Thurian, four Syracusans, one from Anaia, one


Milesian, and one Leon's own. Accordingly the Chians marched out in


mass and took up a strong position, while thirty-six of their ships


put out and engaged thirty-two of the Athenians; and after a tough


fight, in which the Chians and their allies had rather the best of it,


as it was now late, retired to their city.


  Immediately after this Dercyllidas arrived by land from Miletus; and


Abydos in the Hellespont revolted to him and Pharnabazus, and


Lampsacus two days later. Upon receipt of this news Strombichides


hastily sailed from Chios with twenty-four Athenian ships, some


transports carrying heavy infantry being of the number, and


defeating the Lampsacenes who came out against him, took Lampsacus,


which was unfortified, at the first assault, and making prize of the


slaves and goods restored the freemen to their homes, and went on to


Abydos. The inhabitants, however, refusing to capitulate, and his


assaults failing to take the place, he sailed over to the coast


opposite, and appointed Sestos, the town in the Chersonese held by the


Medes at a former period in this history, as the centre for the


defence of the whole Hellespont.


  In the meantime the Chians commanded the sea more than before; and


the Peloponnesians at Miletus and Astyochus, hearing of the


sea-fight and of the departure of the squadron with Strombichides,


took fresh courage. Coasting along with two vessels to Chios,


Astyochus took the ships from that place, and now moved with the whole


fleet upon Samos, from whence, however, he sailed back to Miletus,


as the Athenians did not put out against him, owing to their


suspicions of one another. For it was about this time, or even before,


that the democracy was put down at Athens. When Pisander and the


envoys returned from Tissaphernes to Samos they at once strengthened


still further their interest in the army itself, and instigated the


upper class in Samos to join them in establishing an oligarchy, the


very form of government which a party of them had lately risen to


avoid. At the same time the Athenians at Samos, after a consultation


among themselves, determined to let Alcibiades alone, since he refused


to join them, and besides was not the man for an oligarchy; and now


that they were once embarked, to see for themselves how they could


best prevent the ruin of their cause, and meanwhile to sustain the


war, and to contribute without stint money and all else that might


be required from their own private estates, as they would henceforth


labour for themselves alone.


  After encouraging each other in these resolutions, they now at


once sent off half the envoys and Pisander to do what was necessary at


Athens (with instructions to establish oligarchies on their way in all


the subject cities which they might touch at), and dispatched the


other half in different directions to the other dependencies.


Diitrephes also, who was in the neighbourhood of Chios, and had been


elected to the command of the Thracian towns, was sent off to his


government, and arriving at Thasos abolished the democracy there.


Two months, however, had not elapsed after his departure before the


Thasians began to fortify their town, being already tired of an


aristocracy with Athens, and in daily expectation of freedom from


Lacedaemon. Indeed there was a party of them (whom the Athenians had


banished), with the Peloponnesians, who with their friends in the town


were already making every exertion to bring a squadron, and to


effect the revolt of Thasos; and this party thus saw exactly what they


most wanted done, that is to say, the reformation of the government


without risk, and the abolition of the democracy which would have


opposed them. Things at Thasos thus turned out just the contrary to


what the oligarchical conspirators at Athens expected; and the same in


my opinion was the case in many of the other dependencies; as the


cities no sooner got a moderate government and liberty of action, than


they went on to absolute freedom without being at all seduced by the


show of reform offered by the Athenians.


  Pisander and his colleagues on their voyage alongshore abolished, as


had been determined, the democracies in the cities, and also took some


heavy infantry from certain places as their allies, and so came to


Athens. Here they found most of the work already done by their


associates. Some of the younger men had banded together, and


secretly assassinated one Androcles, the chief leader of the


commons, and mainly responsible for the banishment of Alcibiades;


Androcles being singled out both because he was a popular leader and


because they sought by his death to recommend themselves to


Alcibiades, who was, as they supposed, to be recalled, and to make


Tissaphernes their friend. There were also some other obnoxious


persons whom they secretly did away with in the same manner. Meanwhile


their cry in public was that no pay should be given except to


persons serving in the war, and that not more than five thousand


should share in the government, and those such as were most able to


serve the state in person and in purse.


  But this was a mere catchword for the multitude, as the authors of


the revolution were really to govern. However, the Assembly and the


Council of the Bean still met notwithstanding, although they discussed


nothing that was not approved of by the conspirators, who both


supplied the speakers and reviewed in advance what they were to say.


Fear, and the sight of the numbers of the conspirators, closed the


mouths of the rest; or if any ventured to rise in opposition, he was


presently put to death in some convenient way, and there was neither


search for the murderers nor justice to be had against them if


suspected; but the people remained motionless, being so thoroughly


cowed that men thought themselves lucky to escape violence, even


when they held their tongues. An exaggerated belief in the numbers


of the conspirators also demoralized the people, rendered helpless


by the magnitude of the city, and by their want of intelligence with


each other, and being without means of finding out what those


numbers really were. For the same reason it was impossible for any one


to open his grief to a neighbour and to concert measures to defend


himself, as he would have had to speak either to one whom he did not


know, or whom he knew but did not trust. Indeed all the popular


party approached each other with suspicion, each thinking his


neighbour concerned in what was going on, the conspirators having in


their ranks persons whom no one could ever have believed capable of


joining an oligarchy; and these it was who made the many so


suspicious, and so helped to procure impunity for the few, by


confirming the commons in their mistrust of one another.


  At this juncture arrived Pisander and his colleagues, who lost no


time in doing the rest. First they assembled the people, and moved


to elect ten commissioners with full powers to frame a constitution,


and that when this was done they should on an appointed day lay before


the people their opinion as to the best mode of governing the city.


Afterwards, when the day arrived, the conspirators enclosed the


assembly in Colonus, a temple of Poseidon, a little more than a mile


outside the city; when the commissioners simply brought forward this


single motion, that any Athenian might propose with impunity


whatever measure he pleased, heavy penalties being imposed upon any


who should indict for illegality, or otherwise molest him for so


doing. The way thus cleared, it was now plainly declared that all


tenure of office and receipt of pay under the existing institutions


were at an end, and that five men must be elected as presidents, who


should in their turn elect one hundred, and each of the hundred


three apiece; and that this body thus made up to four hundred should


enter the council chamber with full powers and govern as they judged


best, and should convene the five thousand whenever they pleased.


  The man who moved this resolution was Pisander, who was throughout


the chief ostensible agent in putting down the democracy. But he who


concerted the whole affair, and prepared the way for the


catastrophe, and who had given the greatest thought to the matter, was


Antiphon, one of the best men of his day in Athens; who, with a head


to contrive measures and a tongue to recommend them, did not willingly


come forward in the assembly or upon any public scene, being ill


looked upon by the multitude owing to his reputation for talent; and


who yet was the one man best able to aid in the courts, or before


the assembly, the suitors who required his opinion. Indeed, when he


was afterwards himself tried for his life on the charge of having been


concerned in setting up this very government, when the Four Hundred


were overthrown and hardly dealt with by the commons, he made what


would seem to be the best defence of any known up to my time.


Phrynichus also went beyond all others in his zeal for the


oligarchy. Afraid of Alcibiades, and assured that he was no stranger


to his intrigues with Astyochus at Samos, he held that no oligarchy


was ever likely to restore him, and once embarked in the enterprise,


proved, where danger was to be faced, by far the staunchest of them


all. Theramenes, son of Hagnon, was also one of the foremost of the


subverters of the democracy- a man as able in council as in debate.


Conducted by so many and by such sagacious heads, the enterprise,


great as it was, not unnaturally went forward; although it was no


light matter to deprive the Athenian people of its freedom, almost a


hundred years after the deposition of the tyrants, when it had been


not only not subject to any during the whole of that period, but


accustomed during more than half of it to rule over subjects of its


own.


  The assembly ratified the proposed constitution, without a single


opposing voice, and was then dissolved; after which the Four Hundred


were brought into the council chamber in the following way. On account


of the enemy at Decelea, all the Athenians were constantly on the wall


or in the ranks at the various military posts. On that day the persons


not in the secret were allowed to go home as usual, while orders


were given to the accomplices of the conspirators to hang about,


without making any demonstration, at some little distance from the


posts, and in case of any opposition to what was being done, to


seize the arms and put it down. There were also some Andrians and


Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and some of the settlers in


Aegina come with their own arms for this very purpose, who had


received similar instructions. These dispositions completed, the


Four Hundred went, each with a dagger concealed about his person,


accompanied by one hundred and twenty Hellenic youths, whom they


employed wherever violence was needed, and appeared before the


Councillors of the Bean in the council chamber, and told them to


take their pay and be gone; themselves bringing it for the whole of


the residue of their term of office, and giving it to them as they


went out.


  Upon the Council withdrawing in this way without venturing any


objection, and the rest of the citizens making no movement, the Four


Hundred entered the council chamber, and for the present contented


themselves with drawing lots for their Prytanes, and making their


prayers and sacrifices to the gods upon entering office, but


afterwards departed widely from the democratic system of government,


and except that on account of Alcibiades they did not recall the


exiles, ruled the city by force; putting to death some men, though not


many, whom they thought it convenient to remove, and imprisoning and


banishing others. They also sent to Agis, the Lacedaemonian king, at


Decelea, to say that they desired to make peace, and that he might


reasonably be more disposed to treat now that he had them to deal with


instead of the inconstant commons.


  Agis, however, did not believe in the tranquillity of the city, or


that the commons would thus in a moment give up their ancient liberty,


but thought that the sight of a large Lacedaemonian force would be


sufficient to excite them if they were not already in commotion, of


which he was by no means certain. He accordingly gave to the envoys of


the Four Hundred an answer which held out no hopes of an


accommodation, and sending for large reinforcements from


Peloponnese, not long afterwards, with these and his garrison from


Decelea, descended to the very walls of Athens; hoping either that


civil disturbances might help to subdue them to his terms, or that, in


the confusion to be expected within and without the city, they might


even surrender without a blow being struck; at all events he thought


he would succeed in seizing the Long Walls, bared of their


defenders. However, the Athenians saw him come close up, without


making the least disturbance within the city; and sending out their


cavalry, and a number of their heavy infantry, light troops, and


archers, shot down some of his soldiers who approached too near, and


got possession of some arms and dead. Upon this Agis, at last


convinced, led his army back again and, remaining with his own


troops in the old position at Decelea, sent the reinforcement back


home, after a few days' stay in Attica. After this the Four Hundred


persevering sent another embassy to Agis, and now meeting with a


better reception, at his suggestion dispatched envoys to Lacedaemon to


negotiate a treaty, being desirous of making peace.


  They also sent ten men to Samos to reassure the army, and to explain


that the oligarchy was not established for the hurt of the city or the


citizens, but for the salvation of the country at large; and that


there were five thousand, not four hundred only, concerned;


although, what with their expeditions and employments abroad, the


Athenians had never yet assembled to discuss a question important


enough to bring five thousand of them together. The emissaries were


also told what to say upon all other points, and were so sent off


immediately after the establishment of the new government, which


feared, as it turned out justly, that the mass of seamen would not


be willing to remain under the oligarchical constitution, and, the


evil beginning there, might be the means of their overthrow.


  Indeed at Samos the question of the oligarchy had already entered


upon a new phase, the following events having taken place just at


the time that the Four Hundred were conspiring. That part of the


Samian population which has been mentioned as rising against the upper


class, and as being the democratic party, had now turned round, and


yielding to the solicitations of Pisander during his visit, and of the


Athenians in the conspiracy at Samos, had bound themselves by oaths to


the number of three hundred, and were about to fall upon the rest of


their fellow citizens, whom they now in their turn regarded as the


democratic party. Meanwhile they put to death one Hyperbolus, an


Athenian, a pestilent fellow that had been ostracized, not from fear


of his influence or position, but because he was a rascal and a


disgrace to the city; being aided in this by Charminus, one of the


generals, and by some of the Athenians with them, to whom they had


sworn friendship, and with whom they perpetrated other acts of the


kind, and now determined to attack the people. The latter got wind


of what was coming, and told two of the generals, Leon and Diomedon,


who, on account of the credit which they enjoyed with the commons,


were unwilling supporters of the oligarchy; and also Thrasybulus and


Thrasyllus, the former a captain of a galley, the latter serving


with the heavy infantry, besides certain others who had ever been


thought most opposed to the conspirators, entreating them not to


look on and see them destroyed, and Samos, the sole remaining stay


of their empire, lost to the Athenians. Upon hearing this, the persons


whom they addressed now went round the soldiers one by one, and


urged them to resist, especially the crew of the Paralus, which was


made up entirely of Athenians and freemen, and had from time out of


mind been enemies of oligarchy, even when there was no such thing


existing; and Leon and Diomedon left behind some ships for their


protection in case of their sailing away anywhere themselves.


Accordingly, when the Three Hundred attacked the people, all these


came to the rescue, and foremost of all the crew of the Paralus; and


the Samian commons gained the victory, and putting to death some


thirty of the Three Hundred, and banishing three others of the


ringleaders, accorded an amnesty to the rest. and lived together under


a democratic government for the future.


  The ship Paralus, with Chaereas, son of Archestratus, on board, an


Athenian who had taken an active part in the revolution, was now


without loss of time sent off by the Samians and the army to Athens to


report what had occurred; the fact that the Four Hundred were in power


not being yet known. When they sailed into harbour the Four Hundred


immediately arrested two or three of the Parali and, taking the vessel


from the rest, shifted them into a troopship and set them to keep


guard round Euboea. Chaereas, however, managed to secrete himself as


soon as he saw how things stood, and returning to Samos, drew a


picture to the soldiers of the horrors enacting at Athens, in which


everything was exaggerated; saying that all were punished with


stripes, that no one could say a word against the holders of power,


that the soldiers' wives and children were outraged, and that it was


intended to seize and shut up the relatives of all in the army at


Samos who were not of the government's way of thinking, to be put to


death in case of their disobedience; besides a host of other injurious


inventions.


  On hearing this the first thought of the army was to fall upon the


chief authors of the oligarchy and upon all the rest concerned.


Eventually, however, they desisted from this idea upon the men of


moderate views opposing it and warning them against ruining their


cause, with the enemy close at hand and ready for battle. After


this, Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, the chief leaders


in the revolution, now wishing in the most public manner to change the


government at Samos to a democracy, bound all the soldiers by the most


tremendous oaths, and those of the oligarchical party more than any,


to accept a democratic government, to be united, to prosecute actively


the war with the Peloponnesians, and to be enemies of the Four


Hundred, and to hold no communication with them. The same oath was


also taken by all the Samians of full age; and the soldiers associated


the Samians in all their affairs and in the fruits of their dangers,


having the conviction that there was no way of escape for themselves


or for them, but that the success of the Four Hundred or of the


enemy at Miletus must be their ruin.


  The struggle now was between the army trying to force a democracy


upon the city, and the Four Hundred an oligarchy upon the camp.


Meanwhile the soldiers forthwith held an assembly, in which they


deposed the former generals and any of the captains whom they


suspected, and chose new captains and generals to replace them,


besides Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, whom they had already. They also


stood up and encouraged one another, and among other things urged that


they ought not to lose heart because the city had revolted from


them, as the party seceding was smaller and in every way poorer in


resources than themselves. They had the whole fleet with which to


compel the other cities in their empire to give them money just as


if they had their base in the capital, having a city in Samos which,


so far from wanting strength, had when at war been within an ace of


depriving the Athenians of the command of the sea, while as far as the


enemy was concerned they had the same base of operations as before.


Indeed, with the fleet in their hands, they were better able to


provide themselves with supplies than the government at home. It was


their advanced position at Samos which had throughout enabled the home


authorities to command the entrance into Piraeus; and if they


refused to give them back the constitution, they would now find that


the army was more in a position to exclude them from the sea than they


were to exclude the army. Besides, the city was of little or no use


towards enabling them to overcome the enemy; and they had lost nothing


in losing those who had no longer either money to send them (the


soldiers having to find this for themselves), or good counsel, which


entitles cities to direct armies. On the contrary, even in this the


home government had done wrong in abolishing the institutions of their


ancestors, while the army maintained the said institutions, and


would try to force the home government to do so likewise. So that even


in point of good counsel the camp had as good counsellors as the city.


Moreover, they had but to grant him security for his person and his


recall, and Alcibiades would be only too glad to procure them the


alliance of the King. And above all if they failed altogether, with


the navy which they possessed, they had numbers of places to retire to


in which they would find cities and lands.


  Debating together and comforting themselves after this manner,


they pushed on their war measures as actively as ever; and the ten


envoys sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, learning how matters stood


while they were still at Delos, stayed quiet there.


  About this time a cry arose among the soldiers in the


Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus that Astyochus and Tissaphernes were


ruining their cause. Astyochus had not been willing to fight at


sea- either before, while they were still in full vigour and the


fleet of the Athenians small, or now, when the enemy was, as they were


informed, in a state of sedition and his ships not yet united- but


kept them waiting for the Phoenician fleet from Tissaphernes, which


had only a nominal existence, at the risk of wasting away in


inactivity. While Tissaphernes not only did not bring up the fleet in


question, but was ruining their navy by payments made irregularly, and


even then not made in full. They must therefore, they insisted, delay


no longer, but fight a decisive naval engagement. The Syracusans were


the most urgent of any.


  The confederates and Astyochus, aware of these murmurs, had


already decided in council to fight a decisive battle; and when the


news reached them of the disturbance at Samos, they put to sea with


all their ships, one hundred and ten in number, and, ordering the


Milesians to move by land upon Mycale, set sail thither. The Athenians


with the eighty-two ships from Samos were at the moment lying at


Glauce in Mycale, a point where Samos approaches near to the


continent; and, seeing the Peloponnesian fleet sailing against them,


retired into Samos, not thinking themselves numerically strong


enough to stake their all upon a battle. Besides, they had notice from


Miletus of the wish of the enemy to engage, and were expecting to be


joined from the Hellespont by Strombichides, to whom a messenger had


been already dispatched, with the ships that had gone from Chios to


Abydos. The Athenians accordingly withdrew to Samos, and the


Peloponnesians put in at Mycale, and encamped with the land forces


of the Milesians and the people of the neighbourhood. The next day


they were about to sail against Samos, when tidings reached them of


the arrival of Strombichides with the squadron from the Hellespont,


upon which they immediately sailed back to Miletus. The Athenians,


thus reinforced, now in their turn sailed against Miletus with a


hundred and eight ships, wishing to fight a decisive battle, but, as


no one put out to meet them, sailed back to Samos.


                          CHAPTER XXVI.





       Twenty-first Year of the War - Recall of Alcibiades


            to Samos - Revolt of Euboea and Downfall


            of the Four Hundred - Battle of Cynossema





  IN the same summer, immediately after this, the Peloponnesians


having refused to fight with their fleet united, through not


thinking themselves a match for the enemy, and being at a loss where


to look for money for such a number of ships, especially as


Tissaphernes proved so bad a paymaster, sent off Clearchus, son of


Ramphias, with forty ships to Pharnabazus, agreeably to the original


instructions from Peloponnese; Pharnabazus inviting them and being


prepared to furnish pay, and Byzantium besides sending offers to


revolt to them. These Peloponnesian ships accordingly put out into the


open sea, in order to escape the observation of the Athenians, and


being overtaken by a storm, the majority with Clearchus got into


Delos, and afterwards returned to Miletus, whence Clearchus


proceeded by land to the Hellespont to take the command: ten, however,


of their number, under the Megarian Helixus, made good their passage


to the Hellespont, and effected the revolt of Byzantium. After this,


the commanders at Samos were informed of it, and sent a squadron


against them to guard the Hellespont; and an encounter took place


before Byzantium between eight vessels on either side.


  Meanwhile the chiefs at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus, who


from the moment that he had changed the government had remained firmly


resolved to recall Alcibiades, at last in an assembly brought over the


mass of the soldiery, and upon their voting for his recall and


amnesty, sailed over to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades to


Samos, being convinced that their only chance of salvation lay in


his bringing over Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians to


themselves. An assembly was then held in which Alcibiades complained


of and deplored his private misfortune in having been banished, and


speaking at great length upon public affairs, highly incited their


hopes for the future, and extravagantly magnified his own influence


with Tissaphernes. His object in this was to make the oligarchical


government at Athens afraid of him, to hasten the dissolution of the


clubs, to increase his credit with the army at Samos and heighten


their own confidence, and lastly to prejudice the enemy as strongly as


possible against Tissaphernes, and blast the hopes which they


entertained. Alcibiades accordingly held out to the army such


extravagant promises as the following: that Tissaphernes had


solemnly assured him that if he could only trust the Athenians they


should never want for supplies while he had anything left, no, not


even if he should have to coin his own silver couch, and that he would


bring the Phoenician fleet now at Aspendus to the Athenians instead of


to the Peloponnesians; but that he could only trust the Athenians if


Alcibiades were recalled to be his security for them.


  Upon hearing this and much more besides, the Athenians at once


elected him general together with the former ones, and put all their


affairs into his hands. There was now not a man in the army who


would have exchanged his present hopes of safety and vengeance upon


the Four Hundred for any consideration whatever; and after what they


had been told they were now inclined to disdain the enemy before them,


and to sail at once for Piraeus. To the plan of sailing for Piraeus,


leaving their more immediate enemies behind them, Alcibiades opposed


the most positive refusal, in spite of the numbers that insisted


upon it, saying that now that he had been elected general he would


first sail to Tissaphernes and concert with him measures for


carrying on the war. Accordingly, upon leaving this assembly, he


immediately took his departure in order to have it thought that


there was an entire confidence between them, and also wishing to


increase his consideration with Tissaphernes, and to show that he


had now been elected general and was in a position to do him good or


evil as he chose; thus managing to frighten the Athenians with


Tissaphernes and Tissaphernes with the Athenians.


  Meanwhile the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of the recall of


Alcibiades and, already distrustful of Tissaphernes, now became far


more disgusted with him than ever. Indeed after their refusal to go


out and give battle to the Athenians when they appeared before


Miletus, Tissaphernes had grown slacker than ever in his payments; and


even before this, on account of Alcibiades, his unpopularity had


been on the increase. Gathering together, just as before, the soldiers


and some persons of consideration besides the soldiery began to reckon


up how they had never yet received their pay in full; that what they


did receive was small in quantity, and even that paid irregularly, and


that unless they fought a decisive battle or removed to some station


where they could get supplies, the ships' crews would desert; and that


it was all the fault of Astyochus, who humoured Tissaphernes for his


own private advantage.


  The army was engaged in these reflections, when the following


disturbance took place about the person of Astyochus. Most of the


Syracusan and Thurian sailors were freemen, and these the freest crews


in the armament were likewise the boldest in setting upon Astyochus


and demanding their pay. The latter answered somewhat stiffly and


threatened them, and when Dorieus spoke up for his own sailors even


went so far as to lift his baton against him; upon seeing which the


mass of men, in sailor fashion, rushed in a fury to strike


Astyochus. He, however, saw them in time and fled for refuge to an


altar; and they were thus parted without his being struck. Meanwhile


the fort built by Tissaphernes in Miletus was surprised and taken by


the Milesians, and the garrison in it turned out- an act which met


with the approval of the rest of the allies, and in particular of the


Syracusans, but which found no favour with Lichas, who said moreover


that the Milesians and the rest in the King's country ought to show


a reasonable submission to Tissaphernes and to pay him court, until


the war should be happily settled. The Milesians were angry with him


for this and for other things of the kind, and upon his afterwards


dying of sickness, would not allow him to be buried where the


Lacedaemonians with the army desired.


  The discontent of the army with Astyochus and Tissaphernes had


reached this pitch, when Mindarus arrived from Lacedaemon to succeed


Astyochus as admiral, and assumed the command. Astyochus now set


sail for home; and Tissaphernes sent with him one of his confidants,


Gaulites, a Carian, who spoke the two languages, to complain of the


Milesians for the affair of the fort, and at the same time to defend


himself against the Milesians, who were, as he was aware, on their way


to Sparta chiefly to denounce his conduct, and had with them


Hermocrates, who was to accuse Tissaphernes of joining with Alcibiades


to ruin the Peloponnesian cause and of playing a double game. Indeed


Hermocrates had always been at enmity with him about the pay not being


restored in full; and eventually when he was banished from Syracuse,


and new commanders- Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus- had come out to


Miletus to the ships of the Syracusans, Tissaphernes, pressed harder


than ever upon him in his exile, and among other charges against him


accused him of having once asked him for money, and then given himself


out as his enemy because he failed to obtain it.


  While Astyochus and the Milesians and Hermocrates made sail for


Lacedaemon, Alcibiades had now crossed back from Tissaphernes to


Samos. After his return the envoys of the Four Hundred sent, as has


been mentioned above, to pacify and explain matters to the forces at


Samos, arrived from Delos; and an assembly was held in which they


attempted to speak. The soldiers at first would not hear them, and


cried out to put to death the subverters of the democracy, but at


last, after some difficulty, calmed down and gave them a hearing. Upon


this the envoys proceeded to inform them that the recent change had


been made to save the city, and not to ruin it or to deliver it over


to the enemy, for they had already had an opportunity of doing this


when he invaded the country during their government; that all the Five


Thousand would have their proper share in the government; and that


their hearers' relatives had neither outrage, as Chaereas had


slanderously reported, nor other ill treatment to complain of, but


were all in undisturbed enjoyment of their property just as they had


left them. Besides these they made a number of other statements


which had no better success with their angry auditors; and amid a host


of different opinions the one which found most favour was that of


sailing to Piraeus. Now it was that Alcibiades for the first time


did the state a service, and one of the most signal kind. For when the


Athenians at Samos were bent upon sailing against their countrymen, in


which case Ionia and the Hellespont would most certainly at once


have passed into possession of the enemy, Alcibiades it was who


prevented them. At that moment, when no other man would have been able


to hold back the multitude, he put a stop to the intended


expedition, and rebuked and turned aside the resentment felt, on


personal grounds, against the envoys; he dismissed them with an answer


from himself, to the effect that he did not object to the government


of the Five Thousand, but insisted that the Four Hundred should be


deposed and the Council of Five Hundred reinstated in power: meanwhile


any retrenchments for economy, by which pay might be better found


for the armament, met with his entire approval. Generally, he bade


them hold out and show a bold face to the enemy, since if the city


were saved there was good hope that the two parties might some day


be reconciled, whereas if either were once destroyed, that at Samos,


or that at Athens, there would no longer be any one to be reconciled


to. Meanwhile arrived envoys from the Argives, with offers of


support to the Athenian commons at Samos: these were thanked by


Alcibiades, and dismissed with a request to come when called upon. The


Argives were accompanied by the crew of the Paralus, whom we left


placed in a troopship by the Four Hundred with orders to cruise


round Euboea, and who being employed to carry to Lacedaemon some


Athenian envoys sent by the Four Hundred- Laespodias, Aristophon, and


Melesias- as they sailed by Argos laid hands upon the envoys, and


delivering them over to the Argives as the chief subverters of the


democracy, themselves, instead of returning to Athens, took the Argive


envoys on board, and came to Samos in the galley which had been


confided to them.


  The same summer at the time that the return of Alcibiades coupled


with the general conduct of Tissaphernes had carried to its height the


discontent of the Peloponnesians, who no longer entertained any


doubt of his having joined the Athenians, Tissaphernes wishing, it


would seem, to clear himself to them of these charges, prepared to


go after the Phoenician fleet to Aspendus, and invited Lichas to go


with him; saying that he would appoint Tamos as his lieutenant to


provide pay for the armament during his own absence. Accounts


differ, and it is not easy to ascertain with what intention he went to


Aspendus, and did not bring the fleet after all. That one hundred


and forty-seven Phoenician ships came as far as Aspendus is certain;


but why they did not come on has been variously accounted for. Some


think that he went away in pursuance of his plan of wasting the


Peloponnesian resources, since at any rate Tamos, his lieutenant,


far from being any better, proved a worse paymaster than himself:


others that he brought the Phoenicians to Aspendus to exact money from


them for their discharge, having never intended to employ them: others


again that it was in view of the outcry against him at Lacedaemon,


in order that it might be said that he was not in fault, but that


the ships were really manned and that he had certainly gone to fetch


them. To myself it seems only too evident that he did not bring up the


fleet because he wished to wear out and paralyse the Hellenic


forces, that is, to waste their strength by the time lost during his


journey to Aspendus, and to keep them evenly balanced by not


throwing his weight into either scale. Had he wished to finish the


war, he could have done so, assuming of course that he made his


appearance in a way which left no room for doubt; as by bringing up


the fleet he would in all probability have given the victory to the


Lacedaemonians, whose navy, even as it was, faced the Athenian more as


an equal than as an inferior. But what convicts him most clearly, is


the excuse which he put forward for not bringing the ships. He said


that the number assembled was less than the King had ordered; but


surely it would only have enhanced his credit if he spent little of


the King's money and effected the same end at less cost. In any


case, whatever was his intention, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and


saw the Phoenicians; and the Peloponnesians at his desire sent a


Lacedaemonian called Philip with two galleys to fetch the fleet.


  Alcibiades finding that Tissaphernes had gone to Aspendus, himself


sailed thither with thirteen ships, promising to do a great and


certain service to the Athenians at Samos, as he would either bring


the Phoenician fleet to the Athenians, or at all events prevent its


joining the Peloponnesians. In all probability he had long known


that Tissaphernes never meant to bring the fleet at all, and wished to


compromise him as much as possible in the eyes of the Peloponnesians


through his apparent friendship for himself and the Athenians, and


thus in a manner to oblige him to join their side.


  While Alcibiades weighed anchor and sailed eastward straight for


Phaselis and Caunus, the envoys sent by the Four Hundred to Samos


arrived at Athens. Upon their delivering the message from


Alcibiades, telling them to hold out and to show a firm front to the


enemy, and saying that he had great hopes of reconciling them with the


army and of overcoming the Peloponnesians, the majority of the members


of the oligarchy, who were already discontented and only too much


inclined to be quit of the business in any safe way that they could,


were at once greatly strengthened in their resolve. These now banded


together and strongly criticized the administration, their leaders


being some of the principal generals and men in office under the


oligarchy, such as Theramenes, son of Hagnon, Aristocrates, son of


Scellias, and others; who, although among the most prominent members


of the government (being afraid, as they said, of the army at Samos,


and most especially of Alcibiades, and also lest the envoys whom


they had sent to Lacedaemon might do the state some harm without the


authority of the people), without insisting on objections to the


excessive concentration of power in a few hands, yet urged that the


Five Thousand must be shown to exist not merely in name but in


reality, and the constitution placed upon a fairer basis. But this was


merely their political cry; most of them being driven by private


ambition into the line of conduct so surely fatal to oligarchies


that arise out of democracies. For all at once pretend to be not


only equals but each the chief and master of his fellows; while


under a democracy a disappointed candidate accepts his defeat more


easily, because he has not the humiliation of being beaten by his


equals. But what most clearly encouraged the malcontents was the power


of Alcibiades at Samos, and their own disbelief in the stability of


the oligarchy; and it was now a race between them as to which should


first become the leader of the commons.


  Meanwhile the leaders and members of the Four Hundred most opposed


to a democratic form of government- Phrynichus who had had the


quarrel with Alcibiades during his command at Samos, Aristarchus the


bitter and inveterate enemy of the commons, and Pisander and


Antiphon and others of the chiefs who already as soon as they


entered upon power, and again when the army at Samos seceded from them


and declared for a democracy, had sent envoys from their own body to


Lacedaemon and made every effort for peace, and had built the wall


in Eetionia- now redoubled their exertions when their envoys returned


from Samos, and they saw not only the people but their own most


trusted associates turning against them. Alarmed at the state of


things at Athens as at Samos, they now sent off in haste Antiphon


and Phrynichus and ten others with injunctions to make peace with


Lacedaemon upon any terms, no matter what, that should be at all


tolerable. Meanwhile they pushed on more actively than ever with the


wall in Eetionia. Now the meaning of this wall, according to


Theramenes and his supporters, was not so much to keep out the army of


Samos, in case of its trying to force its way into Piraeus, as to be


able to let in, at pleasure, the fleet and army of the enemy. For


Eetionia is a mole of Piraeus, close alongside of the entrance of


the harbour, and was now fortified in connection with the wall already


existing on the land side, so that a few men placed in it might be


able to command the entrance; the old wall on the land side and the


new one now being built within on the side of the sea, both ending


in one of the two towers standing at the narrow mouth of the


harbour. They also walled off the largest porch in Piraeus which was


in immediate connection with this wall, and kept it in their own


hands, compelling all to unload there the corn that came into the


harbour, and what they had in stock, and to take it out from thence


when they sold it.


  These measures had long provoked the murmurs of Theramenes, and when


the envoys returned from Lacedaemon without having effected any


general pacification, he affirmed that this wall was like to prove the


ruin of the state. At this moment forty-two ships from Peloponnese,


including some Siceliot and Italiot vessels from Locri and Tarentum,


had been invited over by the Euboeans and were already riding off


Las in Laconia preparing for the voyage to Euboea, under the command


of Agesandridas, son of Agesander, a Spartan. Theramenes now


affirmed that this squadron was destined not so much to aid Euboea


as the party fortifying Eetionia, and that unless precautions were


speedily taken the city would be surprised and lost. This was no


mere calumny, there being really some such plan entertained by the


accused. Their first wish was to have the oligarchy without giving


up the empire; failing this to keep their ships and walls and be


independent; while, if this also were denied them, sooner than be


the first victims of the restored democracy, they were resolved to


call in the enemy and make peace, give up their walls and ships, and


at all costs retain possession of the government, if their lives


were only assured to them.


  For this reason they pushed forward the construction of their work


with posterns and entrances and means of introducing the enemy,


being eager to have it finished in time. Meanwhile the murmurs against


them were at first confined to a few persons and went on in secret,


until Phrynichus, after his return from the embassy to Lacedaemon, was


laid wait for and stabbed in full market by one of the Peripoli,


falling down dead before he had gone far from the council chamber. The


assassin escaped; but his accomplice, an Argive, was taken and put


to the torture by the Four Hundred, without their being able to


extract from him the name of his employer, or anything further than


that he knew of many men who used to assemble at the house of the


commander of the Peripoli and at other houses. Here the matter was


allowed to drop. This so emboldened Theramenes and Aristocrates and


the rest of their partisans in the Four Hundred and out of doors, that


they now resolved to act. For by this time the ships had sailed


round from Las, and anchoring at Epidaurus had overrun Aegina; and


Theramenes asserted that, being bound for Euboea, they would never


have sailed in to Aegina and come back to anchor at Epidaurus,


unless they had been invited to come to aid in the designs of which he


had always accused the government. Further inaction had therefore


now become impossible. In the end, after a great many seditious


harangues and suspicions, they set to work in real earnest. The


heavy infantry in Piraeus building the wall in Eetionia, among whom


was Aristocrates, a colonel, with his own tribe, laid hands upon


Alexicles, a general under the oligarchy and the devoted adherent of


the cabal, and took him into a house and confined him there. In this


they were assisted by one Hermon, commander of the Peripoli in


Munychia, and others, and above all had with them the great bulk of


the heavy infantry. As soon as the news reached the Four Hundred,


who happened to be sitting in the council chamber, all except the


disaffected wished at once to go to the posts where the arms were, and


menaced Theramenes and his party. Theramenes defended himself, and


said that he was ready immediately to go and help to rescue Alexicles;


and taking with him one of the generals belonging to his party, went


down to Piraeus, followed by Aristarchus and some young men of the


cavalry. All was now panic and confusion. Those in the city imagined


that Piraeus was already taken and the prisoner put to death, while


those in Piraeus expected every moment to be attacked by the party


in the city. The older men, however, stopped the persons running up


and down the town and making for the stands of arms; and Thucydides


the Pharsalian, proxenus of the city, came forward and threw himself


in the way of the rival factions, and appealed to them not to ruin the


state, while the enemy was still at hand waiting for his


opportunity, and so at length succeeded in quieting them and in


keeping their hands off each other. Meanwhile Theramenes came down


to Piraeus, being himself one of the generals, and raged and stormed


against the heavy infantry, while Aristarchus and the adversaries of


the people were angry in right earnest. Most of the heavy infantry,


however, went on with the business without faltering, and asked


Theramenes if he thought the wall had been constructed for any good


purpose, and whether it would not be better that it should be pulled


down. To this he answered that if they thought it best to pull it


down, he for his part agreed with them. Upon this the heavy infantry


and a number of the people in Piraeus immediately got up on the


fortification and began to demolish it. Now their cry to the multitude


was that all should join in the work who wished the Five Thousand to


govern instead of the Four Hundred. For instead of saying in so many


words "all who wished the commons to govern," they still disguised


themselves under the name of the Five Thousand; being afraid that


these might really exist, and that they might be speaking to one of


their number and get into trouble through ignorance. Indeed this was


why the Four Hundred neither wished the Five Thousand to exist, nor to


have it known that they did not exist; being of opinion that to give


themselves so many partners in empire would be downright democracy,


while the mystery in question would make the people afraid of one


another.


  The next day the Four Hundred, although alarmed, nevertheless


assembled in the council chamber, while the heavy infantry in Piraeus,


after having released their prisoner Alexicles and pulled down the


fortification, went with their arms to the theatre of Dionysus,


close to Munychia, and there held an assembly in which they decided to


march into the city, and setting forth accordingly halted in the


Anaceum. Here they were joined by some delegates from the Four


Hundred, who reasoned with them one by one, and persuaded those whom


they saw to be the most moderate to remain quiet themselves, and to


keep in the rest; saying that they would make known the Five Thousand,


and have the Four Hundred chosen from them in rotation, as should be


decided by the Five Thousand, and meanwhile entreated them not to ruin


the state or drive it into the arms of the enemy. After a great many


had spoken and had been spoken to, the whole body of heavy infantry


became calmer than before, absorbed by their fears for the country


at large, and now agreed to hold upon an appointed day an assembly


in the theatre of Dionysus for the restoration of concord.


  When the day came for the assembly in the theatre, and they were


upon the point of assembling, news arrived that the forty-two ships


under Agesandridas were sailing from Megara along the coast of


Salamis. The people to a man now thought that it was just what


Theramenes and his party had so often said, that the ships were


sailing to the fortification, and concluded that they had done well to


demolish it. But though it may possibly have been by appointment


that Agesandridas hovered about Epidaurus and the neighbourhood, he


would also naturally be kept there by the hope of an opportunity


arising out of the troubles in the town. In any case the Athenians, on


receipt of the news immediately ran down in mass to Piraeus, seeing


themselves threatened by the enemy with a worse war than their war


among themselves, not at a distance, but close to the harbour of


Athens. Some went on board the ships already afloat, while others


launched fresh vessels, or ran to defend the walls and the mouth of


the harbour.


  Meanwhile the Peloponnesian vessels sailed by, and rounding Sunium


anchored between Thoricus and Prasiae, and afterwards arrived at


Oropus. The Athenians, with revolution in the city, and unwilling to


lose a moment in going to the relief of their most important


possession (for Euboea was everything to them now that they were


shut out from Attica), were compelled to put to sea in haste and


with untrained crews, and sent Thymochares with some vessels to


Eretria. These upon their arrival, with the ships already in Euboea,


made up a total of thirty-six vessels, and were immediately forced


to engage. For Agesandridas, after his crews had dined, put out from


Oropus, which is about seven miles from Eretria by sea; and the


Athenians, seeing him sailing up, immediately began to man their


vessels. The sailors, however, instead of being by their ships, as


they supposed, were gone away to purchase provisions for their


dinner in the houses in the outskirts of the town; the Eretrians


having so arranged that there should be nothing on sale in the


marketplace, in order that the Athenians might be a long time in


manning their ships, and, the enemy's attack taking them by


surprise, might be compelled to put to sea just as they were. A signal


also was raised in Eretria to give them notice in Oropus when to put


to sea. The Athenians, forced to put out so poorly prepared, engaged


off the harbour of Eretria, and after holding their own for some


little while notwithstanding, were at length put to flight and


chased to the shore. Such of their number as took refuge in Eretria,


which they presumed to be friendly to them, found their fate in that


city, being butchered by the inhabitants; while those who fled to


the Athenian fort in the Eretrian territory, and the vessels which got


to Chalcis, were saved. The Peloponnesians, after taking twenty-two


Athenian ships, and killing or making prisoners of the crews, set up a


trophy, and not long afterwards effected the revolt of the whole of


Euboea (except Oreus, which was held by the Athenians themselves), and


made a general settlement of the affairs of the island.


  When the news of what had happened in Euboea reached Athens, a panic


ensued such as they had never before known. Neither the disaster in


Sicily, great as it seemed at the time, nor any other had ever so much


alarmed them. The camp at Samos was in revolt; they had no more


ships or men to man them; they were at discord among themselves and


might at any moment come to blows; and a disaster of this magnitude


coming on the top of all, by which they lost their fleet, and worst of


all Euboea, which was of more value to them than Attica, could not


occur without throwing them into the deepest despondency. Meanwhile


their greatest and most immediate trouble was the possibility that the


enemy, emboldened by his victory, might make straight for them and


sail against Piraeus, which they had no longer ships to defend; and


every moment they expected him to arrive. This, with a little more


courage, he might easily have done, in which case he would either have


increased the dissensions of the city by his presence, or, if he had


stayed to besiege it, have compelled the fleet from Ionia, although


the enemy of the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their country and


of their relatives, and in the meantime would have become master of


the Hellespont, Ionia, the islands, and of everything as far as


Euboea, or, to speak roundly, of the whole Athenian empire. But


here, as on so many other occasions, the Lacedaemonians proved the


most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to be at war


with. The wide difference between the two characters, the slowness and


want of energy of the Lacedaemonians as contrasted with the dash and


enterprise of their opponents, proved of the greatest service,


especially to a maritime empire like Athens. Indeed this was shown


by the Syracusans, who were most like the Athenians in character,


and also most successful in combating them.


  Nevertheless, upon receipt of the news, the Athenians manned


twenty ships and called immediately a first assembly in the Pnyx,


where they had been used to meet formerly, and deposed the Four


Hundred and voted to hand over the government to the Five Thousand, of


which body all who furnished a suit of armour were to be members,


decreeing also that no one should receive pay for the discharge of any


office, or if he did should be held accursed. Many other assemblies


were held afterwards, in which law-makers were elected and all other


measures taken to form a constitution. It was during the first


period of this constitution that the Athenians appear to have


enjoyed the best government that they ever did, at least in my time.


For the fusion of the high and the low was effected with judgment, and


this was what first enabled the state to raise up her head after her


manifold disasters. They also voted for the recall of Alcibiades and


of other exiles, and sent to him and to the camp at Samos, and urged


them to devote themselves vigorously to the war.


  Upon this revolution taking place, the party of Pisander and


Alexicles and the chiefs of the oligarchs immediately withdrew to


Decelea, with the single exception of Aristarchus, one of the


generals, who hastily took some of the most barbarian of the archers


and marched to Oenoe. This was a fort of the Athenians upon the


Boeotian border, at that moment besieged by the Corinthians, irritated


by the loss of a party returning from Decelea, who had been cut off by


the garrison. The Corinthians had volunteered for this service, and


had called upon the Boeotians to assist them. After communicating with


them, Aristarchus deceived the garrison in Oenoe by telling them


that their countrymen in the city had compounded with the


Lacedaemonians, and that one of the terms of the capitulation was that


they must surrender the place to the Boeotians. The garrison


believed him as he was general, and besides knew nothing of what had


occurred owing to the siege, and so evacuated the fort under truce. In


this way the Boeotians gained possession of Oenoe, and the oligarchy


and the troubles at Athens ended.


  To return to the Peloponnesians in Miletus. No pay was forthcoming


from any of the agents deputed by Tissaphernes for that purpose upon


his departure for Aspendus; neither the Phoenician fleet nor


Tissaphernes showed any signs of appearing, and Philip, who had been


sent with him, and another Spartan, Hippocrates, who was at


Phaselis, wrote word to Mindarus, the admiral, that the ships were not


coming at all, and that they were being grossly abused by


Tissaphernes. Meanwhile Pharnabazus was inviting them to come, and


making every effort to get the fleet and, like Tissaphernes, to


cause the revolt of the cities in his government still subject to


Athens, founding great hopes on his success; until at length, at about


the period of the summer which we have now reached, Mindarus yielded


to his importunities, and, with great order and at a moment's


notice, in order to elude the enemy at Samos, weighed anchor with


seventy-three ships from Miletus and set sail for the Hellespont.


Thither sixteen vessels had already preceded him in the same summer,


and had overrun part of the Chersonese. Being caught in a storm,


Mindarus was compelled to run in to Icarus and, after being detained


five or six days there by stress of weather, arrived at Chios.


  Meanwhile Thrasyllus had heard of his having put out from Miletus,


and immediately set sail with fifty-five ships from Samos, in haste to


arrive before him in the Hellespont. But learning that he was at


Chios, and expecting that he would stay there, he posted scouts in


Lesbos and on the continent opposite to prevent the fleet moving


without his knowing it, and himself coasted along to Methymna, and


gave orders to prepare meal and other necessaries, in order to


attack them from Lesbos in the event of their remaining for any length


of time at Chios. Meanwhile he resolved to sail against Eresus, a town


in Lesbos which had revolted, and, if he could, to take it. For some


of the principal Methymnian exiles had carried over about fifty


heavy infantry, their sworn associates, from Cuma, and hiring others


from the continent, so as to make up three hundred in all, chose


Anaxander, a Theban, to command them, on account of the community of


blood existing between the Thebans and the Lesbians, and first


attacked Methymna. Balked in this attempt by the advance of the


Athenian guards from Mitylene, and repulsed a second time in a


battle outside the city, they then crossed the mountain and effected


the revolt of Eresus. Thrasyllus accordingly determined to go there


with all his ships and to attack the place. Meanwhile Thrasybulus


had preceded him thither with five ships from Samos, as soon as he


heard that the exiles had crossed over, and coming too late to save


Eresus, went on and anchored before the town. Here they were joined


also by two vessels on their way home from the Hellespont, and by


the ships of the Methymnians, making a grand total of sixty-seven


vessels; and the forces on board now made ready with engines and every


other means available to do their utmost to storm Eresus.


  In the meantime Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, after


taking provisions for two days and receiving three Chian pieces of


money for each man from the Chians, on the third day put out in


haste from the island; in order to avoid falling in with the ships


at Eresus, they did not make for the open sea, but keeping Lesbos on


their left, sailed for the continent. After touching at the port of


Carteria, in the Phocaeid, and dining, they went on along the


Cumaean coast and supped at Arginusae, on the continent over against


Mitylene. From thence they continued their voyage along the coast,


although it was late in the night, and arriving at Harmatus on the


continent opposite Methymna, dined there; and swiftly passing


Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus, and the neighbouring towns, arrived a


little before midnight at Rhoeteum. Here they were now in the


Hellespont. Some of the ships also put in at Sigeum and at other


places in the neighbourhood.


  Meanwhile the warnings of the fire signals and the sudden increase


in the number of fires on the enemy's shore informed the eighteen


Athenian ships at Sestos of the approach of the Peloponnesian fleet.


That very night they set sail in haste just as they were, and, hugging


the shore of the Chersonese, coasted along to Elaeus, in order to sail


out into the open sea away from the fleet of the enemy.





  After passing unobserved the sixteen ships at Abydos, which had


nevertheless been warned by their approaching friends to be on the


alert to prevent their sailing out, at dawn they sighted the fleet


of Mindarus, which immediately gave chase. All had not time to get


away; the greater number however escaped to Imbros and Lemnos, while


four of the hindmost were overtaken off Elaeus. One of these was


stranded opposite to the temple of Protesilaus and taken with its


crew, two others without their crews; the fourth was abandoned on


the shore of Imbros and burned by the enemy.


  After this the Peloponnesians were joined by the squadron from


Abydos, which made up their fleet to a grand total of eighty-six


vessels; they spent the day in unsuccessfully besieging Elaeus, and


then sailed back to Abydos. Meanwhile the Athenians, deceived by their


scouts, and never dreaming of the enemy's fleet getting by undetected,


were tranquilly besieging Eresus. As soon as they heard the news


they instantly abandoned Eresus, and made with all speed for the


Hellespont, and after taking two of the Peloponnesian ships which


had been carried out too far into the open sea in the ardour of the


pursuit and now fell in their way, the next day dropped anchor at


Elaeus, and, bringing back the ships that had taken refuge at


Imbros, during five days prepared for the coming engagement.


 After this they engaged in the following way. The Athenians formed in


column and sailed close alongshore to Sestos; upon perceiving which


the Peloponnesians put out from Abydos to meet them. Realizing that


a battle was now imminent, both combatants extended their flank; the


Athenians along the Chersonese from Idacus to Arrhiani with


seventy-six ships; the Peloponnesians from Abydos to Dardanus with


eighty-six. The Peloponnesian right wing was occupied by the


Syracusans, their left by Mindarus in person with the best sailers


in the navy; the Athenian left by Thrasyllus, their right by


Thrasybulus, the other commanders being in different parts of the


fleet. The Peloponnesians hastened to engage first, and outflanking


with their left the Athenian right sought to cut them off, if


possible, from sailing out of the straits, and to drive their centre


upon the shore, which was not far off. The Athenians perceiving


their intention extended their own wing and outsailed them, while


their left had by this time passed the point of Cynossema. This,


however, obliged them to thin and weaken their centre, especially as


they had fewer ships than the enemy, and as the coast round Point


Cynossema formed a sharp angle which prevented their seeing what was


going on on the other side of it.


  The Peloponnesians now attacked their centre and drove ashore the


ships of the Athenians, and disembarked to follow up their victory. No


help could be given to the centre either by the squadron of


Thrasybulus on the right, on account of the number of ships


attacking him, or by that of Thrasyllus on the left, from whom the


point of Cynossema hid what was going on, and who was also hindered by


his Syracusan and other opponents, whose numbers were fully equal to


his own. At length, however, the Peloponnesians in the confidence of


victory began to scatter in pursuit of the ships of the enemy, and


allowed a considerable part of their fleet to get into disorder. On


seeing this the squadron of Thrasybulus discontinued their lateral


movement and, facing about, attacked and routed the ships opposed to


them, and next fell roughly upon the scattered vessels of the


victorious Peloponnesian division, and put most of them to flight


without a blow. The Syracusans also had by this time given way


before the squadron of Thrasyllus, and now openly took to flight


upon seeing the flight of their comrades.


  The rout was now complete. Most of the Peloponnesians fled for


refuge first to the river Midius, and afterwards to Abydos. Only a few


ships were taken by the Athenians; as owing to the narrowness of the


Hellespont the enemy had not far to go to be in safety. Nevertheless


nothing could have been more opportune for them than this victory.


Up to this time they had feared the Peloponnesian fleet, owing to a


number of petty losses and to the disaster in Sicily; but they now


ceased to mistrust themselves or any longer to think their enemies


good for anything at sea. Meanwhile they took from the enemy eight


Chian vessels, five Corinthian, two Ambraciot, two Boeotian, one


Leucadian, Lacedaemonian, Syracusan, and Pellenian, losing fifteen


of their own. After setting up a trophy upon Point Cynossema, securing


the wrecks, and restoring to the enemy his dead under truce, they sent


off a galley to Athens with the news of their victory. The arrival


of this vessel with its unhoped-for good news, after the recent


disasters of Euboea, and in the revolution at Athens, gave fresh


courage to the Athenians, and caused them to believe that if they


put their shoulders to the wheel their cause might yet prevail.


  On the fourth day after the sea-fight the Athenians in Sestos having


hastily refitted their ships sailed against Cyzicus, which had


revolted. Off Harpagium and Priapus they sighted at anchor the eight


vessels from Byzantium, and, sailing up and routing the troops on


shore, took the ships, and then went on and recovered the town of


Cyzicus, which was unfortified, and levied money from the citizens. In


the meantime the Peloponnesians sailed from Abydos to Elaeus, and


recovered such of their captured galleys as were still uninjured,


the rest having been burned by the Elaeusians, and sent Hippocrates


and Epicles to Euboea to fetch the squadron from that island.


  About the same time Alcibiades returned with his thirteen ships from


Caunus and Phaselis to Samos, bringing word that he had prevented


the Phoenician fleet from joining the Peloponnesians, and had made


Tissaphernes more friendly to the Athenians than before. Alcibiades


now manned nine more ships, and levied large sums of money from the


Halicarnassians, and fortified Cos. After doing this and placing a


governor in Cos, he sailed back to Samos, autumn being now at hand.


Meanwhile Tissaphernes, upon hearing that the Peloponnesian fleet


had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, set off again back from


Aspendus, and made all sail for Ionia. While the Peloponnesians were


in the Hellespont, the Antandrians, a people of Aeolic extraction,


conveyed by land across Mount Ida some heavy infantry from Abydos, and


introduced them into the town; having been ill-treated by Arsaces, the


Persian lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This same Arsaces had, upon


pretence of a secret quarrel, invited the chief men of the Delians


to undertake military service (these were Delians who had settled at


Atramyttium after having been driven from their homes by the Athenians


for the sake of purifying Delos); and after drawing them out from


their town as his friends and allies, had laid wait for them at


dinner, and surrounded them and caused them to be shot down by his


soldiers. This deed made the Antandrians fear that he might some day


do them some mischief; and as he also laid upon them burdens too heavy


for them to bear, they expelled his garrison from their citadel.


  Tissaphernes, upon hearing of this act of the Peloponnesians in


addition to what had occurred at Miletus and Cnidus, where his


garrisons had been also expelled, now saw that the breach between them


was serious; and fearing further injury from them, and being also


vexed to think that Pharnabazus should receive them, and in less


time and at less cost perhaps succeed better against Athens than he


had done, determined to rejoin them in the Hellespont, in order to


complain of the events at Antandros and excuse himself as best he


could in the matter of the Phoenician fleet and of the other charges


against him. Accordingly he went first to Ephesus and offered


sacrifice to Artemis....


  [When the winter after this summer is over the twenty-first year


of this war will be completed.]





                                    THE END